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This study investigates the motives for and favoured investment modes of 
internationalisation of Indian services sector firms. Further, this study examines 
capabilities and resources and how companies deploy these in international markets. 
This entails understanding how the companies adapt to host markets and the 
mechanisms which trigger dynamic capability adoption. Finally, this study analyses the 
effects of the external market on their internationalisation motives. This study’s 
relevance is significant given increasing investments from emerging and transition 
economies, which form a third of global investments today compared to less than ten 
percent two decades ago. This coupled with the notion that emerging market companies 
lack the pre-existing capabilities required for internationalisation, is probed in this study. 
Internationalisation theories have been sourced from a western context based on 
developed market companies’ investment into other developed or emerging market 
countries; in this context, this study provides evidence of a subaltern view in reference 
to the internationalisation of emerging market firms. 
 
The empirical material consists of five Indian service sector firms with significant 
international presence in the Information Technology, Telecom and Hospitality service 
sectors. The research adopts an interpretivist cum constructivist approach to 
understanding their internationalisation motives using a qualitative exploratory case-
study based research method. Data was collected in the form of semi-structured 
interviews (elite interviews) with the decision makers of the companies under study. This 
was supplemented with email questionnaires from former employees who had worked 
in overseas locations. This was further supplemented with secondary data towards 
reliability and triangulation purposes. 
 
Findings from this thesis illustrate that the firms studied are heterogeneous in nature 
about their internationalisation motives. There is divergence in managerial learning 
across host markets in the adaption of internationalisation for the creation of competitive 
advantage. In analysing the internationalisation motives of these companies, this study 
extends the existing theoretical understanding behind the concept of multinational 
companies. This study also makes a theoretical contribution towards the understanding 
of fast capability acquisition by Indian service sector firms towards rapid 
internationalisation while developing a competitive advantage in foreign host markets.    
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Over the past decade, there has been an increase in the flow of Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) from emerging markets. Outward FDI (OFDI) has steadily increased 
from developing and transition economies. As per the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World Investment Report 2015, the share of OFDI 
from developing and transition economies was close to 40% in 2014. While this 
decreased to 30%1 in 2015 (UNCTAD WIR, 2016) and by a further 1% in 20162 (UNCTAD 
WIR, 2017), it is still significant compared to the early 2000s when the share was a 
marginal 10%.  
  
As OFDI increases from developing economies both into other developing countries and 
the developed world, international business scholars have also increased their focus on 
studying emerging market companies and the associated competitive advantage and 
business strategies towards their internationalisation. Additionally, there has been 
extensive interest to understand whether the rise of Emerging Markets Multinational 
Enterprises (EMNE) is consistent with existing international business theories 
(Ramamurti, 2009, a). Existing international business theories are based on behaviours 
of multinationals from developed markets with no focus on behaviour of EMNEs (Cuervo-
Cazerra & Ramamurti, 2014). There is a lack of empirical understanding of the 
internationalisation of Indian companies, especially from the perspective of the resources 
and dynamic capabilities approach. Hence, the focal point of this thesis is to investigate 
the resources and capabilities that firms from emerging markets possess and how these 
have helped them internationalise; further, during the process of internationalisation, if 
these firms acquired additional resources and capabilities for a sustained competitive 
advantage in international markets.  
 
Findings from this thesis illustrates that the firms studied are heterogeneous in nature 
with regards to the motivation for outward investment followed by divergence in 
                                                          
1 The drop has been mainly due to a slowdown in investment from Hong Kong. However, Hong Kong is 
considered a newly industrialised nation as per International Business (IB) literature and has not been 
considered among the developing nations for the purpose of this study.   
2 There has been a decline in total outward investment in 2016 (USD 1.408 trillion) compared to 2015 
(USD 1.432 trillion). In real numbers, OFDI from developing and transition economies increased in 2016 
(USD 408 billion) compared to 2015 (USD 332 billion). 
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managerial learning in various host markets to adapt their internationalisation in order 
to create competitive advantage. 
 
This introductory chapter paves the path for this study. It is important to first understand 
about Indian OFDI and hence, the next section (1.2) outlines the background of India’s 
industrialisation followed by the trend and pattern of outward investment from India. 
This is followed by section 1.3 which articulates the research relevance of this study 
based on the gap in existing literature. Existing literature on internationalisation rests on 
theories which were developed based on outward investment from developed markets 
to other developed or developing markets. There is a debate among international 
business scholars if outward investments from emerging markets conform to such 
theories. There is a growing body of literature on this topic but it is still limited, especially 
studies on Indian outward investments. Outward investment from India has only seen a 
substantial growth after 2000. The gaps that have been identified help generate research 
questions. The over-arching research objectives are provided in section 1.4 and the 
methodology adopted for the research study is articulated in section 1.5 along with the 
findings from the study. Any research work needs to explain its contribution towards the 
field and that has been presented in section 1.6. Finally, section 1.7 provides the 
structure of this thesis. 
 
1.2 India and Outward Foreign Direct Investment 
In line with global forces, industrialisation in India commenced prior to independence in 
1947, although the focus at the time was the growing domestic economy, with little or 
no focus on overseas markets. Whatever little focus there was at the time was based 
primarily on the relationship with the colonial ruler (United Kingdom), and neighbouring 
markets. Additionally, virtually all of this engagement with external markets was around 
trade flows, rather than any investment opportunities.  
 
After independence in 1947, the Indian government’s focus was on a centrally planned 
industrial complex, characterised by a dominant public sector, with a limited role for any 
fledgling entrepreneurs that were developing at the time. Additionally, the focus, building 
on key aspects of the independence movement, were on import substitution, control of 
all private investment, the creation of high barriers, tariff and non-tariff, and the use of 
a fixed exchange rate. In effect, this created a protected domestic economy, and most 
companies felt comfortable operating within this restricted environment, with a limited 
need or desire to consider expanding overseas. However, this structure also created a 
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level of reliance on specific imports to be able to sustain this balance, including oil, 
commodities and the benefits of technological advances. 
 
Through the 1980s, culminating in a balance of payments crisis in 1990/91, caused in 
large measure by a spike in oil prices caused by the Gulf War, the economy entered an 
unsustainable state, exacerbated by an unauthorised flight of capital via illegal means. 
This resulted in a radical re-evaluation of India’s economic and financial approaches, 
given that default on debt servicing seemed inevitable and India’s sovereign rating was 
downgraded by international credit rating agencies like the Moody’s and Standard & 
Poor. 
 
The Indian Government in power during that time ascertained that the national default 
could only be avoided by raising loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
World Bank (WB). However, the repayment of these loans was not only restricted to 
interest and the principal loan amount. Both international funding agencies also expected 
India to undertake market reforms – primarily around the need to open-up the economy 
to overseas investment (FDI), by liberalising the inward investments in FDI, creating 
new options as well as by opening up more sectors to IFDI and relaxing ownership limits 
for developed market multinationals (DMNCs) entering India in the various sectors. 
 
This then opened the Indian economy to IFDI, which also exposed Indian companies to 
world class international competition, which forced them to improve themselves, leading 
to an improvement in their products and services, and the view that they might be able 
to compete globally. In line with Dunning (1998, 2001) and Rugman’s (1979) 
assumption, domestic companies began exploring the opportunity to engage with 
overseas markets and to change their approach from a trade related relationship to an 
investment oriented bias. This was further facilitated by the India Government’s 
liberalising the capital exchange controls. As can be seen from Figure 1, IFDI and OFDI 
have followed an almost similar growth pattern in India over the past decade. 
 
India’s definition of FDI was changed to broadly match the IMF definition in 2003 and 
FDI data using this new definition is available from 2000 onwards. It is important to 
mention here that the Indian definition of FDI includes some components that are not a 
part of the globally accepted definition (Francis, 2010). This remains a constraint of 
various studies (Bellak, 1998); however, it is not expected to have any material impact 
on the outcome of this study since the focus is on analysing the internationalisation of a 
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sample of Indian companies in the services sector within the chosen theoretical 
framework. 
Figure 1: India and OFDI (USD Billion) 
 
(P): Provisional Figures,  
Source: Department of Industrial Production & Policy (DIPP), Ministry of Commerce (MoC), Government of India (GoI) 
Figures are as per Indian Financial Year (April - March)  
*IFDI for 2016-17 is until Sept’16 and OFDI for 2016-17 is until Nov’16 
 
OFDI from India has gradually risen over the past decade, though after the financial 
crisis had somewhat plateaued out. India remains a healthy investor in Africa and other 
lesser-developed countries (LDCs). Recently, Indian companies have increased their 
focus on investment to other BRICS countries (UNCTAD WIR, 2017) 
 
While India continues to invest in LDCs and other BRICS countries, an interesting fact 
remains that almost 60% of its OFDI goes to developed nations (Table 1). 
 
The Indian experience of industrialisation post-independence can be separated into 
three distinct phases. The first phase continued for almost three decades and can be 
termed as an import-substitution era under government central planning. The second 
phase (1975-1991), though not vastly different from the first phase, saw limited 
liberalisation of trade (Athukorala, 2009). Some controls on import were lifted and a few 
subsidies were provided to exporters.  
 
The major liberalisation and structural reforms were announced in 1991, which can be 
stated as the third phase that also saw significant internationalisation of Indian 
companies.  
 
Over the past decade there has been a structural shift in India’s OFDI: first, a huge spurt 
in overseas investment; second, manufacturing investment has slowly but steadily edged 
closer to services investment numbers; and lastly, more investments are going to 
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developed markets and through the mergers and acquisition route (Satyanand & 
Raghavendran, 2010). 
 
Table 1: India OFDI Locational Data (USD Billion) 
 
The data is as per Indian financial Year (April-March) 
* April 2016 to November 30, 2016 
Source: Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE) and Reserve Bank of India (RBI) 
 
All these statistics show that while, after the financial crisis, there has been a slowdown 
in Indian overseas investment, overall there has been a significant increase in its OFDI 
over the past decade; and contraire to existing theory of overseas direct investment 
which generally follows a north-south or a south-south flow, recent Indian investments 
has progressively followed a south-north flow.  
 
Further, as an emerging market, India poses a unique case. On the one hand, it is the 
largest multi-party democracy with the second largest population in the world, a 
relatively low GDP per capita, with 22% living in poverty (Planning Commission, 2013). 
On the other hand, rapid prosperity over the last 20 years has created a small class of 
the elite nouveau riche, and India has a strong multi-cultural heritage with religious 
coexistence. In this environment, the majority of big businesses are family controlled. 
Put together, the country defies extant international business theories with almost 60% 
of its OFDI going to developed nations (South-North flow; Table 1), most of which have 
an assets and resource seeking motive and also a market-seeking motive; OFDI 
exceeding IFDI in certain years, and with the majority of overseas investments through 
mergers and acquisitions in developed markets rather than strategic collaborations. 
Testing the eclectic paradigm for overseas mergers and acquisitions by Indian companies 
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from 2000 to 2007, Buckley et al (2009) found that market-seeking motive was a 
dominant factor. 
 
Indian stock markets have been strong and, as per the Economist (January 2015, a), of 
the four BRIC countries, India is the only country whose prospects have significantly 
improved. World leaders are taking note of a strong emerging India. ‘Wooing the new 
India is at the top of the priorities of the UK’s foreign policy,” then UK Prime Minster 
David Cameron told his Indian counterpart, Narendra Modi, on 16th November 2014 (The 
Economist, 2014); and current UK Prime Minister Theresa May visited India soon after 
the Brexit vote to garner stronger trade ties. President Obama was the Chief Guest at 
India’s 66th Republic Day parade in 2015. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) had 
announced in 2015 that India was set to become the fastest growing economy, 
outpacing China (Bellman - WSJ, 2015). Recently, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD, 2016) also projected that India will remain the 
fastest growing G203 economy with a growth rate of approximately 7.5%. The recent 
demonetisation4 in the country is expected to affect the growth rate only marginally. 
 
With these factors, there is a significant opportunity to study how companies from India 
adopt strategies or develop capabilities and resources to internationalise and become 
effective MNEs, in effect escaping their past heritage and the current constraints of their 
home country. Hence, to understand the strategy behind internationalisation of Indian 
firms based on dynamic capabilities and a resource-based approach presents scope for 
new research.   
 
1.3 Research Relevance 
While research on EMNEs dates to the 1970s and 80s (refer to Heenan & Keegan, 1979; 
Wells, 1983; Lall, 1983; Kumar & McLeod, 1981), such research has gained significant 
importance in recent years as the developed world sees negative or negligible growth 
and the balance of global economic growth shifts towards developing economies. 
 
As mentioned above, the existing international business theories may not be fully 
representative of EMNEs internationalisation motives. Meyer and Thaijongrak (2012) 
have called for a reassessment of established theories of MNE in the wake of a rapid rise 
                                                          
3 List of G20 countries: http://g20.org.tr/about-g20/g20-member-map/ 
4 Indian Rupee notes of the denomination 500 and 1000 were put out of circulation with immediate 
effect from the night of 8th November 2016. 
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of OFDI from the emerging markets. There is an attempt to understand why emerging 
market overseas investment does not fit textbook international business or economic 
theory (Athreye & Kapur, 2009).  
 
While, the aim of this study was not to test accepted international business theories and 
apply their framework to understand Indian OFDI; in the process of studying 
internationalisation motives and associated competitive advantages of Indian companies 
in overseas markets, certain interesting facts with respect to missing links in exiting IB 
theories have been discovered. These have been highlighted in section 1.6. 
 
India’s industrial economy is composed of two large sectors: Private Multinational 
Enterprises (MNEs) and Public-sector Undertakings (PSU). The evidence indicates that 
in a large portion of the OFDI has been driven by the private MNEs in India, as opposed 
to China, where the growth has been driven largely by its large state owned enterprises 
(SOEs).  
 
Generally, Indian private MNEs tend to be able to exploit opportunities faster than the 
PSUs in India. Indian private MNEs have also been subject to the highest level of 
competition from IFDI driven by DMNCs. Hence, to interpret the compulsion of these 
companies which are largely promoter controlled for OFDI, it would be relevant to 
understand their internationalisation motives along with studying the resources and 
capabilities which assist them as they internationalise.  
 
1.4 Research Questions and Objective of the Study 
The primary aim of this thesis is to study the associated competitive advantage, 
resources and capabilities of Indian service sector companies towards their 
internationalisation; primarily to interpret the compulsion of these companies for OFDI 
and to understand the motivation of these companies on the path of internationalisation 
using a theoretical framework based on the resource-based approach and dynamic 
capabilities theory within strategic management. The theoretical aspect has been 
detailed in the literature review chapter (Chapter 2).  
 
As mentioned in section 1.3 above, study of EMNEs has existed over the past 40-50 
years. However, there continues to be interest in continuously examining companies 
from emerging markets as they expand to international markets; more importantly, to 
study the resources and capabilities that these companies possess, which may aid their 
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internationalisation strategies, or do not possess, which may hinder them. In the case 
of them lacking specific resources and capabilities, action is necessary to realise their 
internationalisation motives. 
 
Further, as pointed out in section 1.2, Indian overseas investments have seen a 
significant growth over the past decade with an inclination towards developed markets. 
The country had an inward-looking view post-independence in 1947 with a restrictive 
foreign exchange policy. It took almost four decades for the country to adopt market 
liberalisation. For Indian companies to have grown and then internationalise within 
restrictive and liberalised market regimes, it becomes exigent to study such company 
resources and capabilities.  
 
Existing literature on internationalisation of Indian companies is limited to the extent of 
the literature reviewed; hence a qualitative study on such factors of five Indian service 
sector companies provides scope for empirical investigation. Hence, the overarching 
question for this thesis is to investigate ‘if firms from emerging markets own resources 
and capabilities that help them internationalise, if they develop or acquire further 
resources and dynamic capabilities through internationalisation, and to what extent does 
the external environment affect the internationalisation motives of these companies?’      
 
The main research question is further broken into five sub-questions. They are as 
follows: 
1. Why do Indian companies internationalise and what is the favoured entry mode 
for outward investment and the reasons behind the same? 
2. Whether Indian MNEs that invest overseas possess home-grown capabilities and 
are they able to transfer the same to overseas markets?  
3. Do Indian companies in the data set require building capabilities that suit host 
markets or are they able to transform existing capabilities to meet the needs of 
different host markets?  
4. If the Indian companies in the data set follow divergent internationalisation 
strategies depending upon the host country? 
5. Does the external environment affect internationalisation strategies in any way 
and if yes, then how; and if not, then why? 
 
The above five questions are further broken into specific detailed questions and these 
are elaborated in the Literature Review chapter (Chapter 2) 
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Thus, this study aims to explain the resources and capabilities that these companies 
possess which assist their internationalisation and effects of the external environment 
on such internationalisation motives. More specifically, the use of the resource-based 
approach and dynamic capabilities theory as a lens to frame the phenomenon provides 
the study of the internationalisation process in a disparate context. Thus, the objective 
of the study can be expressed as follows: 
a. Understanding the motives behind Indian services sector firms’ internationalisation 
including the favoured investment mode 
b. Understanding Indian firms’ capabilities and resources that help them 
internationalise and the deployment of the same in international markets 
c. Understanding how Indian service sector firms manage various host markets and 
the mechanisms which trigger dynamic capability adoption 
d. Understanding external environment factors affecting internationalisation of Indian 
service sector firms 
 
1.5 Research Methodology 
It is imperative for a researcher to identify their philosophical perspective as that advises 
the methodological path that the researcher may adopt. Companies are made up of 
human beings who can think, speak, rationalise and debate. The stakeholders in 
organisations have a financially driven interest and tend to work in dynamic and evolving 
external and internal environments (Remenyi et al., 2005). As this thesis studies the 
Internationalisation motives of Indian companies, the study takes an exploratory route. 
The pursuit here is that of knowledge of the phenomenon being researched and hence, 
the philosophical position adopted is that of an interpretivist cum constructivist. The 
interpretivist paradigm involves the use of a multiplicity of research methods for the 
social construction of organisational life (Kelemen & Rumens, 2008). As organisations 
are complex in nature, it would be beneficial to use qualitative methods to study the 
companies in the data set (Marschan-Piekkari & Welch, 2011).  
 
As the unit of analysis is the company here, this research uses a multiple case-study 
method with the purpose of explaining the phenomenon of internationalisation and 
analysing the data to identify the strategic motivations behind firm internationalisation. 
 
The companies were identified through a scoping exercise using a network of bankers 
and company personnel. This network was established from previous work experience 
with multinational banks in India.  
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Data was collected in the form of semi-structured interviews from ten interviewees in 
five different companies. These interviewees were all decision makers (elite interviews) 
in the companies under study. The transcription from these ten interviews accounts for 
approximately 60,000 words. This was supplemented by with email questionnaire from 
five more ex-employees who had worked in overseas locations of three of these 
companies. This additional exercise was carried out to get ‘on the ground’ reality of these 
companies and to ascertain if the headquarters were removed from the practical realities 
in the various host countries. For further reliability and verifiability, secondary data was 
also accessed which included but was not limited to company documents, media reports, 
analyst reports and bank reports. 
 
The data has been analysed using the technique of explanation-building and cross-case 
synthesis (Yin, 2009). The framework for the analysis used reflexivity of the researcher 
to first understand what the data is telling, followed by what the researcher wants to 
know and finally to ascertain if there is synthesis between the two. As the research 
questions are theoretically informed, the analysis synthesis theory with data. The 
analysis has been further augmented with an organisational change level model to trace 
the company’s internationalisation path and how internal and external factors have 
influenced it. 
 
The data analysis was aimed at understanding the internationalisation motives. Hence, 
the analysis has continually sought to query what the interviewees stated and further 
explain the same using other data sources. This process thus helped understand what 
compels Indian firms to invest in overseas markets. 
 
1.6 Contribution of the Study 
This research work contributes to the overall understanding of firms in the services 
sector in India and their strategic motivation towards internationalisation and thus 
making an empirical contribution.  
 
The other contribution is twofold. First, there is contribution towards extending the 
theoretical understanding behind the conception of multinational companies which 
includes accelerated internationalisation concept associated with born-global firms and 
the International New Venture and Free Standing Company concepts. Secondly, this 
study makes a theoretical contribution to the understanding of fast capability acquisition 
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by Indian service sector firms in a desire for rapid internationalisation while developing 
a competitive advantage in foreign host markets.    
 
Finally, this study also enquires into the existence of ownership advantage that the firms 
possess, as international business literature points out that emerging market firms lack 
ownership advantages and internationalise to mainly acquire such advantages. 
 
1.7 Thesis Structure 
There are ten chapters that follow this first introductory chapter. They are as follows: 
 
Chapter 2: Literature Review. This chapter first reviews the exiting literature on 
internationalisation motives of EMNEs and then specifically Indian MNEs. This helps 
identify the knowledge gap that this thesis aims to fill. This is followed by the theoretical 
framework within which this study is based and then a review of the literature on the 
main phenomenon of ‘internationalisation’ that is being investigated. This helps to frame 
the research questions.  
 
Chapter 3: Research Methodology. The methodology chapter outlines the case of India 
first and then delves into international business research methods that have been used 
in the field. It then provides the philosophical perspective of the researcher before 
delineating the qualitative method used and the justification behind the same. The 
chapter finally presents the framework that has been used to analyse the data. 
 
Chapters 4 to 8: The five chapters that follow the methodology chapter are the empirical 
chapters based on the five companies that have been studied for this piece of research. 
The empirical chapters are further divided into similar sections. The company 
background is first detailed followed by the internal and external compulsions that led 
the company to internationalise. The company’s preferred mode of entry is then 
discussed followed by the company’s intendance of various host markets. The effects of 
the financial crisis on decisions regarding internationalisation are then examined. Finally, 
there is a discussion section that posits the empirical contribution and determines if there 
is any theoretical contribution deduced from the analysis of the company in the specific 
chapters. 
 
Chapters 9: Cross-Case Analysis: this chapter presents a cross-case analysis to highlight 
the heterogeneity of the five companies that have been studied for this research work. 
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It explicates the internationalisation motives of these companies and the distinctive 
stance that each company has taken towards internationalisation. Within similar 
services, the motivations are divergent and the same have been conceptualised to 
understand how Indian companies are disparate from developed market companies’ in 
terms of internationalisation.        
 
Chapters 10: Discussion. While there is a discussion section at the end of each empirical 
chapter, this discussion chapter summarise the main findings from the five empirical 
chapters. This is followed by a theoretical synthesis to confirm the integration of the 
findings with existing theories and in the case of disunion extension to existing theories 
is proposed. This chapter also discusses the theoretical contribution in length.  
 
Chapters 11: Conclusion. Finally, the concluding chapter advances the contribution of 
the study to the field of international business and strategic management and 
implications thereof. The discussion chapter (Chapter 10) is used as the platform to 
demonstrate such contribution which lies in both empirical and theoretical contribution. 
Finally, a summary at the end encapsulates the importance of this study and a further 
research agenda concludes this thesis.    
 
1.9 Chapter Conclusion 
This introductory chapter lays out the overall perspective of this piece of research along 
with justification for the same and the overarching context. It advances the context of 
internationalisation in relation to international business theory and then provides a 
perspective of foreign investments from India. It then lays down the research relevance 
and the objectives of this study.  
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2. Literature Review 
This thesis investigates if firms from emerging markets own resources and capabilities 
that help them internationalise and if they develop or acquire further resources and 
dynamic capabilities through the process of internationalisation. More specifically, the 
aim of this thesis is to study the associated competitive advantage that service sector 
firms from India possess which determines their internationalisation path.  
 
2.1 Structure of the Literature Review 
While, the 1980s and 1990s saw an increased flow of FDI from developed countries to 
the developing world (north-south flow), over the past decade there has been a role 
reversal, with an increase of OFDI from developing and transition economies towards 
the developed markets (south-north flow). As the theme of this research is to investigate 
the resources and capabilities of Indian service sector firms, the literature reviewed in 
this section covers the period from 2000 to date, including the historical perspective of 
overseas investments with regards to emerging markets and specifically India. The 
framework for the theoretical basis, which is the resource based and the dynamic 
capabilities approach within strategic management and the philosophical perspective for 
the research will cover the antecedents of such theory and philosophy.  
 
Hence, for the purpose of this study, five different aspects of literature review has been 
conducted as follows: 
 
Firstly, there will be a review of internationalisation process and strategic thinking behind 
foreign direct investments of companies from various emerging markets section (Section 
2.2) 
 
Secondly, a review of India specific literature (Section 2.3) concentrating on Indian MNEs 
internationalisation process is provided. 
 
The third part (Section 2.4) brings out the knowledge gap based on the literature review 
of EMNEs from India and other developing countries.  
 
Fourthly, a review of the existing literature (Section 2.5) on strategic management 
covers strategic management as a field within which this thesis is based followed by the 
resource based approach and dynamic capabilities theories which form the foundation 
of the questions that this thesis seeks to answer. 
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Finally, literature on Internationalisation (Section 2.6) is accessed to understand why 
companies pursue internationalisation and conclude the questions that this thesis is 
investigating. 
 
2.1.1 Keywords  
Strategic Management, Resource Based Approach, Dynamic Capabilities, Outward FDI, 
Internationalisation, Emerging Markets, India 
 
The keywords were used to review material from the University of York Library, Google 
Scholar (which provides links to accessible e-Journal sources like Jstor, Science Direct, 
Willey Online and Ebsco while also covering various university and government working 
papers) and ProQuest. While all refereed journals were reviewed, other articles that have 
relevant information were used as appropriate. As mentioned by Griffith et al. (2008), 
international business authors are not limited to refereed journals.  
 
2.2 Emerging Market Multinational Enterprises (EMNEs) 
Embraer, a Brazilian company is the third largest commercial aircraft manufacturer 
globally (Carrico, 2013); Lenovo of China acquired the IBM personal computer business 
and is today the largest PC manufacturer globally (Reuters, 2015); Cemex, 
headquartered in Mexico, is a global giant among cement producers in the world 
(Aharoni, 2014). Chinese banks hold the top three spots in the Forbes Global 2000 
ranking for 2014. A report by McKinsey and Co. published in October 2013, reported that 
by 2025, 46% of the Fortune 500 companies will be from emerging markets.  
 
The earlier authors referred to the developing world as the ‘third world’ and countries 
like Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea were also part of this third world (today they 
are known as the newly industrialised countries, NIC). Antoine van Agtmael coined the 
term ‘emerging market’. In a very interesting anecdote in the introduction of his book 
on emerging markets (2007), van Agtmael writes how he came up with the term as part 
of an investment strategy for the firm he was working with, he was selling third world 
equity funds to a group of leading equity fund managers in 1981 and as a result of the 
feedback from the presentation he had made to these investors, it emerged that the 
term ‘third world’ conjured an image of instability and anything associated with the third 




From the last decade of the 20th century, there has been a spate of overseas investment 
from emerging market firms and these form part of the ‘second wave’ of developing 
country MNEs (Bonaglia et al., 2006). Overseas investment from such emerging market 
economies was approximately around $5-10 billion by 1980 (Wells, 1983), which 
increased to $468 billion in 2014, accounting for 39% of total global outflows (UNCTAD 
WIR, 2015). Though 2015 has seen a small dip in outward investments from developing 
and transition economies with their overall share falling to 28% of total global outflows 
(USD 332 billion) mainly due to fall in investments from Hong Kong (UNCTAD WIR, 
2016). However, as already mentioned, in international business literature, Hong Kong 
is considered as a newly industrialised country and hence does not fall under the 
definition of developing countries for the purpose of this thesis.   
 
2.2.1 EMNEs versus DMNCs 
It is the view that the EMNEs are different from the traditional multinationals of the 
developed world and it is expected that they would be instrumental in bringing much of 
the development that is required in the poorer economies. It is also expected that the 
EMNEs would eventually pose a challenge to the established developed world 
multinationals. Buckley et al., (2008) had proposed a standard theoretical explanation 
of OFDI from developing countries which stated that EMNEs have specific ownership 
advantages different from developed market multinational companies (DMNCs), EMNEs 
invest in other emerging markets closer culturally and then slowly move to developed 
markets, firms from developing markets prefer international joint ventures over other 
modes of entry and home country governments of EMNEs largely influence OFDI. We 
shall see later in this chapter through observation of other researchers as to how much 
of this standardised theory holds true for the developing world. 
 
Further, a February 2014 Bloomberg report stated that there were pull-outs by foreign 
institutional investors (FIIs) from emerging markets leading to EMNEs disappearing from 
the world’s largest companies by market capitalisation. Quoting a lead strategist from a 
DMNC bank, the report suggested that emerging market companies were still not fully 
geared up to face large global competitors from the more developed markets. 
Irrespective, there remains buoyancy about emerging markets. OFDI is expected to 
continue to grow from developing countries. As per the WIR 2014 (UNCTAD), companies 
from developing and transition economies expected to increase their overseas 
investment by 57% in the short-term and 63% in the medium term over the current 
year compared to only 47% by the developed market MNEs. The EMNEs are competing 
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with DMNCs for almost everything from markets to natural resources to technology 
(World Bank 2013). They are giving the DMNCs competition in their own home markets 
using the benefits of globalisation to become technologically more efficient with easy 
access to capital and world class talent (Bhattacharya & Michael, 2006)   
 
2.2.2 What constitutes an Emerging Market? 
While developed economies remain important sources of FDI, the BRIC bloc, UAE, 
Turkey and others join them in terms of OFDI. Today, almost a third of total global 
outflows are from developing markets (WIR, 2015). With such an increase over a 
relatively short span of time, it is hardly surprising that a lot of interest is being generated 
among international business and strategic management authors to study this important 
phenomenon.  
 
While UNCTAD counts countries like Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong among 
developing economies, the international business authors (Filatotchev et al. 2007; Luo 
& Tung, 2007; Khanna & Palepu, 2006; Gao, 2005; Makino et al., 2002; Ahmed et al. 
2002; Kim & Nelson, 2000; Buckley, 1990) have differentiated these countries as newly 
industrialised economies or countries (NIE/NIC) and the term emerging or developing 
market for this thesis considers countries like the BRIC countries, other Asian economies 
like Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, African Countries such as South 
Africa or Latin American countries like Mexico, Argentina and Chile. In recent times, 
growth in Indonesia and South Africa has been quite significant and researchers and 
analysts have extended BRIC to also include these two countries and in some articles 
and reports the six countries together are being called the BRIICS nations. 
 
EMNEs are a product of innovation and also strategic and organisational imitation of 
DMNCs (Guillén & G-Canal, 2009), a case of “third world copycats” emerging to become 
multinationals in the face of certain triggers like institutional changes in the home 
country (Chittoor et al., 2009). Some of the EMNEs considered world class today did not 
join the club by following conventional practices but challenged some of the best-known 
practices taking advantage of crises, global vision, and disciplined ambition to become 
successful MNEs (van Agtmael, 2007). EMNEs have often suffered from competitive 
disadvantages and latecomer disadvantages. A latecomer firm can be defined as one 
which enters the market not by choice but by historicity, has poor resources, lacks 
market access, and may have relatively backward technology. In many cases, the 
latecomer seeks to overcome these challenges by hoping to catch up with other more 
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successful players often leveraging a low cost competitive advantage (Mathews, 2002); 
however, these latecomers already have a global vision on the onset of their 
internationalisation process (Bonaglia et al., 2006). International connections and 
leveraging resources based on strengths of others, basically enhancing firm resources 
rather than asset exploitation have also been strategies employed by the latecomer 
(Mathews, 2001). These firms then use OFDI as a platform to acquire strategic assets 
that are then used to create competitive advantage over global firms in international 
markets and also against DMNCs in their home countries. Faced with less than stable 
political and economic environments in the home countries, the EMNEs perceive risk very 
differently from DMNCs and hence have a higher tolerance level for risk (Sauvant et al., 
2009).  
 
EMNEs have also benefitted from IFDI in their home countries (Luo & Tung, 2007). 
Specifically using the term ‘springboard’, the authors demonstrate the springboard 
strategies of international expansion that EMNEs have used to overcome their 
disadvantages (competitive disadvantage, latecomer disadvantage, challenges from 
DMNCs in home market, trade barriers, and institutional barriers at home) to become 
successful. The main determinants of OFDI from developing countries are home country 
factors rather than host country factors (Andreff, 2003). These firms are expert in 
dealing with institutional voids and poor infrastructure, combined with their familiarity 
with local factors, which are often a disadvantage for established DMNCs. Further, the 
EMNEs leverage their skills in dealing with home country disadvantages to rapidly modify 
their products when they enter the global markets (Khanna & Palepu, 2006; Zeng & 
Williamson, 2006). Similar strategies do not work in all countries; however, developing 
synergies by getting different markets on a single platform can be useful for a global 
strategy (Khanna et al., 2005).  Developing market firms can use non-market resources 
such as local knowledge of the host country to complement market resources that they 
may have developed or acquired to challenge DMNCs in different host countries 
especially those that have a similar environment as the home country of the EMNE 
(Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2011). Relative distance or the psychic distance plays an 
important role for the success of internationalisation. Psychic distance is the perceived 
distance between home country and host country based on cultural closeness rather 
than distance; but in recent times, relevance of psychic distance has diminished (Meyer 
& Thaijongrak, 2012). Psychic distance has become more of a managerial decision-
making process with increased experience of internationalisation, and investments to 
culturally distant countries have increased (Buckley et al., 2008). Emerging markets are 
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not homogenous and studying the environment of these countries can provide a dynamic 
view of CSA that the firms can capitalise on (Ramamurti & Singh, 2009, a).  
 
There is also a growing body of knowledge that is focused on new ventures from 
emerging markets and their strategies for internationalisation. New ventures are 
relatively young compared to the established business groups from the developing 
countries. These firms face the twin liabilities of newness and foreignness (Singh et al. 
1986; Zaheer, 1995). Research into new ventures from China, India, Mexico and South 
Africa shows that these firms followed an early internationalisation strategy if the 
founders had existing international experience, were focussed on foreign customers and 
their preferences, did not concentrate on their domestic market and had higher 
international sales intensity (Wood et al., 2011); unique proprietary knowledge backed 
with Research and Development (R&D) did not contribute to new ventures becoming 
early internationalisers as per the paper. Performance of new ventures from emerging 
markets was positively related to the degree of internationalisation and speed of 
internationalisation is somewhat related to organisational entrainment (Khavul et al., 
2010b).   
 
An attribute of the emerging market firms is business group affiliation and unrelated 
product diversification (Contactor et al., 2007 quoting Khanna & Rivkin, 2001; Yiu et al., 
2005; Yeung, 1999a). Diversified business groups are a common feature among the 
private sector in emerging economies (Khanna & Palepu, 2000) due to underdeveloped 
market, legal and judicial institutions and less than fully developed equity markets; most 
of the business groups are family-controlled even if not owned, have the implicit support 
of the home government and seek monopoly rents (Khanna & Yafeh, 2005). Given 
asymmetric trade and OFDI conditions, business groups play an important role in 
emerging economies. Per the resource based view model, they develop capabilities of 
combining the required foreign and domestic resources for entry into a wide range of 
business lines (Guillén, 2000). Business group affiliations help in networking and capital 
raising while unrelated product diversification leverages the power of a pre-existing 
brand. To compete effectively in global markets, the business group firms need to 
globalise their operations and become more professional through hiring of business 
experts rather than having all the decision-making in the hands of the founder/owners 
(Yeung, 1999b). Business groups with dominant family ownership generally have a 
narrow scope of diversification (Hoskisson et al., 2005). The emerging market companies 
have been different from the DMNCs; they are also different from the companies from 
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emerging markets who globalised earlier (countries which are now referred to as newly 
industrialised economies or countries; NIEs/NICs). The difference lies in the fact that the 
EMNEs over the last decade or so have been more aggressive, have ventured straight 
into developed markets rather than exploring similar developing or less developed 
markets, and choosing direct investment modes like mergers and acquisitions or 
greenfield as compared to joint ventures (Indian software and pharmaceutical 
companies, Haier and Lenovo of China are a few examples). While being different in the 
various approaches to internationalisation, as mentioned above, EMNEs have imitated 
the earlier established MNEs from developed markets to some extent; but in a role 
reversal, such DMNCs are also adapting from some of the innovations from the emerging 
world (Guillén & G-Canal, 2009; Govindrajan & Ramamurti, 2011). Reverse innovation 
can pose challenges to the established players in their home markets and hence, they 
are willing to incorporate some of these innovations to pre-empt such challenges 
(Govindrajan & Ramamurti, 2011).    
 
2.2.3 Investments from EMNEs 
The overseas investment from developing markets from around the mid-90s has been 
referred to as the ‘third wave of OFDI’ (Gammeltoft, 2008; Gammeltoft et al., 2010, b; 
Rasiah et al., 2010). Its uniqueness lies in the fact that investments have also been 
made into knowledge-intensive and mature sectors in developed nations rather than 
only primary sector or small scale industries on a south-south basis as earlier. While CSA 
and FSA remain as specific ownership advantages, the third wave has also seen 
technology, economies of scale, and managerial and organisational capabilities emerging 
as prime advantages. Internationalisation has been driven by asset augmentation and 
market power motivations in addition to asset exploitation motives; asset-seeking by 
EMNEs is expected to meet their goals of growth diversification, increase in global market 
share, and exploitation of opportunities otherwise not available in their home markets 
(World Bank, 2013). Emerging market governments in this phase have also been 
instrumental in creating opportunities for overseas investment by the EMNEs through 
policies of liberalisation and targeting specific industries and locations; however, such 
government interests have also been questioned on the basis of narrow national interest 
rather than broader economic development (Rasiah et al., 2010). Further, a company’s 
own internal resources and other factors like industry type or location may determine 
how much it can benefit towards its internationalisation endeavours due to the role of 
the state (Hong et al., 2015). With specific reference to the BRICs nations, Gammeltoft 
(2008) analysed the historical and contemporary flow of OFDI for the period 1980-2004 
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and found that Russia was the largest outward investor followed by Brazil and China. 
The trend has since changed with China leading the BRIC group in terms of outward 
investments and the third in the world behind USA and Japan (UNCTAD WIR, 2016).  
 
The trends mentioned above can be validated through the UNCTAD report reproduced 
by Raja (2013) which mentions that overseas investment from the BRICs accounts for 
9% of the total global outflows in 2012 compared to just 1% in 2002. China accounts 
for 54% of this share and 42% of the total share going into developed markets with 
mergers and acquisitions as the key mode of entry and market-seeking as the main 
motivational factor. This has been further substantiated by Holtbrügge and Kreppel 
(2012) that market seeking is of prime importance for the companies from BRIC nations. 
Using an exploratory case-based approach of eight companies from the BRIC nations, 
the authors further demonstrate that technological and management resource seeking 
in host countries is also high on the agenda. EMNEs are an idiosyncratic feature of the 
current globalisation phase (Henisz, 2003; Goldstein, 2009). Studying the performance 
of target firms by BRIC countries, a study demonstrated that tangible factors rather than 
intangible factors affect the performance of the acquired firms especially in the 
manufacturing sector and hence EMNEs invest in developed markets to source such 
tangible assets and relative success allows for successive investments in developed 
markets (Buckley et al., 2014). However, a single study of only Indian firms indicated 
that international acquisitions helped create both tangible and intangible resources which 
otherwise would have been required to be generated internally and this creates value 
addition for the share-holders (Gubbi et al., 2010).  
 
Given factors specific to home country, home institutions, economic structure, openness 
to international trade, government policies, resource endowments, each emerging 
market country will have its own particular FDI objective, such as resource seeking, 
market seeking, strategic asset seeking, knowledge seeking, and asset augmentation. 
Many of the developing countries moved away from protectionism and import 
substitution in the 1980s and 1990s.  This can be termed as the start of the current 
phase of globalisation (the third wave) with gradual assimilation of various economies 
towards a single global economy (Dunning et al., 2008). The authors evidenced that the 
earlier MNEs (mainly from the developed countries) had different characteristics as 
compared to the EMNEs. The latter benefitted from a more integrated global market 
with ease of capital flows across borders whereas the earlier DMNCs were faced with a 
high degree of restriction especially from the developing world. The emerging market 
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firms were not endowed with FSAs but received more support from their home country 
governments that enabled them to aggressively invest outwards without any major 
internalisation edge.  
 
The earlier phase of investment by EMNEs was regional compared to intra-triad 
investment by the DMNCs. Traditional DMNCs used internal growth (WOS) as their 
default entry mode compared to the EMNEs who followed an external growth mode 
(alliances and acquisitions), and had a higher organisational adaptability for accelerated 
internationalisation (Guillén & G-Canal, 2009). While an outright generalisation of EMNE 
internationalisation attributes is not advisable due to the diversity of the countries from 
where they emerge, there are some common factors that link them in their efforts 
towards internationalisation and make them distinct from their developed market 
counterparts - local and central governments play a significant role to support OFDI, 
they face institutional constraints in their home markets, they rely on networks and 
cultural proximity, and they demonstrate an industry specific focus with cost competitive 
characteristics (Gammeltoft et al., 2010, a). Firms may have different motivations when 
moving overseas in light of institutional constraints as some firms may choose to avoid 
home-based declining institutions where others may choose to go overseas to exploit 
the better surroundings of host markets (Witt & Lewin, 2007).    
 
Among all nations, developed, developing and transition, developing Asia was the 
highest investor region in 2014 (UNCTAD, WIR 2015) but saw a decline in 2015 mainly 
due to decrease of OFDI from Hong Kong (UNCTAD, WIR 2016). A large portion of OFDI 
from developing and transition economies goes to developed countries. OFDI from 
developing Asia has been intra-regional and is vertical in nature which evidences that 
there is a cost consideration of such investments which is being driven by cheap 
resources and labour available in other lower income countries (Gao, 2005). Specific 
collaborative platforms for transparent communication to facilitate negotiations and 
success of projects should be of prime importance for both home (Asia or south group 
here) and host country governments (developed markets) with investor interest at the 
heart of such facilitation and with expectation of sufficient corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) on part of the investor firms (Rasiah et al., 2010).  
 
2.2.4 Research on EMNEs 
As mentioned earlier, while there is a lot of focus on EMNEs; the actual research on them 
as a percentage of total international business research is not that significant. The largest 
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amount of research focuses on China, which is not surprising given its share of both IFDI 
and OFDI flows across emerging market economies and the country’s accession to WTO 
since 2001. However, it needs to be recognized that data on Chinese MNEs is not very 
reliable (Sauvant, 2005).   
 
Traditional theories (Like Ricardian theory of comparative advantage and/or the 
Heckscher-Ohlin theory) state that firms internationalise to exploit their inherent 
competitive advantage. However, a 2005 study of Chinese firms (which excludes Chinese 
SOEs) by Child & Rodrigues contradicts such theoretical assumptions. The firms in the 
study generally followed a partnership (of original equipment manufacturer nature or 
joint venture – internal internationalisation) or acquisition or organic expansion route 
(external internationalisation), to overcome their competitive disadvantages such as low 
margins in the domestic market, impaired technology, the lack of brand development 
and marketing capability and adopting a catch-up strategy to established global players. 
These firms often seek tactical mergers and acquisition in developed markets as they 
are perceived to be the quickest way to acquire strategic assets relatively cheaply (Anand 
& Delios, 2002) and can also contribute to technological catch-up (Amighini et al., 2010).  
 
Among the emerging markets in Asia, China has been the largest recipient of IFDI 
although it has been widely believed that the large flows are due to potential round-
tripping of investments (domestic funds generated going out of the country to return as 
investments) from ethnic Chinese routed through Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan. The 
firms also rely on home networking (administrative, regulatory and financial) for their 
international forays (Yiu et al., 2007).  
 
Studying ownership and internationalisation relationship on the basis of a survey of 607 
firms, it was evident that the concentration of power is disadvantageous towards 
entrepreneurship orientation required for internationalisation and firms should decrease 
their ownership concentration to increase motivation at managerial levels for increased 
internationalisation opportunities (Liu et al., 2011). Applying the eclectic paradigm to 
test the internationalisation of these specific 607 Chinese firms, it was inferred that due 
to concentrated family ownership and interests of individual family members, the 
outward looking strategy were given less focus compared to the established theory 
based on western MNEs and locational choices were built upon existing networked 
relationships. It was also identified that the Chinese family firms may expand into 
geographies that established MNEs may avoid as the former have a superior ability to 
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work in hostile environments due to exposure in their challenging home market. These 
firms leverage their home cost advantage and have operating flexibility due to smaller 
sizes in comparison to MNEs, but for exactly the same reason they are unable to expand 
quickly; hence, the Chinese family firms are distinctive from MNEs with respect to ‘OLI’ 
advantages (Erdener & Shapiro, 2005).  
 
However, Yiu (2011) found OLI advantages along with LLL (Mathew’s framework of 
linkage, leverage and learning) advantages that Chinese business groups (a mix of state, 
private and collectives), have exploited to internationalise through asset-exploitation and 
asset-acquisition due to their internal market and inward linkages. They use their unique 
ownership, internalisation and locational advantages, to attract and provide linkages, 
leverage and learning opportunities through their internal markets, inward linkages and 
also institutional support.  
 
Further, the OFDI from emerging markets is determined by cost advantages and 
flexibility rather than technological advantages (Hong & Sun, 2006). The Chinese 
external internationalisation commences from internal internationalisation (partnership 
with Western MNEs in China) before moving to external internationalisation, initially to 
lesser developed markets (12 of the Chinese firms in Global 500 in 2005 had intra-
regional sales; Collinson & Rugman, 2007) for experiential learning before moving to 
more developed markets (Lyles & Li, 2009).  
 
On the other hand, and contrary to Erdener and Shapiro (2005), Hong and Sun (2006) 
are of the view that in their objective for internationalisation, Chinese companies are 
close to their western counterparts in asset, resource and technology seeking objectives. 
This is due to evolution of policies and shift of such policy strategy from centre to state 
level and motives being commercial rather than political in nature. Increasing number of 
Chinese companies are listing on various overseas exchanges for the ease of raising 
capital. The rise in the number of Chinese companies in the Fortune Global 500 list is 
only indicative of the fact that they are rapidly implementing their catch-up strategy. 
Some of the private companies (like Haier) have overcome home disadvantages as they 
enjoy full autonomy along with government support where required; such hybrid 
companies with mixed ownership are becoming truly multinational and competitive on 




2.2.5 Research on specific Emerging Countries  
This emerging trend of increased outward investment by emerging market companies 
(especially the BRIC nations) is indicative of state directions due to locational choices 
and heightened internal liberalisation. Internationalisation of Indian and Brazilian firms 
is driven by economic motives and those from China and Russia are backed by the state 
especially in strategic industries (Holtbrügge & Kreppel, 2012). In China’s case, the only 
difference is that a significant proportion of Chinese MNEs remain state controlled 
(SOEs). These large SOEs have monopolistic advantages with regards to natural 
resources and infrastructure sectors (Morck et al., 2008). While it is quite apparent that 
emerging market firms and their internationalisation has become a fixed feature of 
international business, ongoing research on BRIC nations indicate divergences in the 
internationalisation trends among them (Gammeltoft, 2010, b).  
 
Turkey, which due to its unstable political conditions has failed to put forward a strong 
case to be part of the EU, forms part of Asia currently. It has lately seen significant 
political upheaval but it has been an attractive destination for DMNCs and has also has 
a number of EMNEs emerging from its midst. The country has seen high GDP growth 
rates and has been open to international trade and is a significant recipient of IFDI but 
has failed to build on localisation advantages consistently (Erdilek, 2003). An exploratory 
study on Turkish firms in the retail sector corroborated that internationalisation emerged 
due to adverse home conditions, and although the country lacked a significant low cost 
advantage, it had professional managers and homogenous firms with respect to 
corporate and brand identity (Eren-Erdogmus et al., 2010). In many cases, the latecomer 
approach to catch up with established global brands was visible in the 
internationalisation strategies. Unlike the earlier latecomers (like Japan, S. Korea and 
Taiwan), which imported technology to catch-up to the established players from the 
West, the current latecomers (like China) are innovating rather than assimilating foreign 
technology (Amighini et al., 2010). Elite interviewing from four large Turkish retailers 
revealed that internationally oriented top management was imperative in the firms’ 
decisions to attempt internationalisation. Location was another key criterion along with 
networking with developed retailers and branding strategies (separate for developed and 
developing markets).  
 
Another country that has faced political turmoil for some time is Thailand, a country 
known for its tourist attractions. The army has taken control twice over the past decade 
including as recently as 2014. Thailand has gone through its own three plus one stages 
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of OFDI; the first stage (early 80s) with strict capital controls like for rest of the 
developing world saw investments into China, Japan, Singapore and USA; the second 
stage (mid 80s – mid 90s) was the take-off phase with increase both in volume and 
destination; the third stage (late 90s) was severely affected by the Asian Financial Crisis 
and OFDI took a plunge and it was a period of consolidation for the Thai domestic firms; 
and the current or fourth stage has been a recovering phase with flows aimed towards 
Europe and USA supported by government policy initiatives (Wee, 2007). Many Thai 
firms have sought the acquisition route for internationalisation in both developed and 
developing markets. A combination of primary and secondary data of six recent 
acquisitions in mining, food and heavy industries explained that motives as per Dunning’s 
typology (1998) did not fit the motives of the Thai acquisitions in most of the cases; 
transportation costs and free trade zones drove the geographic distance decision; 
importance was given to local knowledge and learning and building talent for 
international business (Meyer & Thaijongrak, 2012). 
 
Daniels et al. (2007) presented a consolidated view on Latin America and the Caribbean 
outflows. They stated that in the earlier stages due to lack of international competition 
in their home markets (major restrictions on IFDI), the firms lacked growth and exports 
also suffered. As the governments slowly liberalised to support the regionalisation and 
globalisation of the domestic companies, the firms started to move towards becoming 
MNEs. However, most of the EMNEs emerged from countries like Brazil, Mexico, 
Argentina and Chile. For the growth and development of EMNEs from this region, IFDI 
was necessary for the required capital and technology alongside stimulation from their 
respective home country institutional policies.  
 
As already mentioned above, Brazilian firms took time to internationalise and were 
initially focussed towards other Latin American countries. Their initial mode of entry was 
through exports, moving to setting of representative offices to focus on customer sales 
and support followed by subsequent acquisitions that could take care of such operations. 
Mergers and acquisitions as an international expansion strategy to acquire capabilities, 
resources and overcome the liability of foreignness was much belated for Brazilian firms 
(Cyrino & Barcellos, 2013). Companies from Brazil have had a mix of global first movers, 
global consolidators, local optimisers and global value-chain climbers (Fleury & Fleury, 
2009). They have lacked institutional policies and a strategically planned overseas 
business model and some of the OFDI has been purely due to external market 
opportunities (Resende et al., 2010).  
36 
 
Brazilian overseas investment can be categorised into three phases as per Gouvea 
(2007). The first phase between 1970 and 1980 was characterised by firms partaking in 
licensing, consulting and technical services. During the next decade, the firms increased 
activities to include telecommunication, banking, oil exploration and transport. These 
two phases saw only the established large firms with existing technological capabilities 
foraying into overseas markets. The third phase (post 1990s) has seen firms of varying 
sizes from different industries looking outward and this phase saw the emergence of the 
IT sector from Brazil too. 
 
Internationalisation through a strategy of innovation in Brazilian firms has specific traits 
(Oliveira et al., 2013). Local traits influence innovation in Brazil with an aim to transform 
CSAs to FSAs. Capability building is slower and hence, catch-up to world-class technology 
or adaptation is moderate. Brazilian companies are trying to build sustained capabilities 
through commodity innovation (oil), product innovation (automobiles and consumer 
goods), business model innovation (aeronautics), bottom-of-the-pyramid innovation 
(consumer goods, infrastructure, and energy), reverse innovation (using research 
networks) and sustainable innovation (social and environmental responsibility in 
petrochemicals, cosmetics). Firms have used their networks to internationalise especially 
in the IT space (de Oliveira Mota et al., 2012).  
 
In a striking difference from other emerging market companies, Brazilian firms with 
higher degree of internationalisation had lower profits in international operations 
compared to the domestic operations and the reason provided is a steeper learning curve 
in international markets (Barcellos et al., 2010).  Brazil has felt the brunt of the global 
financial crisis and the Brazilian companies have taken time to internationalise. Brazilian 
companies have been known to follow its international customers as a factor for looking 
outward and like other emerging markets to escape from unsatisfactory home conditions 
but they face double-taxation issues as they internationalise and hence it is important 
for the Brazilian government to re-think its policies around taxation and bilateral treaties 
to promote investments (Lima & Barros, 2009) as it is a proven fact that 
internationalisation of home companies helps in the development of the home economy.       
 
Russia moved from a socialist state to part democracy in the early 1990s. It was a move 
to elevate Russia from a period of economic stagnation but it led to economic and 
political upheavals. The socialist republic was dissolved and Russia emerged. However, 
the country remains state oriented and in recent times due to its involvement with the 
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Ukrainian rebels, Syrian crisis and annexation of Crimea, western countries are slowly 
implementing sanctions (however, with Donald Trump coming to power in the USA and 
his alleged closeness to Vladimir Putin, the longevity of the imposed sanctions are a 
question mark as claimed by some tabloids). Nevertheless, Russia seems to be holding 
its own given its vast natural resources.  
 
OFDI from Russia dates back to the 19th century when it exported capital to neighbouring 
countries like China, Mongolia and Persia (Liuhto & Vahtra, 2007). Today, Russian 
multinationals (most of which are state owned and the rest by Oligarchs and their 
partners) are dominant in natural resources particularly energy firms (Mccarthy et al., 
2009). Based on ownership, Russia’s largest industrial corporations can be categorised 
into four typologies: non-transparent patriots (companies controlled by the state), 
transparent patriots (relative transparency with a strong overseas presence), non-
transparent independents (companies with no state control and low transparency but 
with significant overseas presence) and transparent independents (companies with 
virtually no interference from the state and very developed in their operations) (Liuhto 
& Vahtra, 2007). Russian firms which belong to the last category run transparent 
businesses that are not politically motivated and these get preferential treatment in host 
countries.  
 
Russia’s OFDI has exceeded IFDI since the start of its transition to a more liberalised 
state and the motivating factor has been to control the value chain of natural resources 
(Kalotay, 2006). Unlike other transition states like Hungary and Slovenia where the 
concentration has been on manufacturing, Russian OFDI which grew significantly only 
in the early 2000s is dominated by petroleum and gas and mining but not services, and 
is directed mainly to CIS and the EU countries (Kalotay, 2003; Kuznetsov, 2010). OFDI 
has been positively affected by the growth of the country (GDP). Host country market 
and natural resources are locational determinants for Russian OFDI, as are ownership 
advantages and cultural proximity (Kalotay & Sulstarova, 2010; Kalotay 2010). Like other 
emerging markets the internationalisation path for Russian firms started from exports. 
Russia too was affected by the global financial crisis and OFDI weakened as a result. To 
overcome the crisis, the country needs to consolidate its overseas assets and the state 
could provide help for future gradual expansion (Kolatay, 2010). The appropriation of 
Yukos (a private international oil producing company) by Rosneft (a Russian state owned 
company) has not gone down well with the international business and political 
communities and this, along with other (apparently politically motivated) actions has led 
38 
 
to many MNEs taking a cautious approach to relationships with Russian MNEs. Russia 
lacks the understanding that OFDI is beneficial for the economy and its competitiveness 
(Panibratov & Kalotay, 2009). As per UNCTAD WIR 2016, OFDI from Russia has reduced 
significantly due to the country’s inability to access international capital markets. The 
other reason provided by the report is the implementation of internal policies to reduce 
round-tripping (domestic funds generated going out of the country to return as 
investments). Transition states have had a general tendency to invest in other transition 
economies. 
 
With the developed world seeing negative and negligible growth as an aftermath of the 
Global Financial Crisis in 2007-08, research on emerging markets has gained significant 
importance as the balance of global economic growth tilts towards them with a change 
in the global business environment. Understanding EMNEs and the nature of their 
strategies and actions can also have far-reaching implications for both home and host 
countries; are internationalisation path of EMNEs distinctive, institutional policies 
affecting overseas investments, challenges faced by them in host countries, how do their 
actions affect host countries are but just a few of the studies conducted on EMNEs 
(Gammeltoft et al., 2010).  
 
2.3 Indian Overseas Investment 
While Indian overseas investment has gained momentum only in mid-2000, the first 
wave of manufacturing investments (which went into production overseas) was in the 
1960s (Wells, 1983). The first Indian mill (textile) was set up even before this, in 1959 
in Ethiopia by the Birla group, which was the second largest business house at that time 
(Athukorala, 2009 further quoting Kudaisya, 2003). In this earlier phase of overseas 
investment, the main motivations for Indian companies were to protect the export 
market, leverage cost advantages and investment incentives in host markets, circumvent 
restrictions in domestic growth and benefit from low technology requirements in host 
countries. Known as the first wave it was largely driven by manufacturing companies 
and low technology sectors, directed towards other developing markets, mostly 
greenfield in nature (Pradhan, 2004; Kumar, 2008) and driven by restrictive government 
trade practices, strict exchange regulations and the South-South co-operation (Pradhan, 
2007).  
 
Overseas investment from India has not been extensively researched. There has recently 
been a significant increase in the interest in this space due to the unique nature of Indian 
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OFDI, specifically the south-north flow of the country’s overseas investment and high 
technological advancement. The country has been called the back-office powerhouse of 
the world due to relatively low wages and an educated English speaking population. 
India along with Philippines have been frontrunners in garnering such outsourced jobs 
from developed markets which do not require any direct interphase with the clients 
(Peck, 2017). However, most of the literature is descriptive in nature (Nunnenkamp et 
al., 2012) and outlines the trends and patterns of Indian OFDI along with the preferred 
mode of investment and locational preference among Indian MNEs. OFDI has increased 
post liberalisation, has been dominated by the service sector, directed towards 
developed markets and mergers and acquisitions has been the preferred route of 
entering the foreign markets; this phase has been called as the second wave of Indian 
OFDI and was concentrated on cost-effective processes and trade supporting activities 
(Kumar, 2008). This phase was marked by the need for acquiring skills (technological 
and management), networks (marketing and distribution), secure natural resources and 
more importantly to become globally competitive firms (Nayyar, 2008; Pradhan, 2007). 
These factors have been assisted by the policy implications towards OFDI from India 
which can be categorised into three phases: 1969-92 (restrictive guidelines on Indian 
joint ventures and funds transfers); 1992-2003 (removal of few restrictions with regards 
to remittances, introduction of automatic route for overseas investment; 2004 onwards 
(further lifting of restrictions, increase in limits of automatic route for overseas 
investment, further financial de-regulation) (Saikia, 2012). Important regulatory 
developments like reducing industrial licencing, financial de-regulation and free floating 
currency and capital market liberalisation paved the path for India as a global outward 
investor (Satyanand & Raghavendran, 2010).  
 
While different industries have different motives for Internationalisation (Baskaran & 
Chaarlas, 2012), a common theme on the motive of overseas investment that emerged 
was that Indian OFDI was market-seeking (Subramanian et al., 2010; Singal & Jain, 
2012) and the motive to access resources is a recent phenomenon (Kumar, 2008; 
Baskaran & Chaarlas, 2012) though market-seeking greenfield investments and 
investments in natural resources have not totally diminished (Kumar, 2008). 
 
Given the relative sluggish technological development in India, its OFDI growth has been 
impressive - especially the acquisitions of established brands by Indian MNEs in the 
developed markets over the past few years. Unlike earlier years of its overseas 
investment, recent trends from India have moved in the direction of billion-dollar 
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manufacturing acquisition deals in developed countries indicating strategic-asset seeking 
motivation (Kumar, 2008) and this can be referred to as the third phase of Indian OFDI.     
 
The third phase of Indian OFDI has also seen an advantage that the Indian firms have 
used, which is their capital-raising ability. Their healthy balance-sheets have allowed the 
companies to attract both domestic and foreign debt (Kumar, 2008). However, over time 
and with the aftermath of the financial crisis, the Indian firms have faced the challenge 
of rolling over debt due to global liquidity freeze or interest rate issues (Taylor & Nölke, 
2010).       
 
The factors for internationalisation of Indian firms are not very different from other 
countries and there are mixed motivations of technology absorption and knowledge 
seeking along with finding new markets (Hattari & Rajan, 2010); building scale for global 
competitiveness is also a formula adopted by many Indian firms. Software firms and 
pharmaceutical companies led the second phase of Indian OFDI indicating India’s global 
position in knowledge-based segment (Pradhan, 2004). Another commonality across the 
present research is the acknowledgment of the fact that the reforms and liberalisation 
in the country have been conducive for the exponential growth in Indian OFDI over the 
past few years. The flow of investment to other developing countries has been due to 
(a) domestic R&D development and has helped in knowledge transfer (Pradhan & Singh, 
2009; Mani, 2013; Chowdhury, 2011) and (b) development of these countries and the 
policy framework these countries have adopted to attract OFDI, including from India 
(Pradhan, 2008; Nunnenkamp et al., 2012). Akin to China, Indian internationalisation 
has also benefitted from network channels (though not to the extent of Chinese firms).  
 
In line with the Uppsala internationalisation model (moving from psychic distance 
exports to capital investments in further away markets), Indian firms display the 
development of capabilities for internationalisation, but they also show some unique 
characteristics such as learning through internal home networks to building capabilities 
and access to scarce resources (Elango & Pattnaik, 2007). Interviews, archival data and 
participant observation of four new ventures in the Indian software industry reveal that 
these firms have established networking relationships (social capital) but also exploit the 
same to extend the network. Separately, soliciting international business depends on the 
existing capability of the firm (Prashantham & Dhanaraj, 2010); it would be beneficial 
for firms to supplement their initial ties and make new ones as old ones’ decay. In a 
comparative study of Indian software ventures with developed market software ventures 
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(Irish software firms) there was evidence of similarity in their Internationalisation path 
in the use of intermediate form of internationalisation wherein the new ventures use 
other intermediary companies for various processes during the initial phase of 
internationalisation (Terjesen et al., 2008). Indian MNEs use their technological and 
financial resources to supplement their knowledge capabilities for furthering their 
internationalisation (Buckley et. al, 2016).  
 
Ramamurti and Singh (2009, b) have articulated some interesting thoughts around 
generic international strategies adopted by Indian MNEs. Over the preceding 5 years 
there have been many changes in the companies (structure, international and domestic 
competition, global outlook and performance and overseas investment) that they 
identified, to demonstrate the strategies adopted. These are local optimiser (targeting 
other emerging markets for product and process optimisation targeting downstream 
operations through acquisitions and joint ventures); low-cost partner (targeting mature 
industries in a south-north acquisition flow for moving up the value curve); global 
consolidator (global markets target with large acquisitions in mature industries); and 
global first-mover (global innovators and global sourcing for strategic asset acquisition 
in developed markets and greenfield in low-cost countries). Indian firms used one or 
more of these strategies as they internationalised which were based on advantages such 
as cheap production costs, superior design capability, ease of restructuring and process 
excellence which in turn were ‘rooted in India’s technological absorptive capacity, built 
over several prior decades, its cheap brainpower, its seasoned managerial class, and a 
historically rooted entrepreneurial tradition’ (p. 159). As mentioned before, the 
international markets were more flexible than those that earlier Western MNEs or 
NIEs/NICs faced and that, coupled with easy access to the capital market spurred Indian 
OFDI specially to developed markets.  
 
Williamson et al. (ed., 2013) discuss the competitive advantage of EMNEs from BRIC 
countries and talk about how the companies have leveraged innovation, value-chain 
configurations and cross-border mergers and acquisitions to expand globally. The phases 
of innovation provided and the case examples analysed to substantiate the same are 
based on secondary data which concludes that there has been much progress with 
innovation and internationalisation since liberalisation due to some institutional flexibility 
leading to increased innovation in home markets to then proceed to global markets with 
a mix of asset-seeking and market-seeking purposes (Celly et al., 2013); value chain 
configuration of software firms and pharmaceutical companies were presented using a 
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dominant strategy lens again based on historical data which elucidates that these 
industries had more entrepreneurial tendencies compared to the manufacturing industry 
and their success has been in positioning themselves as global suppliers of intermediate 
products rather than attempting to build branded products themselves (Athreya, S., 
2013); Indian firms relied on FSAs rather than on CSAs due to lack of natural resources 
and a less than conducive outward business environment, a few mature industries, large 
economic geographic dispersion, the merger and acquisition route by Indian companies 
has been a mix of FSA exploitation and FSA seeking (Ramamurti, 2013). Indian IT 
companies and pharmaceutical companies are considered as being the most successful 
in implementing internationalisation. Companies in the pharmaceutical industry seeking 
to internationalise their product market have benefited from technological advancement 
and access to international financial markets along with possessing innovation 
capabilities (Chittoor et al., 2009). These companies have succeeded in producing low 
cost products to serve customers at the far bottom end of the prosperity chain. Due to 
the absence of product patents in India, Indian pharma companies were able to develop 
cost-effective generics (Kumar, 2008). Pharmaceutical firms have evolved due to home 
country institutional changes to explore capability resources and global product markets. 
But there is no specific proof of business group affiliations within this industry that have 
supported internationalisation strategies. 
 
For manufacturing firms, the firm maturity, firm size and in-house technology are 
important determinants for internationalisation; product differentiation is partially 
important and previous trade experience is an added advantage (Pradhan, 2004). 
Overseas acquisitions with the objective of re-shaping internal resources and capabilities 
are an important mode of Indian internationalisation to transform to a world-class 
competitive firm and sustain any institutional transformations (Gubbi et al., 2010) and 
to acquire quality strategic resources and capabilities to overcome home disadvantages. 
However, a recent study on the determinants of overseas acquisitions by Indian firms 
found no evidence of resources and strategic-asset seeking motives, while the role of 
foreign exchange fluctuation, cost of capital, host market size and openness to trade, 
intangible assets and to a certain extent psychic distance were important determinants 
for such foreign acquisitions (Buckley et al., 2009, 2012).  
 
With increase in the degree of internationalisation, firm performance deteriorates due to 
business group affiliations even in manufacturing and services industry (Gaur & Kumar, 
2009). Using the resource based view as the theoretical framework, strategies of some 
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of the largest business groups revealed that in emerging liberalised economies, the firms 
consolidated related businesses and carefully drew on their resource-mix to provide the 
right direction on such consolidation (Manikutty, 2000). With increased liberalisation and 
new directions that firms may take, they tend to increase professionalism and recruit 
professional managers at higher levels for operational freedom, quick decisioning and 
efficient strategy formulation.           
 
The outflow from India in percentage terms has grown considerably. Large sized 
acquisitions and green-field projects can have far-fetched policy implications for host-
countries and hence researching Indian MNEs is essential (Pradhan, 2011). A special 
issue of Transnational Corporations Review in 2011 discussed all aspects of FDI and 
India (IFDI, OFDI and Internationalisation). Looking at the primary sector (food and 
agriculture) the main determinants of OFDI were market-seeking, obtainment of world 
class technology, resource-seeking and learning for innovation of new products 
(Satyanand, 2011). Technological outsourcing emerged as the main determinant for IT 
and chemical firms along with firm size, global linkages and skills (Bhat & Narayanan, 
2011). The same authors when studying just the IT sector (130 IT companies over a 
six-year period from 2000 to 2005) pointed out that the ‘O’ factor was significant for 
such firms; further, proprietary R&D, technology absorption and client knowledge were 
important factors in deciding on overseas investment (Narayanan & Bhatt, 2011). Given 
India’s preference for mergers and acquisitions to green-field investments in overseas 
market, they have been increasingly investing into the triad rather than the region and 
the US is one of its largest markets for OFDI with its attractive business environment 
and other incentives provided for inward investments (Jain, 2011).  
 
Funding for most of these acquisitions has been through borrowings rather than from 
internal generation of funds with spending in foreign currency exceeding earnings, which 
is detrimental for the economy of the country (Beena, 2011); these acquisitions have 
both positive and negative economic implications at a micro and macro level (Nayyar, 
2008). Acquisitions in pharmaceutical and automobile sectors were market-seeking; 
horizontal cum vertical integration was the motive for steel and chemical sectors; 
branding was important in consumer goods and pharmaceuticals; service delivery was a 
determinant for IT and BPOs; and access to technology was an important factor for 
telecommunications and energy sectors. Apart from sectoral motivations the sourcing of 
raw materials and global leadership aspirations are some of the common factors for the 
overseas acquisitions by Indian firms (Nayyar, 2008). The automotive sector, due to its 
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experience of fast growth and capability formation, has been aggressive in looking 
outward via exports, OFDI and strategic alliances with a focus on garnering knowledge 
for enhanced R&D (Pradhan & Singh, 2009). Cost-effectiveness has also been seen in 
this sector with low cost cars being produced (Tata Indica and the Nano by Tata Motors 
and Scorpio SUV by Mahindra). Carlos Ghosn, the ex-CEO of Renault/Nissan had called 
the cost-effective automobile manufacturing processes by India car manufacturers with 
‘frugal engineering skills’ (Kumar, 2008), which has helped attract DMNCs to India for 
design and development activities.  
 
In the new venture classification, some of these firms are small enterprises and a study 
on Indian SMEs from pharmaceutical, automotive and IT sector suggested a ‘capability-
then-size’ conceptual model that could be extended to other emerging markets but 
requires empirical validation (Singal & Jain, 2012). International education and 
experience of managers propelled internationalisation of Indian SMEs, management 
commitment from smaller firms encouraged capability building and formation of human 
capital with a global outlook (Javalgi & Todd, 2011). However, the movement of human 
capital as an investment or as a brain-drain has been a matter of concern for developing 
countries. In today’s largely globalised world, while human mobility does have an upside 
with increase in global productivity, such returns are unequal among the developing 
nations with the poorer nations suffering from higher emigration and hence the need for 
policies that would ensure equitable returns of globalisation among nations due to the 
movement of scarce human talent (Solimano, 2004). However, a limited study on US 
FDI suggests that investments from US is higher to countries which have a higher 
migrant representation in the country (Javorcik et al., 2011) which may suggest that 
export of human capital may eventually lead to a positive return for the home country 
with increased IFDI. India is among the top three prospective hosts for global MNEs 
(UNCTAD, WIR, 2016).  
 
India and China as two of largest emerging markets with common borders, comparative 
studies among international business researchers is recurrent. Overseas investment 
journeys in both countries commenced from developing markets and gradually shifted 
to developed markets (Pradhan, 2012). Other studies include, evolution of the steel 
industry and motivation for internationalisation (Kumar & Chadha, 2009), path adopted 
for going global by the software industry (Niosi & Tschang, 2009), comparison of 
pharmaceutical companies showing common motivation of acquiring FSA and 
technological advantages (Athreya & Godley, 2009), comparison between two large 
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conglomerates and strategic motivation behind their internationalisation (Duysters et al., 
2009), policy implications of the emerging internationalisation of China and India and 
strategy behind increased acquisitions (Athreye & Kapur, 2009),  macro-economic 
factors affecting FDI demonstrated that volumes of OFDI from the two countries were 
not affected by change in trade policies and home country interest or exchange rates 
and vice-versa (Tolentino, 2010), ownership advantage framework for overseas mergers 
and acquisitions revealed that Chinese mergers and acquisitions is manufacturing 
oriented, regional based, resource-seeking, prefer backward integration whereas Indian 
mergers and acquisitions is directed towards developed markets, seek superior 
technology, prefer forward integration and is intensive in services industry; both 
countries prefer friendly host countries and avoid hostile takeovers (Sun et al., 2012); 
are pre-dominantly market seeking with low corporate tax rates (Duanmu & Guney, 
2009); attracted to tax-havens, products and prices in host countries, currency strength 
(Pradhan, 2012). A study in 2008 by Henley et al. on investment in sub-Saharan Africa 
by China and India and South Africa substantiates the market seeking objective albeit in 
different sectors, and follows the pattern of investments from Europe to developing 
countries in the earlier years. There are important differences too in the direction of the 
OFDI from these two countries wherein Chinese investment generally shies away from 
OECD member countries and geographic distance is an important factor whereas India 
reaches out irrespective of either factor (Duanmu & Guney, 2009; Pradhan, 2012). 
Increased investments in Africa by China suggest that they are less worried about the 
level of corruption and have the ability to handle informal systems and their investments 
are directed to large but poorer nations while India seeks favourable law conditions and 
hence smaller richer countries or developed countries (Fung & Garcia-Herrero, 2012).  
 
Companies seek rent. Sustained financial profits are the main objective of organisations. 
Internationalisation and its effect on performance is a topic which is also widely debated 
– is internationalisation good for the companies? The three-stage model has been 
described in the ‘Internationalisation Literature’ section (Section 2.6.1). This posits that 
the 2nd stage of internationalisation is when the company see maximum benefit. The 
performance vis-à-vis internationalisation graph is ‘S’ shaped. Exporting and 
internationalisation is a simultaneous strategy seen in both the services and 
manufacturing industries in India (Contractor et al., 2007). Studying 269 Indian firms 
from these industries over a five-year period between 1997 and 2001, the authors 
postulate that performance/internationalisation relationship is ‘U’ shaped for the 
manufacturing firms, whereas for the services the first stage is very short (being less 
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capital intensive) and hence generates positive results from the onset as a result of 
internationalisation. For services, stage three of the ‘S’ curve was not supported by the 
data but the reason could be that the period covered was close to the period when India 
liberalised. Considerable time has passed since then; many of the companies in the two 
industries have further diversified into international markets. It will be interesting to see 
if the Indian industries also fall into the excessive internationalisation stage (it seems 
likely, given for example the experience of Tata Steel post its Corus acquisition and 
sustained negative returns). In a contradictory result, a similar study by Gaur and Kumar 
(2009) for manufacturing and services industry for the period 1997 and 2001 on 240 
firms found no negative relationship between firm performance and degree of 
internationalisation during the initial stages of Internationalisation.     
 
In a systematic study of strategies adopted by Indian companies to become global 
successes, van Agtmael (2007) studied a software firm (Infosys) and a pharmaceutical 
company exporting ‘generics’ (Ranbaxy5). It emerged that the competitive edge for these 
companies was the abundant supply of cheap brainpower. Irrespective of the overall low 
literacy rates in India, given the total population, a fraction of the educated lot accounts 
for many millions, many of whom have been educated in English with a proficiency in 
computer education and engineering at low costs compared to USA and Europe. This 
then translates into a large pool of well-trained human-capital. Further, given relatively 
high birth rates, India has a young workforce. A primary motive for the software firm 
was to create a captive market of software coding and outsourcing using existing low 
cost resources. Quick adaptability, client-focus, good governance, integrity and above 
all unusual vision were the success factors for Infosys. There is an on-going debate at 
the WTO forum on trade deals and India has taken a rather firm stance with respect to 
agriculture and drug patents; the latter in order to provide cheap medicines to India’s 
underprivileged by re-engineering expensive drugs. Ranbaxy, thinking ahead, chose to 
invest in R&D rather than relying on patents on drugs with compositional modification. 
Ranbaxy’s success significantly depended on international managers and a focus on 
creating differentiated strategies for the domestic market, developed markets and other 
developing markets.       
 
                                                          
5 Ranbaxy was acquired by Daiichi-Sankyo (Japanese company) in 2008. Daiichi then further sold its stake 





India has benefited from OFDI in the form of growth, technology adoption and 
advancement of managerial expertise that in turn will help India to expand its market 
further through acquisitions and reinvigorate host economies by providing employment 
(Basha, 2013). OFDI also plays an important role in the economic development of an 
economy and has helped India establish itself in the global arena (Chowdhury, 2011).  
 
Posing challenges and opportunities to India, Goldstein (2009) states that diversified 
business groups in India will do well to overcome institutional or infrastructure 
insufficiencies. The diversified business groups in India have the added advantage of 
easy access to foreign capital and technology and also benefit from political connections 
in an economy burdened by government regulations (Khanna & Palepu, 2000). They 
also diversify in more host countries and are Europe-centric; take into consideration 
growth rate, resource-endowments, bilateral investment treaties and investment 
regimes when making locational choices (Pradhan & Singh, 2010). Indian companies 
have been welcome overseas in recent times as compared to earlier ones (Arcelor Mittal 
versus Tata Steel). Post the global financial crisis, most advanced economies have gone 
through an extended period of low growth or recession, with high levels of inflation and 
protectionism which is removing some of the south-north divide. There is competition 
from companies from other emerging markets who face similar home-country 
disadvantages and can create similar competitive advantages. The Indian government 
needs to be more business friendly and initiate new reforms in policy areas. This last 
point is much in focus with a new government having been elected in May 2015 with a 
new Prime Minister known for his pro-business approach to policy-making. 
 
2.4 Outlining the Knowledge Gap 
The gap in literature is identified in this section based on the literature review presented 
in the previous two sections (2.2 and 2.3) in relation to research conducted on outward 
investments from various emerging market firms followed by the literature on Indian 
companies and the outward investment of Indian MNEs.  
 
It can be stated that Indian OFDI is unique which does not fully fit traditional 
international business and economic theories. Contrasting with the IDP theory, Indian 
OFDI has been exponential rather than incremental/gradual, IFDI and OFDI have taken 
off together rather than OFDI following IFDI; OFDI has been mainly to developed 




It is evident that large part of the available research is based on secondary data including 
government reports and company published records and remains descriptive in nature 
with emphasis on trends and pattern of Indian OFDI. Further the companies under the 
study barring one were established in an India that was protected with import 
substitution.    
 
In an integrated literature review of emerging market business groups by Yaprak and 
Karademir (2010), it emerged that for a deeper understanding of the internationalisation 
of these firms, it was necessary to research them from the perspective of markets, 
institutions, and resource based approach along with certain constructs of the OLI and 
LLL paradigms.  
 
Ramamurti and Singh (2009) also pose questions about how the strategies of Indian 
MNEs have changed over time in response to the dynamic environment, their specific 
selection of the environment for investment, occurrence of strategic transitions and 
interplay of selections on firms. Irrespective of the fact that currently India’s presence 
in the Fortune 500 list is negligible, India can become truly global and it can develop a 
substantial number of multinational companies by 2028 (Kshirsagar & Kumra, 2013). A 
2010 report by PWC states that by 2024, India may have the largest numbers of EMNEs, 
potentially 20% more than those from China. The current set of Indian managers has a 
global ethos having experienced challenging and dynamic environments. Innovation is 
the name of the game for Indian companies. India’s successes in IT and pharmaceutical 
are expected to be replicated in other industries, and with the impetus from the current 
business friendly government and a stable growth compared to other developing 
countries (UNCTAD WIR, 2016), India is a country with huge potential and future 
prospects to be a global leader.  
 
Given the fact that EMNEs have been considered to be in a catch-up phase (to the 
developed market multinational companies), emerging markets like India are ripe for 
studying companies which have internationalised, some of which have already gained 
considerable global market share and some are still in the process of catching-up (Brandl 
& Mudambi, 2014). Also, research on emerging markets companies other than Chinese 




Hence, studying the competitive strength of Indian companies in the services sector on 
the basis of a resource-based approach and dynamic capability model through a close 
study of five Indian companies in the service industry using semi-structured interviews, 
company documents, analyst reports and available public records, is expected to make 
a significant contribution in the understanding the phenomenon of internationalisation 
of firms from emerging markets.  
 
Based on the above the overarching research question for this thesis is to investigate ‘if 
firms from emerging markets own resources and capabilities that help them 
internationalise, if they develop or acquire further resources and dynamic capabilities 
through internationalisation, and to what extent does the external environment affect 
the internationalisation motives of these companies?’   
 
The sub-questions are formulated on the basis of the review of the theory which is 
provided in the next two sections (Sections 2.5 and 2.6).  
 
2.5 Theoretical Framework  
The theoretical framework used for this thesis is based on the resource based approach 
and dynamic capabilities theory within strategic management. Strategic Management is 
a very broad field. The field of business policy was re-labelled as strategic management 
in 1979 by Schendel and Hoffer and it overlapped with other subject matters from the 
fields of Economics, Sociology, Management and Psychology (Hambrick, 2004). Nag et 
al. (2007) state in their study of strategic management that researchers from the fields 
of Economics, Management, Sociology and Marketing have more similarities than 
differences on the way they define strategic management. The unit of analysis as the 
‘firm’ is common among the researchers from these fields with the firm’s performance 
as the major source of research interest; and ‘environment6,’ ‘resources’ and ‘internal 
organisations,’ being the other common factors. The major difference within these fields 
lay in the manner by which they demarcated their own field from strategic management 
without really exploring the meaning of strategic management. Hence the authors, using 
a lexicographic analysis of twenty years of abstracts of articles from four major US based 
journals concluded that ‘the field of strategic management deals with the major intended 
and emergent initiatives taken by general managers on behalf of owners (which in the 
case of India as we shall see later when discussing the specific companies in the data 
                                                          
6 Here the environment does not refer to nature but to the economic environment and also to the 
political and social environment that may affect businesses.   
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set, owners/entrepreneurs are the main decision makers and are substantially supported 
by a close-knit management team), involving utilisation of resources, to enhance the 
performance of firms in their external environment’ (p. 944). They further presented 
explicit definition of strategic management based on scholarly responses from the 
management discipline and other disciplines like Economics and Sociology. This 
definition contextualised the major conceptual elements of strategic management as 
strategic initiatives (strategic planning and actions), internal organisation (internal 
processes and practices), managers and owners (top managers and executives), 
resources (resources and capabilities of the firm), performance (profitability and 
sustenance), firms (the unit of analysis) and the environment (competition and external 
environment).  
 
From within these elements of strategic management, the focus of this study will be on 
strategic formulation, resources and capabilities, which can be interpreted as the 
strategies adopted by the senior management of the companies that have been studied 
on the basis of resources based and dynamic capabilities approach towards their 
internationalisation and how they create competitive advantage towards success in a 
dynamic external environment. 
 
2.5.1 Review of the Theoretical Literature 
The main objective here is to study the associated competitive advantage, resources and 
capabilities of Indian MNEs in the service sector towards internationalisation; mainly, to 
interpret the compulsion of these companies for OFDI and to understand the 
internationalisation path of these companies.  
 
Relating strategy to business was first established in 1947 and until the late 1970s, the 
broad definition of strategy in business was the constructive use of firms’ resources to 
meet its objectives or as a sequential decision stream for the same purposes within a 
dynamic environment (Bracker, 1980). Mintzberg and Waters (1982, 1985, 1989) 
proposed to view strategy more specifically as intended (what the company plans to do 
but may or may not realise), deliberate (where the company realises its plans) and 
realised (where the company takes action which were never intended in the first place); 
the various formations happen based on the kind of strategy formulation adopted by the 
company and the authors described various strategies from planned (perfectly precise) 
to entrepreneurial (personal) to ideological to umbrella (within constraints) to process 
(partly constrained) to unconnected (within silos) to consensus (all pervasive) and 
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imposed (diktat) strategies. Given the ever-changing external environment, companies 
in the 1970s and 1980s concentrated on positioning themselves through quick 
adaptation due to the dynamic environment, although this may not have benefited such 
companies as much as they would have hoped.  
 
From an agency perspective, managers strategise to implement intended or emergent 
initiatives using available resources to enhance firm performance in competing dynamic 
environments to increment owner and shareholder value (Clegg et al., 2011); strategy 
evolves rationally and needs to survive successfully, each strategy is different and 
distinctive and is affected by complexities which are on the outside of the firm. The 
companies need to focus on competitive strategies and Porter (1989, 2008) specified 
five competitive forces that shape strategy which are: close substitutes to the product 
or services offered; bargaining power of buyers, bargaining power of suppliers; the 
threat of new entrants and existing competitive rivalries; however, the combination of 
these forces will differ from industry to industry and company to company, further, 
Porter (1996) warned against confusing operational efficiency and company strategy. 
Depending upon the forces that affect or could affect a company, the corporate strategist 
would then formulate strategies so that the firm can attain a position of competitive 
strength. Mintzberg (1994), proposes 5 P’s for strategy formulation; perspective 
(required to avoid any shocks), planning (important to have one but disturbances can 
always occur), pattern (can be formed through consistency observed), position (to create 
an ideal niche) and ploy (to create the right image for the customer). Hence, strategic 
management as a field is important in understanding why a firm in any industry takes a 
certain decision (here internationalisation) and what are the motives behind the same.     
 
In unpredictable business environments where companies need to consider malleability 
(working alone or collaborating) and harshness (survival), Reeves et al. (2015) suggest 
five distinctive strategy scenarios that companies could adopt. The first is the obvious 
‘classical’ business model based on the assumption that environments are stable and 
having long-term stable plans which may not hold true in a dynamic environment and 
hence managers need to acclimatise to the same by adopting one or a combination of 
four other variants of strategy scenarios, namely: ‘adaptive’ which is to continually 
change in an environment neither predictable nor malleable; ‘visionary’ where the firms 
are the first off the block with an innovative/creative idea which is scaled to potential; 
the ‘shaping’ strategy follows next in an unpredictable but malleable surroundings where 
firms collaborate and evolve;  and finally the ‘renewal’ approach to strategy which is 
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appropriate in environments like the financial crisis when firms need to take drastic steps 
of reinventing to survive.  
 
Once a strategy is formulated, this will further require successful implementation 
(Alexander, 1989). This depends on both internal and external factors; however, Kaplan 
and Norton (2001) state that implementation failure is likely to occur as a result of 
internal factors rather than external ones like design or process failures. While not totally 
applicable (as the example is from a developed market), there is relevance due to the 
theoretical aspect and the exogenous factor; a mixed-method study on Finnish firms in 
media, maritime and food processing demonstrated that firms can benefit from renewing 
capabilities (modifying the resource base) rather than regenerative capabilities (adopting 
new forms of organisational change) in the face of exogenous shock like the financial 
crisis (Makkonen et al., 2014), however the relationship is contextual. In the face of loss 
of business opportunities, changes to operational capabilities may not be beneficial for 
the firms.  The relationship to dynamic capabilities and the operating environment is 
contextual that is a company can perform better if it understands and then fits into the 
environment, however such an understanding is not an easy task as it entails identifying 
the continuous opportunities and threats and changing organisational operations and re-
organising company resources to face the situation as it may be. Bradly et al. (2013) 
suggest that companies should follow a building block of strategy by which they can 
track the advancement of a strategic foundation to the achievement of the end goal 
through successful operational implementation. The building block comprises of 
understanding where and why the company generate revenues (diagnose), predicting 
the future (forecast), identifying the paths that help achieve its end goals (search), 
recognising integrated strategy (chose) and creating an action plan and ways of 
achieving it (commit). These five building blocks are bounded by an initial block (frame), 
which is asking the right questions, and an end block (evolve) which is adapting and 
learning continuously through the process.      
 
As per early strategy literature, companies formulated strategy to be successful and in 
Porter’s definition (1991), a firm could be considered successful if it attained a 
competitive position vis-à-vis the best rival/s in similar business for a sustained and 
better financial performance ceteris paribus. A strategic decision would generally have 
longitudinal organisational implications for the future success and sustainability of an 
organisation. From an outsider’s perspective, some company strategies can appear to 
be idealistic, others astute, while some will be cataclysmic. An organisation’s strategy 
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can be quite obvious from the decisions that a company makes. Strategy, which is a 
series of steps in decision-making, is largely formulated by weighing various options, 
framing issues, specifying non-issues and having the ability to finally arrive at a decision.  
 
A company taking strategic decisions involving operations across borders falls within the 
realms of international business. This when extended to the firm level within 
international business can be referred to as globalisation. Globalisation is a global 
assimilation in any sphere, which is attained largely through the distribution of goods, 
services and operational processes through international channels and across 
international borders. Globalisation creates new relationships between firms and nations 
thus leading to their structural transformation (Dunning, 1995). While conventional 
wisdom states that all nations should benefit due to wider integration of the world 
economies, there are always barriers and associated costs that will determine the overall 
benefit derived by a nation, some nations may benefit more than the others. The 
traditional view is that integration will always lead to inequality and create a divide 
between the haves (rich core) and the have-nots (poor periphery).  A crude model of 
globalisation was suggested by Krugman and Venables in 1995 which brought together 
two separate notions of integration between the rich core and the poor periphery around 
which one will benefit at the expense of the other. They suggested that at a certain level 
of initial world integration, the core benefits at the expense of the periphery but with 
advanced integration the periphery income will rise and the advantage of the core slowly 
erodes. McCann (2009) confirms that the emergence of free trade zones, increased 
economic integration, institutional changes, better communication and transportation, 
changes in the relationship between countries or group of countries, technological 
changes leading to lower transactional costs have all helped towards a global integration; 
however, especially taking the example of the BRICs versus the developed markets, he 
states that there is still a huge gap and any real convergence of significant meaning will 
take many more decades. Hence, strategic management understood at an international 
level is the process through which an individual or group of individuals operate across 
national borders for value creation (Click, 2007). 
 
Due to globalisation, there is cross-border movement of liquidity, people and materials 
through multitudinal structures. Global companies can manage to put all the various 
flows of liquidity, people and material things together on a truly global scale through 
exerting control either through direct ownership or through partnerships and/or 
operational controls. Truly global companies will have their sales across the world and 
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not only in their region (Rugman & Verbeke, 2004; Collinson & Rugman, 2007); for 
example, an American company selling only in North America or a British company selling 
in Europe or a Taiwanese company selling only in Asia. However, in the narrower sense, 
any capital investment into markets outside the geographic border of the home country 
is considered as OFDI. The world today is a global village in a continuous flux with 
changing motives of wealth-seeking corporations and rapid fundamental changes in 
governmental policies in dynamic environments. Firms that can face up to such 
challenges will survive in this global village (Dunning, 2007).  
 
Post the global financial crisis, the BRIC nations and other emerging markets have 
continued with their growing influence but significantly reduced from pre-crisis times. 
With more firms from emerging markets entering the international markets and existing 
MNEs further growing their international businesses, there is a growing interest in global 
strategies by such emerging market firms. Globalisation has its risks and established 
global firms also require an appropriate strategic management process. For newer or 
lesser established companies, especially from the emerging markets, a foray into 
international markets is a long-term process of acquiring knowledge for such 
international survival and performance can be affected until such knowledge is acquired 
through local development or transfer from the home country (Hitt et al., 2012). 
Internationalisation by firms is towards achieving different objectives which could be any 
one or a combination of accessing new resources, economies of scale, exploiting 
innovative capabilities, acquiring new knowledge, advantage of newer geographies, cost 
reduction (Hitt et al., 1997). The strategic direction of the firm can be established by the 
scale and scope of its Internationalisation (Hitt et al., 2006).  
 
Ghemawat (2003) developed the concept of ‘semiglobalisation’, which is international 
integration that falls in between being totally isolated from any cross-border integration 
and full integration across borders. Dicken (2011) refers to the latter as pure 
globalisation, a perspective from the hyper-globalist view (Figure 2). There is an ongoing 
debate about the levels of globalisation given the global slowdown at various points in 
history. Rather than concentrating on the flow or direction of international integration, 
it would be far more relevant to take a measured historical perspective of evaluating 
how close or far we are from perfect integration as per economic theory, and hence the 
term semiglobalisation. Ghemawat states that international integration can be in the 
form of product-market integration (through trade, FDI and price) and/or factor-market 
integration (through capital, labour and knowledge).  
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All the market factors mentioned have been known to be associated with significant 
barriers to international integration and should be accorded strategic importance from 
an internationalisation perspective and the critical role that location specificity plays in 
such cross-border integration. The firm level view includes activity based view 
(performance of the firm linked to effective and efficient performance of the activities 
and right combination of the same), knowledge based view (exploit firm-specific 
knowledge), and resource based view (create rents through distinctive firm resources). 
These views are not mutually exclusive (Ricart et al., 2004) and should be brought 
together to what is known as the ‘ARK’ (activity, resource, knowledge) view of strategy 
(further quoting Enright, 2002): activities, resources and knowledge are combined to 
create firm specific advantage (FSA). This can be further extended to the economy of 
the geography; each location would have its own bundle of activities, resources and 
knowledge which is outside the firm (CSA). The ARK view of strategy in international 
business can help extend understanding why companies internationalise and the 
selection of host country for such Internationalisation. Countries can be differentiated 
on the basis of cultural, administrative, geographic, and economic differences (CAGE 
framework of country level analysis, Ghemawat, 2001). International business is the 
interactive synergy between firms and geographic locations. Geographies are not 
isolated silos but in the international context comprise the various regions and their 
governments, policies and trade regimes, local industries and firms. The firm 
performance is affected by some or all such interactions in the various locations. Why 
do multinationals select one country over another? What are the differences that they 
perceive which match their own international growth strategies?  
 
Semiglobalisation can provide a basis for international business strategy as it combines 
criticality of location-specificity and the need of product/factor based on location-
specificity for international business by understanding how and why firms compete in 
various locations and compare it with its operations in a single location. Locational 
strategy can be contextual and will depend upon the industry specificity, investment 
motive and the subsidiary functions (Dunning, 2004). The CAGE framework also can be 
used to understand fundamental differences in locations and to understand firm strategy 
within international business strategy. Ricart et al. have also added a very searching 
agenda for future international business research, which takes the focus away from rent 
seeking purposes and towards serving the population below poverty levels or as Prahalad 
(2005) addresses them ‘bottom of the pyramid’, the billion or so people that mainstream 
international business research has ignored and future research could focus on how 
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MNEs (this includes all multinational firms from developed and developing economies) 
can help towards far reaching welfare and developmental issues. This focus will be more 
on MNE flows which are north-south and south-south.  
 
Figure 2: Model of Pure Globalisation 
 
Some of the influencing factors that compel companies to invest overseas is towards 
seeking natural resources, markets, efficiencies or knowledge. The next step is to 
understand the actual entry strategies, which are generally the most important strategic 
decisions made by the EMNEs. The entry modes could be through acquisition mode, 
partnerships or alliances, green-field projects or setting up wholly owned subsidiaries 
(WOS). Such entry strategies will depend upon the host-country government regulations 
(for example in China, a firm needs to have a Chinese partner and cannot have a WOS). 
Choice of entry has been analysed on the basis of transaction cost theory or the resource 
based approach (Ionascu et al., 2004); the resource based approach focuses on 
organisational learning due to presence of various modes (further quoting Barkema & 
Vermeulen, 1998), resource development and exploitation (Anand & Delios, 2002) where 
resource development can be an outcome of home country environment and can affect 
the global strategies of the firm looking outward (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011).  
 
The internationalisation process can be gradual, starting from operating contracts to 
joint ventures and finally establishing WOS. A joint venture locks in investors and can 
only be based on mutual trust of the partners and selecting the right partner requires 
tacit knowledge that often only comes from experience. Li and Meyer (2009) call the 
gradual process of internationalisation as ‘competence-building effect’ and successful 
joint venture formation as ‘partner-selection effect’. Experience can be varied 
(depending on the host environment and the home environment) which will affect 
ownership preferences. The acquisition route as a form of Internationalisation exhibits 
maximum guarantee of engagement (Meyer & Thaijonggrak, 2012). Ownership structure 
of the firm also affects internationalisation strategy and the adopted strategy then 
further affects the outcome of the internationalisation (Liu et al., 2011). Overseas 
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investment decisions depend upon various factors that may not always be transferable 
from one context to the other and hence overtime companies may follow similar 
investment pattern (Buckley et al., 2014). Peng and Meyer (2011) pin down the 
opportunities or advantages of global strategies that present themselves to firms when 
they decide to diversify overseas; these include, economies of scale, global sourcing, 
global innovations and knowledge management, global customers and risk 
diversification. There is no single global strategy that would fit all firms. Their view is 
that there is an issue in the convergence strategy as was suggested by Levitt (1983). 
Rather Peng and Meyer (2011) suggest an ‘AAA’ strategy for firms having global 
diversification plans. The firms could use any or all such strategies; these are 
‘aggregation’ of operations; ‘adaptation’ to local markets; and financial ‘arbitrage’.  
Strategic planning in international business must be objective and should be owned by 
the team responsible for its delivery (Geiersbach, 2010). A good business strategy for 
international success requires the company managers (who are responsible for strategic 
decision-making) to be aware of risks and rewards, available growth options for 
internationalisation, have a longitudinal operational plan; basically, have a broadened 
awareness. This also needs to be coupled with business experience.    
 
From the literature on Indian MNEs and official records on Indian OFDI it has been 
established that OFDI from Indian firms has increased over the past decade and that 
the majority of outward investment from India has taken the mergers and acquisition 
route. Hence, the first step will be to understand why Indian companies internationalise 
and what is the favoured entry mode for outward investment and the reasons behind 
the same?  
 
To answer the above, the following questions have been formulated: 
 
Question 1a: What are the salient factors behind the internationalisation process of 
Indian firms? 
Question 1b: What type of overseas investment do Indian firms favour for their 
Internationalisation and why? 
 
A literature review conducted by Hitt et al. (2006) on Internationalisation for the 
preceding 20 years in leading management journals and related journals found several 
factors for internationalisation such as antecedents (size of organisation, existing 
resource base, resource seeking, background of top management), environmental 
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(internal, external and natural), performance outcomes of internationalisation, 
endogenous (product diversification) and exogenous (culture, institutions) factors, and 
processes (operational efficiency and improvements and organisational learning).       
 
Given the various strategic directions and factors that a firm can take towards 
Internationalisation or on the path to internationalisation and with the focus on emerging 
market firms and their strategic motivations towards such internationalisation, in the first 
major encapsulation in strategy formulation and implementation by EMNEs, Hoskisson 
et al. (2000) indicated that there was a paucity of research in this field due to 
methodological incapacity and the dynamism of the developing and transition economies 
and reiterated that extant international business theory may not be appropriate for such 
economies. They nudged international business researchers ‘to contribute to knowledge 
of enterprise strategies in emerging economies both from a theoretical perspective and 
in terms of empirical analysis based on institutional theory, transaction cost theory and 
resource-based theory. Strategy as a tool of analysis towards a study of organisational 
decision making process (here internationalisation) needs earnest attention (Levy et al., 
2003)    
 
Five years after Hosskisson et al. (2000), the Journal of Management Studies, in a special 
issue in 2005, invited authors to submit papers on ‘Strategy Research in Emerging 
Economies’ with a distinct classification of four strategic options of which two will be 
relevant in the given scope of work (India as an emerging market): 
1. Firms from emerging markets investing into other emerging markets 
2. Firms from emerging markets investing into developed markets 
The above was required to be examined within the four perspectives of institutional 
Theory, transaction cost theory, Resource-based theory and agency theory. The guest 
editors (Wright et al. 2005) again opined that existing literature did not consist of much 
research on the internationalisation of emerging market MNEs either investing in other 
similar emerging markets or more developed markets.  
 
Eight years after Wright et al. (2005) paved the path for advancing strategic theories in 
emerging economies, Xu and Meyer (2013) studied related articles in 8 leading 
management and strategic journals (selected based on impact factor) for the period 
2001-2010, and found that overall there was an increase of 63% in the number of total 
articles published on emerging markets or related to emerging markets. However, 
narrowing the scope and combining the context of the MNEs from emerging markets 
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(irrespective of the fact if that were investing in similar emerging markets or more 
developed markets), they found that only 20% of the articles examined emerging market 
MNEs (for this study, countries like Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore have not 
been considered as emerging market economies). Among those, the majority of the 
articles were on China. Articles related to India increased from 8 to 13. There has been 
a clear bias towards research on Chinese MNEs while other emerging markets continue 
to remain under-researched (Thite et al, 2016).  
 
Examining the four perspectives as laid down by Wright et al. (2005) in view of strategic 
management that EMNEs from India may adopt on the path to internationalisation. Peng 
et al. (2008) and Peng and P-Miles (2009) emphasise that institutional theory is an 
important aspect of international business strategy and should not be isolated. However, 
other than the unique case of China, most other emerging markets have a weak 
institution base with partially stable governments, less than efficient capital markets, 
high inflation, and surface communal tensions: all of which are relevant to the India 
context as it has been faced with high inflation rates, religious tensions, hung parliament 
from 1989-2014 and a weak capital market. Due to such weaknesses, companies from 
emerging markets develop specific resources which shape both home and outward 
business prospects (Tan & Meyer, 2010 further quoting Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008; 
Yamakawa et al., 2008; Kumar & Chadha, 2009; Bhamuik et al, 2010). The agency 
theory will also be ignored in the context of Indian firms as most of the large firms are 
family controlled and can lower agency cost as the firm objectives are aligned throughout 
the firm with higher trust among the various members (Duh, 2010 further quoting 
Chrisman et al, 2004 and Dyer, 2003, 2006). Given the significant south-north flow of 
Indian OFDI, it is apparent that these firms have sought to gain superior technology and 
market share and not to lower costs and hence, to that extent, the transaction theory 
perspective will also be given less importance.        
 
It is understood that EMNEs are not endowed with dominant firm advantages and invest 
overseas to acquire strategic assets (Ramamurti, 2013, Cuervo-Cazurro & Ramamurti, 
2014). 
 
Hence, the second step will be to understand whether Indian MNEs that invest overseas 





The questions formulated are as follows: 
 
Question 2a: Do Indian firms believe that they lack strategic assets which may help them 
compete with existing global players in both the international market and home market? 
Question 2b: Do Indian firms then seek internationalisation as a means of acquiring such 
strategic assets? 
 
As mentioned above, Tan and Meyer (2010) have stated that ‘foreign direct investment 
is driven by business strategies aiming to explore resources in international markets or 
to extend their resource-based by acquiring complementary ones’ (p. 5). Barney and 
Clark (2007) postulated that the resource-based view as a strategic tool was initially an 
attempt to develop theory of competitive advantage based on the strength of a firm’s 
resources – acquired or developed as articulated by Wernerfelt (1984). This was followed 
by Rumelt (1984), Barney (1986) and Dierickx and Cool (1989), who all attempted to 
theorise firm characteristics and rent-generation based on existing or future acquired 
resources - all of which ‘outline some of the basic principles of the resource based 
theory’. This has been further elaborated below. 
 
Resource based theory received greater direction from the seminal work of Penrose 
(1959) (Barney, 1991). Though it was not her aim to make such a contribution but to 
more generally interpret the nature of the firm and understand its growth model, her 
work came to greatly influence international business and strategy (Augier & Teece, 
2007). While Penrose’s original work emphasised managerial resources, it was also to 
greatly inspire internationalisation as a growth model for firms (Johanson & Vahlne, 
2009). The authors state that internationalisation as a perspective of Penrose’s original 
ideas evaluates the growth and commitment of firms in international markets and the 
need to build competencies so as to grow and survive in these international markets. 
Avoiding the term ‘factors of production’ as used in economics literature as she felt that 
the term made no distinction between resources and services, Penrose stated that each 
firm was unique based on the services that its resources rendered. The resources when 
combined with other resources or used in different ways rather than what its initial use 
was or used in varying measurements provide distinctive services. These services are in 
the form of physical goods or intangible services which are sold to generate profits and 
expand or grow the firm. Firms can plan for such future growth and expansion but there 
are always risks and uncertainties, which may lead to reduced profits or even failure. 
Different firms have contrasting ways of handling risks and uncertainties; firms may 
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require specific managerial resources to plan for future unforeseen eventualities. A firm 
will use resources available to it as long as the services available from them are profitable 
or, if it has unused resources, will try and apply them in ways to generate profits for 
growth and expansion. Penrose goes on to state that a firm will stop expanding when it 
reaches a state of equilibrium (as per traditional theory) which will be caused when 
resources become indivisible, the resources available cannot be used in various ways 
and are specialised or when the resources are homogeneous. A firm requires both 
internal and external inducements to expand using resources already acquired or 
inherited or required to be obtained externally for such growth and expansion.  
 
Rugman and Verbeke (2002), while not totally critiquing the fact that the strategic 
management literature has continually referred to the work of Penrose as seminal, do 
clarify that her work (while having impacted the resource-based field) reflected a specific 
model of what the firm should be or value towards growth. She based her theory on the 
disequilibrium approach (supply does not equal demand) without taking into 
consideration monopolistic rents (where a firm can restrict supply or increase price 
without fear of competition). Augier and Teece (2007) propagate that the Penrosian 
approach is different from the modern resource-based approach to multinational 
activities which has been influenced by Prahalad and Hamel (1990) and Rugman (1996). 
Her definition of resources was not specific, she did not address the question of how 
firms developed competitive advantage, importance of knowledge and learning were 
underestimated, issues of organisational design were not explored though the human 
aspect of organisation was considered, and she considered that markets need to be 
developed contrary to economic theory which assume that markets already exist (Augier 
& Teece, 2007; who state that Penrose’s definition of resources was later tightened by 
Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997) to describe inimitable and non-transferable resources 
inherent to the firm).  
 
Pitelis (2004) refuted the claim made by Rugman and Verbeke (2002) with regards to 
Penrose’s work. He argued that her work talks about monopolistic rents which are short-
term and a stable platform for a company can only be built on the pillars of sustainable 
resources and other leverages that the firm may have in dynamic environments. It is 
important to continually innovate and internalise the ‘Schumpeterian process of creative 
destruction’ to create fortified firms and that firms need to continually innovate else they 
will perish. Thus, her work affects both competitive advantage and social welfare and 
hence remains of significant importance. Penrose’s work is symbolic of the business 
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environment of that time which was bridled with trade and investment barriers (Teece, 
2000 quoted in Augier & Teece, 2007) and hence, may not have foreseen all the required 
determinants for Internationalisation; nevertheless, her influence over strategic 
management cannot be totally ignored.       
 
Towards short-term goals, firms can subsist on ordinary capabilities; however, to survive 
and succeed in the long-term, firms need to build further on their ordinary capabilities 
or what can be termed as dynamic capabilities (Winter, 2003). Winter states that 
exogenous factors affecting firms cannot always be foreseen and hence building 
capabilities is an ongoing process as a part of strategic management. Dynamic 
capabilities can also be termed as a survival technique for the firm in ever-changing 
markets through the manipulation or modification of resources so as to create value 
enhanced strategies and develop competitive advantages (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; 
Rindova & Kotha, 2001). Thus, dynamic capabilities can be considered as a form of 
organisational process which include product research and development resource 
allocation towards certain routines, acquisitions or strategic alliance capabilities, 
knowledge transfer and resource replication processes (Helfat, 2007).  
 
Dynamic capabilities are capabilities in themselves and form the resource base of a firm 
which are tangible, intangible in nature and also include human resources of the firm; 
they also perform two basic functions with respect to the resource base of a firm which 
are resource creations and resource deployment (Helfat, 2007).  
 
Firms can use dynamic exploitative capabilities (threshold capabilities and consolidation) 
or dynamic explorative capabilities (value-addition and disruption capabilities) towards 
internationalisation process (Prange & Verdier, 2011) for success in international 
markets; however, adopting any one approach alone will not result in sustained 
performance and growth (further quoting March 2003). A firm needs to be ambidextrous 
and employ both the approaches for internationalisation attainment. ‘Successful 
internationalisation processes rest on the deployment of differential capabilities’ (Prange 
& Verdier, 2011, p. 132). Exploratory endeavours can result in failure traps whereas 
exploitation may result in success-traps (Wang et al. 2015 further quoting Gupta et al., 
2006). Success traps are more damaging than failure-traps. A survey on 113 UK 
technology firms by Wang et al. (2015) demonstrates that there is a negative relationship 
between dynamic capabilities and success-traps. Each firm can adopt a different process 
for internationalisation depending on the path selected (accelerated or incremental) and 
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accordingly will need to administrate consolidation or disruption capabilities. It is 
imperative for managers responsible for firm strategy to know what their competitive 
advantage is and accordingly build their dynamic capability using a balanced approach 
to both exploitive and exploratory learning (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004). Manager 
decision making also represents dynamic managerial capability and decision making by 
managers is based on prior experience and learning (Helfat, 2007).  
 
Capabilities cannot just be acquired or bought across the counter; they must be built 
(Teece et al. 1997). Teece et al. further assert that companies not only need to strategise 
the mode of entry but also the timing of entry along with related diversification and 
distribution of assets in a dynamic market environment. Multinational companies go 
through a process of capability leverage and capability building to maintain competitive 
advantage for sustained growth and continuing profits (Tallman & F-Lindquist, 2002). A 
dynamic capabilities model for internationalisation is depicted in Figure 3. 
 
Internationalisation requires both enhancing and exploitation of capabilities and 
resources, specifically for firms from the emerging markets; they capture advantages of 
host markets to complement their home market advantages to create sustained 
competitive advantages (Lessard, 2014). 
 
Figure 3: Dynamic Capabilities model for Internationalisation 
 
The ever-changing external markets further require that capability building happens in 
phases. Helfat and Peteraf (2003) introduced the concept of capability lifecycle (CLC) 
which lays the foundation for dynamic resource based view. As emerging market 
companies internationalise, understanding their competitive advantages and 
disadvantages and transformation of organisational resources to adapt to new 
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environments forms a ‘key component of dynamic resource based view’ (p. 1009). But 
resources can be both strength and a weakness for a given firm (Wernerfelt, 1984). 
Resources need to be utilised to give the best competitive advantage to the firm. They 
should have ‘VRIN’ properties, which have value, are rare, inimitable and non-
substitutable and if the firms possess resources with such properties, they can build and 
sustain a competitive edge through effective strategies (Wernerfelt, 1984; Peteraf, 1993; 
Barney, 1991, Grant, 1991). However, possessing resources with VRIN alone does not 
ensure that firms will have an edge over its rivals. A firm needs to have both VRIN 
resources and dynamic capabilities to retain a position of strength and sustain long-term 
profitability (Ambrosini & Bowman, 2009). Resources are required to be formed into a 
capability to yield competitive advantage; through resources and capabilities, firms 
develop core competencies which give them an edge over their rivals (Hitt et al. 2012).  
 
Dynamic capabilities are of various types; they can create new resources, reconstruct or 
assimilate existing resources or even remove resources which may have become 
obsolete. Bowman and Ambrosini (2003) explored the creation of resources and assets 
under four distinctive processes: reconfiguration (resource creation and consolidation 
for scale economies), leveraging (diversification of existing resources), learning 
(innovation through experimentation leading to failures or success with the aim to 
perform more efficiently and effectively) and finally integration (combining assets and 
resources leading to new resource configuration). Dynamic capabilities ‘focusses 
attention on the firm’s ability to renew its resources in line with changes in its 
environment’ (Ambrosini & Bowman, 2009, p. 45). Such an approach reflects the 
resource based view (further quoting Cavusgil et al. 2007; Teece et al., 1990). The 
resource based view as a corporate strategy requires firms in different settings with 
single-line businesses or diversified businesses to exploit available resources in a manner 
to get the best possible use (Peteraf, 1993). To succeed in unknown environments where 
an EMNE will be competing against the best alternative already present in that 
environment, strategies need to be resource-based (Wernerfelt, 1995). Moving to 
international markets, firms need to also develop or adopt regional or international 
advantages depending upon the proximity of the market they wish to venture into as it 
is possible that home advantages may not always work in host markets. Successful 
international firms build/develop their advantages and do not merely acquire it (Rugman 




EMNEs will have some inherent advantages in the form of existing resources (EMNE 
literature is provided in the section 2.5), though some scholars have questioned if EMNEs 
should be in possession of any capabilities or resources given the regressive nature of 
the home countries.  
 
Hence, the third step is to investigate whether Indian companies in the data-set require 
building capabilities to suit host-markets or are they able to transform existing 
capabilities to meet the needs of different host-markets?  
 
The questions formulated are as follows: 
 
Question 3a: Do Indian firms possess resources that enable them to diversify into 
international markets. If so then what type of properties do these resources have? 
Question 3b: To gain and maintain competitive advantage, do Indian firms need to 
continually make changes or supplement the resources that they possess?  
Question 3c: Does change in the environment cause Indian firms to create new resources 
while integrating, recombining or completely releasing existing resources? 
 
While globalisation is the integration of international markets into one large entity, the 
resource-based strategic model and capability-based model suggest that firm decisions 
are a response to industry pressures on the basis of their own specific capabilities where 
the industry characteristics are formed as a response to the various players making that 
industry (Tallman & F-Lindquist, 2002). A resource-based and capability-based model 
for internationalisation is depicted in Figure 4. 
 





Priem and Butler (2001) critiqued the resource base theory. The authors disputed it as 
a viable theoretical system not fully adaptable to empirical substantiation. This assertion 
was refuted by Barney (2001). While accepting the fact that Priem and Butler do direct 
international business researchers to dwell more deeply into a resource base view, 
attributes like understanding of the firm context in specific markets, inductive theory 
generalisability, parsimonious list of sustained strategic advantages and dynamic 
analysis of the resource base view, Barney stated that more pertinent questions around 
creation of strategic alternatives followed by arrogation and implementation of such 
alternatives remained unanswered.  
 
Over the years there have been other critiques of the resource base theory. Kraaijenbrink 
et al. (2010) summarised the criticisms into eight major themes and concluded that while 
the critical reviews cannot be rejected outright, resource base theory research needs to 
come out of the existing narrow neoclassical view to include a broader scope and 
understanding of firm resources, studying human involvement at various stages in the 
firm towards value-creation and long-term firm sustenance through competitive 
advantage as an outcome of firm resources. Establishing a clear link between resources 
and firm internationalisation and to find the connection between those resources and 
sustained competitive advantage is required to advance the resource based view 
research (Daellenbach & Rouse, 2007). They acknowledged that one of the limitations 
was the limited availability of longitudinal data. Barney et al. (2011) also pondered on 
the future of the resource base theory. They concluded that international business 
researchers needed to innovate along the lines of resource base theory linkage with 
other theories, acquisition and development of resources, sustainability, multi-
disciplinary approach to the resource base theory research and establishment of micro-
foundations of the resource base theory. While use of the resource base theory as a 
strategic management tool has generally taken a macro-view of the firms, there has 
been a call to study the micro-foundations. However, it has limiting factors in the form 
of being more arduous and costly (Foss, 2011); hence, in this study, we will maintain 
the macro analysis to study the firm as a whole. 
 
Mathews (2001) framed the ‘LLL’ model as an alternative to Dunning’s eclectic paradigm 
or the OLI model (1977, 2000) from the perspective of resource base to explain EMJNE 
internationalisation. ‘O’ stands for outward-oriented, implying accessing external 
resources, which are available in global markets rather than in the home market, thus 
the firm strategises to look outwards. ‘L’ denotes linkage (and leverage). How can the 
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resources be leveraged using existing linkages to overcome the barriers of new 
competition? ‘I’ is for integration, along with the rapid expansion through linkage and 
leverage, the firm needs to quickly integrate its internal operating assets and core 
capabilities so as not to be faced with a disproportionate imbalanced global operation. 
The resource leverage framework adds to Barney’s static VRIN based RBV view (2001) 
about opportunity capturing by EMNEs as they engage in internationalisation (Thite et 
al., 2016).   
  
Li (2003, 2007) has suggested an integrated model which encompasses the OLI and the 
LLL model within the content-process (internal, external, market performance) 
framework of MNE evolution (Figure 5). Internationalisation and all decisions relating to 
it is the strategic choice of the firm and dynamically viewed, the ‘spatial factors interact 
with the temporal factors’ (p. 314). MNE evolution is the macro view and 
internationalisation is a part of it. All related institutional and social elements need to be 
considered along with the associated business cycles for organisational learning during 
the various phases of MNE evolution.  
 
Figure 5: Framework of MNE Evolution 
 
 
While the understanding is that the resources based theory and the resource based view 
have different typology and analysis, it has been seen that the terms have been 
interchangeably used (refer article by Rugman & Verbeke, 2004). Many scholarly articles 
have also used the terms resources-based approach, resources-based perspective and 
resources-based model. Articles on resources-base generally mention similar scholars 
like Penrose, Barney, Peteraf, Wernerfelt for the theoretical basis for their articles. An 
extensive search was made to find any piece of work that differentiates the resource 
based view from the resource base theory. Articles mentioning the two separately talk 
about similar resources and resource characteristics and capabilities required for firms 
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for sustainable competitive advantage. Hence, while the literature review on resource 
base has categorically mentioned the resource base theory or the resource based view 
as has been the case in the articles cited, for the purpose of this study the term will be 
referred to as the resource based approach.  
 
2.6 Internationalisation and International Business Theory 
Earlier international business theories were based on various laws of economics like the 
product cycle hypotheses, labour productivity theory or transactional cost analysis. They 
focused on inter-country trade (and agreements and pacts), advantages of multi-
national organisations and their strategy, attractions of host countries, flows of capital, 
goods, labour and technology, and efficiency spill-overs, among a host of other topics.  
 
Theories which have often been used to explain FDI in general include the theory of 
market power (Hymer, 1960), which is a seminal piece of work based on his PhD thesis 
explaining the emergence and survival of the MNEs due to market imperfections; 
internalisation (Buckley and Casson, 1976) who postulate in their book that firms will 
seek to increase profits through lowering of transaction costs (Transaction Cost Theory, 
TC) as they create firms within the firm and have ownership of all these firms; the 
eclectic paradigm (Dunning, 1977, 2000) also known as the OLI framework (Ownership, 
Location and Internalisation) which establishes that the firm will look outward when it 
has all three advantages – ownership which encompasses exclusivity of the firm, 
locational advantages of the host country which suit the MNE, and internalisation that 
has already been explained above in this paragraph; and the stages model (Johanson & 
Vahlne, 1977), also known as the Uppsala Model, based on the internationalisation 
experience of Scandinavian manufacturing firms within Europe, which states that firms 
internationalise gradually, starting by exporting first to foreign markets through 
intermediaries and then by setting sales subsidiaries in such markets and then finally to 
setting up production operations in those host markets. Later, Johanson and Vahlne 
extended the Uppsala Model (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009) to take into consideration that 
internationalisation does not work in silos but within networks of relationship and 
knowledge creation.  
 
Rugman (2010) has stated that Dunning’s OLI model is too broad in definition. He is of 
the view that the empirical research to prove the OLI paradigm is firm specific rather 
than industry-focussed; for example, he points out that some of the ‘O’ advantages are 
‘country factors’ (p. 2) which Dunning argues can be used to the specific advantage of 
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the firm. Similarly, MNEs can exploit the ‘L’ advantages of host countries in conjunction 
with the local governments to turn them into ‘O’ advantages. Finally, with regard to ‘I’ 
advantages, the same is restricted to benefits via transaction costs and does not consider 
the resource based view explanation of firm efficiency. Rugman has then attempted to 
reconcile the internalisation theory and the eclectic paradigm. He has used the firm 
specific advantages (FSA) and the country specific advantages (CSA) as ‘key 
determinants of FDI’ (Rugman, 2010, p. 5) to develop a matrix model (designed by 
Rugman, 1981; Rugman & Verbeke, 2008) and fitted the OLI model into the matrix from 
the perspective of the home country while recognising that the locational aspect of the 
OLI model is specific to host countries. He has further considered the four motives for 
FDI (as conceptualised by Dunning, 1992), which are resources, market, efficiency and 
asset seeking, and concluded that these motives can also be incorporated into the 
FSA/CSA matrix and provides direction for home country OFDI.  
 
Buckley (2009) has commented that emerging market MNEs pose frequent challenges 
to the established international business theories as they ‘refute orthodoxy’ and behave 
very differently from the conventional multinational (p. 322). He has further quoted in 
his paper from 2007 (Buckley et al., 2007) to explain how the ‘emergence of Chinese 
multinationals can be explained as a special application of the general theory of the 
growth of the firm by internalisation of the imperfect markets’ (p. 322) mainly because 
of the peculiarity of the imperfect Chinese capital market.  
 
In a recent paper, emphasis has again been laid on the fact that established international 
business theories were entrenched in the studies of investment by Developed Market 
Multinational Companies (DMNCs) and hence an assumption or hypothesis based on the 
same may not be relevant for EMNEs investing in developed markets (Buckley et al., 
2014). Emerging market countries differ significantly from developed markets culturally, 
politically and the basic institutional environment (Goldstein, 2007 quoted by Buckley et 
al., 2014) and hence companies from such emerging markets will also differ vastly from 
their developed market counterparts and so will their internationalisation experience.  
 
Ramamurti (2012) raised the question as to why emerging markets produce MNEs at all 
as the companies from such economies were not expected to have any ownership 
advantages due to their relative technological backwardness. He goes to explain that 
EMNEs may have ownership advantages but different from the ones that are/were seen 
in DMNCs. It is critical that researchers recognise this and have an open-minded view 
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and consider empirical ground research for such advantages. He also queried the right 
or wrong way of internationalisation (the ‘development path’ of countries), the concept 
of which is credited to Dunning (1981) and then Dunning & Narula (1996). The EMNEs 
are different from DMNCs as their strategic DNA is different from their more developed 
counterparts in that some are ‘born global’ in a flatter world and therefore have the 
ability to exploit opportunities more effectively. Ramamurti (2012) also questioned the 
relevance of the stages model to explain EMNEs, stating that EMNEs investments 
persistently displays a south-north flow, a phenomenon that has not been considered in 
the stages model. 
 
The new paradigm of development (NPD, Dunning, 2006) explores what the 
development path of economies should be and what role should institutions play 
(Institutional Theory, InT) in such a development and ‘theorising about determinants of 
TNC activity in developing countries’ (p. 174). 
 
To this we can also add the Agency Theory (AT) practices as a strategy that firms follow 
when seeking to invest in countries similar or different to home country environment.  
 
The investment development path (IDP) (Dunning, 1981; Dunning and Narula, 1996) 
shows the five stages of the development path of countries in light of IFDI and OFDI. 
Overseas investment by EMNEs has been sought to be explained on the basis of IDP. 
However, in the case of emerging markets (especially India), industrialisation was an 
outcome of import substitution rather than IFDI, and OFDI emerged much before the 
stage as per IDP and substantial flows have been to developed nations (Athreya & Kapur, 
2009). India has had an untypical leapfrog development model (Buckley et al., 2009). 
India OFDI has been firm specific rather than a national representative trend and if the 
corporate guarantee figures are added to OFDI numbers then OFDI has exceeded IFDI 
in certain years which is expected to happen only at the last stage of IFDI when the 
country is developed (Sathye, 2008). 
 
In the last few years, there have been attempts to explain EMNEs actions through a 
different lens. Mathews (2006) framework around the three L’s (linkage, learning and 
leverage) can be applied to EMNEs, which explains how firms use linkages to 
internationalise, then focus on leveraging resources and finally learn from repeated 
application of the first two processes to become more effective. Banga (2007) has 
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categorised drivers of OFDI from developing countries into three factors: trade-related, 
capability-related and domestic factors.  
 
Some studies have shown that existing international business theories may not perfectly 
expound OFDI from emerging markets. Hence, there is a need to revaluate the 
internationalisation path of these firms and as Tan and Myer (2010) have suggested, 
particularly study the resources available to the EMNEs as they manoeuvre their way to 
become international firms. 
 
Griffith et al. (2008) assessed emerging themes and research agendas in international 
business, and they used the Delphi method to identify the most prolific authors in six 
leading international business journals over a ten-year period from 1996 and described 
the themes of past international business research. They further provided these themes 
to a select group of respondents to identify the potential future themes of international 
business research and presented their results. One of the themes on company 
internationalisation process questions the evolution of firm’s internationalisation process, 
difference in the experience of firms in various sectors during the process of 
internationalisation and what ‘contextual factors moderate’ such process (p. 1226). 
 
Using the above emerging theme, this study therefore investigates the 
internationalisation process pathway of service sector firms from India and further 
attempts to investigate any disparity in such process from what has already been 
investigated and discussed in existing internationalisation literature.     
 
2.6.1 Internationalisation Literature 
Until about the mid-1970s, international trade (export and import) was the main focus 
of international business studies and it was only post this period that the concept of FDI 
gained recognition (Buckley and Lessard, 2005). While world trade in absolute numbers 
is much higher than world investment flows7, as a percentage investment (FDI) has 
grown by 477% versus 276% growth in trade over the past two decades. Companies do 
not only want to stay in their home countries but are choosing to invest overseas. Which 
leads us to ask if benefits of overseas investment are higher than the costs associated 
                                                          
7 World trade which includes both merchandise and commercial services was USD 23,874 billion in 2014 





with it? Contractor (2007) determines that companies investing overseas go through 
three stages of internationalisation, namely: early internationalisation (a stage where 
they face unfamiliarity with the foreign markets); later internationalisation (length of 
internationalisation during early stages finally results in benefits); and excessive 
internationalisation (incremental internationalisation in all types of market may lead to 
reduced profits). He is of the view that the benefits reaped are higher than the associated 
costs in the second stage of internationalisation (though there are various views on the 
direction of the relationship and past internationalisation).  
 
The earlier notion that MNEs competed in international markets on the basis of 
internalised advantage is gradually getting displaced by the belief that the new MNEs 
are more of ‘international learner, coordinator, cross-border arbitrageur, multiple-
network alliance partner, and integrator across borders’ (p. 462, further quoting 
Palmisano, 2006; Contractor & Lorange, 2002). Overseas performance depends upon 
the mode of entry and also the location of entry and not each and every type of 
experience provides similar benefits but can also have negative impacts (Buckley et al., 
2014). Some firms are born global and do not wait to reach a stage of maturity to 
internationalise. They have set their sights on international markets right from their 
inception (Knight & Cavusgil, 2004; Weerawardena et al., 2007; Singal & Jain, 2012 
quoting Rennie, 1993). The concept of born global is ingrained in three interrelated 
attributes - new market conditions, technological advancement in many areas, and 
capabilities of the managers (Nummela et al., 2004 quoting Madsen & Servais, 1997). 
These firms are typically smaller in size and relatively more flexible in nature so as to 
quickly adapt to international markets. The founders and managers often begin with a 
global vision and already have inherent capabilities to conceptualise international 
strategies due to past such experience having worked with DMNCs. They focus on 
innovative products and create dynamic capabilities in the form of international customer 
support (processes that create value for the relationship of the firm with its customer) 
as their model for success (Khavul et al. 2010a). 
 
Firms possess resources and capabilities which are heterogeneous in nature and helps 
determine the choice that a firm makes in regard to its internationalisation (Gaur et al., 
2014). Resources and capabilities which are firm specific are important for firm 
internationalisation and for EMNEs these differ from the developed market firms as 
EMNEs rely on specific advantages gained from competitive strength in the home 
market, cheap labour and a traditional customer base (Gaur et al., 2014). 
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Geographic diversification can reduce risk for the firm to a certain extent as business 
cycles will not be synchronous in different geographies, firms can hedge against 
exchange risk if they use a combination of currencies (though this is debatable due to 
the fact that most firms deal in three major currencies: USD, GBP and Euro; and this 
fact was observed during my 11 years’ work experience as an international banker), and 
have greater flexibility with multiple production facilities. Contractor (2007) states that 
it is unequivocal that there is a net positive effect of internationalisation. 
 
While internationalisation has its benefits, there are difficulties that firms can face during 
the process of internationalisation. From a resource based perspective, the difficulties 
that a firm faces during internationalisation could be in the form of loss of advantage 
from the specific resources transferred overseas and which may actually turn 
disadvantageous and lack of complementary resources required for international 
operations (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2007). The causes behind this are various - resources 
transferred may lose their VRIN properties in the new country; products created by using 
the resources transferred are not usable/viable in the host country; resource capability 
within home country context becomes disadvantageous with respect to host country 
context; host country hostility to certain products or country of origin or institutional 
factors; and strong competition from host country own home grown companies. The 
firm can face one or a combination of these issues in one or multiple foreign markets. 
Decision making through self-learning by managers differs from country to country 
(Aharoni et al. 2011). In a quantitative study on Latin American companies, Thomas et 
al. (2007) found that managers can become over-confident from the knowledge gained 
from internal internationalisation and can face failures during subsequent external 
internationalisation (especially in internationalisation into developed markets). This can 
deter these firms to further internationalise due to initial failures, which could 
tantamount to failed opportunities due to non-utilisation of knowledge during the 
process of the failed venture. Resources and capabilities are crucial for 
internationalisation for firms from emerging markets (Liu, et al., 2011).    
 
Hence, companies wishing to internationalise must adopt solid business strategies, be 
willing to learn from mistakes, and may test knowledge from internationalisation in 





So, the fourth step is to comprehend if the Indian companies in the data set follow 
divergent strategies depending upon the host country? 
 
The questions to answer the same are as follows: 
 
Question 4a: How do Indian firms manage diverse host country advantages which may 
differ from home country advantages? 
Question 4b: In the absence of home country advantages in a host country, do Indian 
firms meet with the same degree of success as achieved in their home markets? 
Question 4c: Can Indian firms replicate a favourable business outcome from one host 
market to another host market? 
 
While the IFDI far exceeds the OFDI flows in emerging markets, post the financial crisis 
there was a doubt as to how much decline will be seen in the overseas investment from 
emerging markets (Sauvant et al., 2009) especially developing Asia (Hill & Jongwanich, 
2009). However, such crises affect all entities, some more than others. It was expected 
that lower asset prices may actually create opportunities for EMNEs to actively acquire.  
 
So, finally we want to ascertain how does the external environment affect 
internationalisation strategies in any way and if yes, then how; and if not, then why?  
 
For this question, the global financial crisis of 2007-08 has been taken as the reference 
point as the most significant event during the past couple of decades which is also the 
period when India has seen a significant outflow of overseas investment and the 
companies in the data set have also had substantial OFDI flow. Thus, the sub questions 
are as follows:  
 
Question 5a: How has the global financial crisis affected the company’s 
internationalisation strategies?  
Question 5b: What action has the company taken to counter the effects of the same? 
 
The next section (2.8) provides the logical pathway of the research questions graphically 





2.7 Graphical Representation of the Research Questions Logical 
Pathway  
 
Figure 6: Graphical Representation of the Research Questions Logical Pathway 
 
 
2.8 Chapter Conclusion 
Dynamic capabilities and the resource based approach have been studied at great 
length; however, there is limited research on emerging market economies and especially 
in the context of international business. An empirical study of the internationalisation 
path of the services industry of an emerging economy like India is expected to contribute 
to the literature. Contribution towards understanding dynamic capabilities of these firms 
and the strategies that they adopt on the strength of these capabilities towards 
internationalisation is also expected. Further, if the companies in the data set gain 
competitive advantage which may be derived from the tenacity of available or acquired 
resources and the final success or failure in host markets can also have potential for 
significant contribution to research. 
 
Ambrosini and Bowman (2009) say that there is a dearth of empirical studies in dynamic 
capabilities and a potential problem that may occur is the wide occurrence of quantitative 
studies which may provide a repetitive issue of examining only firm performance. The 
authors go on to state the need to study firms as cases which have sustained competitive 
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advantage in dynamic environments and to understand where and how managers use 
or need dynamic capabilities (quoting Pablo et al., 2007). This would enhance the 
strategy-as-practice field which examines the work of managers and the reasons behind 
their work. Teece (2014) states that international business literature has been strongly 
influenced by transaction cost theory with limited emphasis on entrepreneurship and 
capabilities and it is imperative that international business scholars also view MNEs from 
an entrepreneurial/capability lens towards a unified theory of the MNE enabling a fruitful 
dialogue between practising managers and management scholars.  
 
Reviewing internationalisation literature, Hitt et al. (2006) stated that international 
management research would greatly benefit from the study of EMNE internationalisation 
operational strategy and processes. Today’s EMNEs have internationalised in an 
environment far removed from that when the early MNEs emerged from developed 
markets (Gammeltoft et al., 2010, b) and therefore do provide basis to challenge extant 
internationalisation theories and hence there is scope to continue to study EMNE 
internationalisation through different lenses (Jormanainen & Koveshnikov, 2012).  
 
Hence, understanding EMNE internationalisation based on the five service sector 
companies studied for this thesis, nature of their internationalisation and actions based 
on their resources and capabilities and effect of a significant change in the external 






3. Research Methodology 
 
The objective of this thesis is to investigate the business strategies and associated 
competitive advantage of Indian companies in the services sector on the path of their 
internationalisation. 
 
As has been mentioned earlier, with OFDI increasing from developing economies both 
into other developing countries and the developed world, there is an increasing interest 
among international business scholars to study EMNEs and the associated competitive 
advantage and business strategies towards internationalisation. 
 
Data has been gathered through interviews of key personnel involved in strategic 
decision making in the selected Indian MNCs in the services sector. Further data in the 
form of information available in the public domain has been gathered to attempt 
triangulation for validity and reliability. Hence, this study has adopted a case-based 
qualitative approach. Reasons for adopting such an approach and the analysis 
description have been discussed further in the chapter.  
 
3.1 International Business Research Methods 
International business is very broad in nature. It deals with questions about MNEs and 
how and why they venture, operate, succeed or fail in markets other than their own. 
While international business also includes trade (export and import), the most important 
aspect of international business is to understand about FDI. Various international 
business theories have already been discussed in the introduction chapter (Chapter 1). 
To provide a gist, earlier international business theories were based on various laws of 
economics. Theory of market power, Hymer’s seminal work in 1960 paved the path 
towards explanation of FDI. Buckley and Cason (1976) postulate the notion of 
internalisation. The eclectic paradigm or OLI (Dunning, 1977, 2000) has formed the 
backbone of international business theorising. Dunning (1992) further conceptualised 
the main motives for FDI, which were resources, market, efficiency and asset seeking. 
Rugman (2010) attempted to reconcile the internalisation theory and the eclectic 
paradigm stating that FSA and CSA were key determinants of FDI. IDP theory (Dunning, 
1981; Dunning and Narula, 1996) postulated the stages of development that a country 
may follow given the levels of IFDI and OFDI in that country. When emerging markets 
joined the international business fray, Dunning (2006) developed the NPD model 
discussing the development path of economies and the role of institutions in such a 
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development. Strategies of firms when seeking to invest in other countries formed the 
basis of agency theory. To further understand emerging market OFDI, Mathews (2006) 
used linkage, learning and leverage to explain EMNE OFDI and Banga (2007) added 
trade-related, capability-related and domestic factors as drivers of OFDI from developing 
countries. There is a continued interest in developing further theories which explain 
EMNE overseas investment as it has been observed that extant international business 
theories based on developed markets do not perfectly expound OFDI from emerging 
markets. 
 
As mentioned above, earlier international business theories were based on various laws 
of economics and there is a general consensus across most of the schools of economic 
thought that ‘quantitative and statistical approaches are a suitable and integral part of 
economic method’ (Buckley & Chapman, 1996; p. 235) and it has been observed over 
time that the majority of international business and business study researchers have 
adopted quantitative methods to test the various theories. This is a fairly strong bias. In 
an informal gathering of international business scholars, it was mentioned that choosing 
a qualitative approach for the research project, any publication may be difficult to 
achieve. However, in recent times there has been a bent towards qualitative study in 
the international business space. 
 
Journal of International Business Studies (JIBS) in a special issue in 2011 invited authors 
to suggest ways in which qualitative research could make a comeback into international 
business research. In the introduction of this issue, Birkinshaw et al. have stated that 
they feel that there is a missing link between ‘the more grounded perspective of many 
individual-level studies’ (p. 575) and an attempt to generalise the theories developed by 
viewing the organisations through the eyes of economists and strategists. They feel that 
this missing link or void can be filled with qualitative research as it can be used to 
comprehend how ‘culture and context’ play a role in the ‘collaboration and integration of 
activities.’ This would further provide an insight into how individuals collaborate across 
contexts, which is something that the authors feel has eluded organisational process 
scholars.  
 
Doz, in the same issue (2011), mentions that international business is multidisciplinary 
in essence; however, it remains unexplored and the international business authors have 
rather chosen to fit their research into existing theories borrowed from other fields or 
restricted themselves to ‘data driven inductive empiricism’ (p. 582). He feels that 
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qualitative research can bring an edge to international business research wherein 
new/original theories, specific to international business, can be developed and tested. 
Burgelman (2011), echoes similar views that through longitudinal qualitative research; 
new international business theories can be generated.  
 
International business is about the overseas investment of companies around the world. 
These companies could have one or a combination of strategic motivations to invest 
overseas. These motivations could rise out of initiatives, internal organisation, managers 
and owners, resources, performance, and the environment. Hence, strategic 
management (SM) can play an important role in interpreting the internationalisation path 
of MNEs which is considered a domain of international business. Thus, SM theories can 
be adopted to understand an international business concept.  
 
In an article in 2002, Buckley debated whether the themes around the flow of FDI, 
concept of the MNE and their emergence and strategies and stages of a firm’s 
internationalisation enabling globalisation were passé. He called for international 
business researchers to identify what new was required in the international business 
field and also suggested that new world emerging economies should be the focus for 
new research. Later, based on 30 years of research collaboration results, Buckley and 
Casson (2009) opined that international business questions have raised additional 
multiple questions and that the current questions have evolved with the times and the 
changing global business scenario. They felt that progress in international business 
research agenda should continue to cover formalising and testing theories; entry 
strategy for firms into foreign markets; international joint ventures; innovations; and the 
effect of culture on international business.  
 
During such times and as mentioned earlier, other international business researchers 
have followed and endorsed using quantitative methods for testing international 
business theories. However, as this research is about understanding an international 
business concept (internationalisation) on the basis of SM theory, a qualitative method 
has been embraced. The rest of the chapter is dedicated to explaining the richness of 
qualitative research, justification for the method adopted and its limitations, and the 
method within qualitative research that will be adopted for study of the research 




3.2 Qualitative Research Methods 
Qualitative research has a ‘rich diversity of techniques’ with various roles and ‘variety of 
approaches’ (Cassell et al., 2006, p. 301). There is a misconception that qualitative 
research is but just a prologue eventually leading to a quantifiable study. This is 
debatable. Different philosophical positions with their various contributions have much 
to offer to qualitative research which then can further add to the business and 
management studies (Cassell et al., 2006).  
 
3.2.1 Philosophical Perspective 
A researcher can decide on which methodological path to select. This selection can be 
made through the philosophical perspective. Each paradigm has its own ontology, 
epistemology and assumptions about the research methods that can be used (Guba & 
Lincoln, 1994). Research is about gathering data (within accepted moral and ethical 
boundaries) in a systematic manner about the social world and analysing this data to 
derive conclusions. These conclusions could then provide a reflection about the world in 
general. One can use either a deductive approach where ‘theory guides research’ that is 
testing through instances pre-determine theories and generalisations or an inductive 
approach where ‘theory is an outcome of research’ where theory or generalisations are 
established after studying a phenomenon (Bryman & Bell 2011, p. 4; Hyde, 2000). The 
research methodology, which refers to the system of enquiry (for example positivism, 
interpretivism, realism and others) and strategy, which refers to the type of method used 
(for example data collection methods, analysis, or interpretation) need to be confirmed 
and justified along with the research design adopted (which should be reliable, replicable 
and valid) (Linstead, 2013). Study of organisations can combine both theory and its 
application and different research methodologies (quantitative and qualitative, Denison 
1996). 
 
Organisational studies and management as a field have been historically classified under 
the social sciences. However, there is a difference between the study of organisations 
and social science due to the nature of the stakeholder. Remenyi et al. (2005) point out 
that the stakeholders in business tend to be a more varied group within a constantly 
changing environment and they tend to have a more financially driven interest rather 
than the other social sciences where the interest is of a more academic nature. 
Organisations are made up of human beings, who can speak, think, rationalise and 
debate. The research methods from the pure sciences cannot be replicated for 
researching organisational behaviour as those are based on ‘eternal laws’ (Marschan-
81 
 
Piekkari & Welch, 2011). However, some forms of social science research methods (like 
ethnographic study from anthropology and or psychoanalytical tests from psychology) 
have been adopted for management studies. While past researchers have used both 
quantitative and qualitative methods, it has been felt that as organisations grew in 
complexity, it would be far more beneficial to use qualitative methods to study 
organisational behaviour. Hence, the researcher’s philosophical bent would be that of an 
interpretivist cum constructivist.  
 
Research methodology used in the pure sciences or other social sciences are seen to be 
inadequate to capture the intricacies of organisational behaviour and research.  Van 
Maanen (1979) states that the ‘qualitative and quantitative methods are not mutually 
exclusive’ (p. 520). He has very clearly argued for using qualitative methods in 
organisational research. He has given the example of an instinctive reaction to an 
oncoming speeding truck to portray the interpretive procedure required by a qualitative 
researcher to identify such symbols and record pattern of responses based on the same. 
Once a given phenomenon based on such recordings is established, this can then be 
further fit into quantitative studies for theorising. He stresses the need for organisational 
research based on qualitative methodology to increase the extent of such studies for a 
more reflective discovery and insight into organisational behaviour.  Consequently, 
researchers in organisational behaviour have been prodded to expand their research 
methodology and to keep an open mind to more effectively understand organisational 
culture. 1980s is the period when the concept of ‘postmodernism,’ which ‘rejects the 
notion that any organisational issue can be studied with one universal method of 
scientific inquiry’ (Linstead 2013, p.4), gained in popularity among the social sciences 
(Alvesson, 1995). Postmodernism suggests that the actual happening of the real world 
cannot be systematically agglomerated, because research methods of conceptualising 
have inherent gaps (Chia, 2002).  
 
Michel Foucault, a French philosopher, has greatly influenced postmodern thinking with 
his contribution (Genealogy or in his interpretation ‘full control through centralisation of 
power’).  Although he did not believe that he belonged to the postmodernism genre 
(Burrell, 1988) his ideas were seen as being anti-modern and hence his work is generally 
considered under postmodernism philosophy. He believed in the superiority of power 
over knowledge. The ‘deconstruction’ theory (study of text) of Jacques Derrida, a French 
philosopher, has also greatly influenced postmodernism as a way of organisational 
analysis. Organisations are made up of humans and their chief modes of communication 
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are through symbols, spoken language (Cooper 1989 further quoting Pondy & Mitroff 
1979) and writing. The formalisation of these three components is a form of control that 
can be analysed to understand organisations. Derrida states that deconstructing these 
components can unveil the underlying dynamics of an organisation even so far as to 
threaten its stability. He states that an organisation can be logically reflected through its 
disorganisation. Discourse analysis, which is a way of understanding inter-social 
communication and relationships, is another approach that has been considered 
synonymous with postmodernism. Foucault had said that a discourse is not only what 
people say but it is more a regulated system of statements. Derrida’s deconstruction 
theory has also influenced discourse analysis based research.  
 
Explaining postmodernism in light of organisational study would show ‘human activity to 
be essentially reactive or defensive’ (Cooper & Burrell 1988, p. 106). Humans are social 
animals and react differently in different situations. While, there are different leadership 
styles, a single individual in a similar role but in different settings could react in two 
distinct manners. For example, when confronted with a challenging personnel situation, 
a leader may react very differently in one cultural context as opposed to another. In 
dealing with such situations, a researcher of organisational studies needs to be intimately 
involved with the organisation in various ways and methods and be able to effectively 
understand the responses and then to theorise.  
 
Whether organisational studies/management is an art or a science has been a topic of 
great debate. Morgan and Smircich (1980), very soon after Van Maaren’s (1979) call for 
reclaiming qualitative methods for organisational research, made a case for the same. 
However, they did not wish for one type of methodology to be replaced by another. 
Rather, they tried to highlight the fundamental core of the required research, which may 
then favour one methodology over the other. They restricted themselves to an 
interpretive and functionalist paradigm while leaving out the radical (humanist and 
structuralist) paradigm. They clearly pointed out that their aim was not to continue the 
debate on the right or wrong advocate in determining any given approach; rather it was 
their attempt to point the researcher towards studying the various assumptions or 
propositions or questions of their research and to adopt the epistemological method 
most suited for the study that they undertake. The choice of method should depend 
upon the phenomenon being studied and in the case of social sciences there is a 
requirement of reflexivity.  
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Daft (1983) advised management researchers to treat research as a craft wherein the 
activities cannot be analysed in a straightforward manner (further quoting Perrow, 1967) 
due to obscurity of cause and effect relationships and procedural complications. While 
he took the stance of the pragmatic researcher and provided similes between 
management observation and scientific experiments, the mere suggestion of treating 
research as a craft points towards an interpretivist perspective. He was keen to develop 
new methods to obtain cogent knowledge about organisations and urged the mature 
breed of researchers to explore ways of making their work intriguing and rewarding.  
 
Alvesson and Kärreman (2007) sought to actively discover theory and advised against 
relying solely on data for social research. The authors believed in looking for mysteries 
in research and then solving those mysteries. The authors’ objective, as constructionist 
researchers, was to pave a path ‘of breakdown induced theory development’ (p. 1267). 
A constructionist is one who believes in enhancing knowledge through continuous 
learning and evolving along the way (constructionist is arising out of Papert’s 
Constructionism theory and is further based on the learning of Piaget’s Constructivism 
as quoted in Ackerman 2001). In Papert’s own words (along with Harel, 1991), 
constructionism adds to the constructivist’s view of ‘building knowledge structures’ 
irrespective of the circumstances wherein the ‘learner’ is engaged in ‘constructing a 
public entity.’ Alvesson and Kärreman (2007) admitted that organisations were very 
complex and could be rather difficult to decipher. Data alone could not be reliable and 
should not be force-fitted into the theory. Rather they sought to look for deviants (or 
breakdowns) in the empirical material which would allow researchers to delve further 
into their material to solve these deviations and come up with new theories which could 
fit the data rather than try and squeezing existing theories into the data found 
(reductionist view). 
 
Cunliffe (2011) continued the argument for qualitative research in organisational studies. 
Like Daft, she also stated that organisational research is a craft in the way the 
organisational life is portrayed through close observational analysis. She claimed that 
each problematic while dealing with any one characteristic, treats them differently; 
however, within each problematic, the dealing of all the characteristics were somewhat 
similar. As per Cunliffe, objectivists would fall under the single hermeneutic category 
(humans can predict and use replicable knowledge for improving the required 
surrounding); subjectivists would come under the double hermeneutic (observations and 
interpretations get influenced by experience of own and surrounding); intersubjectivists 
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get categorised under reflexive hermeneutic (on going interpretations of self and 
surrounding based on interactions). She, therefore, furthering Morgan and Smircich’s 
(1980) question of whether human knowledge is gained outside their social construct (I 
refer to this as comfort zone wherein an individual knows his surrounding and if he is 
willing to step out of it to amass more knowledge), states that this would depend on the 
problematic, and given the categorisation, subjectivist and the intersubjectivist would 
answer ‘no’ and the objectivist would answer ‘yes.’ She also urged researchers of 
organisational studies to explore more than one method that could fit into their study so 
as to give a wholesome argument for their discoveries about the organisations which 
today are more complex and have various verticals which need to be studied individually 
or in relation to each other depending upon the research study undertaken.  
    
However, there remain many researchers who are confirmed functionalists and 
positivists. Donaldson (2005) belongs to this genre and was influenced by the Aston 
school (known for its positivist approach to theory). He was also greatly influenced by 
science fiction and Eysenck (who has sought ‘scientific approach to psychology,’ clearly 
refuting Freud’s unscientific approach, p. 1073). Donaldson chose to defend his own 
research rather than rebuking others (for example accepting Chandler’s strategy-
structure thesis derived by using case studies for organisational research which the Aston 
school was cynical about). He calls himself an integrationist and one who sees 
‘organisational theory as a policy science’ (quoting Reed 1985, 1989, p. 1076). 
 
Then there are others (realists) who choose the middle path and do not reject either the 
quantitative approach or the qualitative approach and may use any one or both types of 
methodologies. As Onwuegbuzie and Leech (2005) point out, researchers need to be 
pragmatic and can strengthen their results by combining both the qualitative and 
quantitative methods. They have pointed out similarities between the two approaches 
(‘methodological pluralism,’ p. 382) and have criticised the barriers affecting such 
pluralism emanating mainly out of alienation by one side or the other of the 
methodological divide.  
 
Philosophy is significant for organisational analysis (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). However, 
the role of philosophy in discussions around organisations and the field of management 
have not been considered of paramount importance (Linstead & Linstead, 2005). The 
authors state that to ‘represent’, ‘knowing’ and ‘becoming’ of an organisation, scholars 
of organisation studies and management should draw upon philosophy in a more 
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definitive and instinctual way. It is important here to take a philosophical stand and ratify 
the acceptance.  
 
3.2.2 Philosophical Position 
My philosophical stance leans towards an interpretivist-constructivism paradigm. The 
study will be exploratory in nature and while it does not actively seek inductive 
theorising, the research will be open to any such discovery. As a researcher of a 
phenomenon which has been not been analysed in depth, the main endeavour here is 
the pursuit of knowledge, to understand the why and how of the phenomenon.  
 
The interpretevist paradigm involves the use of multiplicity of research methods for the 
social construction of organisational life (Kelemen & Rumens, 2008). It has not been as 
commonly used as the positivist paradigm in business and management research (Myers, 
2009); however, it has gained popularity since the late 1990s. An interpretivist 
researcher will try to analyse a phenomenon by understanding what meaning people 
assign to it; they do not commence with a hypothesis of dependent or independent 
variable but ‘focus instead on the complexity of human sense-making as the situation 
emerges’ (further quoting Kaplan & Maxwell, 1994, p. 38).  
 
The social researcher is expected to study the phenomenon from the inside. However, 
in this research work knowledge is expected to be gathered through analysing the 
interviews of key personnel involved in the phenomenon under research, which is 
interpreting the strategic motivations of Indian firms’ internationalisation, without 
actually becoming a part of the social setting that is being studied as it is difficult to get 
these companies to agree to participant observation for disclosure and access issues. 
However, unstructured, open-ended interviews with the key strategic personnel will 
provide enough evidence to answer the research questions (Buckley & Chapman, 1996).  
 
Realism as a paradigm has greatly influenced the field of strategy (Mir & Watson, 2000 
further quoting Godfrey & Hill, 1995). A realist would try to be as close to the truth as 
possible; there are only two outcomes for a realist, which is that the theory is either true 
or false and this can be discerned only through ‘reason’. ‘To be a realist is to, minimally, 
assert that many entities exist independently of us and our investigations of them 
(Ackroyd & Fleetwood, 2000, p. 6). Realism is more ontologically focussed with 
understanding the nature of being. However, the social world is made up of humans; 
organisations are made up of humans. To understand the social world or the 
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organisations present therein, it is important to view it from the perspective of those 
who live in it (Kelemen & Rumens, 2008); this is what forms the crux of constructivism. 
The phenomenon under study should be explained through the actions of the people 
responsible for such phenomenon. Actions by the humans within the organisations are 
due to their experiences of different situations rather than a direct reaction to external 
forces (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). Constructivism aims to provide accounts of 
individuals and how they reach a particular decision.     
 
I have stated above that my philosophical stance is leaning towards an interpretivist-
constructivism paradigm. Burrell and Morgan (1979) have emphasised on paradigm 
incommensurability. However, there has been a shift towards multi-paradigm research 
in the fields of management, organisational studies and international business (Keleman 
& Rumens, 2008). An interpretive approach uses qualitative methods like interviewing 
and analysis of existing documents so as to construct a meaningful reality through the 
interaction between the researchers and the researched. Interpretivist positions are 
established on the theoretical belief that reality is socially constructed within the 
relationships of social settings and are generally fluid.  
 
Hence, intrepretivism and constructivism are related approaches to research that are 
characteristic of particular philosophical world views. Schwandt (1994) states 
‘proponents of these persuasions share the goal of understanding the complex world of 
lived experience from the point of view of those who live it. This goal is variously spoken 
of as an abiding concern for the life world, from the emic point of view, for understanding 
meaning, for grasping the actor’s definition of a situation, for Verstehen. The world of 
lived reality and situation-specific meanings that constitute the general object of 
investigation is thought to be constructed by social actors’ (p. 118). So, through this 
philosophical underpinning, this study will attempt to analyse the strategic motivations 
behind firm internationalisation by interpreting the dialogues that will be held with the 
people in these firms who are responsible for such strategic actions.   
  
3.2.3 Organisational Studies and International Business Studies 
A question that may arise here is, why from discussing international business, the 
researcher has switched to explaining organisational studies. International business 
concerns itself with inter-country trade (and agreements and pacts), advantages of 
multi-national organisations and their strategy, attractions of host countries, flows of 
capital, goods, labour and technology, and efficiency spill-overs, among a host of other 
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topics. In this research project, the researcher will study organisations and specifically 
the motivational strategies of firm internationalisation. Hence, the philosophical 
perspective of the researcher from the point of view of organisational study was 
explained in the earlier section. Studying organisations is entwined with international 
business studies.  
 
3.2.4 Adopting a Qualitative Study 
A qualitative approach should not be adopted just to be different in a field that leans 
towards another approach (quantitative here); as Silverman (2010) makes a point, ‘last 
thing you want to do is re-invent the wheel’ (pp. 13). Rather, a particular research 
methodology should be selected because it is the best means by which to find the 
answers to the particular research questions being addressed.  
 
When should a qualitative approach be adopted? Creswell (2013) points out that it is 
appropriate to use qualitative research when an issue needs to be explored wherein the 
variables cannot be measured, when individual stories need to be captured and when 
theories need to be developed due to the fact that existing theories do not fully or only 
partially explain the phenomenon that is being investigated. In situations that require 
the investigation of a phenomenon on which much information is not available, and, 
where for such investigation, complex organisations need to be studied from the inside 
but ‘controlled’ approaches may not be possible – in such situations, a qualitative method 
will be most suitable (Gillham, 2000).     
 
The researcher is the majority stakeholder in the research project (Camerorn & Price, 
2009). As a stake holder, the researcher is required to evaluate their motives, skills (both 
present and needed), available networks and disposable time to decide on which 
research method will be best suited so that the research can generate a useful 
contribution towards the selected field of work. 
 
Another key question that the researcher needs to address before embracing research 
strategies is why the research is being conducted and who the audience is that is 
interested in that research (Bryman & Bell 2011). These questions form the basis of 
business research and can help the researcher narrow down the research methodology 




3.3 Qualitative Case Study Method 
Within a qualitative study, there are different approaches that a researcher can take. It 
is important to identify the exact approach, what it means, why it is being used, and 
how it will inform the process of the research study (Creswell, 2013). Creswell identifies 
the following five approaches to qualitative research: a narrative research, which is a 
collection of stories about an individual gathered through various means which are then 
analysed within a given context; phenomenological research, which is also a collection 
of stories but from different individuals who are connected due to their experience of a 
common phenomenon and these experiences are then analysed and presented; 
grounded theory research, which is theory building  when an explanatory theory is not 
available and hence the researcher studies a specific aspect and derives an explanation 
or theory out of it which can then tested by conducting further experiments or studies; 
ethnographic research, which can be considered as an extension of grounded theory 
research wherein the participants studied are bounded by a common cultural background 
and are present/available at a common place; and finally case study research, which ‘is 
a qualitative approach in which the investigator explores a real-life, contemporary 
bounded system (a case) or multiple bounded systems (cases) over time through a 
detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of information and then 
reports a case description and case themes’ (pp. 97).   
 
Yin (2009) says that if the research question seeks to answer ‘how’ and why’ questions, 
a case study approach will be more relevant and more so if the research question 
requires a comprehensive examination of a social phenomenon.  
 
Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) state that case studies are the perfect bridge between 
inductive theory building and deductive theory testing. Going a step forward, Welch et 
al. (2011) take a pluralist approach towards international business research and give 
new vision of theorising from case studies. They suggest that the international business 
researchers should not restrict themselves to theory building through an inductive 
approach alone, but consider the use of causal-explanation and contextualisation for 
theorising. 
 
Seeking to explain what constitutes a ‘casing’ in social enquiry, Ragin and Becker (1992) 
elucidate that in the course of research wherein ideas are required to be linked to 
evidence, cases can be concocted (as done commonly is social sciences) or found, as 
theory may not be a precise guide to empirical research. Casing often creates objects 
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(the group of people who are empirically categorised) which can then be manipulated 
to broadly generalise. The casing is matched to the ‘appropriate theory or its decisive 
theoretical properties must be specified so that it can be located theoretically, often 
generating new ideas in its wake’ (p. 221). In a situation where cases are not able to 
explain theory, new theories are generated which can then change viewpoint of existing 
cases.  
 
Credit can be given to Robert Yin for having provided credence to case study research 
(Cameron & Price, 2009) and hence, we can use his applications as a general rule to 
define what should formulate a case study. As already discussed earlier, case studies 
can be either single or multiple and the case study research can take an exploratory, 
descriptive or explanatory path (Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7: Strategy for Case Study Research 
 
(Researchers’ own version of Yin’s (1994, 2014) case-study research strategy) 
 
As the name suggests, a single case study will focus on a single case whereas a multiple 
case will include two or more replicative cases that can predict either similar or 
contradictory results. An exploratory case study is undertaken to ascertain what the final 
research questions and final research methods will be; descriptive cases will explain the 
happening of an event within a certain context and; explanatory cases define a causal 
relationship. What method to use and when will depend upon three conditions as 
illustrated by Yin (2014, p. 9) as the type of research question posed, control that a 
researcher may have over actual behavioural events and the focus on contemporary as 
opposed to entirely historical events. Seeking to understand why Indian companies 
internationalise and the motivations behind the same will include case studies of 
companies and their history. The researcher has no control of behavioural events so this 
study will focus on historical events of established companies and their past strategies 
towards internationalisation and hence, this piece of research will be exploratory in 
nature.    
 
Yin (2014) has further demonstrated five techniques that can be used to analyse the 
data within the chosen strategy or strategies. Pattern matching logic that matches data 
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findings to pre-determined predictions is the first technique. Second is explanation 
building where the objective is to analyse the case through an explanation about the 
same. The third technique is a time-series analysis that traces events related to a case 
or multitude of cases through a time period. Logic models is the fourth technique and 
Yin states that this has gained interest over the last few years especially for studying 
theories of change. Changes can be studies at an individual level, organisational level or 
a large program level. Finally, the cross-case synthesis technique, which can only be 
applied to two cases or more, studies each individual case separately first and then the 
results are amalgamated to seek generalisation. 
 
Silverman (2010) and Creswell (2013) have further identified three different types of 
case studies (further quoting Stake, 1995 and 2000) (i) an intrinsic case study which 
involves studying a single case that explains a specific issue, where there is no room for 
generalisation or theory building; (ii) an instrumental case study wherein a single case 
is studied to strengthen an earlier result or to revise a generalisation; and (iii) a collective 
case study which is a study of a particular phenomenon or issue using a number of cases 
(which is akin to Yin’s multiple case study approach).    
 
Bryman and Bell (2011) have added to the above by identifying a ‘comparative design’ 
case-study. It basically is a comparative study that helps in enhancing understanding of 
a particular phenomenon by comparing it to a couple or more contrasting phenomena. 
This is rather useful in business and management studies due to the fact that universal 
applicability of business theories is proving to be inaccurate. The authors have 
specifically advocated this method for cross-cultural research across two or more 
nations. Thomas (2011) calls it the ‘multiple or collective or comparative or cross-case 
analysis’. The analysis is a broad comparison of what these cases show – which is the 
particular phenomenon under study. Drawing on Sennett’s (2009) study, The Craftsman, 
Thomas prepares taxonomy of the case study approach (p. 143), from which this study 
will adopt the following pathway: 
 
Unit of analysis (subject) is key as the companies have specifically undergone the specific 
phenomenon under study 
Purpose is explanatory; explaining the phenomenon 
Approach is drawing a picture of the phenomenon (the strategic path taken for 
internationalisation) 
Process is a multiple/comparative study (retrospective) 
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3.3.1 Case Study Selection 
The next step was to decide on the company cases that will be studied. Yin (2014), 
states that selection of cases is one of the most difficult steps in the case-study research 
method. The researcher should not make a selection on the basis of ease of collection 
of data but should be focussed on why a certain selection has been made which could 
be based on the actual phenomenon being studied. To that effect, a screening or scoping 
process should be carried out which should not be too extensive or expensive. 
 
Silverman (2010) clarifies the three main features of case study research. First, each 
case should have a set boundary which needs to be illustrated at the outset; second, 
each case should be reflective of the research interest and the unit of interest specified 
in the beginning of the research so that the research strategy is clear; and third, the 
establishment of a limited research problem so that the focus of the case study is 
maintained. 
 
India has remained under-researched despite its growing economic significance (Buckley 
et al. 2012). In this context, the researcher felt that it will be interesting to study some 
of the larger companies of India and their process of internationalisation through a 
contextual case study approach within the resource-based framework. Gummesson 
(2008) points out that for those events that are under-researched or there is an 
uncertainty around them and which may include complex relationships, a case-study 
approach should be adopted to better understand them, given that quantitative 
approaches may prove inadequate to explain any such complex phenomena in 
management studies.   
 
A further step was to decide which companies and which sectors that were present in 
India were to be studied and more importantly which had significant international 
investments. There were a number of pathways that this study could have undertaken; 
for example, it was possible to study a single conglomerate with exposure in various 
industries and make a comparison of the approach that the company had selected for 
its various businesses. Yin (2009) defines this as an embedded design of a single case 
study. One of the rationales that he provides for using single case studies is to test the 
proposition of a given theory or to search for other explanation and in the process, build 
new theories. The other was to compare and contrast different companies within the 
same industry (multiple case study approach). As per Gummesson (2008), ‘any real-
world management case can be turned into a case; for example, an industry can be a 
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case but so can a company within that industry, one of its departments, processes or 




There was a constraint in the number of companies that could be studied in the given 
time frame for an in-depth case analysis. Further, there was a possibility of a selection 
bias and if the number of companies selected for the study could provide a good 
evidence of internationalisation strategic theoretical framework.  
 
To this end, a scoping exercise was undertaken during the initial phase of this study to 
ascertain the responsiveness of the companies for the study. The maximum positive 
response was received from the service industry. The companies that were finally 
selected are large multinationals in the IT, telecoms and hospitality service industry. 
They are all established companies with a history in international trade and investments.  
 
Case studies should not be defined in one way or the other (Ragin, 1992). Cases are 
dynamic and useful in linking ideas and evidence. Case study fluidity supports theoretical 
development through a smaller number of case studies. Theory generation does not 
require explicit evidence and hence the number of cases is not crucial (Van Maanen, 
2000).  
 
The other issue was that of generalisation. Could the analysis emerging out of the study 
of the strategies behind the internationalisation of these companies be representative of 
the whole industry and other industries (that have not been studied) within the given 
context? Longitudinal cross-country studies could have been undertaken to confirm 
generalisability. As was seen in a study of cross-country mergers and acquisitions from 
nine emerging markets based on resource-dependence theory, the resultant factors 
attracting Chinese investments differ from the other countries (Deng & Yang, 2015). If 
new theories can be propounded out of the research work, these would then need to be 
tested through a deductive approach to other MNEs in similar emerging markets. Ghauri 
(2004) states that international business qualitative researchers need to come out of 
narrations of stories and theory development and at some point, these theories will need 




Eisenhardt’s article on building theories from case-studies (1989) is considered seminal 
in the field. It is a positivist approach to qualitative studies and is used as a guideline by 
case-study researchers. Using a positivist linear approach, she lays down the process for 
qualitative research by first defining the research question as that will help focus on 
construct effort (flexibility for theoretical construct); cases selected should have a 
theoretical basis and should not be a random sampling so as to ensure external validity 
and replication; using multiple data collection method for a solid grounding of theory; 
adjustments to data collection if required to address emergent themes; the data analysis 
would include detailed write-ups of case-studies for intra-case analysis and cross-case 
patterns; establishing hypotheses for validity and measurability; comparison with 
existing literature both similar and contrasting for validity and generalisability and finally 
closure either due to theoretical saturation or pragmatic considerations.  
 
There are others who feel that case studies about businesses are more about 
particularisation rather than generalisation (Stake, 1995; Thomas, 2011). It is easier to 
generalise from large samples of statistical data as they are more ‘objective’ vis-à-vis 
the more ‘subjective’ interviews (Buckley & Chapman, 1996). Studying a particular case 
is to know it in-depth rather than for mere comparison. However, it will be subject to 
researcher interpretation, uniqueness of the case with respect to different contexts (like 
economic, cultural, social, historical etc.) and esoteric in nature. Hence, it is important 
to gather maximum information about the case and analyse it from different angles to 
gain maximum analytical insight (Thomas, 2011). Using an abductive approach (Dubois 
& Gadde, 2002 and 2014) will be useful as this research is trying to discover new things. 
While similar to grounded theory, the abductive approach is more about ‘theory 
development rather than theory generation’ (p. 559). Unanticipated empirical findings 
and theoretical comprehension during the research process can help in the evolution of 
the study, which is initially guided by an established framework. The intention is to make 
both empirical and theoretical contribution on the basis of the study of the Indian MNE 
experience on their path to internationalisation.  
 
Silverman (2010) says that in an independent, unfunded research, the inquirer will select 
cases which can be demonstrative of the phenomenon being studied, can be easily 
accessed and data is reasonably easily available. As has been mentioned above, a 
scoping exercise was carried out for just this purpose and the companies selected were 
the ones that readily agreed to participate in this research activity. It is fortunate that 
the companies that did agree to participate also happen to be all from the services 
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industry which will help in cross-case analysis. However, if this helps improve the 
chances of generalisability or if the companies were heterogeneous in nature is provided 
in the Discussion chapter (Chapter 10). 
 
3.3.3 Criticism 
There have been critiques of multiple case-study research too. It is argued that by using 
a multiple case study, the researcher concentrates on contrasting the various cases 
rather than a comprehensive study of the specific research context (Bryman & Bell, 2011 
further quoting Dyer & Wilkins, 1991). Cameron and Price (2009) also enunciate some 
of the drawbacks of case study research. They state that the ‘embeddedness’ of the 
problem can make it difficult to clearly define what should and what should not be 
included in a case study. Using multiple sources of data and multiple methods of data-
gathering can make the process very time consuming and the use of multiple methods 
requires a wider analytical skill set. Finally, the researcher has to be confident about 
data analysis and have the ability to synthesise the research findings to present a 
coherent set of conclusions.  
 
Another criticism of the case study approach is that it cannot be as fully validated as 
other methods that use statistics based on a large number of random samples, because 
the approach can generate hypotheses, those cannot be tested as rigourously (Van 
Maanen, 2000). However, he adds that there is a ‘holistic’ view of research, which is 
time consuming and hence does not allow the researcher to carry out more than one or 
a limited number of cases that are studied in depth. These extensive studies can provide 
a comprehensive view of the specific event or phenomenon being researched. 
 
3.3.4 Using a Case Study method for this Thesis 
Irrespective of the limitations, case studies are being increasingly used in management 
and international business studies. Management authors have repudiated some of the 
limitations/myths. Flyvbjerg (2006) tries to address some of the major 
misunderstandings about case study research. Firstly, that case knowledge is central to 
human learning (further quoting Christensen, 1987; Cragg, 1940); this is refuting the 
view that context independent learning is more practical than context dependent 
learning.  
 
Flyvbjerg (2006) contends that there is a difference between general talent and expertise 
and the latter can only be achieved through a context dependent training more so 
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because human affairs cannot be predicted to an exact theoretical perspective. Another 
major critique of this research practice is that it is not possible to generalise on the basis 
of a singular case study. The author then provides single case experiments in scientific 
studies to disprove this belief. He says it is about choosing a strategic case and the 
underlying event that is being studied which should help decide the research 
methodology. He adds that research is about knowledge gathering and should not be 
discounted in a situation of non-generalisation. Generalisation as a form of scientific 
enquiry should not limit search for knowledge. There is no issue using large samples to 
prove a phenomenon but a single false observation (falsification theory) disproving the 
phenomenon will require the generalisability to be revised or rejected. Which brings us 
to another limitation that hypothesis/assumption testing relates to that is generalisability 
and that then depends upon the strategic cases selected in the context of the 
phenomenon under study. He also specifies that ‘richness of information’ is of prime 
importance. Large general samples may not provide as much clarity on the contextual 
phenomenon as single specific cases, which can make a much larger contribution. The 
issue that could arise is the selection of the critical paradigmatic case and the author 
goes on to state that such a selection would require experience and intuition rather than 
a laid down specific methodological principle. Finally, case studies are characterised by 
falsification rather than verification. The perception that a case study is only a verification 
of the researchers’ hypothesis or assumptions does not hold water in such a scenario. 
Case studies have their own rigour and can depict the true picture of real-life situations. 
Subjectivism is also practised in quantitative methods in the selection of the dependent 
or independent variables.  
 
As stated earlier, in the phenomenology of the human study, a researcher needs to be 
part of the phenomenon in context to get the maximum learning and understanding. 
Last but not the least that case study narratives cannot be summarised to provide a 
general directive. The author during his own research sometimes questioned the interest 
that large detailed cases could generate. It is beneficial to keep a case study open rather 
than derive a conclusion so that it could have a different meaning for different people 
(other researchers, practitioners, academics, students) and such different readers then 
could interpret the narrative in their own way and draw their own understanding based 
on their theoretical perception. 
 
The clarification of the misunderstandings about case study should not be taken that 
other research methods should be rejected but rather to create a foundation for using a 
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case study research path in the context of the phenomenon that this study is 
undertaking.  
 
Piekkari et al. (2009) conducted an analysis of 157 case-study articles in international 
business journals between two time periods (1975 to 1994 and 1995 to 2005). They 
concluded that most of the researchers were straying away from the ‘methodological 
recommendations made in the literature’ (pp. 584). They found that majority of the 
articles were exploratory in nature, used multiple case design which were interview 
based with ‘positivistic assumptions and cross-sectional designs.’ Some alternative 
approaches to case study design were found but they were negligible. The authors have 
suggested that researchers specify the type of case study that they will be conducting 
and have further provided some alternatives (for example interpretive, longitudinal, 
theory testing) to the present disciplinary convention as they feel that this would broaden 
the horizon of the researcher and provide a richer perspective out of the case study 
design.   
 
In another study of case studies over a period of 6 years (1995-2000) in ten leading 
management journals, Gibbert et al. (2008) concluded that the authors generally 
followed a framework of validity (internal, external and construct) and reliability. 
However, they failed to see an explicit reporting of a rigour criteria for the studies 
conducted. They, akin to Piekkari et al. (2009) have suggested that case study 
researchers could use alternative conceptualisation rather than just using the method as 
isolation from scientific mode of enquiry.  
 
Morse et al. (2002) have also focussed on the need for constructive validity and reliability 
rather than evaluative trustworthiness. They state that different labels and strategies 
were suggested to have rigour in qualitative studies as were used in quantitative studies. 
However, due to a lack of clarity in such procedures, ‘post-hoc evaluation of qualitative 
enquiry’ (pp. 15) was introduced by many of the authors who propagated qualitative 
research methods. However, there are issues with such a practice vis-à-vis rationale of 
audit-trails, defining correct analysis judgment by readers as a verification process and 
member checks invalidating the research work. They feel that the attempt for rigour is 
more an evaluative process rather than a process of ensuring rigour, which should be 
the main aim. This depends on the responsiveness of the investigator as the outcome 
of the research will depend on the knowledge of the researcher, the effective use of 
such knowledge and continued thirst to seek further knowledge. Qualitative research 
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should maintain reliability and validity (through verification) by the researcher, which in 
turn ensures rigour. The verification strategies should encompass matching of the 
research question with the methodology adopted; selection of appropriate sample, data 
collection and analysis should be concurrent; and thinking through the work to create a 
solid foundation and possible theory development.       
 
Yin (2009) defines certain components vital for a case study design. There needs to be 
a clear articulation of the central question that the research is trying to address. The 
within-case propositions require to be defined and unit of analysis to be specified. Data 
analysis and the case propositions should have linkage. And lastly there should be a 
clear articulation of the interpretive mechanism for the data findings. 
 
3.3.5 Unit of Analysis 
The unit of analysis is very important in a case study design. The researcher needs to 
specify what the focus of the analysis will be. Within organisations, it could be individuals 
(senior managers) or a specific group within an organisation (business strategists) or 
organisations themselves (survey on best place to work). ‘The unit of analysis is the 
entity on which the interpretation of the study will focus’ (Boyatzis, 1998, p. 62). For this 
study, the unit of analysis will be the organisation as we are trying to understand the 
strategic motivations of the organisations on their path to internationalisation, which is 
the phenomenon of interest. The data collection process can lead to a distortion of the 
unit of analysis if the main source of data is individual people whereas the unit of analysis 
is the organisation to which the individuals belong (Yin, 2014). So, while the data 
collection may rely heavily on individual interviews, it has been augmented with other 
sources like organisational documents, balance-sheets, company records, press reports, 
analyst reports, news articles and others.    
 
3.3.6 Data Collection Method 
The case studies for this thesis will be formulated by gathering information through semi-
structured interviews, company documents, analyst reports and available public records. 
It is important for the researcher to properly define the case, specify data sources, know 
the research questions, allocate time for data collection and confirm how the data 
collected will be reported (Stake, 1995).  
 
A triangulation method can ensure reliability in the findings (Bryman & Bell, 2011). While 
previously, it had been discussed with the interviewees that the company name will also 
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be redacted post examination of the thesis, it was subsequently felt that redacting 
company names will not completely anonymise the company identity given the specificity 
of their history and internationalisation path. Also, given the vast amount of secondary 
data that has been used for the final analysis, redacting the company name would in 
essence have taken away the richness of the analysis conducted. Hence, subsequently, 
it was informed (by email) to all the interviewees that the company name will not be 
redacted. However, all interviewee names have been anonymised. Further, a respondent 
validation method has also been applied to ensure reliability; but this has a limited scope 
as the respondents can only corroborate what they said but cannot validate any 
analytical inference that the researcher makes of such communications.  
 
Silverman (2010) states that qualitative researchers ‘should not be overly defensive’ (p. 
275) and there are no laid down ground rules on qualitative validity. So, it is of prime 
importance that the researcher can ensure the reliability of the methods used and the 
validity of the conclusions. Validation in qualitative methods cannot equal the rigours 
adopted in a quantitative approach. Cho and Trent (2006) added on Donmoyer’s (2001) 
‘problematic nature of paradigm proliferation’ (p. 325) framework and specified the kind 
of validity that could suffice in the various approaches that a researcher may adopt 
within a transactional or transformational or a framework overlapping both such 
approaches to validity. As an interpretivist-constructivist, my adopted method lies 
between ‘thick description’ and developmental; the validation cannot take just one form 
but will be interlocking triangulation, member checks (both ongoing and recursive), 
descriptive data & rich archives and perfect knowledge of the phenomenon. The authors 
(Cho & Trent, 2006) support narrative constructions that clearly state the validity 
approach adopted and the reasons behind the same.   
 
Cassell (2014) in a seminar on qualitative research stated that qualitative researchers 
should abandon the quantitative notion of reliability, validity and replicability. Qualitative 
research has its own criteria and the researchers would do well to meet those. She 
nudged the seminar participants towards a paper on such criteriology co-written by her 
in 2006. The paper seeks to create a ‘contingent criteriology’ keeping a positivist 
viewpoint and which could fit ‘the researcher’s mode of engagement’ (Johnson et al., 
2006, p. 134). The authors have proposed a heuristic contingent criteriology that enables 
the researchers to open their minds to address quality issues within the ontological 
oscillation (quoting Burrel & Morgan, 1979, p. 266 and Weick 1995, pp. 34-38) of their 
enquiry. As stated earlier too, management researchers (having determined their 
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philosophical stance) should match it with their ‘methodological and criteriological 
consequences as resources for contingent evaluation’ (p. 147) and through such 
evaluation match their philosophical position to their investigation.    
 
3.3.7 Interviews and Elite Interviewees 
This section provides the rationale of using semi-structured interviews from elite 
interviewees to gather information for analysis of the companies in the data-set. Specific 
literature on elite interviewing as a method has been accessed which reveals the 
robustness of elite interviewing as a method for studying the internationalisation motives 
of the companies analysed. In the process the drawbacks of the method have also been 
highlighted and how the same were managed has been articulated. 
 
The five case-studies (empirical chapters 4-8) were mainly constructed through elite 
interviews. Ten interviewees from the five different companies were interviewed. These 
interviewees were all decision makers in the companies analysed. Extensive interviewing 
is an appropriate method to understand the actions of decision-makers, which in this 
context are the senior members of the team responsible for the decision making of the 
company’s internationalisation path (Ghauri, 2004). ‘The presumption is that strategy is 
carried out – for the most part – by those in senior positions’ (Clegg et al., 2017; p. 
373).  Strategy development of an organisation is influenced by strategic leaders which 
could be one individual or a team of senior management (Johnson et al, 2017).  
 
Hence, for the purpose of this thesis, elites are the top layer of the management team 
(Giddens, 1972). Corporate elites are the typical respondent in international business 
research and are powerful and extremely visible both within and outside their 
organisation (Welch et al., 2002). One of the main benefits of conducting elite 
interviewing as a data collection method is receiving in-depth data from the interviewees. 
The companies studied, being public limited in nature, many of the internationalisation 
strategic decisions are publicly announced much later thus such early decision making 
would generally lie with the elites (Clegg et al., 2017). Thus, elite interviewing as a 
method is also beneficial in accessing information which otherwise may not be easily 
available (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000). 
 
Deciding internationalisation strategy is formulated at the corporate level and such 
corporate level strategy is formulated at the CEO and other senior executive level 
(Thompson et al., 2017). The elite manager will have control over the company 
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resources which include capital resources, human resources and knowledge resources 
(Desmond, 2004). Senior management are expected to be adaptive and hence strategy 
formulation (which here is the internationalisation strategy of the companies studied) 
power and the relative freedom required for such formulation with access to relevant 
tools and levers are available to such elites (Clegg et al., 2017).  
 
Having only ten interviewees can be considered as a limitation of this study. However, 
quality of the interviewee was paramount for this research (Duhaime & Grant, 1984). It 
was imperative for this study to interview only those company officials that were familiar 
with the internationalisation motives of the company being investigated. The unit of 
analysis being the company and its internationalisation path, accordingly, interviewees 
were sought who could talk about the company’s internationalisation motives (Goldstein, 
2002). Further, as per the methodological continuum towards an interpretivist qualitative 
research, five to ten in-depth interviews are expected to provide rich data. 
 
Interview techniques are good sources of data when the numbers involved are limited, 
the interviewees are accessible (this can be debated as was experienced with some of 
the interviewees), the interviewees are key to acquire the information on the 
phenomenon being studied, questions are open-ended and require comprehensive 
responses along with prompting and finally, the material is sensitive enough (Gillham, 
2000). Interviews were semi-structured, that is there were structured questions around 
the phenomenon being studied, but the wordings were flexible, level of language was 
adjusted, interviewer sought continuous clarifications during the process and questions 
were added or deleted or re-worded in between the interview (Berg & Lune, 2012).  
 
Researchers will fare well to have a strict process in place before the collection of actual 
data through interviews, which should include determining the research questions (in 
this study this was essential as some of the questions were common like the effects of 
the global financial crisis on internationalisation strategies but most of the questions 
were specific relating to the company’s specific strategies within a common theme); 
develop skills as a case study researcher (keeping in mind the elite interviewees); 
identifying the companies and interviewees (which was carried out via the scoping 
exercise); type of interview which will be followed so as to get the best possible 
responses to the research questions; use of recording procedures (permission for 
recording was taken upfront and is mentioned in the consent form; while this can have 
its disadvantages due to mechanical failure and the possibility that the interviewee may 
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not have the ability to give another opportunity; hence, researcher notes are critical); 
setting up an interview protocol (interview guide, consent formalities); pilot testing (this 
was not feasible in this specific study due to the seniority and hectic schedules of the 
interviewees); place where the interview will be conducted; obtaining consent before 
starting the interviews; protection of the human subjects (ethical standards); and 
procedure to be followed during the actual interview (Yin, 2009; Creswell 2013).  
 
The researcher will take the role of a ‘miner’ as the interviews are expected to uncover 
information which already exists (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009), which is the phenomenon 
of internationalisation that the companies have already gone through and understanding 
what the strategies were behind the specific action of internationalisation. 
 
To get the right interviewees is crucial in this type of research, which is focussing on a 
very specific aspect of the organisations in question. Welch et al. (2002) state that the 
interviewer is required to provide their professional credentials to elicit response from 
elite interviewees. For this it is necessary for the researcher to promote their institutional 
affiliation and use personal connections. Gaining access to elite interviewees is expensive 
and time consuming (Mikecz, 2012). Hence, networks from previous work experience as 
a senior banker in India was used to get to the right level of people in the companies 
and to this extent, the scoping exercise proved very useful in identifying such companies 
with senior executives who could be contacted through this network. 
 
The senior executives thus contacted and interviewed were current and past CEOs, 
current and past CFOs, current and past head of strategy, senior strategy team members 
and current and past company treasurers and investor relationship heads. The level of 
senior executives interviewed for this research work is being mentioned here to protect 
their identities as communicated via the participant information sheet (page 293) and 
agreed as per the consent form (page 295). In the analysis chapters (Chapters 4-8) only 
the number of senior executives met has been mentioned as it is possible to identify the 
interviewee through triangulation if their exact designation is mentioned against the 
name of the company. 
 
Conducting interviews can be challenging. They are not mere conversations and hence, 
require planning, preparation and skills to steer them in the right direction (Cameron & 
Price, 2009). As the theme of this research is to understand internationalisation strategy 
of the companies being studied, the interviews conducted were at the senior-most levels 
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of the organisations (elite interviewing); those who are involved in the strategic decision 
making of the company. While the term ‘elite’ elicits an inegalitarian undertone, the term 
has come to be synonymous when interviewing very senior people who have the 
capability of providing an in-depth insight into the research area (Gillham, 2000). The 
seniority of the interviewee can pose an issue in the form of ‘unequal power dynamic’ 
(Creswell 2013, p. 173) where the researcher finds him/herself in a ‘hostage syndrome’ 
situation eternally grateful to have received an interview (Welch et al., 2002). However, 
such a situation did not occur due to past experience of the researcher as a senior 
multinational banker having had sufficient experience of interacting with corporate elites 
of multinational companies. I could elicit respect by projecting a positive impression, 
thus ensuring quality responses (Harvey, 2011). 
 
Another issue that can be faced is about the reliability and validity of the data. It is 
possible that the interviewees provide data with a subjective element. To avoid this, it 
is imperative to supplement the interviews with other secondary sources of information 
towards verification and triangulation (Yin, 2014). The questions framed have to be 
informed by various documents available in the public domain. As all the five companies 
were publicly listed, this did not prove to be an issue. Thus, during the actual interview 
process, the interviewees were aware that the researcher was knowledgeable and the 
responses to that extent were objective (Berry, 2002). 
 
During the scoping exercise, one of the requests that emerged was of providing a 
questionnaire to allow flexibility to these senior level executives who remain very busy. 
It was explained that due to nature of the topic, it would be unsuitable to provide a 
standard questionnaire. Also, if the interviewee knew the questions in advance, the 
responses could have been affected (Silverman, 2010). Nonetheless, a very broad set of 
main themes of discussion were shared in advance with the companies, which also acted 
as an interview-guide (Cameron & Price, 2009). 
 
The questions were open-ended and during the interview, related questions were also 
developed. It was expected that each respondent would have a unique story to tell 
depending upon the experience and level in the company and involvement in the 
strategic decision making within the company. ‘Getting a good interview is not easy’ 
(Stake, 1995, p. 64); specially when very senior level of interviewees is involved and the 
process can be subject to various restrictions like paucity of time, sudden company 
emergencies, information control. Further, repeat interviews being almost impossible 
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(Mikecz, 2012), it is imperative that sufficient preparation is carried out in researching 
the company and the set of interview questions. As many of the company specific 
reasons cannot be controlled by the researcher (who is the interviewer), the time factor 
is something that can be managed. To that extent, a considerable amount of time was 
provided to conduct the interviews in India so that flexibility was ensured to the 
interviewees. This led to considerable additional expenses and after a point it was not 
possible to indefinitely remain in India. Time and money plays an important role in such 
elite interviewing especially when it is spread over a wider geography. The elite 
interviewees will not generally adapt to the researcher’s schedule (Stephens, 2007). This 
was something that was experienced with the second interviewee at TCS. Nevertheless, 
continuous follow-up resulted in a Skype interview.  
 
Effective interviewers should be flexible thus making the interviewees comfortable. In 
the case of elite interviewees, such a situation can lead to additional contacts (Harvey, 
2011) as was experienced with IHCL. 
 
The order of the questions was not strictly invariant. The interviewing was expected to 
capture the strategic stories of the company internationalisation process. Riessmann 
(2008) is of the view that a narrative interview is more suited to ethnographic studies 
as social science interviewing has limited scope of open-ended questions or has fixed 
close-ended questions. However, in this specific case, while the broader set of questions 
were common, each company had followed a specific strategy intrinsic to its own goals 
and objectives towards international growth. For example, one company’s foray into a 
certain market has been an organic investment led expansion and in a second market 
they have made selective acquisitions while in a third market they have tried to establish 
a presence through a joint venture. While in the case of another company, they have 
started the internationalisation process by first setting up operations, then moving to 
joint ventures and finally using the merger and acquisition route. Each company has had 
its own specific agenda like market-seeking, resource-seeking or capability-seeking 
purpose. The companies have had certain successes and a few failures too in their 
internationalisation endeavours. The aim of this thesis has been to try and capture all 
the experiences of the companies on their internationalisation journey through these 
interviews. Hence, the data gathering has taken a narrative form of interviewing. There 




Analysing and interpreting the transcripts can also pose a challenge. It takes 
considerable time and it is important to capture each and every sound particle 
(Silverman, 2010) that may guide the researcher in the right analytical direction. Mark 
Twain had famously written in 1888 that ‘interviews are pure twaddle and valueless’ in 
response to the transcript of a ‘chat’ (interview) he had had. He has stated that the 
‘written speech’ is very different from the ‘spoken speech’ and the ‘soul’ of the talk goes 
missing when put into print. This has been corroborated by Matykiewicz (2013) stating 
that written words italics to show emphasis in delivery or symbols like dots and brackets 
to represent pauses or speech overlaps cannot catch each and everybody movement 
and nuance that gives life to the speech. The constructed written record veils the actual 
emotions, mannerisms, qualities, and experiences of the interviewee. As stated earlier 
the questions were open-ended and in all cases of the elite interviews were held face-
to-face (in person and in one case over Skype). For the purposes of validation, a few 
email interviews were also conducted with ex-employees of the companies who had 
worked at international locations. These individuals were Indians and non-Indians who 
have worked for the subject companies. 
 
Through the presence of the researcher (who will act as the interviewer), listening skills 
and questioning in a particular manner, it is possible to shape the stories that the 
interviewee tells (Reissmann, 2008). As a pre-test or pilot was not possible given the 
senior positions of the interviewees, the questions were well framed to get maximum 
knowledge about the subject from the respondents. Hence, the interview design was 
well structured so as to maximise the chances of achieving the purpose and minimising 
any errors expected to occur (Cameron & Price, 2009).  
 
It is advisable that the researcher commences transcribing the data as it is collected. 
The threats to transcription are three-fold; breakdown of the recorder or poor recording, 
capturing the right context and providing an accurate transcription which is no ‘tidying 
up’ of the talk (King & Horrocks, 2010). Except for the Skype call, there were no technical 
issues faced during any of the interviews. All the interviews were transcribed immediately 
after the interviews were conducted. 
 
3.3.8 Method of Analysis 
The analysis of this study has been built upon Yin’s (2009) technique of ‘Explanation 
Building’ and ‘Cross-case Synthesis.’ Data has been analysed to seek explanation as to 
why these companies internationalise and the strategies that they use. A possible 
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drawback could have been that during such a process, there could have been digressions 
from the original topic as many other interesting facts could emerge from the discussion. 
Hence, it was important to remain focussed and not divert from the original research 
aim.  
 
Once an explanation was generated from each of the cases, a cross-case synthesis was 
implemented to detect any common themes or peculiarities. It is critical for the 
researcher to prepare solid grounds of argument that are evidenced by the data. 
Interpreting the data is the central role of the researcher. Constructing knowledge out 
of such interpretation for the benefit of the reader experience will depend on a 
researchers’ ‘notion of knowledge and reality’ (Stake 1995, p. 100). In a narrative case 
description, constructionism plays an important role. It helps the researcher provide 
ample material to the readers for their own generalising. 
 
When this study was commenced, a qualitative methodology had been opted for, within 
which it was determined that this thesis would be case based and that the main data 
would be in the form of interviews gathered through elite interviewing and substantiated 
with documents about the companies in the public domain, press and analyst reports. 
Linking theory to methodology is important; methodology used by the researchers 
should reflect the theoretical aims and research questions (Gephart, 2004).  
 
3.4 Strategy behind Case based Analysis 
Case based analysis of data can take four different strategies as defined by Yin, 2014. 
The first relies on theoretical proposition; the second is the grounded theory approach; 
the third is using a descriptive framework to organise the case; and the fourth is a 
combination of the first three and involves examining plausible rival explanations. The 
first form has been aptly defined as a case-based analytic induction by Rindova et al. 
(2007). Analytic induction seeks ‘the analysis of data in which the researcher seeks 
universal explanation of phenomenon by pursuing the collection of data until no cases 
that are inconsistent with a hypothetical explanation (deviant or negative cases) of a 
phenomenon are found’ (Bryman & Bell, 2011; p. 575).  
 
Lindesmith (1952, p. 492) describes analytic induction as ‘the principle which governs 
the selection of cases to test a theory that the chances of discovering a decisive negative 
case should be maximised; the investigator who has a working hypothesis or assumption 
concerning the data becomes aware of certain areas of critical importance; if his theory 
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is false or inadequate, he knows that its weakness will be more clearly and quickly 
exposed if he proceeds to the investigation of those critical areas; this involves going 
out of one’s way to look for negative evidence’ (quoted in Berg & Lune, 2012). Berg and 
Lune (2012) and Hammersley and Cooper (2012), expanding the analytic method have 
also stated that it is necessary to find negative cases and if one is located, then the 
hypothesis or assumption should be discarded or reformulated to account for the 
negative case or the negative case needs to be discarded.  
 
As this research work seeks to answer pertinent research questions that were developed 
on the basis of the gap found from the literature review, this study has not taken a pure 
grounded theory approach (the grounded theory approach has already been explained 
earlier in the chapter). Rather, it has sought to analyse the data by relying on particular 
theoretical proposition. However, the study was open to grounded theory 
experientialism.   
 
Nevertheless, as mentioned above, studying the motivational strategies for 
internationalisation of the sample of Indian service industry MNEs, there is bound to be 
both similarities and differences in approach to internationalisation. Accordingly, the 
research questions were formulated. For example, given the Indian data on FDI, almost 
sixty percent of the location choice has been the developed markets. So, majority of the 
sample companies studied should prefer the developed market. The answers provided 
by the interviewees should then lean towards this along with the reasons thereof. Hence, 
the methodology cannot follow a purely analytic inductive method.  
 
A method which involves broad codification or open coding as the first step followed by 
analysis can form the basis of an analysis. This has been called the constant comparative 
method by Glaser and Strauss (1967). They state that this method does not discover 
hypothesis but tests theories and that to a certain extent is the objective here. However, 
this method also involves development of theory through continuous testing and 
comparison of cases. This then again takes the path of inductive theory building which 
is not the main objective here.  
 
The third strategy stated by Yin on creation of a framework which develops the initial 
framework through the literature review. The purpose of a framework study is pre-
decided and shaped by the information required by the researcher (Pope et al. 2000).  
The process of qualitative analysis is iterative in a reflexive way as interpretations do not 
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emerge by themselves but are developed by what the researcher wants to know 
(Srivastava & Hopwood, 2009). To that extent, qualitative analysis will always be 
controversial as it is quite dependent on what the researcher is querying (Patton, 2002). 
Qualitative analysis is self-evolving and sense-making from vast amounts of raw data. 
There is no set formula for reliability and validity and hence it is the obligation of the 
researcher to provide the analytical procedure followed and to report it without any 
variance (Patton, 2002). 
 
3.4.1 Framework for Analysis 
The framework that was provided by Srivastava and Hopwood (2009) involves the 
reflexivity of the researcher in trying to answer three questions; one is what the data is 
telling the researcher; second is what the researcher wants to know; and third is to find 
if there is an analytic understanding between the first two questions. Following this 
framework (Figure 8) allows the researcher to have an open view about the data, be 
more flexible and responsive and also be sensitive to serendipity. The analysis will be 
theoretically informed. 
 
Figure 8: Reflexive Model for Analysis 
 
 
To this framework, a firm or organisational change-level model will be applied to trace 
how the firm internationalised. In most cases the company first established itself in the 
domestic market before internationalising and this trajectory has been portrayed using 
the change level model which includes the effects of the external environment on 
internationalisation decisions, host country adaptation, changes and learnings in foreign 
markets; in one of the cases, the company almost immediately internationalised, 
however the reasons thereof and effects of such internationalisation trajectory has been 
depicted using the organisational change-level model. This model is based on the 
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organisational level-logic model as suggested by Yin (2014). The change model involves 
understanding of events over a period of time. As an analytical tool, the events observed 
over a particular time period are then matched to the theory and to the research 
questions. 
 
Also, as mentioned, other than interviews, publicly available documents like balance 
sheets, investor and analyst reports and news items related to the topic under study 
were used. These help in validity. Organisational documents and mass media reports 
are valuable sources of information in management studies. As these will be reflective 
case studies, issues with unascertainable data from print media on future speculation 
are not expected. 
 
3.5 Chapter Conclusion 
In summary, it can be stated that using a qualitative reflective case study method which 
was constructed using semi-structured interviews and other publicly available documents 
and analyst reports with appropriate rigour and validation and presented vide a narrative 
interpretive analysis has contributed to the knowledge about the strategies that Indian 
companies in the service sector have adopted in their quest of becoming multinational 
global companies vide the path of internationalisation. In the process, this study has 
achieved both empirical and theoretical contribution (which has been detailed in 
Chapters 10 and 11). 
 
Finally, Baxter and Jack (2008, pp. 556) have summarised the methods of case study 
research quite perfectly: 
 
‘Case study research is more than simply conducting research on a single individual or 
situation. This approach has the potential to deal with simple through complex situations. 
It enables the researcher to answer “how” and “why” type questions, while taking into 
consideration how a phenomenon is influenced by the context within which it is situated. 
For the novice research a case study is an excellent opportunity to gain tremendous 
insight into a case. It enables the researcher to gather data from a variety of sources 




4. Bharti Airtel Limited 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Bharti Airtel Limited (Airtel) is in the telecom services business. Unlike other companies 
in the services industry in my data set, this company has invested mainly in other 
emerging markets. Companies internationalise due to advantages and opportunities in 
the form of economies of scale, global sourcing, global innovations and knowledge 
management, global customers and risk diversification (Peng and Meyer, 2011). Thus, 
this chapter explores the strategic intent of Airtel’s internationalisation and the specific 
route that the company selected and the reasons therefore. The field of strategic 
management has been used as a basis to understand the motives of internationalisation 
of the firm. Business environments are unpredictable and firms need to continually adapt 
or re-invent themselves, either on a stand-alone basis or through collaboration (Reeves 
et al., 2015). Hence, this chapter further aims to understand the opportunities and 
challenges that the company faced in various host markets and how the company 
exploited these opportunities to overcome the challenges that it faced. Given Airtel’s 
south-south OFDI flow, it can be inferred that the company has not sought to gain 
superior technology as it is understood that EMNEs are not endowed with dominant firm 
advantages and invest overseas to acquire strategic assets. So, if the company was 
looking to expand its market share, then it is important to understand if the company 
was hoping to transfer home-grown capabilities to overseas markets. Hence, this chapter 
also explores what resources or capabilities the company possessed that helped it 
internationalise and whether the company needed to acquire additional resources to gain 
competitive advantage in different host markets. A firm can face various issues in 
different host markets which can arise due loss of advantage from the specific resources 
or capabilities transferred overseas (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2007). So, the other thing 
that this chapter seeks to analyse is how the company manages various host country 
environments that may differ from its home-country environment to gain competitive 
advantage. Finally, this chapter also enquires and explains if world incidents like the 
financial crisis affect the company’s internationalisation strategy. 
 
The rationale of the main research questions has been raised in the literature review 
chapter, keeping in mind the growing importance of emerging markets within the global 
investment environment which can be established from the fact that investments from 




4.2 Company Background 
Airtel was established in 1995. It is a telecommunications company headquartered in 
Delhi, the national capital of India. The founder, Sunil Bharti Mittal (Mittal) first 
established Bharti Telecom Limited in 1983 to supply push-button telephone models for 
the first time in India which were especially made for the Indian market in an agreement 
with Siemens, Germany. This was followed by the launch of fax machines and cordless 
telephones, also for the first time in India. Liberalisation during the early 1990s in India 
paved the path for privatisation in the telecom industry with the announcement of the 
‘New Telecom Policy’ in 1994 (DOT, 1994) aimed at encouraging private domestic 
investment and attracting FDI in the telecom industry. Mittal who was already present 
in the telecom industry but on the hardware side, saw an opportunity in the telecom 
services industry and established Bharti Tele-Ventures in 1995 to create a cellular 
network in the capital region of Delhi and then slowly extend to other regions of India. 
During the same period, many other local players were also issued licences and had 
commenced cellular services in various parts of the country. 
 
Bharti Tele-Ventures went on a systematic path of acquiring these local companies to 
increase its presence across the country. This was followed by the company’s first Initial 
Public Offer (IPO)8 in 2002 and was listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE), Delhi 
Stock Exchange (DSE) and the National Stock Exchange (NSE) simultaneously in 
February 2002. At the same time, it rebranded its services under the singular ‘Airtel’ 
brand and also launched voice services across the country. It then changed its name to 
Bharti Airtel Limited in 2007. Between 2009 and 2010, the company ventured overseas 
with its first international operation in Sri Lanka followed by Africa (the sub-Saharan 
Africa where Airtel ventured does not include South Africa or many of the North-African 
Countries) and finally to Bangladesh. 
 
Today the company operates in 20 countries across Asia and Africa with a customer base 
of 290 million. The company pioneered the ‘minutes factory’ model which hinges on a 
business strategy of outsourcing non-core activities and benefits from economies of scale 
(Leahy, 2010; Anderson et al. 2010). The model which forms the core capability and 
resource for the company has been described in detail in the next section under 
‘Resources and Capabilities.’ 
 
                                                          
8 In an IPO, a company offers its shares for the first time to the public for a certain pre-determined price.  
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To understand the internationalisation strategies of the company, a senior member of 
the company was interviewed in October 2014. A follow-up informal interview was also 
conducted in August 2016. By that time, the interviewee had been elevated to a far 
senior role for the holding company. Other interviewees were not available mainly due 
to logistical reasons. Hence, it can be stated that the analysis of this company may suffer 
from single-informant bias (Ernst & Teichert, 1998). However, given the seniority and 
the involvement with various strategic functions, the interviewee was able to provide an 
in-depth overall view of the company’s internationalisation process from a strategic 
perspective. In addition, company documents such as balance sheet, investor and 
analyst presentations, corporate, bank and media reports, which are available in the 
public domain, have been used for triangulation purposes towards validity and reliability. 
 
The whole interview was recorded. The words indented in quotation marks are direct 
quotes from the interview. 
 
4.3 Resources and Capabilities 
Airtel has held a dominant position among telecom providers in India in number of 
subscribers (Indian Telecom Presentation, 2006). This was due to its first mover 
advantage in the telecom industry as a result of the liberalisation policy in India during 
1991-91, which opened up the sector to private players. (The telecom sector until then 
was government controlled.) However, Vodafone India (a subsidiary of Vodafone Group, 
UK), which entered the Indian telecom market only in 2010 through a series of 
acquisitions, stands second to Airtel in India in number of subscribers (Figure 9). Further, 
Airtel is also the third largest cellular services provider in terms of number of subscribers 
in the world (TOI, 2015). 
 
Use of mobile phones in the developed world dates back to the early 1970s. This does 
not include the earlier two-way walkie-talkies or telegraphs, the use of which dates to 
the early 1900s but refers to an earlier version of a functional portable phone. It is said 
that the first call using such a device was made by an employee of Motorola to place a 
call to the Bell Labs in 1973 (Lee, 2013). The instrument used, though portable, was 
almost a kilogramme in weight and measured just a little under a foot in length. Mobile 






Figure 9: Share of Telecom Service Providers in India 
 
Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) report card dated 31st March 2015 
 
In UK, Vodafone launched the first cellular services in 1985; though this was two years 
after the first launch in USA by AT&T in 1983 and four years after the Nordics had their 
first cellular service in 1981 (Rockman, 2015). So, the developed markets were more 
than a decade ahead of India in terms of a cellular network. As already mentioned above, 
while developed markets did have potential for growth, the densities were already high 
and the ARPM model that Airtel had established would not have worked in a developed 
market. The internationalisation of the company was more driven by their internal 
capabilities (ARPM model) which they felt could be implemented in a similar demographic 
country as the home market, basically other emerging markets. The interviewee stated 
that the company operated a telecom model in India which was totally different from the 
telecom models used in developed markets. As the interviewee explained: 
‘Developed markets have always worked on… in a model where they can 
generate returns by higher cash accruals. So it became a niche product in 
the market, more for the high classes or top end consumers rather than mass 
consumers‘ 
 
Given India’s vast population and a demography which is considerably middle class 
or lower-middle class, which was the prospective market for the company, Airtel 
needed a model with lower costs. 
‘We need to grow by scale, by volume, by masses, so we need to convert a 
high-class model to a mass sort of model. And we chose to go antithesis to 
most of the DM [developed markets] market models and said ‘look, if we 
need to do that, we need to create a model where our costs are lower, we 




The company’s thought process centred on a low-cost product that would attract 
more consumers while expecting that the existing consumers would also increase 
their usage. As the interviewee explained, such a low-cost model would increase 
overall usage through existing customers and the addition of new customers and 
increase the scale of the company’s sales. This results in economies of scale for 
the company and the company can save costs. This saving of cost is further used 
to lower the price of the product to the consumer. Through this model, the 
company created their ‘minutes factory’ model. In the interviewee’s words: 
‘So, your cost goes down further and you re-deploy that cost save into the 
price and drop it down further, you had more users coming into the net, you 
had more existing users using more and this was [the] ‘minutes factory’ 
model…’ 
 
Post the liberalisation in India, the entrants in the telecom sector in India including Airtel 
were first using the developed market model which was subscriber-led. There was 
tremendous competition and profit margins were either low or the companies were 
making losses; Airtel then came up with the ‘minutes factory’ model in 2001-02 through 
which the company was able to target millions of pre-paid customers, something that 
the subscriber-led model did not allow (Dharmakumar & Prasad, 2010). 
 
So, constructing a cost model entirely reverse from the developed world telecom model, 
the company has garnered a gigantic subscriber base and is still able to continue to grow 
along with cost-effectiveness (Sinha, 2013). 
 
The company re-invented its core capability to create a niche in the market. This is 
evident from the fact that they came up with the ‘minutes factory’ model of costing or 
the ‘average revenue per minute’ (ARPM) model. To make a success of its ARPM model, 
the company convinced its operational partners to agree to a payment that was also 
minute based. It then decided to concentrate on its core capabilities and outsource the 
non-core operations to other established professional companies. 
 
The interviewee explained how their outsourcing model was also created differently. In 
a general outsourcing model, the user of the service pays monthly which becomes their 
operating expenditure. However, for Airtel, the company was billing its own subscribers 
on the basis of minutes. Hence, the company also required that its own cost should also 
be as per the minute for their ‘minutes factory’ to work. So, the company convinced its 
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outsourcing partners to bill it on a minute usage base rather than on a monthly basis. To 
this effect, the interviewee said: 
‘For me [the company] to care equally for both, the 100 minutes user [vis-à-
vis a 1000 minute user] should also give me EBITDA [Earnings before interest, 
tax, depreciation and amortisation], for that he should pay me per minute and 
I should [also] be costed on per minute…[so] we went to Ericsson and said 
‘you know what you do, you supply me a big box and I need to pay for you 
[the box], let’s say 20,000 dollars, 15,000 dollars for, per box, that needs to 
go get installed, once it is installed, it produces minutes, somebody uses it, but 
I’ve paid you per box…I need to pay you for per minute basis’ 
 
So, through this process the company attained a massive transformation in its own 
costs. This was then further extended to the IT services which were outsourced to 
a large multinational technology firm. Explaining this the interviewee stated: 
‘So, you said, okay IT cost is a big cost in telecom, it is at that point in time. 
You will outsource IT to IBM…so IT cost also becomes a permanent basis, 
because I made a percentage of my revenues. Suddenly, I ITised and 
minutised my cost in a different model…’ 
 
The company outsourced all its services to Ericsson which included network design, 
maintenance services for both operations and field and optimisation. Similarly, all the 
infrastructure and application services were outsourced to IBM. However, instead of 
paying a fixed charge, Airtel convinced its outsourcing partners to charge on a variable 
basis, which is to charge as per the actual usage of the services. Furthermore, it has tied 
up with Nokia for operational services for its 3G network and more recently with Huawei 
to upgrade to 4G. 
 
Through this model of outsourcing and sharing towers with other mobiles services 
providers, Airtel was able to offer remarkably low prices (The Economist, 2015, b). The 
company was able to convert its fixed cost to variable cost through the outsourcing of 
its network planning and the IT infrastructure (Dharmakumar & Prasad, 2010). Airtel’s 
“minutes factory” model, focused on generating usage volume from each of its base 
rather than from each user, which implied that users of any kind were welcome to use 
the Airtel network irrespective of the actual usage that the subscriber provided and such 
a model worked very well in the Indian environment which is pre-dominantly a 
demography with low to medium income population (Leahy, 2010). As Anderson et al. 
(2010) point out, ‘Bharti Airtel adopted the “volume” model wholeheartedly from 2003, 
and was one of the first operators in the world to scale the approach through the 
aggressive outsourcing of five critical value chain activities – network (active 
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infrastructure), mobile towers (passive infrastructure), information technology (IT), call 
centre support and distribution’ (p.1). 
 
Hence, the company’s business model, which was its ‘minutes factory model,’ was a 
success in India and helped it become the most dominant telecom provider in the 
country. Here a business model is described as the one which generates value for the 
company through efficient distribution of information between partners which could be 
customers, government, competitors or its supplier (Kallio et al., 2006). 
 
This model of outsourcing operational cost is what the company calls the ‘Opex’ 
(operational expenditure) model (Figure 10). The company implemented this model in 
Africa too. It is using the same operating partners in all the locations and is benefitting 
from a global outsourcing model which helps to reduce its cost further. The interviewee 
confirms this: 
‘One was, you will be able to get aggregate benefits of global sourcing, 
nothing we’ve gotten back, 100 per cent there. So, we now have global 
contracts with IBM, with Ericsson, with Huwaei, with Nokia Networks and so 
on so forth.’ 
 
Figure 10: Airtel Factory Model 
 
Source: Forbes India, FEATURES/CROSS BORDER | April 24, 2010 
 
Basically, the company has tied up with the same outsourcing partners in all the 
countries that it operates in, thus concentrating on its core services and related 
marketing and branding. By using the same partners, the company benefits from global 




The resource-based view states that companies develop competitive advantage based 
on the strength of its resources which are either acquired or developed (Wernerfelt, 
1984; Barney & Clark, 2007). Company resources are transformed into capabilities to 
yield competitive advantage and thus firms develop core competencies which give them 
an edge over their rivals (Hitt et al. 2012). 
 
Airtel’s capability in the form of its ‘minutes factory model’ was developed and not 
acquired and helped the company achieve a competitive advantage over its nearest rivals 
in the Indian market. 
 
This is further reflected in many of the company’s products and tie-ups. The company 
was a first in introducing many new mobile technologies in India (Panigrahi, 2015). The 
company introduced the Blackberry in 2005. In a tie-up with Research in Motion (RIM) 
in 2004 (RIM website history, 2016), the service was available only for corporate use. 
The tie-up lasted for half a decade before a Blackberry could be used with other service 
providers. Similarly, the company also introduced iPhone, Hello Tunes and M-commerce 
in India (Panigrahi, 2015). 
 
The company had resources (in the form of a successful low capex model) which helped 
them diversify into the international market. However, the way the model was built, it 
could have been successful only in similar emerging markets with high population density 
and low telecom density. While, the product did have value and was rare due to the 
company’s first mover advantage, it was not inimitable or non-substitutable as it was not 
a generic product that could be patented. Other players in the market could use a similar 
model which would then be tantamount to a price war-fare. However, it was not easy to 
replicate such a low-capex model. This can be substantiated from the fact that other 
operators could not match up to Airtel and were either fully acquired or sold part of their 
spectrum to the company. For example, Spice Cell was acquired in 2001 in the eastern 
region of India, Skycell was acquired in Southern India in 2000 and in recent times the 
company has been acquiring spectrum and is the only pan-India 4G provider (Appendix 
1). 
 
Once the company had reached a position of strength in cellular services, it decided to 
extend to other services like dish TV in India to maintain its position in the market and 
also to thwart competition from other larger Indian based global conglomerates like 
Reliance, the Tatas and the Birlas. 
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Airtel Digital TV was launched in October 2008 and the company was the fifth operator 
to do so in the domestic market (Airtel Presentation May 2012). Hence, the company 
was a late entrant in the direct-to-home (DTH) business. The interviewee to this affect 
stated: 
’DTH, direct to home business is a fantastic business. The learning is we 
entered DTH late. We should’ve entered DTH much earlier. We are number 
two now’ 
 
So, while the company was a late entrant in the DTH business, it has climbed to a 
number two position in the Indian market with a share of 20.26 per cent of the total 
Indian DTH subscribers behind Dish TV (owned by the Essel group of India) which is at 
24.92 per cent, this data is as of 31st December 2015 (Data.gov.in, 2016). 
 
The company was also a late entrant in the mobile money transfer business. It learnt 
from its experience in Africa of easy money transfer via mobile phones. It was a 
competitor product of Safaricom (a subsidiary of Vodafone). This learning resulted in 
‘Airtel Money’, which the company launched in Africa, and then transferred the idea back 
to India. Airtel Money was the first such product that was launched in India, thereby 
further strengthening the position of the company in the Indian market. 
 
Talking about this experience, the interviewee explained how they were faced with a 
dominant player in Kenya with a market share of almost 80 per cent. This was Safaricom 
(Vodafone subsidiary) that had launched a product called the M-pesa which was a money 
transfer facility using mobile services. This is how Airtel-Money was launched by the 
company to compete with Safaricom in Kenya. Explaining why this service, of mobile 
money transfer, was so popular in Kenya, the interviewee said: 
‘Kenya is a very liberalised mobile money banking market. And because they 
[Safaricom] have developed a huge pool of on-net, as we call on-net 
subscribers, they [the subscribers] don’t want to leave even if I give half the 
price for voice minutes. So price is not elasticity or a hook product for them 
[the subscribers]. They just say, look you know what when I want to transfer 
money to my son there, I just do this and there it’s done’ 
 
As per a study by the Gates Foundation, mobile money transfer was hugely successful 
in Kenya, first due to low cost of transfers as compared to bank transfers, second transfer 
of actual cash to rural areas had low safety, and third due to regulatory restriction of 




Hence, Airtel then decided to launch a similar product in Kenya to provide competition 
to Safaricom in Kenya: 
‘So, we learnt to be able to compete in Kenya, we must launch what is we 
call as Airtel Money. The moment we learnt that Airtel Money is adding so 
much of a damn value in Kenya for Safaricom and thereby hopefully for us 
overtime, we just not restricted that to Kenya, but launched Airtel Money 
across 17 countries and it is in the strong paths of successes in many of the 
countries and also [im]ported that back in India’ 
 
The interviewee was very explicit in mentioning that Airtel Money was the biggest 
learning that the company had made in Africa and then imported it back to India. 
 
Nonetheless, the product has not been fully successful in India. Even Vodafone launched 
the M-pesa in India after the success it accomplished in Kenya. As Roy and 
Soundararajan (2016) point out the cost of transferring money in India is very low 
compared to Kenya and, hence, that could be the prime reason as to why mobile money 
transfers in India were not hugely successful. 
 
However, with the demonetisation9 that occurred in India in November 2016, the number 
of mobile money transactions has increased throughout the country, not only in urban 
areas but also rural areas (Mukul, 2016). However, many other local players have also 
sprung up in India, providing such services. 
 
In this section, it was observed that Airtel developed its own capability in the ARPM 
model and also continued to develop and enhance its resources to maintain and gain 
competitive advantage. This is in line with what Rugman and Verbeke (2004) state: that 
firms acquire advantages and also build and develop capabilities to remain successful. 
The company has continually looked at ways in which to reduce costs so that their model 
is successful and thus first gain and then maintain its competitive edge in the market. 
The company has also continued to add new resources or redevelop existing resources 
as per the change or demand of the environment, which is the consumers here and 
which arises out of the need for continuous growth in the market where the company is 
present. 
 
                                                          
9 Indian Rupee notes of the denomination 500 and 1000 were put out of circulation with immediate 
effect from the night of 8th November 2016 
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4.4 Liberalisation and Opportunity seeking (Domestic to International) 
The Indian government introduced market-oriented reforms during 1991-92 (Bhagwati 
et al., 2010). Through these reforms the country liberalised and became open to both 
private and foreign investments in industries which until then had been government 
controlled. The telecom sector, which was also government controlled, was deregulated 
and private companies were invited to operate in telecom services. Mittal, who was 
already supplying telecom hardware, saw a vast opportunity in the telecom services 
sector (Nayak & Maclean, 2013) and formed a company which is Bharti Airtel today. This 
is indicative of dynamic capabilities in the form of entrepreneurial activity and managerial 
capability. Helfat et al. (2007) state that dynamic capabilities involve entrepreneurial 
activity along with organisational strategy to affect change in a dynamic environment. 
Augier and Teece (2009) further elaborate dynamic capabilities as a company’s ability 
to first identify and then seize new opportunities while protecting intellectual knowledge 
with the desire to achieve a sustained competitive advantage. 
 
When the company was established its initial pricing model was charging for the services 
it provided using the traditional ARPU (average revenue per user) model of costing. This 
model, also known as the average revenue per unit model, is predominantly used in the 
telecom industry that measures the average revenue a company earns in relation to its 
user base. This model is prevalent in the developed world. However, Airtel soon 
implemented a new pricing model which was based on a different costing model known 
as the ARPM model (average revenue per minute). The ARPM model calculated the 
revenue that the company earned in relation to the total number of voice minutes. 
Through this model, a mobile operator can provide low rates to its subscribers by 
reducing its own cost through outsourcing of operations which are not its core activities. 
Airtime is treated as a perishable item and the mobile operator seeks to maximise 
network utilisation and thus increases revenue maximising the consumption of minutes 
(EY, 2013). New enterprises create such models to attract customers by convincing them 
to pay for the perceived value creation and thus make profits (Teece, 2010). 
 





Table 2: Airtel Minute Factory Model 
 
Source: Bharti Airtel 
 
The company benefitted from a first mover advantage and was growth oriented. It could 
be seen in the inherent characteristic of the company which was entrepreneur driven 
(Nayak & Maclean, 2013). The company was always trying to seek opportunities. To this 
affect the interviewee states: 
‘Look at the gene pool of the company… [Airtel was an] entrepreneur-driven 
company… [it was in] 1995 when the privatisation started in India, you [then] 
looked at opportunities in India. It was a virgin market, tele-density was very 
low… You did develop… a ‘minutes factory’ model… obviously it is a growth 
oriented company, growth-oriented drive, the gene pool was more growth 
rather than creating a more stable cash flow pool for repatriations and or 
distributions to the shareholders‘ 
 
This echoes with Teece’s (2010) theories about new enterprises and business models. 
Teece states that such companies first understand the need of their customers and then 
seek to create models to meet these needs and in the process, generate revenues and 
also make profits. Mittal, who was already running a company delivering hardware in 
the telecom industry, turned to telecom services when the Indian economy liberalised in 
the early 1990s. After following the standard pricing model, the company created a new 
business model, ARPM (average revenue per minute), so that cost of mobile services 
could be reduced for its client base. This is also evident from the fact that charges for 
mobile services have dropped from INR 2.89 in March 2004 to INR 0.47 in December 
2012 as stated by the Ministry of Communications, GOI as per PTI (2013). For the same 
period the number of subscribers has increased from 33.6 million to 864.72 million. 
 
Airtel had achieved the number one rank among cellular services company in India by 
2005 by the highest number of subscribers and percentage of mobile market share 





As the market in India started to saturate, the company saw internationalisation as a 
growth strategy. The company was facing competition in India from established Indian 
multinational companies (Tata and Reliance also entered the Indian telecom market) and 
overseas multinational companies (Vodafone, which is second to Airtel in number of 
subscribers in India) (Balancing Act, 2010). 
 
This is also evident from what the interviewee said: 
‘…you look outside India, because [in] India you were [already] a leader…’ 
 
As the first step towards internationalisation, Airtel launched Ethernet services in 25 
cities across the globe in Asia, Europe, North America and Australia. Ethernet service 
providers attach customer equipment (computer, TVs etc.) to a network through a user-
network interface at various speeds (mbps) (Santitoro, 2003). The company investor 
presentation from January 2010 states, ‘The launch of the Global Ethernet Service 
Portfolio by Bharti Airtel is part of its strategy to become a truly global service provider 
with a wide range of product offerings’ (p. 9). 
 
For cellular services, the company had at first scoped out Europe – the initial thought 
was to go to developed markets. However, the cellular services model that the company 
had built was based on usage per minutes rather than per user, and Airtel concluded 
that such a model would only work in other emerging markets, similar to India, with high 
population density and low telecom density. To validate this, the interviewee said: 
‘…the kind of model that we developed in India … [came from] the drive to 
look at where is the demographic fit [in India], where is it that the evolution 
of telecom market is in, a phase which we have seen in general in India. And 
which markets do behave in general like the way India does, which markets 
are emerging markets…’ 
 
So, after scoping Europe, the company shifted its focus to Africa. The company concluded 
that the African countries demography was similar to the Indian demography and the 
‘minutes model’ which was already a success in India, could be easily transferred to 
African countries. Africa presented an opportunity for the company as mobile penetration 
level was far lower than India; 32 per cent compared to India's 50 per cent, also there 
were fewer competitors in Africa (Balancing Act, 2010). 
 
The interviewee stated that Africa in 2010 was similar to how India had been during the 
earlier part of 2000. The demographic fit was similar to India and the continent was in 
an evolutionary phase with a low 30%-35% penetration of telephones. Explaining why 
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Airtel felt that Africa was a right fit to penetrate at that point, the interviewee further 
stated: 
‘Median age by the way in Africa was about 17-18 years, which is youth 
oriented. Again, a great fit from the way what we have seen in India. The 
middle class, the mid-belly of the core population who will be potential 
consumers to you was far more befitting from what we had seen in India. 
And there where we thought the applicability of the model which was, if I 
may use patented word, which was something which we thought Bharti’s 
‘minutes factory’ model is more replicable there’ 
 
Airtel has also stated this fact in its Investor Presentation of November 2014, ‘Africa 
presented an opportunity where Bharti could replicate its ‘minutes factory’ model 
successfully’ (p. 19). Airtel entered Africa through an acquisition of an existing company. 
This acquisition provided the company with growth opportunities in the continent due to 
the relatively low mobile phone penetration (Sukkawal, 2010). 
 
This is compelling evidence that the company was market-seeking for the model they 
had pioneered; and in order to succeed, the market had to have a high population density 
and a low telecom density. This was also the reason behind the company’s entry into 
other emerging markets like Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. 
 
The first country into which Airtel ventured was Sri Lanka and the entry mode was 
through Greenfield. A Greenfield mode of entry is when a company enters a new foreign 
market through capital investment or de novo investment (Hennart et al., 2015). 
 
At the time Airtel entered Sri Lanka, there was already a presence of a few service 
providers in the country. Post-entry, Airtel realised that they had entered Sri Lanka late. 
The company especially felt that the Greenfield mode of entry into a market already 
saturated by three to four operators was problematic in creating a niche or obtaining a 
sustained stable growth. Though Sri Lanka is a neighbouring country to India, for Airtel 
it was akin to extending its penetration within the country: 
‘[with] no disrespect to the geographical boundaries to a different country 
system, we thought Sri Lanka is pretty close enough. It is like probably you 
know in a way adding [a] new circle [in India], right?’ 
 
However, the company arrived at the conclusion that an acquisition strategy would have 





The interviewee elucidates this further: 
‘The Greenfield theory was stronger in our mind than what it actually turned 
out to be. We realize that [being] fourth or fifth operator [in the] Greenfield 
sense globally doesn’t work If you are not number one or number two, you 
find if there is organic-based visibility of reaching number one or number in 
few years. If not that, then you find, can you acquire someone to become 
number one or number two?’ 
 
Sri Lanka was an evolved market with a small population (20 million) and a 
considerable penetration of telephony services. The interviewee stated that Airtel 
could have been in a dominant position in Sri Lanka if the company had entered it 
earlier. At the period in which Airtel entered this neighbouring country, it was 
difficult to reach a stage of competitive advantage on the basis of organic growth. 
 
One of the marketing approaches that operators take is to provide facilities to family and 
friends in the same network. So, in a smaller market, it is then difficult to steal such 
customers. An operator benefits from net calls on the same network as it does not have 
to bear any termination charges (Pratap, 2010). 
 
From the learnings of the Sri Lanka experience, Airtel realised that in markets which were 
not virgin territory, where more than two or three operators were already operating in 
that market, acquiring an existing player in that market made more strategic sense than 
investing through the Greenfield mode. Investing through the acquisition route provides 
the acquirer with an opportunity to provide serious competition to the remaining existing 
players in the host market and to carve out a position of competitive advantage in that 
market with the potential for future growth. 
 
Gerpott and Jakopin (2005 in Al-Kaabi et al., 2010) have argued that telecom operators 
become limited to their home-market because of international connection and roaming. 
To overcome this liability, telecom operators establish new ventures or prefer to invest 









Figure 11: Modes of Internationalisation for Mobile Network Operators 
 
(Gerpott and Jakopin 2005) 
 
In 2010, Airtel entered Africa by acquiring Zain which was mainly present in the sub-
Saharan region of Africa. Zain did not have a dominant market share in the African 
countries in which it was operating. While its major competitor was MTN, a South-African 
based company, there were other Middle-Eastern and EU players also present in the 
market. For example, in Kenya, the main competitor is Safaricom, a Vodafone subsidiary 
(Africa and Middle-East telecom week, 2015). 
 
Literature states that acquisition of such strategic assets helps companies from emerging 
markets to compete in both the international market and home market. Companies 
explore strategic assets and resources in international markets to extend their resource 
base (Tan & Meyer, 2010). 
 
After its initial failing with the Greenfield route in Sri Lanka, Airtel has preferred the 
acquisition route (in-organic growth) over organic growth when internationalising in 
African countries and Bangladesh due to the specificity of its unique telecom services 
model. The company can be categorised as a ‘local optimiser’ which Ramamurti and 
Singh (2009) define as companies acquiring targets in other emerging markets for 
process optimisation. 
 
4.5 Brand and Logo 
The company has also promoted a strong brand image. They have used various 
advertising campaigns to target different age groups and segments of the society. This 
is substantiated by an advertisement of Airtel from more than a decade ago, which 
showed a poor tea-server affording a mobile phone, which was still a very new 
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phenomenon in India. Today a lot of advertising is focussed on generation10 Y and Z. 
However, the company has not forgotten generation X either, and recently introduced 
the ‘one touch’ easy access service for the older people. Advertising, if used effectively, 
can help create customers in the Indian telecom industry (Agarwal et al. 2011). So the 
company has targeted all sections of the society by advertising affordable and attractive 
products and services to each of these segments and age groups, thus creating its brand 
of ‘Airtel’. 
 
In Africa, the company acquired various brands with the acquisition of Zain. Zain had 
also entered Africa by acquiring Celtel (a local African telecom company). Hence, to 
maintain its brand image, the company almost overnight re-named all its African 
operations to the single brand name ‘Airtel’. This was a company strategy to operate 
under a single global brand name and today all its operations in 20 countries operate 
under one single brand name. The reason behind this is explained by the interviewee: 
‘… we decided the benefits of a synergistic global single unified brand are far 
higher than trying to attend to temporary problems of another brand 
shift….so we took all those calculated calls and I think in December of 2010, 
maybe 5 - 6 months into the journey of Africa on one single overnight we 
changed the brand to Airtel’ 
 
The brand and logo that the company now operates under was created in 2010. The 
company used an international creative design agency. The company moved from its 
original three colour label to a red and white logo (Figure 12). 
 
There was much apprehension regarding Airtel’s newly-adopted colour scheme as the 
Vodafone logo (Vodafone being the second largest telecom company in India behind 
Airtel in number of subscribers) was also red and white. 
 
Figure 12: Airtel Logo 
 
 
                                                          
10 Generation X born between 1966 and 1976; Generation Y or the millenniums born between 1998 and 




Airtel also came up with a tag line to make people feel that, through conversations, they 
could become closer to each-other. 
‘Dil jo chahe paas laye’ 
[if the heart so desires; things feel closer] 
 
However, there was speculation that a change of logo and a catchy tag line may not be 
sufficient to attract more customers or give the company the edge that it was trying to 
create through the revamp. Brand makeover is successful if it is backed with superior 
customer service (Bhandari & Khicha, 2010). 
 
Sanjay Kapoor, CEO (in an interview with media on the launch of the new logo in 2010) 
stated that ‘The new symbol is an interpretation of the ‘A’ in Airtel and shows the 
company’s willingness to embrace anything new. The curve with the red highlights 
makes it more inviting and warm. It looks like a living object and represents the dynamic 
force that exists in our lives. The Airtel logo is now in lower case, which is an attempt to 
show the humility that is required in a service brand. And the red colour is a part of our 
heritage not only because it is auspicious in our environment but also because it is truly 
vibrant and has played a role in our success thus far. Airtel's new identity goes beyond 
telecom. So, in the future, if the company wants to get into new services, the brand 
image will not be a hindrance.’ 
 
With the increase in the use of smart phones in India, Airtel decided to position its 
advertising campaign so that its brand could be recognised as the most preferred service 
provider for smartphone users (Dasgupta, 2014). 
 
The actual effect of this change in logo and its various advertising positioning has not 
been captured in any media or company source; however, Airtel was and is still number 
one in India in number of subscribers. In Africa, it has been named as the top telecom 
brand by the Africa Brand Index (Capital Business, 2016). The company has been 
successful in creating a universal single brand to ensure international recognition. 
 
4.6 Host Country Environment 
Airtel internationalised in 2009 with entry into Sri Lanka (Airtel Sri Lanka website, 2017), 
followed by Africa and then Bangladesh in 2010 (Airtel company balance-sheets, 2010 
and 2011). In Africa, it initially acquired services in 15 countries and has since added 
two more countries. The company chose these countries in Africa as it was felt that 
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these countries would be more receptive to the ‘minutes factory’ model given their 
demographic fit with India. While Sri Lanka and Bangladesh are neighbouring countries 
and smaller in size, in Africa, the company is present in 17 different countries. 
 
Each country in Africa is different in size, density, regulatory environments, infrastructure 
etc. So, the important question that arises here is in regard to the company’s ease or 
difficulty in operating in 17 different countries within Africa, as each country has different 
regulations and socio-political differences. 
 
Africa was not a virgin market and to that extent was different to India during the period 
when Airtel commenced cellular services in the early 1990s. Africa had already been 
penetrated and there was a strong presence of other service providers like MTN, a South 
African company and Safaricom (a subsidiary of Vodafone). Success in entering such 
host markets depends upon the resource-based strategies that companies adopt 
(Wernerfelt, 1995). 
 
Experiences differ in each host market. A firm may not be fully successful in deploying 
its capabilities or taking full advantage of its resources in a new host market as it may 
lack complementary advantages (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2007). The company was also 
faced with certain issues in Africa and the learnings that emerged out of the problematics 
of operating in the African countries. These have been discussed below. 
 
Airtel expected the same success that it had experienced in India based on their pricing 
model. This pricing model was based on outsourcing operational expenditures which 
were not core company processes. Airtel established global contracts with IBM, Ericsson, 
Huwaei and Nokia for outsourcing the non-core business processes in all the countries 
that it was operating in. Hence, to that extent the company was able to lower its 
operational expenditure across the globe. 
 
The other aspect of Airtel’s pricing model was price elasticity which depended on the 
variability of customer income. To this effect, the interviewee states: 
‘The other thing was… the ability to understand a variability of elasticity in 
the market. Prices in Africa at a time when we acquired were about eight 
times than the prices of what we had in India. Per minute costed eight times 
more in Africa than it costed in India. Per capita income there was a third 




The company expected that with global sourcing they will be able to replicate its 
‘minutes model’. Airtel predicted that with lower costs, the volume usage would 
increase. However, due to lowering of price, the volumes did not increase to the 
extent that the company had experienced in India. The interviewee said: 
‘We realised the elasticity is present, but not ubiquitous, it is not everywhere 
and it is not as high. In India, in 2005, 2006 or 2007, we experienced 
elasticity quotient of about as high as 4, 5 or 6 which means you dropped 
the price by 10 per cent, but the volume increased by 30, 40, 50 per cent’ 
 
The interviewee in the above quote refers to price elasticity of demand when comparing 
revenue generation with context to the elasticity in India versus elasticity in Africa. The 
formula for price elasticity of demand is: 
 
Price elasticity of demand = % change in quantity demanded / % change in price 
 
Price elasticity is the customer’s responsiveness to demand based on the price of the 
product (Gallo, 2015). The higher the price elasticity, the more likely a small percentage 
change in the price of a product will lead to a higher percentage change in the demand 
for that product. 
 
Price elasticity in Africa was much lower than it was in India and hence decreasing the 
prices in Africa did not result in a higher demand as the company had witnessed in India. 
The money that the consumers saved due to lower costs of telephony services, were 
used for other living expenses in Africa. Hence the company did not witness the kind of 
success that it was expecting due to its pricing model. The interviewee on success of the 
company in Africa stated: 
 
’I won’t say we failed or anything, it’s just that we needed to recalibrate. So, 
to answer your question, have we successfully implanted the model? We have 
in it scores sourcing schemes...infrastructure costs, I won’t say we 
underestimated, but we under-appreciated the, the ability to debottleneck 
them’ 
 
Explaining this further, the interviewee explained the import costs in Africa versus the 
import costs in India. Africa is a continent and the company is present in 17 countries. 
The company was importing telecom equipment and the same was transported only by 
the sea route due to size, weight and quantity of such equipment. If the equipment 
reached the African shore (Tanzania) and had to be transported to the middle of Africa 
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(Democratic Republic of Congo), it could pass through three or four countries with 
separate import controls. This would translate into duties and octroi at each port of entry 
and exit. This caused the company severe delays. It was taking almost three months for 
the equipment to reach its intended destination. While the transport time was reduced 
to sixty days (by 2014), it is nowhere close to the ease of transport that the company 
enjoyed in India11, with transport times of less than one week from one side of the 
country to the other. 
 
Talking about the miscalculation of infrastructure setting in Africa, the interviewee stated: 
‘So, infrastructure cost, I won’t say is our key bottleneck, but it’s something 
to toil about’ 
 
Other important aspects that the interviewee mentioned were human resource costs and 
the availability of talent: 
’And I will tell you one of the learnings over the last four years is that human 
resources cost and quality is a trade-off at least in the context that we are 
talking about in Africa.’ 
 
In contrast to India, where there is a vast pool of English speaking graduates, such 
resources were less available in Africa. Hence, the company could not reduce its human 
resource costs in Africa as that would have translated into a compromise on quality. This 
was something that the company was not willing to do: 
‘What that meant was if we needed to reduce the cost, we could only do it 
by reducing the quality, which we cannot because it is antithesis.’ 
 
While Africa seemingly had a similar demographic fit to India, its level of urbanisation 
was much lower than that of India. This lack of urbanisation was the biggest challenge 
that the company faced in successfully implementing its ‘minutes factory’ model. 
 
The company had met with tremendous success in India with its ‘minutes model’ and 
was confident that the same model would be successful in Africa given a similar 
demographic landscape and the fact that there was sufficient potential for market 
penetration as the usage rates were much lower than in India. Further, the existing 
telecom players in Africa were still using a developed market pricing model. Hence, 
investing in Africa, from Airtel’s perspective, was expected to be beneficial. 
 
                                                          
11 India is ranked seventh in the world on total square area. 
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However, the similarities to India that Airtel had perceived in Africa were not quite 
present. For example, a country like Nigeria, which had a high population compared to 
other African countries, only had a population density of 162 people per square kilometre 
which is far lower than India which has a population density of 339. To replicate the 
‘minutes factory’ model was therefore a challenge not only for Airtel but for other players 
too due to lack of scale (Dharmakumar & Prasad, 2010). 
 
The company also faced issues on its branding efforts in countries like Nigeria. Airtel was 
issued a court order to rebrand as Econet (Johnson, 2012). This was due to an ongoing 
dispute with Econet Nigeria on a shareholding clause which arose due to the acquisition 
of its majority share; first by Celtel, followed by Zain and then Airtel. As of February 
2014, Airtel had lost the case in the lower courts and was planning to appeal in the 
Supreme Court of Nigeria (Appendix 2). The Airtel Nigeria website continues to show the 
new logo of the company (Appendix 3). In a recent report by Reuters (2016), it was 
stated that both companies had reached an out-of-court settlement. As the telecom 
license was sold by Zain without the consent of Econet, Zain agreed to pay Airtel’s 
litigation costs in Nigeria (Kabweza, 2016). 
 
The company recognises the fact that Africa is a continent and not one country; and 
that the 17 countries that it entered are all different. Airtel would have to deal with 
different regulators in each country of a continent that had already suffered from geo-
political risks (Leahy, 2010). The interviewee clarified this, saying: 
’… the reality of the situation [is], there are 17 different jurisdictions, there 
are 17 different currencies, there are 17 different economies, they are all at 
a different evolution point, there are 17 different government sets, there are 
17 different regulators. So, what we needed to be sure of and which 
thankfully in this particular case, we were sure of from day one itself is there 
is no one uniform strategy will follow with all’ 
 
This is indicative of adaptation to local markets as suggested by Peng and Meyer (2011) 
towards one of the AAA (Aggregation, Adaptation and Arbitrage) strategy for global 
diversification. 
 
The company was already facing losses in Sri Lanka due to fierce competition among 
various operators; Airtel had entered the Sri Lankan market in January 2009 with an 
offer of price for its services which was lower than the prevailing market rate; however, 
the same was then negated by the telecommunications regulator who fixed a floor rate 
(Pratap, 2010). Airtel is now fighting a case in the country’s Supreme Court against the 
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ruling, stating that a fixed floor price is not beneficial to consumers and is against their 
interest. While the case is still ongoing, there has been speculation that, due to the floor 
pricing, the Sri Lankan market has been making a loss for Airtel and it is in discussion 
with the market leader in the island country for a proposed merger (Parbat & Gupta, 
2016). Eventually Airtel may exit the Sri Lankan market. 
 
The company continues to struggle in Africa. Airtel made a statement at the GSM World 
Conference held in Barcelona in 2012 about its initial understanding of the African 
market, stating that there was a misunderstanding in the company’s judgment of the 
African mobile consumer and how they were different from the Indian mobile consumer; 
the increase in consumers that the company had expected due to decreasing call rates 
did not take place to the extent that the company had anticipated (Johnson, 2012). 
 
The primary assumption that Airtel made when entering Africa, about creating a niche 
in the market through increase in usage via an aggressive reduction in tariffs along with 
outsourcing and consolidating its operations so that it could expand its margins, does 
not seem to have worked in the company’s favour: the process is much slower than they 
expected due to the unresponsiveness of the African market to the ‘minutes factory’ 
model (Pyramid Research, 2013). 
 
In Kenya, the company had to increase its tariffs by 11% which analysts read as an 
admission by Airtel that its ‘minute factory’ model had not worked in Kenya (The East 
African, 2013). 
 
Airtel made some aggressive claims of the success it expected to achieve when entering 
Africa. However, results of the company’s African venture seem to be lower than 
expected, and while the company is making slow progress, its ‘minutes factory’ has not 
been embraced by Sub-Saharan Africa the way it had been in India (AMETW, 2013). 
 
To win market share at a rapid pace, Airtel slashed rates when it entered Africa in 2010, 
claiming that existing operators were overcharging. However, the strategy appears to 
have failed in Africa as the African people chose to spend the money saved from cheaper 
calls to buy essential items such as food etc., contrary to Airtel’s expectations that 




For Airtel, Africa has been a struggling market. The company has missed estimates with 
revenue declining 1 per cent per quarter and operating profit slipping by 1.75 per cent 
to 21.9 per cent in 2014, which is the lowest for Airtel since its acquisition of Zain in 
Africa (Moneycontrol, 2015). The company continues to be faced with a net loss in Africa 
due to increased taxes, continuing finance costs, devaluation of the Nigerian currency 
and other financial charges, although revenues have increased over the previous 
financial year (2016 versus 2015; Parbat, 2017). 
 
Host countries are different from home countries in many aspects. However, an inherent 
strength of emerging market companies investing in other emerging markets is their 
understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of doing business in a similar 
environment and their ability to replicate it in such emerging markets (Contractor, 2013). 
Companies are expected to know how to manage separate geographies with separate 
regulations, heterogeneous customer preferences, local customs and values, so that they 
can then be successful in such host countries. Notwithstanding what is stated in the 
literature, from Airtel’s experience it can be inferred that success in one market cannot 
always be replicated in another similar market. Airtel continues to struggle in Africa. 
 
4.7 Internationalisation Strategy and the Financial Crisis 
It is understood that Airtel first wanted to acquire MTN (a South African based telecom 
company with the largest presence in the African continent) in Africa and had been in 
negotiations with the company for a couple of years. Airtel had approached MTN first in 
2008 and then again in 2009; however, neither company could enter into a deal. Finally, 
Airtel settled for Zain and the acquisition deal took place in early 2010. To this effect the 
interviewee stated: 
‘We did try to look at a deal with MTN and I think not just once, twice over, 
some of that didn’t work through…We tried MTN in 2008, didn’t work out. 
We tried MTN again in 2009, it didn’t work out’ 
 
The company entered Sri Lanka in 2009 and Bangladesh in 2010. The talks with MTN 
and the final foray into the 2 neighbouring countries and Africa happened during the 
financial crisis and the years following the peak of the financial crisis. This is in contrast 
with the literature, wherein there is evidence that strategic decisions of MNCs are 
affected during any kind of global crisis, especially those of MNCs from emerging markets 
(Hill & Jongwanich, 2009; Sauvant et al., 2009). Such effects are not necessarily 
negative. A strategy could be expedited if a crisis is actually beneficial in terms of lower 
valuations (of the company to be acquired). But on the other hand, debt financing 
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becomes expensive during a crisis and especially so in the case of a financial crisis of a 
global scale. This does seem to corroborate with the Airtel case, and as the interviewee 
stated: 
‘Well, linkage to financial crisis are pretty low [to internationalisation 
strategy], we just wanted to follow through and execute the Africa strategy 
by taking [acquiring] the Zain assets’ 
 
As stated earlier in this chapter, Airtel had a strong presence in India and was a leader 
in the Indian market in number of subscribers. Hence, the company wanted to expand 
through internationalisation. After the initial issues of Greenfield investment faced in Sri 
Lanka, the company wanted to enter Africa only through the acquisition route. As Africa 
is similar to India in demography, Airtel was keen to invest in the continent before the 
market matured because the company felt that its ‘minutes factory’ model would also be 
successful in Africa, so the financial crisis did not affect its internationalisation strategy. 
 
The company had a strong balance sheet and has the ability to leverage the same. So 
the company accessed the debt capital market to finance the acquisition of Zain assets. 
The interviewee explaining about the debt financing stated: 
‘Access to debt capital was important part of our strategy. To get access to 
the capital was important; to get access to the capital at the right cost point 
was also equally important. But I think cost [interest cost and transaction 
fees] did increase’ 
 
During and immediately after the financial crisis, financial deals (especially merger and 
acquisition deals) saw a major reduction in numbers. The global financial crisis had 
negatively affected international mergers and acquisition deals (Reddy et al., 2014). 
Banks themselves were affected adversely by the global financial crisis and in many 
countries required financial assistance from their national governments; especially in the 
USA. 
 
In 2010, when Airtel accessed the debt market, it had a strong balance sheet and did 
not find it difficult to raise capital for the acquisition in Africa. Talking about the same 
and the cost of the debt financing, the interviewee mentioned: 
‘In 2010 when we actually executed, things were trading down, there were 
not enough deals in the market, we were a good… sought after credit for 
lenders to provide us the money…about the same rates as pre-financial crisis. 
So, in a way, that in a way ring-fenced the effects of financial crisis to us’ 
 
Hence, it can be determined from the above that the financial crisis did not affect the 




Bharti Airtel is the leading telecom services company in India and the third globally in 
number of subscribers (TOI 2015). By developing its ‘minutes factory’ model in India, it 
created a niche in the market, thus having a strong capability advantage in its home 
market. The success of its model was due to the specificity of the Indian demography 
which was highly populous but with a low tele-density. Liberalisation in India opened up 
a vast opportunity in the telecom market which was recognised by the owner/promoter 
of the company, which is indicative of his entrepreneurial capability. The company met 
with huge success in its home market and complemented its main capability with 
additional resources to enter into various other services, thus maintaining its competitive 
advantage against other domestic players and multinational companies in the home 
market. Due to its specific ARPM (average revenue per minute) model which is different 
from the ARPU (average revenue per user) model prevalent in developed markets, the 
company chose to invest in similar emerging markets during its process of 
internationalisation. While it chose to enter the first host market via the Greenfield mode, 
due to the negative experience, it then decided to invest in other emerging host markets 
only via acquisitions. As the interviewee has stated, for telecom services it is better to 
enter markets which are not virgin territory by acquiring an existing player, hence also 
acquiring a ready-made market. Hence, the company was market-seeking. However, it’s 
FSA in the form of the ARPM model was not as successful in Africa, as it had expected 
it to be. While the company maintains a dominant position in most of the 17 countries 
in Africa, it has been struggling financially in the continent. The company has adopted 
certain capabilities in its overseas learnings and has also imported the same back to its 
home country (Airtel Money). 
 
That the company chose to commence internationalisation close to home and then seek 
a continent which was an emerging market aligns with the extant literature on 
internationalisation of EMNEs based on the ‘psychic distance’ phenomenon. The 
company was seeking markets which were similar in demography and hence the 
perceived difference was low (Håkanson & Ambos, 2010). However, from the analysis 
above, it can be ascertained that the company did not fully comprehend the economic 
situation in Africa where the purchasing power parity is much lower than in India and 
the company continues to struggle even after 6 years of having entered Africa. In 2016, 
the company announced that it would restructure its businesses in Africa (PTI, 2016). 
Since then, the company has sold two of its operations to Orange (a French telecom 
company) along with some of its tower businesses. So currently, it has a presence in 15 
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African countries. It is considering further sales and mergers in Africa to reduce debt 
and make net profit in the continent (Philip, 2017). 
 
Using a Change model (based on Logic Model, Yin 2014), we can see how the company 
changed from a domestic company to an EMNE and how it implemented its strategies 
based on internal resources and capabilities and the external environment (Figure 13). 
The change model involves understanding of events over a period of time. As an 
analytical tool, the events observed over a period of time can then be matched to theory. 
 
The events depicted in Figure 13 are numbered and are explained in detail along with 
its theoretical understanding. 
 




1. Liberalisation of the Economy which also led to the privatisation of certain sectors 
which until then were fully controlled by the government 
2. The company looked for where the opportunities lay and found the same in the 
telecom sector 
3. These opportunities were created due to liberalisation and privatisation which saw 
economic development, infrastructure building which further attracted inward 
investment helping build a conducive environment for growth 
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4. This was accentuated with telecom licences from the government. Other private 
players were also entering the telecom space which until then was operated solely 
by the government 
5. The telecom space had huge opportunities as India was a large country with 
massive coverage prospects and penetration. The company saw opportunities in 
scale. 
6. This led to the conception of the ‘minutes factory’ model 
7. Low Capex Model. More of an Opex Model which allowed for low price for the 
services. Average revenue per minute (unlike the ARPU model prevalent in DM) 
8. Successful model. Helped the company gain a number one position in the market 
(13 and 14) 
9. Internationalisation (mode of entry/specific markets) 
10. Not easy to replicate/regulatory differences/cultural differences/timing issue 
11. Learnings (New Product/Human Resources) 
12. Other products in home country (14) 
13. Company Characteristics (enterpreneur driven/growth oriented) 
14. External conditions (market saturation/competition) 
15. Financial Crisis 
 
4.9 Chapter Conclusion 
Using a framework of dynamic capabilities and the resource-based approach, this 
exploratory case study examines how an Indian company entered the telecom services 
sector in its home country due to internal factors (entrepreneurial potential of its 
progenitor) and external factors (liberalisation of the country). It was successful in 
building a specific capability model to suit the particular demographics of the Indian 
telecom consumer market which helped it to become successful and secure a leadership 
position among all telecom service providers in India, which it has successfully 
maintained. However, at the end of 2016, one of the Indian conglomerates (Reliance 
Industries led by Mukesh Ambani) entered the telecom sector and launched telephony 
services at prices lower than the prevalent prices in the Indian market at that time. So 
currently, Airtel is facing a price war in the domestic market. Due to this competition, 
Vodafone India has recently announced that it will merge with Idea Cellular (Panchal & 





It is evident that the company has fallen into a success trap as it is struggling in the 
African continent, which indicates that the company had primarily adopted an exploitive 
approach although it did explore new products that were being used by its competitors. 
Hence, effective internationalisation involves both exploitative and explorative 
capabilities. The study of Airtel’s internationalisation also demonstrates that 
internationalisation on the back of home-grown capabilities and resources may not be 
immediately replicable. Managers need to understand the complexities of a dynamic 
environment in the quest of firm internationalisation. 
 
Towards its internationalisation, Airtel has preferred the acquisition route. It is learning 
to adapt and adopt ways in which to be successful in its international endeavour. 
However, it is faced with challenges both in the domestic front and in the international 
markets and is hoping to consolidate its position in Africa and Sri Lanka through mergers 
or sale of operations. Nevertheless, the company has made a concerted effort in building 
its brand positioning and, despite all the challenges that it faces, the company is currently 




5. Wipro Limited 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The chapter provides exploratory indication and explanation for the research questions 
that were raised in the literature review chapter. As has been mentioned earlier in this 
thesis, there is an increasing interest around internationalisation of emerging market 
multinational enterprises (EMNEs) as they continue to grow their outward investments 
from the early 2000s. Further, there is an ongoing debate on outward FDI (OFDI) from 
EMNEs and whether the same can be explained through extant IB theory (Hoskisson et 
al., 2000; Buckley, 2009). Further, Ramamurti (2012) has stated that EMNEs may have 
ownership advantages that are different from the ones seen in developed market 
multinational companies (DMNCs). Hence, it is important to continue our understanding 
of EMNEs and their internationalisation process and the strategies behind the same. Why 
do EMNEs internationalise and what is the preferred route for their outward investments? 
Is it through an organic route, which is setting up stand-alone operations in the host 
country or setting up joint ventures and partnerships; or through an inorganic route, 
which is via acquisitions in the foreign markets? Do EMNEs internationalise to acquire 
strategic assets to compete at both the home market and the global market? Do EMNEs 
already possess resources, which help them internationalise, or do they need to 
continually change and augment existing resources to both gain and maintain 
competitive advantage? What challenges do they face in host markets and how do these 
companies adapt to such challenges? Finally, does a change in the external environment 
like the financial crisis affect internationalisation strategies of EMNEs? 
 
India is an emerging market that has seen a rise of multinational companies, especially 
in the services sector. Wipro Limited (Wipro) is the company being analysed in this 
chapter. While it is present in the consumer sector and IT services, as the research is 
concentrated on the services sector, only the IT business of the company has been 
investigated and, through primary and secondary sources, this chapter seeks to answer 
the aforementioned questions and reach certain conclusions. 
 
5.2 Company Background 
Wipro Limited was incorporated in 1945. It started as a small-hydrogenated cooking oil 
producing company established in British India. Today it is a global IT giant which 
appears in the Forbes 2000 list at number 755 by market capitalisation (Forbes, 2016) 
and is ranked 20th among IT companies in the world (HfS Research, 2015). It has 
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operations across 39 countries with consolidated revenues of USD 8 billion12 (as of 31st 
March 2016, Wipro Balance Sheet, 2015-16). 
 
The founder of the company was Mohamed Hasham Premji (1915 - 1966). He was the 
son of a successful bulk rice trader. He branched out and established a company called 
‘Western India Vegetable Products Limited’ in December 1945 in the state of 
Maharashtra, in undivided India. MH Premji took the company public in just a couple of 
months post its incorporation in February 1946. India gained independence in 1947. 
British India was divided and two separate states were formed, Pakistan and India. While 
Pakistan declared itself a Muslim country, India became a socialist, secular and 
democratic state as indicated in its preamble when the Indian constitution was declared 
in November 1949. The first Governor-General of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, 
invited MH Premji to move to Pakistan and join his cabinet as the first finance minister13. 
MH Premji declined the offer and chose to stay in India. MH Premji was interested in 
politics as a policy strategist. He served on various foods industry boards and was 
continuously lobbying with the Indian national government to deregulate the food grains 
industry. 
 
In 1945, MH Premji had a son, Azim Hashim Premji (current Chairman of Wipro). As a 
young boy, AH Premji was not interested in his father’s business and was critical of the 
Indian consumer market (TW International, 2012). He initially intended to work with 
developing economies, which was then possible in a job with World Bank or similar 
organisations (McCormick, 2006). After finishing schooling in Mumbai (the capital of 
Maharashtra and the financial capital of India), AH Premji went to study engineering at 
Stanford. However, just a few months before he could graduate14, he had to return to 
India in 1966 due to the sudden death of his father. 
 
AH Premji was only 21 years old when he was recalled back to India. Amidst shareholder 
concern, he took over the reins of his father’s company. The company was then worth 
USD 2 million (Saran & David, 2000). 
                                                          
12 1 USD = INR 67.0350 (Reuters as on 16/02/2017, 
http://in.reuters.com/finance/currencies/quote?srcAmt=1&srcCurr=USD&destCurr=INR) 
13 MH Premji was an established businessperson and was Muslim by birth. At the time of partition in 1947, 
influential and rich Muslims who resided in mainland India, were invited to move to Pakistan and were 
offered important positions in the government as an inducement. 
 
14 AH Premji had completed the requirements for the degree of engineering, however he needed to 
complete certain subsidiary arts courses to get his degree. He received permission to do so through 
correspondence and finally received his degree from Stanford in 1996.  
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AH Premji took on the challenge of the role of CEO, thrust on him despite his earlier 
misgivings about the Indian consumer market. That he was a visionary was evident 
when he made drastic changes to the cooking oil business and thus created a mini 
revolution in the Indian consumer market15. 
 
In 1977, the name of the company was changed to Wipro Products Limited (from 
Western India Vegetable Products Limited) which was further changed to Wipro Limited 
in 1984 (The Economic Times, Wipro Timeline). 
 
This was also the period when the political milieu of the country changed and a more 
socialist party came into power16. The party believed in the self-sufficiency of the country 
and, due to their policies, multinational companies like Coca-Cola and IBM shut down 
their operations and exited the country (Encarnation & Vachani, 1985). AH Premji saw 
an opportunity in the exit of IBM and the company commenced domestic IT services in 
1981 followed by manufacturing and marketing of indigenous personal computers (PC) 
in 1985. This is conceivably indicative of dynamic capabilities in the form of 
entrepreneurial activity and managerial capability. Helfat et al. (2007), state that 
dynamic capabilities involve entrepreneurial activity along with organisational strategy 
to affect change in a dynamic environment. There was change in the Indian political 
environment which the company exploited to diversify into information technology from 
having been only a vegetable oil company. This highlights the capability developed 
through an overseas engineering education due to an inclination towards information 
technology which was totally disconnected to the vegetable oil business of the company. 
 
Wipro Systems Limited (a subsidiary) was established in the early 1980s to develop 
software which, until that point, was being provided only by MNC’s in India. While the 
sector was still government controlled, private companies were allowed to enter the 
fledgling IT industry (Rajaram, 2012). There was a restriction on software imports and 
hence companies had to make their own software. This led to India producing a large 
number of software developers during that time and with proficiency in English (due to 
the legacy of the British rule education system) and a large pool of science graduate and 
engineers (second only to the US during that time), created a competitive advantage in 
                                                          
15 Hydrogenated cooking oil was sold loosely. AH Premji started the process of selling the same in 
packets which had never been observed in the Indian market before that. 
16 The ruling party, Indian National Congress which was at the helm of Indian politics since India’s 
independence in 1947, was replaced by the Janata Party. 
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human capital required for such services (Kapur & Ramamurti, 2001), thus, leading India 
to become a substantial software exporter. 
 
The establishment of the IT subsidiary laid the foundation for the global information 
technology company that Wipro has become today. 
 
It was almost 20 years after the establishment of the IT subsidiary that the company 
made its first overseas foray by launching its operations in Japan in 1998 followed by its 
German operations in 2002. In the same year, it made its first overseas acquisition in 
America. The company’s IT services operations and internationalisation timeline has 
been provided in Appendix 4. 
 
To understand the internationalisation strategies of the company, I met three senior 
executives of the company. To confirm anonymity, the exact designations are not being 
mentioned. Together, they could provide an in-depth overall view of the company 
internationalisation from a strategic perspective. Combined interview time was more 
than 2 hours. I was allowed to record all three interviews. The words ‘indented in 
quotation marks’ are the direct quotes from the interviews. 
 
5.3 Resources and Capabilities 
Resource based view helps explain a firm’s competitive advantage, which are the unique 
resources that the firm may possess vis-à-vis its competitors (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). 
These resources can be tangible or intangible assets and would need to be rare and 
inimitable for sustained competitiveness (de Oliveira Mota et al. 2011). Unique 
capabilities that the firm may possess would be a subset of these resources (Barney, 
1991). EMNEs have emerged in times much different from the earlier DMNCs, times 
which have seen a conducive international policy environment and a technologically 
advanced environment that have helped them adapt for international markets 
(Ramamurti, 2009, b). Hence, such conducive environments have helped EMNEs 
accumulate resources and capabilities (Ramamurti, 2012) that were not seen in the 
earlier DMNCs. Talking about the developed markets and advanced technology, 
interviewee 1 states: 
’So, like that, technology keeps changing. The developed markets have 
always been at the forefront of technology and we have been partners in that 




These evidences what the literature mentions about EMNEs having resources and 
capabilities different from earlier DMNCs. While developed countries lead in building 
technologies, the emerging markets were able to replicate that technology at a larger 
scale and hence could provide cost arbitrage. 
 
Interviewee 1 continued: 
‘…therefore, we have added value to clients by moving up in terms from just 
providing wage arbitrage to providing a lot more value in terms of more 
outcome base and output base’ 
 
So, the company was not only providing cost benefits to clients due to economies 
of scale but also adding value by providing a variety of services (output) which 
could help their clients be more efficient (outcome). 
 
From the above, it can be ascertained that EMNEs have developed on capabilities 
(for example technologies) built by DMNCs or have acquired capabilities that they 
felt they were lacking. However, they do develop their own capabilities too. With 
the global world becoming flatter, emerging markets are not only borrowing 
innovations from developed markets but are also innovating themselves and 
contributing to the developed world and other emerging markets (Govindrajan & 
Ramamurti, 2011). 
 
Interviewee 2 elaborates about capabilities that Wipro built: 
‘So, infrastructure services for example, testing services is another area, 
enterprise application services - these are all services which are 
homegrown…’ 
 
India was rapidly growing at this time (mid 1990s to early 2000s) due to its new 
liberalisation policies. To attract DMNCs, there was a thrust on industrialisation. Building 
Indian infrastructure was an important government initiative. In India, Wipro was a large 
infrastructure player, managing the IT systems of other large Indian corporates and 
hence building on the infrastructure services was adding value for their existing clients. 
They were able to provide the same services to global infrastructure companies too. With 
the rise of global infrastructure services, Wipro, which had built the same on the basis of 
local Indian companies, were able to provide these services offshore thus able to 
decrease costs for their global customers. This helped the company grow. Hence, Wipro 




This is in line with literature that states that firms which want to become successful and 
remain successful in international markets not only acquire advantages but also build 
and develop capabilities and advantages (Rugman & Verbeke, 2004). Companies need 
to build technologies and also acquire technologies to provide differentiated products 
and services for sustained competitive advantage (Teece, 2014). It is evident that Wipro 
maps to this and it is further confirmed via a report undertaken by UNCTAD (2004) that 
stated: 
‘Access to technology and knowledge has been a strategic consideration for 
Indian firms seeking to strengthen their competitiveness and to move up 
their production value chain. In 2003, WIPRO acquired NerveWire Inc (United 
States) for USD 18.7 million to gain deep domain knowledge and other IT 
related benefits, including access to markets (p.7)’ 
 
In general terms industry experts also support this; as Sudin Apte, CEO and research 
director, Offshore Insights stated (Mishra, 2013): 
‘Going by some recent acquisitions made by Indian IT firms, it is clearly 
evident that onshore capabilities are getting more prominence now, though 
client access continues to remain an important aspect’ 
 
Further, regarding the characteristics of the company’s resources, Teece (2000, 2014) 
states particular technology and know-how (in this case Wipro’s R&D) would meet the 
VRIN properties as defined by Barney (1991), that are valuable, rare, inimitable, and 
non-substitutable. For Wipro, its investments in R&D and capabilities in the same would 
constitute its resources. 
 
Interviewee 2 explains about Wipro’s R&D strategy: 
‘…the whole testing practice started as more as an R&D house doing R&D 
work for lot of technology companies overseas and their testing was a big 
area of work…Now that was built up further to kind of enhance testing into 
other areas not only on the R&D side, but also on the enterprise side’ 
 
So the company was strong in R&D, both on the technology front and the enterprise 
side and were providing testing services for new technologies to overseas clients. This 
ability, or unique R&D capability that Wipro had, can be said to have VRIN properties. 
As Storchevoi (2015) also stated: ‘for technology companies, the VRIN resources are the 




5.4 Mode of Internationalisation (Domestic to International) 
 
5.4.1 Export Diversification 
Exports precede direct investment (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). This has also been 
experienced in the case of the first software companies established in India; however, 
the reason for the same was primarily due to the Indian government’s restrictive 
investment policies rather than individual firm choices from the time that India gained 
independence in 1947 until the country attained market liberalisation during 1991-92. 
During this period, there were severe restrictions of entry of foreign firms into India 
(Bhagwati et al., 2010). Liberalisation changed that. However, the restrictions were not 
lifted instantly but carried out in a phased manner. In 1992, the total value of Indian 
OFDI through the automatic route (no approval was required from the Indian apex bank, 
The Reserve Bank of India) was restricted to USD 2 million, which has been revised over 
the years and stands at 400% of a company’s net worth today (various RBI reports). 
Though, some restrictions still remain in sectors like energy and natural resources (Khan, 
2012). 
 
Due to the software import restrictions, Wipro too was making its own software. The 
company commercially commenced providing software services in 1990. An overseas 
design centre (Odyssey 21) was set up in 1994 to exclusively export technology services 
to overseas clients. 
 
5.4.2 Liberalisation and Opportunities 
As mentioned above, market liberalisation in India occurred in 1991-92. Liberalisation 
saw the re-entry of some of the big developed market multinational companies (DMNCs) 
in technology including IBM, which entered India through a collaboration with the Tatas 
in 1992 (Sharma, 2011). These DMNCs set up subsidiaries in India to hire the rich pool 
of human resources and talent to produce software services. They even acquired smaller 
Indian based software companies. However, they still lagged behind the big Indian 
software companies (Kumar, 2001) like TCS, Infosys and Wipro in the export of software 
services. 
 
Wipro took advantage of this opportunity to collaborate with different DMNCs to provide 
different services in India; for example, a joint venture with Royal Dutch Company for 
internet services in India and a joint venture with General Electrics (GE) to provide 
diagnostic and imaging products, which was introduced for the first time in the country. 
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The company then worked towards attaining recognised certifications for its services 
and established tie-ups with overseas companies for technical know-how, mainly 
companies from the developed markets (like Switzerland, US, and Japan). 
 
The need for such global certifications, like SEI-CMM Level 5 and ISO 14001, and 
technical tie-ups, arose because of the entry of DMNCs in the Indian market with known 
brand names and enormous R&D resources (Hamm, 2007). With its pool of human 
capital (English speaking engineers and scientists), AH Premji and his management team 
ascertained that they could create a niche through engineering expertise, software 
programming, hardware and chip designs and supplying these services to various 
industries including banking and manufacturing. For a rather unknown company offering 
such services during those times, possessing global certifications allowed them to bid for 
international contracts. 
 
Through this process of technical tie-ups and acquiring global certifications, Wipro 
gradually started establishing itself as a reliable partner for DMNCs entering India which 
is evidenced from the various tie-ups the company formed with these MNCs that were 
entering India at that time. This also assisted the company to create its brand awareness 
in countries outside of India. 
 
5.4.3 Organic Growth 
Due to the initial phased relaxation of investment policies in India post market 
liberalisation, Wipro ventured overseas (horizontal integration which is replicating 
operations in another country; Yeaple, 2003) to start its first operations in Japan followed 
by Germany (both developed markets) in 1998. This does not follow the extant IB 
literature on the kind of host market sought by EMNEs. Literature states that companies 
from emerging markets in the initial stages of internationalisation invest in other 
emerging markets and seek host countries which are culturally closer in proximity 
(Buckley et al., 2008); they seek partnerships and joint ventures in the early stages of 
internationalisation rather than setting up a wholly owned subsidiary (Li & Meyer, 2009). 
This phenomenon has also been observed with other Indian companies in the IT 
industry; like Tata Consultancy Services (another Indian IT giant which is ranked among 
the top 10 IT companies globally, HfS Research, 2015) which internationalised by setting 
up operations in USA in 1973. This is indicative of opportunity seeking by emerging 
market companies investing in advance markets to complement their individual strengths 
(Luo & Tung, 2007). 
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As indicated on the Wipro Japan website (2016), it was important for businesses in Japan 
to reinvent themselves in order to keep up with the markets and hence seek new 
horizons through innovative solutions. Japan has an ageing population and lacks a skilled 
and talented workforce. Further, the country is in a disadvantaged position due to 
continuous natural disasters. 
 
This gives an indication of the logical progression of Wipro’s initial internationalisation 
stage, which emanated due to changes in the liberalisation policies of the country and 
the threat from DMNCs entering the Indian domestic market. The opportunity in the PC 
market, which had emerged due to the exit of IBM in the late 1970s, was threatened 
with the entrance of Compaq and Hewlett-Packard as an outcome of the liberalisation 
policies in India. Wipro then began concentrating on engineering and software services. 
The company ascertained that as the country was open to the DMNCs, there was also 
opportunity for the company to look outward (Hamm, 2007), which is invest overseas 
through OFDI. Hence, internationalisation of the company was an outcome of the 
liberalisation policies of the country and the imminent competition from DMNCs within 
India. 
 
5.4.4 Inorganic Growth 
In 2000, the executive team of Wipro set a goal for the company which was termed as 
the 4x4 plan. The strategy behind the plan was to become a USD 4 billion company by 
2004 (Hamm, 2007). 
 
To put this plan into action, the company first listed on the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) in the year 2000. It then set on an aggressive path of inorganic growth. An 
inorganic growth strategy in a foreign host market implies internationalisation through 
the acquisition route (Gubi et al., 2010; Hattari & Rajan, 2010; Khan, 2012). As 
interviewee 2 mentions, the thought in 2000 was that the company lacked specific 
capabilities that could pose a hindrance for it to achieve the 4x4 plan. 
 
‘…Wipro had a lot of capabilities. What was missing is specific niche areas in 
a particular vertical…Wipro had normal IT services and it had BPO, but it did 
not have a consulting piece which can kind of lead to get to the next level of 
services so we did acquisition to kind of enhance that portfolio… a lot of 
clients who were requiring BPO services but we didn’t have the capabilities 




The ‘next level of services’ that the interviewee mentions above can be interpreted as 
the additional services that the company needed to add to its product suite to compete 
at a global level. The company mentions on its website that IT is not a support function 
solely and in an ever-changing dynamic business environment, organisations need to 
keep reinventing themselves and hence IT consulting helps provide organisations with 
a process for transformation to increase effectiveness and reduce costs. Talking about 
existing capabilities and the need to acquire the capabilities the company was lacking, 
interviewee 3 said: 
‘… the thinking was that we have a great execution engine in technology, we 
don’t have the domain’ 
 
Hence, to gain capabilities that the company lacked, it chose to use the acquisition route 
in its path to achieve its ambitious goal. Interviewee 1 confirms this: 
‘We forayed in to an M&A [merger and acquisition] aspect from a 
differentiated skill set that we thought that we didn’t have...therefore one of 
the areas was to move up the value chain was to get access to differentiated 
capability and we felt that was, you know, inorganic could also be means to 
get there…’ 
 
It is evident that Wipro was intending for accelerated internationalisation through the 
inorganic route that is through quick acquisitions. In international business literature, 
accelerated internationalisation has been associated with born global firms or firms 
which are small and medium enterprises (Bangara et al., 2012; Mathews & Zander, 
2007; Pla-Barber & Escribá-Esteve, 2006; Chetty & Hunt, 2003). As per the definition 
provided, born global firms are young and entrepreneurial in nature with 
founder/managers who look outward from the outset (Cavusgil & Knight, 2015). 
However, Wipro was not a born global firm when it ventured overseas; it was not a small 
and medium enterprise when it first invested overseas in 2000. Further, the company 
was already listed on the NYSE. 
 
Wipro made its first acquisition in USA (a developed market) in 2002. A second 
acquisition followed in 2003, again in USA. Literature states that acquisitions in advanced 
market can help EMNEs become successful (Stucchi, 2012) and that EMNEs acquire 
companies in developed markets to seek a strategic fit for existing capabilities so as to 
gain accelerated internationalisation (Deng, 2012; Gammeltoft et al., 2012). Further, 
acquisitions in developed countries are a tool used by EMNEs to pursue rapid 
internationalisation thus bypassing the traditional route of internationalisation (stages 
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model) to catch up with existing global players (Tsai & Eisingerich, 2010). All the three 
interviewees corroborate this: 
‘We have always used acquisition as a means to fit strategic gaps…we found 
that assets which will fill strategic gaps were more likely to reside in the 
developed markets’ [Interviewee 1] 
 
’There are certain skill sets that you are building, certain aspects…that we 
are building within, you will say possibly inorganic would also help…’ 
[Interviewee 2] 
 
‘A lot of acquisitions that we do for domains are catch-up acquisitions, 
because an IBM has it, an Accenture has it and we don’t, so we are at a 
disadvantage’ [Interviewee 3] 
 
The last quote talks about being in a disadvantageous position vis-à-vis the larger players 
in the field due to lack of certain capabilities. Such a positon of weakness may be 
reversed to a positon of strength through capability acquisition. As Madhok and Keyhani 
(2012) have stated, EMNEs can use acquisitions for access to learning and opportunity 
to create advantage through capability building, which they may otherwise lack. 
 
The executives (not part of the interviewees in the data set) of the company have echoed 
this capability-seeking requirement for advantage building during the initial acquisitions 
in 2002 and 2003. 
‘This acquisition enhances our ability to deliver end-to-end IT solutions for 
players in the energy and utilities space, bolstered by a global delivery model’ 
– Sudip Banerjee, President, Enterprise Solutions, Wipro Technologies 
(Beary, 2002)’ 
 
‘The team of 90 plus consultants from NerveWire bring in deep domain 
knowledge and strong customer relationships. We believe this acquisition will 
be a strong catalyst for growth by creating better customer value,’ - Girish 
Paranjpe, President, Financial Services, Wipro Technologies (PTI, 2003)’ 
 
However, the company did not achieve its USD 4 billion goal by 2004. In 2005, its 
revenues stood at USD 1.9 billion and this failure was attributed to a global economic 
slowdown in 2001 and 2002 (Hamm, 2007). Hence, the company’s strategic plan of 
attaining the revenue goals that it had set through acquisitions was unsuccessful. 
 
5.4.5 Acquisition Strategy 
Wipro completed several acquisitions during mid-2000s. These acquired units were 
mainly small and medium in size and the company acquired them all via cash deals. As 
interviewee 3 mentioned, and quoted in the earlier section, the company’s first 
acquisitions were not completely successful and the company learnt how to integrate 
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overseas acquisitions over time. The company realised how important it was to be 
sensitive to local cultures for the effective integration of an acquired company. These 
focussed acquisitions that were a strategic fit for the company are famously known as 
Wipro’s ‘string of pearls’ acquisition strategy (Mishra & Raghu, 2007). Interviewee 3 
confirms the terminology used for Wipro’s acquisition strategy: 
‘I think we did a series of acquisitions; I think we did about 16 or 17 during 
that particular phase of time (2005 – 2008) which is when the famous term 
‘string of pearls’ came in’ 
 
These small to mid-size acquisitions have been a part of Wipro’s strategy towards its 
growth plans as stated by industry analysts (FE Bureau, 2015). AH Premji’s son, Rishad 
Premji, joined the board of directors in 2015 and also assumed the role of the company’s 
strategy head. He launched Wipro Ventures in July 2015 with an initial corpus of USD 
100 million for exploring investment opportunities in start-up companies that focus on 
niche technologies. 
 
However, in 2016, Wipro completed two acquisition deals which are considered to be its 
biggest acquisitions of all time on the basis of the cash outgo that Wipro made (close to 
USD 500 million for each acquisition). While these two acquisitions were outside Wipro’s 
‘string of pearls’ approach, due to the size of the acquisitions, they still remained within 
the company’s strategy of capability acquisition. Such a shift in its acquisition strategy is 
expected to help stimulate its growth and strengthen its capability delivery and product 
offering (BS Reporter, 2016). 
 
It can be determined from the above that the company feels it is now able to efficiently 
integrate any size or type of acquired unit which has led it to venture towards large size 
acquisitions. This sense of expected efficiency emanates from the successful experience 
of past acquisitions. There is evidence in literature too, which states that firms become 
comfortable and perform better having had prior acquisition experience in the same line 
of business in the industry (Hayward, 2002). Interviewee 3 substantiates this: 
 
‘…culturally people can get easily rebelled, partially because we are so heavily 
Indian in our culture and two, partially because it’s just the sheer size, so you 
also need an ecosystem for these people too, in fact we did a lot of that in 
the organic business subsequently and the consulting especially. We said, we 
need to give them an ecosystem where they can collectively integrate solely 




Interviewee 3 talks mainly about people integration. The biggest asset for IT companies 
is the employees and Wipro, over time, created an environment so that acquisition of 
overseas units integrated easily into the company, which was culturally Indian oriented. 
This is endorsed by Barkema and Schijven (2008) who state that experience does not 
happen automatically but involves information sharing, coordination among various parts 
of an organization, training and integration and all of these take time to develop for 
acquisitions to be successful. 
 
5.5 Brand and Logo 
During the time that the company initiated its internationalisation process in 1998, it also 
changed its logo. The original logo was a black and white sunflower, the sunflower to 
denote its origins as a sunflower oil producing company. While it has maintained the 
sunflower, it is now a rainbow coloured sunflower with the tagline ‘Applying Thought’ 
(Figure 14). 
Figure 14: Wipro Logo 
 
 
In a conversation with Sen and Jhala (2005), the creator of the logo, Shombhit Sen says, 
that they identified four values that are crucial for Wipro’s end users (human values, 
integrity, innovative solutions and value for money) that signifies the core value of the 
tagline which implies that ‘Wipro is process oriented and that it is thinking of you.’ 
 
As Wipro states on its website (Wipro Newsroom, 2017): 
‘The Rainbow flower consists of basic values of Youthful and Energetic, 
Multifaceted, Innovative, Large-Diversified and Vibrant and stands as our 
brand identity. Below the flower is inscribed the line ‘Applying Thought’, our 
brand promise, representing Powerful, Intellectual, Futuristic- Visionary, 
Maturity and Commitment to Innovation.’ 
 
A case study on Wipro brand building by Chattopadhyay (2011, Insead Case Studies), 
shows that in 2006 the company’s awareness level among non-clients was only 35%. 
This was far behind international competitors like IBM and Accenture (who are also from 
the same industry of Information Technology and Consultancy Services). So, Wipro 
launched an initiation around building its brand (Appendix 5). It sought to differentiate 
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itself through technological excellence, innovative solutions, operational excellence, 
extending the company culture of linking values to business performance and last but 
not least, extending its global footprint using its inherent strength and capabilities. This 
resulted in increasing the company brand recognition and it ranked behind IBM in a 
brand-audit study in 2007 among prospective clients. 
 
5.6 Host Country Environment 
In 2006, Wipro was operating in different host markets such as USA, UK, Canada, Middle 
East, Europe and Asia. As mentioned in the earlier section, the company had developed 
in-house capabilities and was also acquiring capabilities and resources. The company 
was acquiring those resources and capabilities which they felt the company lacked.  
 
Through the acquisitions that the company had made, the company acquired both 
tangible and intangible capabilities. For example, in the acquisition of NerveWire, the 
company acquired 90 consultants (tangible resources) but these consultants brought 
with them expertise in financial consulting (intangible capabilities). Similarly, in its 
acquisition of NewLogic, an Austrian company, Wipro not only acquired engineers and 
customers (tangible) but also acquired patented engineering designs (intangible). 
 
Linking this back to literature; dynamic capabilities theory ‘focusses attention on the 
firm’s ability to renew its resources in line with changes in its environment’ (Ambrosini & 
Bowman, 2009, p. 45) because resources and capabilities are crucial for 
internationalisation of firms from emerging markets (Liu, et al., 2011); such an approach 
is a reflection of the resource based view (further quoting Cavusgil et al. 2007; Teece et 
al., 1990). EMNEs are competing against various established players in various host 
markets. For such EMNEs to be successful, they require resource-based strategies. As 
Wernerfelt (1995) states that businesses will always encounter competition in whichever 
market they choose to enter and the business pattern of entry and exit will ensure that 
only the best survive and hence to succeed, businesses are required to adopt resource-
based strategies. 
 
Hence, depending upon the proximity of the host market, managers of EMNEs need to 
develop or adopt regional or international strategies to create competitive advantage. 
EMNEs do possess advantages based on home-grown capabilities; however, it is not 
always possible that home advantages may be successful in host markets. As we have 
established in the case of Airtel in Africa (Chapter 4). 
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On the success of home-grown capabilities in overseas markets, the interviewees stated: 
‘We have to be different in different countries, because the local dynamics 
are very different. So to that extent, it is a very localized strategy in terms of 
how we approach each country…there will be expectation of overtime, there 
will be a protest’ [Interviewee 1] 
 
‘You can continuously add capabilities is one, and in some of these countries 
where it was not English speaking, Germany for example is one challenge, 
Japan, China when you don’t have English speaking so prominent then it is 
difficult to kind of penetrate because you need to hire locals, right and in 
Japan and Germany especially there were large players who are well 
penetrated’ [Interviewee 2] 
 
Tying this back to literature, it can be stated that experience of each host country differs. 
From a resource-based perspective, a firm may not be able to use to its full advantage 
the resources that they may have transferred to a host country or may actually be at a 
disadvantage due to the lack of complementary resources required for international 
operations (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2007). There could be various causes for such a 
situation as interviewee 2 has mentioned above about countries which are not English 
speaking, hence there is a challenge due to language barriers. Companies can also face 
cultural barriers. As interviewee 1 states: 
‘See it is culture. What maybe an appropriate comment in an Indian set-up 
maybe highly inappropriate in some other country set-up, right, so you need 
to have that, you know, diversity training of sorts, right. So when you say 
DNA, that is there in its….you know…as an Indian you are capable of making 
many comments which in the Indian context maybe acceptable, may not be 
acceptable in certain context, right. We want to increase our presence in 
Europe…there is special focus, also because you have to do business a little 
differently in terms of, you know, language barriers are there, lot more 
localization needs to be there.’ 
 
There are cultural differences in approaches to work between India and other countries. 
This is something that I have personally experienced while working in the banking sector 
in India. As I was handling multinational companies, work happened in different time 
zones and one was expected to work at all hours. However, while dealing with other 
countries, it was accepted that certain countries would not work post cut off time or 
during major holidays. 
 
Interviewee 3 articulated this further: 
‘I won’t say while you have this home country advantage, in fact, no country, 
you think, you can put into another market and the success in one country 
cannot be replicated at all, so I think it’s a very powerful thing and we’ve kind 
of lived it in every acquisition we have seen, wherever we have…oh it worked 




In situations of such language and cultural barriers, companies adapt to the host 
market in various ways and Wipro adapted by hiring locally and sensitising to local 
culture in Japan and European countries. In Japan, the company acquired local 
talent as mentioned by interviewee 2. This was mainly on the sales side to 
penetrate the Japanese market as the company was providing R&D services to 
many Technology firms in that country. The company also initiated network 
relationships as interviewee 2 specifies: 
We had, at various points in time, senior board members from Japanese 
background and the ex-Finance Minister of Japan was on the Board of Wipro 
for some time…Sakakibara. So, we used all those relationships and contacts 
to kind of penetrate this [the Japanese market] better’ 
 
Interviewee 3 validates this further, stating that the company adopted divergent 
strategies based on local requirement of specific host countries. The company has been 
successful in countries where they were responsive to local requirements but in countries 
where they were less responsive, the company met with failure. Specifically talking about 
the acquisitions in various countries and the requirement to adapt to local requirements 
and make changes, interviewee 3 stated: 
‘We changed… in Portugal… In France…So those nuances are something that 
you learn along unless you are sensitive to those…So you have to be very 
sensitive and you cannot put [your own rules], you have to make your rules 
so much more localized to that extent’ 
 
The interviewees are consistent in their view about being sensitive to local language and 
local culture. This is indicative of decision making through self-learning by managers and 
it differs from country to country (Aharoni et al. 2011). Wipro was also continually 
adapting to various host countries as is evidenced from the interviews. This is 
symptomatic of dynamic capabilities, which is the ability of company management to 
continually build both internal and external capabilities in tune with a dynamic external 
environment (Teece et al., 1997). This also ties in with literature about adaptation to 
local markets as a strategy for successful internationalisation (Peng & Meyer, 2011). 
 
Companies need to build competitive advantage; however, the acquisition of capabilities 
and resources that the company may lack alone cannot assure competitive advantage. 
Ranft and Lord (2002) propositioned that the retention of employees of acquired firms 
through the giving of financial incentives and key positions to such employees ensures 
the success of the acquisition. Host countries have advantages and disadvantages, which 
the foreign acquiring company needs to comprehend so as to build competitive 
advantage; such advantages lie in a firm’s innovation capabilities, corporate management 
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and culture, global resources and integration with locational history (Teece, 2014). 
Interviewee 3, who was the head of strategy during the initial phase of Wipro’s 
acquisition phase, talking about the failure that the company experienced with its first 
acquisition and how they learnt from the same elaborates: 
‘We tried to run NerveWire the way we would run a company in India, but it 
completely bombed. We stepped back, did a lot of things, we put a lot of 
processes in place and the second phase of acquisition which I said happened 
between 2005, 2006 to about 2008, …the thinking there was that let’s take 
on acquisitions which are significantly strong. Now, we know how to integrate 
these teams, because we’ve learnt from our mistakes, so there will be very 
small verticals or micro verticals, which can be easily integrated, assimilated’ 
 
The above is characteristic of Indian software companies who are well aware of both 
challenges of employee retention and integration of acquired employees (Thiagarajan, 
2003). Ranft and Lord (2002) have further propositioned, from their study of acquisition 
of software, electronic and biotechnology firms, that favourable climate and rich 
communication between the acquired and the acquirer enables greater integration; 
further, autonomy for the acquired unit also ensures preservation of the technology and 
capability knowledge acquired. 
 
5.7 Effect of Financial Crisis on Internationalisation Strategy 
The global financial crisis of 2007-08 was considered the most calamitous with spiraling 
effects across continents. Sauvant et al. (2009) and Hill and Jongwanich (2009) raised 
the question of survival of EMNEs, especially those from developing Asia, post the 
financial crisis. Global crises affect all companies and entities around the world, some 
more than others. Valuations of companies drop and there is an opportunity for active 
acquisition during such times. The notion of ‘Fire-sale FDI’ was introduced by Krugman 
(1998) in which companies in countries affected by financial crisis were acquired by more 
developed market companies at low valuations. This emanated from observations from 
the Asian Financial Crisis of the late 1990s. However, Erel et al. (2012) state that EMNEs 
may actually reduce the acquisition of new subsidiaries during crisis times which is 
corroborated by Makaew (2010) who expostulates that the majority of cross-border 
acquisitions take place during times when the economies of the countries of the acquirer 
company and the acquired company are flourishing. Interviewee 1, who is the current 
treasurer for the company, elucidated on acquisition strategy of the company during the 
financial crisis in detail: 
‘…it is easier to do acquisitions in bull-runs than bear-runs, ok for two 
reasons. The promoters are also not idiots, they also know the peak of our 
crisis, why will they sell? …a company which is bleeding, would you go and 
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acquire just because valuation is low? So, you would typically find that M&A 
[merger and acquisition] in bad times is not necessarily high…Because you 
will find that you are, you struggle to make assumptions. So, you find that 
typically stable environments are more conducive’ 
 
What interviewee 1 states above is confirmed by the fact that the management team of 
Wipro did not engage in any international acquisitions during the period of the financial 
crisis (Wipro Timeline Appendix 4). The company entered into acquisition deals until 2007 
and then recommenced acquisition in foreign markets from 2012. Articulating Indian 
acquisition strategy as a whole, Sauvant et al. (2010) mentions that acquisitions by 
Indian companies are mainly financed by banks and other financial institutions, hence, 
due to difficulties and paucity of international financing during crisis times, Indian 
companies cease to acquire. However, Wipro does not fall into the category of such 
companies that rely on credit for its acquisitions. Wipro maintained a strong cash surplus 
balance sheet and financed majority of its acquisitions in all-out cash deals. Interviewee 
2 explains the reason behind these cash deals: 
’…when you are sitting on huge amounts of cash then why would you want 
to kind of dilute (shareholding value) and still sit on the cash… Wipro still had 
a net cash positive but it at least had some leverage on the balance sheet for 
the acquisition, so when I was a treasurer we did a large borrowing to do the 
acquisition which was one of the largest acquisitions that Wipro had done at 
that point of time, so we did leverage for that acquisition…’ 
 
While Wipro was not totally closed to the idea of bank financing as Interviewee 2 has 
articulated, it has preferred to use its pool of cash without diluting stock. During the 
financial crisis period of 2008-2011, the company was consolidating and entering into 
global partnerships and was involved mainly in organic growth (Malaysian and Australian 
operations). They acquired an Indian subsidiary of a multinational bank for which 
Interviewee 1 says: 
‘…we continued to be cash-rich during the downturn, so we continued to be 
open. So, we got the acquisition of Citi, one of the India centres [of Citibank], 
we did that acquisition, so I don’t think we were closed at that time’ 
 
As the arm of Citi that the company acquired was in India, it is not featured in Appendix 
4 but it is evident that the company strategy changed during the crisis period. However, 
it still engaged in overseas investment. The overseas investment of the company during 





Wipro is a leading company in the IT services sector not only in India (home country) 
but is a globally known brand. From the interviews and secondary data, it is evident that 
the company possesses resources and a capability advantage in its home country. 
Domestically it was a known brand and it strategically built its brand awareness to be 
one of the top ten recognised IT brands globally. The diversification of the company 
from vegetable oil production to IT was due to both change in the external environment 
(Political and Market liberalisation) and the entrepreneurial capability of the 
owner/promoter who was aptly supported by a team of top management, which was 
handpicked because of their educational and technical background and prior experience 
with DMNCs. The company is hugely successful in its home market and built its 
reputation through partnering with DMNCs, both at home and abroad. It commenced 
international operations through organic growth and then transitioned to inorganic 
growth. The company’s main objective behind its mergers and acquisitions was capability 
acquisition rather than market seeking. The company used its cash-pool to make small-
scale acquisitions and is famous for its ‘string of pearls’ approach. The capability 
acquisitions were in verticals that the company had less or no exposure. By adding these 
capabilities, the company sought to increase its product suite to compete with global 
competitors both in home and host countries and thus strengthening its competitive 
advantage. The acquisitions have mainly taken place in developed economies which 
evidences that the company has sought to gain from pioneering technologies. However, 
there is no evidence of companies trying to acquire well-known brands for establishing 
global networks. Acquisitions do bring in customers but Wipro’s acquisitions have clearly 
aimed for improved technological capabilities and thus providing existing customers and 
new customers with various value-added products under the same umbrella. CSAs like 
trained English speaking work force and FSAs like outsourcing capabilities and the 
specific product suites better suited to developed markets have seen the company 
concentrating its internationalisation in developed markets. However, it has operations 
in other emerging markets and non-English speaking European countries too. The 
company learnt to localise its approach in various geographies to integrate a global 
workforce into the company culture. A dynamic environment affects the strategic 
direction of an international company 
 
The above findings do not align with the extant literature on internationalisation of 
EMNEs, which states that EMNEs seek to commence internationalisation closer to home 
(psychic distance) and seek economies similar to its home country for institutional 
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proximity. The literature on ‘psychic distance’ in IB, states that this is the ‘perceived 
difference between two countries’ (Håkanson & Ambos, 2010). This perception 
originates from the difficulty in fully comprehending the foreign environment that is 
different from the host environment due to cultural, economic and geographic factors 
with the latter being the primary explained factor of variance. Given this definition, if we 
compare the English speaking developed markets like USA and UK to an emerging 
market like India, the psychic difference would appear to be vast. However, India’s 
majority OFDI flow is in a south-north direction (as explained in the introductory 
chapter). The common factor between these developed markets being the language. 
However, the first countries that the company ventured into to set up operations was 
Japan and Germany and these countries are non-English speaking with very different 
cultural and economic environment and with a large geographic distance. 
 
Wipro’s global footprints are mainly in developed markets. Its presence is spread across 
different continents, which confirms the affirmation made by Ramamurti (2013) that 
Indian private companies have high entrepreneurial capabilities; as they are not state 
owned, they are more adventurous in their internationalisation strategies and seek 
advanced technologies present in advanced economies. Further, they have design, 
product, branding and distribution capabilities that they can provide at low prices and 
hence have the added advantage of labour-cost arbitrage. The Indian IT model has been 
skill-intensive rather than labour-intensive. Capability acquisitions have been within 
similar verticals or adding verticals but within the same domain to complement the 
company’s FSAs (FSA exploitation). Learning of integration has come with experience. 
 
Using a Change model (based on Logic Model, Yin 2014), it can be observed how the 
company changed from a domestic company to an EMNE and how it implemented its 
strategies based on internal resources and capabilities and the external environment 
(Figure 15). The change model involves understanding of events over a period of time. 
As an analytical tool, the events observed over a period can then be matched to theory. 
 
The events depicted in (Figure 15) are numbered and are then explained in detail along 










1. Change in the government of the country. The party that came into power believed 
in the self-sufficiency of the country and due to their policies, foreign multinational 
companies left India including IBM and Coca Cola 
2. Due to the exit of IBM, a gap appeared in the IT services of the country and AH 
Premji identified an opportunity in such services (indicative of dynamic capabilities 
in the form of entrepreneurial activity and managerial capability) 
3. This led to the company commencing domestic IT services in 1981 followed by 
manufacturing and marketing of indigenous personal computers in 1985 
4. Due to restrictive import licences on software, Indian companies were forced to 
make their own software, which led to the country producing English-speaking 
engineers and graduates who were hired by Indian domestic IT companies. (These 
can be termed as country-specific assets and India gained a competitive advantage 
in human resources required for IT software services) 
5. India experienced market liberalisation in 1991-92. Foreign multinationals re-
entered India to hire Indian country specific assets which were in the form of 
English-speaking software engineers 
6. To provide competition to the foreign multinationals, the company acquired certain 
global certifications which assisted the company to create a niche in IT services 
through engineering expertise, software programming, hardware and chip designs 
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7. Collaborated with foreign MNCs for providing services in India and tie-ups for 
technical know-how, thus establishing itself as a reliable partner for developed 
market multinational companies which were investing in India 
8. This also assisted the company to create its brand awareness and attain a position 
of strength within the country. This was attained also due to the intrinsic 
characteristics of the company (13) 
9. The company made outward foreign direct investment through various modes 
(both organic and inorganic). Mainly investing into developed markets (which is 
contrary to the notion of Psychic distance) 
10. Wipro’s acquisitions were mainly targeted towards attaining resources and 
capabilities which the company ascertained that they did not possess and which 
were necessary to gain a competitive advantage in the IT services sector both in 
the domestic market and in the international market. However, during the process 
the company was faced with several challenges in different host countries 
11. Due to the challenges faced in different host countries, the company learned to 
manage its acquisitions by being sensitive to the local environment in the various 
hots markets and thus managing employee retention and integration of acquired 
employees 
12. Cost-effective solutions to client including value adding services thus building on 
internal capabilities and not solely relying on acquiring external capabilities. 
Initiated a process to increase its brand awareness and is in the top ten global IT 
companies 
13. Company Characteristics (entrepreneur driven/growth oriented) 
14. Effects of Financial Crisis on outward FDI 
 
5.9 Chapter Conclusion 
This exploratory case study using a framework of dynamic capabilities and the resource-
based approach examines how an Indian company diversified due to its entrepreneurial 
capability and formed organisational strategies to change its resource base in a dynamic 
environment for sustained growth. It continued to build both internal and external 
capabilities via organic and inorganic means in the international market. Its tendency 
towards acquisitions to increase its capability and product suite confirms to the 
proposition that EMNEs favour the mergers and acquisitions route to grow in 
international markets. However, the rate of its acquisitions does not confirm to the 
literature which associates accelerated acquisition to small and medium global born 




Further, ‘psychic distance’ does not explain why the company sought developed markets 
in the first instance of internationalisation. The company had unique technological 
resources along with human talent which it exploited towards its internationalisation and, 
where required, it transformed its existing resources in line with change in its working 
environment which links to the dynamic capabilities theory. It successfully adapted 
through learning and experience for the successful integration of its international 
capability acquisitions. This is indicative of managerial capability towards assimilation 
and absorption. The company diligently built on its brand awareness to compete with 
established players both in the home and host markets. Today the company is globally 




6. Tata Consultancy Services 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Tata Consultancy Services (TCS) is a global information technology (IT) service company 
and is ranked among the top ten IT companies in the world by revenues (Phadnis, 2014) 
and is ranked number one in India in industry rankings (NASSCOM, 2015). TCS is the 
second IT services company that I have investigated among the services industry firms 
in my data set. This chapter explores the internationalisation strategies of this company 
and uses the field of strategic management as the basis for the analysis. 
 
India as an emerging market has given a lot of thrust on business and professional 
services, especially in data processing, management consulting, banking and financial 
account services, computer hardware and software services, business processing 
outsourcing since the mid-1990s (Karmakar, 2005). The country has been called the 
back-office power of the world with American Express establishing such services in India 
in 1993, followed by British Airways in 1997 and then General Electrics, which by 2003 
had its largest service subsidiary in India and other MNCs like Dell and SAP following 
soon thereafter (Dossani & Kenney, 2007). TCS, which is present in the IT consultancy 
services, was the first private Indian software company to be set up in the 1960s 
(Khanna & Palepu, 2005) with competition only from IBM (an MNC) and Electronic 
Corporation of India (ECI, which was an Indian government-owned company and mainly 
dealt in hardware). Unlike other Indian software companies which gained prominence 
post liberalisation of the country in the early 1990s (market-oriented reforms during 
1991-92, Bhagwati et al., 2010), TCS, which was incorporated in 1968, opened its first 
international office in New York as early as 1979 (Ramadorai, 2011). Firms 
internationalise due to their antecedents, culture, processes and the environment in they 
operate to achieve operational efficiency (increasing productivity while lowering costs) 
and improvements towards organisational learning (Hitt et al., 2006). 
 
This chapter analyses the strategic motivation behind the internationalisation of TCS and 
the mode of its diversification. Most of TCS revenues come from overseas markets (as 
has been mentioned by the interviewees and discussed later in the chapter) of which 
the majority is from developed markets. Literature on EMNEs (Buckley et al., 2008; 
Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2011) indicate that firms from emerging markets, in the initial 
stages of internationalisation, seek other markets which are culturally closer to their 
home market; whereas TCS opened its first international office in USA (a developed 
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market). Ramamurti (2012) states that EMNEs do not possess ownership advantages 
which are advantages that can be used to create rents; further the product life cycle 
theory assumes that FDI flows from more-developed to lesser-developed nations. Hence, 
it becomes important to analyse why TCS selected developed markets during the initial 
stages of its internationalisation. Did the company possess some homegrown capabilities 
that they felt that they could exploit in such markets? TCS is present today in all the 
continents. Each continent and countries within them have different business 
environments and cultures, so this chapter will also study what challenges the company 
faced in different host countries and how it confronted such challenges. External 
environment affects overseas investments. Among developing markets, developing Asia 
has the highest overseas investment and there was a question raised on the decline of 
such investments post the financial crisis (Sauvant et al., 2009; Hill & Jongwanich, 2009). 
So, finally this chapter will also study and explain if overseas investment of TCS was 
affected in any way during or post the financial crisis. 
 
6.2 Company Background 
TCS is a subsidiary of Tata Sons Limited, an Indian conglomerate. It commenced as a 
data processing centre for established Tata companies (like steel and motors) and was 
a division of Tata Sons, established in the year 1962. It was incorporated as a full 
subsidiary in 1968 and is headquartered in Mumbai (the financial capital of India). Today 
it is present in 45 countries with 229 offices and a headcount of 362,079 employees 
(TCS Investor FAQ, June 2016). It has consolidated revenues of USD 16.4 billion (TCS 
Balance Sheet, 2016). It ranks number one within India and is at number ten globally 
as per revenues earned (HfS Research, 2015). It ranks at number 66 on Forbes most 
innovative companies in the world (Forbes, 2016). 
 
The company history below has been reproduced using data from the book, ‘The TCS 
story and beyond’ (written by an ex senior employee). Bryman (2013) mentions that 
commercially published autobiographies about companies can be used for organisational 
research; and if it has up-to-date information. However, the analysis is supplemented 
with other sources which have been mentioned at the end of this section. 
 
The founders of the Tata Group, one of the first entrepreneurial companies in India, 
were known as the pioneers of basic Indian infrastructure. This is indicative from the 
fact that the current national air carrier of India (Air India) was a Tata initiative (Tata 
Airlines, established in 1932, renamed to Air India after it became public limited in 1946) 
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which was acquired by the Government of India (GoI) in 1953 as part of a government 
initiative of nationalising all air carriers in the country (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2016). 
The chairman of the Tata Group during 1960s along with a close family member and 
confidant took the decision of forming a single unit for the group (largely manufacturing 
companies) which would be responsible for all the data processing requirements. The 
Tata Group had its own administrative services known as Tata Administrative Services 
(TAS) which hired young management trainees and were groomed to take up managerial 
positions in the various Tata Group companies. The business processing unit that was 
formed comprised largely of people from TAS and was headed by an external hire with 
a statistical background. A ‘Unit record machine’ was hired from IBM. However, it was 
the decision of the various other companies within the Tata Group to outsource their 
business processing data to this newly formed unit and most of them were not providing 
any work other than the electric company which mainly comprised engineers. Hence, 
the unit started to also seek work from outside the Tata Group to meet its escalating 
costs (salaries and lease rentals). In 1968, Tata Sons created TCS as an operating unit 
and this was also the year when TCS started to get work from both in-house companies 
and external companies (especially banking business). In 1969, the company took a 
strategic decision to position itself as a management consulting company rather than 
only a business data processing company as automation was not fully comprehended in 
India and companies were wary of sharing data. 
 
As a management consultant company, TCS started working with various government 
banks and organisations (like Unit Trust of India, the first portfolio investment company 
of India, and Central Bank of India). In 1970-71, TCS also initiated work with companies 
and governments outside India (for example with the Government of Iran for power 
infrastructure set-up; Ramadorai, 2011). However, any such work was carried out in 
India as overseas offices were not allowed to be set-up until 1979. 
 
TCS imported a Burroughs17 mainframe computer in 1974, despite the import restrictions 
which enabled it to provide software development services to Burroughs customers in 
India. This further provided an opportunity for the company to provide similar services 
to Burroughs customers in overseas locations. This can be considered as the first Indian 
                                                          
17 Burroughs was a US-based Hardware Company and was successful during the 1960s-1970s for its 




offshore project which was initiated way back in in 1974-76. This also exposed TCS to 
advanced technology which was otherwise unavailable in India. 
 
During the 1970s, as already mentioned above, there were severe restrictions on imports 
in India. This was due to a shortage of foreign exchange in the country. New regulations 
restricted MNCs present in the country from operating freely, and companies like Coca-
Cola and IBM quit the country in 1978 (Encarnation & Vachani, 1985). 
 
The exit of IBM, saw the entry of the Burroughs Corporation in India. Burroughs formed 
a joint venture with the Tata’s (as was required under the new regulations) in 1978. The 
joint venture was selling Burroughs hardware equipment in the Indian market. TCS had 
already been using an imported Burroughs mainframe computer since 1974 and 
providing services for Burroughs customers in India and overseas. 
 
However, with the formation of the joint venture, there was a clash of interest between 
the new joint venture and TCS. There were discussions about folding TCS into the new 
joint venture (Tata Burroughs). After much deliberation TCS remained a separate entity 
but had to transfer several its engineers to the joint venture. Also, the revenue generated 
from services to Burroughs and its overseas customers was transferred to the joint 
venture and TCS could not bid for any of those services. Hence, TCS became like a start-
up company overnight. 
 
The Indian domestic market was not mature enough for the kind of services that TCS 
was already providing due to its association with Burroughs. Hence, when the Indian 
regulations permitted Indian companies to set up an overseas unit, TCS opened an office 
in New York in 1979. This is where the internationalisation journey of TCS commenced. 
 
It was almost 26 years later that TCS acquired its first overseas company. Until then the 
company grew its international presence in overseas markets through organic growth. 
The company’s timeline has been provided in Appendix 6. 
 
To understand the internationalisation motives of the company and the strategies behind 
the same, I interviewed an ex senior executive of the company (Interviewee 2) and a 
current senior member of the company (Interviewee 1) in May 2016 and October 2014 
respectively. The ex-executive was a career TCS employee and was involved with the 
business from the very start of company operations. Interviewee 1 is also a career TCS 
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employee having served within TCS for 25 years. Hence, I was able to gather strategic 
information and motivations behind the company’s internationalisation from these two 
interviews. Both the interviews were recorded. The words indented in quotation marks 
are direct quotes from the interview. 
 
This was followed by an email questionnaire with an ex-employee (Interviewee 3) who 
had worked with TCS for almost 20 years in various overseas locations. The purpose of 
this exercise was to understand some of the operational level details of the workings of 
TCS in different countries. 
 
For triangulation purposes towards validity and reliability, additional documents such as 
balance-sheet, investor and analyst presentations, corporate, bank and media reports 
available in the public domain have also been referred to. Due to investor protection and 
rules guided by the various exchanges at which the company is listed, the information 
gathered through various sources only investigates the past internationalisation 
strategies of the company. 
 
6.3 Resources and Capabilities 
TCS was the first private IT services company to be established in India. As mentioned 
in the earlier section, in the initial ten years of its establishment it was mainly providing 
services to one American MNC both in the domestic market and in the overseas market. 
When that ended due to internal conflict of interest, the company decided to look for 
new contracts and business overseas and opened its first office in New York in 1979. 
Talking about its first step towards internationalisation, the interviewees stated: 
‘The domestic market [in India] was non-existent but we [TCS] always had the 
belief that ultimately the learnings and the technology adoption will translate 
into opportunities for the domestic market but our foray had to be an 
international connection that technology adoption was the most dominant in 
the United States’ (Interviewee 2) 
 
‘We consciously have not grown the India business as much, [there are] specific 
reasons for it, one is… there is still a lot of controls around the unions and things 
like that. Large part of business happening in the, you know, government owned 
or government influenced businesses – unionism and stuff like that’ (Interviewee 
1) 
 
So, the interviewees mention two separate aspects, first that the initial 
internationalisation happened since India was not technologically advanced and the 




The phenomenon of looking at developed markets, especially that of the USA, at the 
onset by Indian IT Services Company has already been discussed in the Wipro chapter 
(Chapter 5). From an Indian perspective, TCS was not a latecomer to the global platform 
as large IT MNCs, like IBM, GE, Novell (Haigh, 2011) were already present in the overseas 
markets. 
 
In IB literature, it is stated that latecomers (defined as those companies that enter a 
market not by choice but to overcome disadvantages that they face in their home 
countries) often leverage on low cost competitive advantage (Mathews, 2002) or import 
technology and innovate (Amighini et al., 2010) to catch up with the established existing 
players (Mathews, 2002). Talking about cost arbitrage as another reason for TCS not to 
grow aggressively in the domestic market, Interviewee 1 said: 
‘The other thing is the biggest benefit any customer gets today [it] is still cost 
arbitrage and the Indian companies wouldn’t get that, right, so the way we want 
to look at it is if we work with a customer and do a complete full services business 
with them, infrastructure, IT and operations, then it makes a lot more sense to 
add value, otherwise there is always an uphill task of what exactly they are looking 
for. So, we do have a set of customers which are Indian customers, but a larger 
chunk of my business today comes from overseas customers.’ 
 
Due to the low cost of labour in India, TCS services cost less than what the overseas 
companies were paying for in their local market, especially in the US market. This is the 
cost arbitrage that the interviewee is referring to. Within the domestic market, Indian 
companies could not benefit from such an advantage and hence, TCS, from its experience 
of working with Burroughs customers overseas, used this as a competitive advantage to 
generate software services business overseas. 
 
The initial period when TCS moved to USA, was also the period when personal computers 
started to become popular in the US and Europe with a shift from mainframe to client-
server computers (Lee et al., 2014). Due to this, there was a demand for customised 
software which allowed firms to make this shift or migrate and there was a need for 
qualified consultants (Krishnan & Vallabhaneni, 2010). TCS had already performed such 
work for Burroughs in the US and hence, it was a strategic decision to look for similar 
work from other clients with low value-added services but high labour-intensive services 
(Lee et al., 2014). 
 
Low cost arbitrage by TCS was created due to country specific advantage (CSA) 
comprising trained English-speaking engineers and scientists and firm specific advantage 
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(FSA) in the form of building private infrastructure for its employees and human 
resources (HR) skills for their selection and training (Ramamurti, 2013). Arbitrage has 
been a long-term strategy for TCS (Ghemawat, 2007). 
 
However, such cost arbitrage strategies are not inimitable and cannot be sustained over 
a long period of time (Lewin & Peeters, 2006). For a global diversification strategy, 
companies can adopt the AAA triangle framework; aggregation of operations, adaptation 
to local markets and financial arbitrage (Peng & Meyer, 2011). It is not always necessary 
for companies to use all three strategies. TCS had used both arbitrage and aggregation 
as a competitive advantage tool to become a global player in the IT services; it attained 
aggregation by placing great importance on its global network delivery model 
(Ghemawat, 2007). To this effect, Interviewee 2 stated: 
‘Our value proposition has always been quality every time on time. So, the 
delivery execution capability and the delivery competencies to the 
requirements of the client is the first step. Our capability is always going to 
be technology, how to align the technology with the business or the domain 
of the customers. Once you know the domain of the customer and what 
are the kind of value addition that your technology with respect to that can 
provide, that is the value proposition that we give’ 
 
From the above quote, it is clear that the company believed that their success lay in 
delivering services as per the turn-around-time (TAT) agreed with the client. However, 
the TAT was achieved due to the company’s capabilities of understanding their clients’ 
needs and the ability to align the needs with changing technology and value adding to 
that by projecting the future needs that the client may have due to change in the business 
technological environment. 
 
TCS also developed their global network delivery to cater to their customer’s demand. 
Giving an example, Interviewee 1 explains: 
‘General Electric was one of our largest customers… they actually helped 
us in the entire global network delivery model, because they were a global 
organisation, they wanted servicing from TCS at the locations where they 
were operating, so our entire global network delivery model which was in 
the works, got co-created along with them’ 
 
The TCS global network delivery model (GNDMTM) is a unique business proposition that 
allows the clients to choose their sourcing strategy suited best to their business needs 
(TCS, 2016 a). The platform runs 24 hours, 7 days a week, 365 days a year supporting 
their clients at any business location across the globe. 
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Creation of this delivery model to cater to one client helped TCS get business from other 
customers too. For example, TCS won a contract from ABN in 2005; this deal (software 
maintenance and software development; BBC News, 2005) was the largest for an Indian 
IT firm; the contract was for a period of five years and TCS won the specific deal as it 
was able to deliver the requirement of the bank in the specific locations that it wanted 
the services, in different countries where the bank was present (PR Newswire, 2005). 
The company believed in growing with its clients. Explaining this further, Interviewee 1 
stresses that not all capabilities were grown in house: 
‘I don’t think we believe that we have all the expertise. If you look at our 
innovation network itself [it] is a very, very open network, so it is almost 
like a three-tier setup which is there, we work with starters, we work with 
various alliances, we work with technology companies, we work with our 
customers, we call it as a co-innovation network. So, next generation 
initiatives actually come from that co-innovation network and it is not all 
within the organisation’ 
 
Hence, TCS has collaborated with its clients to develop additional capabilities. The 
company’s co-innovation network (COINTTM) provides a platform to conduct IT research 
across various domains and enables new firms, academics and other research labs to 
connect over its global platform to fraternise and share their exploration in information 
technology (TCS, 2016 b). 
 
In today’s dynamic environment firms need to engage with each other and collaborate 
rather than work as a single entity (Reypens et al., 2016). Co-innovation network is not 
only collaboration with clients or suppliers but also with business partners and academics 
(Dawson et al., 2014; Romero & Molina, 2011). Such collaborative networks help provide 
productive processes and frameworks for business outcomes, hence, creating values for 
individual stakeholders and network shareholders and leading to competitive advantage 
for the firm (Tsou et al, 2015). 
 
DMNCs which emerged in times which had experienced technological advancement, have 
deliberately sought to accumulate resources and capabilities to adapt themselves to 
international markets (Ramamurti, 2012). The company not only built capabilities like the 
global delivery system but also acquired capabilities through formations of JVs and 
acquisitions which also helped it to increase market share; as it is apparent from 
interviewee 1’s statement: 
[Joint ventures and acquisitions were] predominantly [for] capability building. We 
actually acquired the back-office of Pearl insurance. So we do largely close-book 
operations for life and pensions and we do it for 2 or 3 large insurance companies, 
169 
 
serviced in the U.K. Then we did the acquisition of a company called Comicrom. It 
was predominantly to increase our footprint in Lat-Am [Latin America]. It was like 
more of a shared service capability that we had acquired and then through that 
we were able to penetrate into various accounts, build up the leadership team’ 
 
However, market share alone was not the only reason for such acquisitions. The company 
was clearly seeking capabilities which would add benefit and integrate with TCS. As the 
interviewees clarified: 
‘Let’s say another opportunity comes, like there is another captive which is 
up for sale and it doesn’t really make sense to me [as] I already have the 
capability, I wouldn’t go and acquire that, that’s the clear route’ 
(Interviewee 1) 
‘So again, if you look at the acquisitions overall it is very selective. It’s not 
that we acquired what was available, but if it does not synergize with our 
overall main bunch of people which are the main core IT services we will 
not go for it. That’s the fundamental logic we operated [with]’ (Interviewee 
2) 
 
The main acquisitions were for acquiring capabilities that TCS did not possess. These 
capabilities could be deployed in other host markets too and also a means to penetrate 
the newly-acquired clients with additional products, as Interviewee 2 confirmed: 
‘Look at Australian acquisition who [the acquired company] had a retail core 
banking application. I think it was one of those products which were done 
out of Australia but deployed in the South-East Asia and we saw that and 
then we evaluated it and found that it can be used for our Indian customers 
in the banking space. So that was the rationale behind acquiring [the 
Australian client] [for] a flexible architecture, for global benefits. The UK 
acquisition was again an enhancement of our back-office skills in the 
vertical like insurance space that could bring in set of capabilities and 
competencies which we acquired and then integrated’ 
 
From the above acquisitions, it can be ascertained that the company has continually 
refocussed and reinvented itself through collaborations and acquisitions for enhancing 
its capabilities resources. While its first set of management team, in the early 1970s were 
mainly educated overseas due to a lack of core IT graduates (Ramadorai, 2011), the 
company also hired young engineers from within India and provided training through 
Tata Management and Training Centre (TMTC, Pune). TCS also collaborated with various 
Indian schools and colleges to provide skills training and have specific IT and computer 
related courses. For example, it supported the Indian Institutes of Technology (IIT)18 to 
teach computer science courses, working with other engineering colleges to develop IT 
                                                          
18 The IITs are India’s premier technology institutes. While they are governed by the Government of 
India’s Technological Act, they are run autonomously.  
170 
 
skill-based curricula and also supporting by way of importing computers for these 
institutes and sponsoring students to go abroad for studies in the related field 
(Ramadorai, 2011). The company had developed the first research centre (Tata Research 
and Development Design Centre, TRDDC) in the early 1980s in Pune (Pune is known as 
the Oxford of the East, a city in close proximity to Mumbai, the financial and business 
capital of India). TRDDC known as the innovation lab of Tata, has a global platform which 
collaborates across various domains (like insurance, banking, retail, telecom, engineering 
etc.) for research in information technology across various networks (TCS, 2016 c). TCS 
has collaborated with foreign universities and academia in furthering research, too. 
Illustrating on such partnerships, Interviewee 1 and 2 stated: 
‘And you know, even though we may have sourcing some of these things 
from the bay area or some of the academia, there’s a leg which is already 
working over here [in India]. So, there is a lot of capability building which 
is already happening [in the country], which is enabling and given what we 
had pioneered [with] the TRDDC set up way back in ‘81, the mind-set of 
the organisation towards doing those investments has always been there’ 
 
‘I think proactivity is the name of the game whether it is people 
competency, training, the acquisition of technology or engagement with 
researchers of the academic institutions. Proactivity with fearless 
investment both in technology and human resource building’ 
 
The Tata Group focuses on business excellence which is borrowed from the ‘Baldrige 
Excellence Framework. The Baldrige Excellence Framework helps organisations reach 
their goal, improve results and be more competitive. The framework uses a 7-point 
criteria to understand the organisation as a whole to improve and achieve its objectives. 
These areas of importance are leadership, strategy and customers which are aligned 
with workforce, operations and results through measurement, analysis and knowledge 
management (https://www.nist.gov/baldrige/about-baldrige-excellence-framework). 
 
The business excellence criterion has been used by the Tata Group since the 1990s 
(Schaefer, 2012). TCS has also adopted a similar framework which consists of the 4Es 
(Explore, Enable, Exploit and Evangelise) with each having a definitive accountability to 
provide research from the drawing board to the end client. This framework is used for 
innovation through network collaboration. TCS using its co-innovation network (COIN, 
which has been explained earlier in this chapter) connects with academics, venture 
capital firms and other business partners and clients through an internal social platform 




Storchevoi (2015) has stated that ‘for technology companies, the VRIN resources are 
the technology itself or the patents it maintains’ (p.1). Barney (1991) defines VRIN as 
resources that are valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable. The resources of 
TCS are its technology and technical know-how and especially its Research and 
Development (R&D) capabilities which are evident from its investments in its innovation 
labs and research centre, its innovation strategy and collaboration with various 
stakeholders. This ability or unique R&D capability that TCS has can be said to have 
VRIN properties. 
 
6.4 Mode of Internationalisation (Organic versus Inorganic Growth) 
Organic (or internal) growth is expansion through employment whereas inorganic (or 
external) growth implies expansion through mergers and acquisitions (Coad et al., 2014). 
TCS has followed a more organic path towards its internationalisation process. This has 
been explained further in this section. 
 
As mentioned in the background section of this chapter, TCS was the pioneer among 
Indian IT companies and forayed overseas during the 1970s with the opening of an office 
in New York in 1973. This was a time when India had a closed economy, that is the 
economy was closed for overseas investments unless the overseas company formed a 
joint venture with an Indian company. This was also the reason behind the exit of IBM 
and Coca-Cola from India in 1978 and saw the entry of Burroughs in India in joint venture 
with the Tata Group. This joint venture created issues for the fledgling TCS (as explained 
in the ‘company background’ section) and it started to actively look for business in the 
US with a subsidiary being opened in New York in 1979. TCS internationalisation was 
different from most MNEs of that time either from the developed market or emerging 
market (which were as such very few during that time). IB literature on 
internationalisation states that companies compete in international markets on the basis 
of internalised advantage which is built over time. TCS was a small company and did not 
possess a high degree of such internalised advantages. Compared to the earlier MNEs, 
the new age MNEs are breaking such stereotypes of internationalising only after attaining 
internalised advantage (Contractor & Lorange, 2002). However, literature on such new 
MNEs is much more recent and dates to the early 2000s. Hence, TCS which 
internationalised in the 1970s without having a large set up in the home country was 
very different from its contemporaries, who had already internationalised or were 




Recent literature, of the past 20 years, also talks about born global firms that do not wait 
to reach a stage of maturity to internationalise and have their sights on global markets 
from the onset (Knight & Cavusgil, 2004; Weerawardena et al., 2007; Singal & Jain, 
2012). The reason stated behind such early internationalisation of born global firms lies 
in the make of their founders and managers who develop this global vision due to their 
prior experience of working with DMNCs. However, TCS had no such credentials among 
its early managers. While it was a Tata Group company, its status was like a start-up (as 
explained in the background section of this chapter) and while the early managers were 
graduates from US universities, TCS was either their first job or they were from within 
the Tata Group or were ex-Indian government employees (Ramadorai, 2011). 
 
In Business History and International Business literature, there is discussion about a type 
of multinational enterprises known as the international new ventures (INV) which are 
theoretically similar to born-global firms. INV organisations are formed through 
internalisation with pre-existing global networks and alliances and the ability to raise 
capital through alternative governance structures and emerge due to the unique 
capabilities of its founders/entrepreneurs in a technologically developed environment 
(Oviatt & McDougall, 1994; Rialp et al., 2005). However, TCS does not fall into the 
category of INVs both as it was not strictly a founder/entrepreneur-driven company and 
was set up with a capital investment from the parent company (Tata Sons which also 
held 100 per cent shares in TCS at that time). The interviewees called the company a 
start-up on the basis of the size of the company at the time when contractual work from 
Burroughs ceased and TCS was required to find new IT service jobs that it could 
undertake. It did not have any global alliances or network and was dependent on a 
separate venture of the Tata’s in New York for workplace support (Ramadorai, 2011). 
 
Business History literature also discusses free-standing companies (FSC) that emerged 
during the period 1600s to 1800s and existed until after the Second World War. The 
theory of FSCs was propounded by studying British domiciled companies which did not 
have any domestic presence in the home market and were set up solely to conduct and 
manage lines of business that operated overseas, mainly in British colonies (Wilkins, 
1988). This phenomenon was also noticed in non-British FSCs but for countries which 
were also colonisers, like France and Holland. FSCs were set up as joint stock companies 
but were independent of their legal holdings. FSCs were markedly different from the 
modern-day multinationals as the former were set up for the sole purpose of operating 
in one overseas market whereas MNCs established themselves first in the home countries 
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prior to venturing to several overseas host markets (Wilkin & Schröter, 1998). These 
companies were mainly operating in manufacturing, banking and trade but not in 
advanced technology sector. Some of the multinational companies today were first set 
up as British FSCs, for example LG Group of Korea and the HSBC bank. 
 
TCS cannot be considered an FSC either as it was set up in India with the purpose of 
servicing Tata manufacturing companies. It was a technology company which ventured 
into consultancy. Its earliest overseas contracts occurred due to the Tata parent alliances 
(Government of Iran and Burroughs). The company’s move to New York in 1979 was an 
outcome of the political restrictions on foreign investments to and from India. For the 
services that the company was providing, the home market did not have the required 
demand and the company was in a way forced to internationalise. Hence, it can be stated 
that the internationalisation process of TCS was unique and such a phenomenon has not 
been witnessed in international business literature on the formation of multinational 
companies of which TCS is one today. 
 
Talking about foraying overseas without having a solid base in the home country, the ex-
CEO states in his book (Ramadorai, 2011): 
‘While most companies begin by serving their local or national markets and 
then expand their operations overseas, TCS did just the opposite. It took 
on a challenge that very few corporates in very few countries have taken 
on: to look outside the home base and establish a presence in a foreign 
market’ (p. 132)’ 
 
The subsidiary that was opened in New York had only one employee whose sole task 
was to look for contracts in the US similar to the work TCS had done for Burroughs. One 
of the interviewees, the ex-CEO, was that employee who was sent to New York. The 
company was supported by Tata Sons (the promoter shareholding company of Tata 
Group as a whole) representative office in New York. Elaborating on both, Interviewee 2 
stated: 
‘We said that [US] should be the market we should aim for and some of us 
were graduates from the universities there. So, I think we had an 
infrastructure in terms of Tata Sons having a presence in New York, and 
Tata Incorporated who had some of the administrative support they could 
provide for us. So then establishing it as a one-person organization 
becomes the obvious…the model we adopted’ 
 
TCS had already been servicing the clients of Burroughs in USA. Hence, the company 
was aware of the market to a certain extent along with prior experience as students of 
universities in that country enabled the management of TCS to take the decision of 
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opening a subsidiary office in USA. This was further made possible due to the presence 
of the main Tata Group promoter company who provided infrastructure support to TCS. 
 
Opening an office in the US, a developed market which was geographically also removed 
from India does not confirm to IB literature on host market selection by emerging market 
companies which states that EMNEs seek markets which are both culturally and 
physically close; further, EMNEs prefer joint ventures or partnerships with established 
companies rather than opening a wholly owned subsidiary (WOS) during the initial 
stages of internationalisation (Buckley et al., 2008). While TCS did establish joint 
ventures, it was much later in countries like Japan due to cultural differences. In 2012, 
it established Nippon TCS Solution Centre Ltd which was a 60%-40% joint venture with 
Mitsubishi, to provide client services in Japan (NDTV, 2012). 
 
However, as TCS became comfortable with the host environment, it acquired all the 
shares of the joint venture to merge it with TCS Japan. This was followed by a USD 600 
million deal between TCS and Mitsubishi in 2014, with TCS having a controlling stake 
with 51% shareholding (Zachariah, 2014). 
 
Talking about joint ventures Interviewee 1 mentions: 
‘So again, it could be a dependency on the other organisation which is 
actually let’s say Mitsubishi. Japanese culture could be different, so there 
would be certain specific reasons for doing it [the joint venture] than trying 
to do a pure acquisition. So, there is a reason for doing certain things and 
keeping it in a particular stage until some stage we are comfortable of doing 
the, you know, integration’ 
 
Hence, depending upon the host nation, TCS has chosen its entry strategy. While it has 
preferred to have single entities as its main entry strategy, the company has not 
hesitated in forming joint ventures (like it did in Japan) given the strategic importance 
of the country and the need to be present in that geography. 
 
Since TCS opened its first office in New York in the 1970s; it has grown overseas mainly 
through organic growth which is dissimilar to Wipro (Chapter 5). TCS has not made any 
acquisitions to date in the first country it entered (USA) and all the growth in that country 
has been through an organic mode. Talking about this phenomenon, Interviewee 2 said: 
‘Organic is growing at such a speed and organic will be with your own 
culture, your own people and if program management capabilities exist and 
to deliver consistently and [with] growth at the right margin, we did not 
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feel a need to go inorganic and then deplete the management time on fixing 
a problem, compromising the margins’ 
 
The company acquired its first overseas company in the year 2005. This was the year 
after the company’s initial public offering (IPO) which happened in July 2004. The 
company was listed on both the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) and the National Stock 
Exchange (NSE) in India. In 2005, it acquired companies in UK and Australia (developed 
markets) and Chile (an emerging market). 
 
Before 2005, the company had only made acquisitions in the Indian domestic market. 
Answering the question whether overseas acquisitions had happened only after TCS 
became well versed with integration of acquired entities in the domestic market, 
Interviewee 1 said: 
‘No, it was not. It was more of the timing was more of our going public 
more than anything. So, I think that was the inflection point as against 
looking at it from a different perspective, so once we went public, we had 
a lot of investments, people started believing that we can be the leader’ 
As Interviewee 2 clarified: 
‘I think on the acquisitions, we have been very selective all the time, that’s 
the way we believed all the time so that we don’t compromise on the 
returns to the shareholders, growth and profits.’ 
 
In a forum held in Bangalore (now Bengaluru, the IT capital of India) in 1998, the 
company, brainstormed how to grow TCS further. They realised that the company was 
still small compared to some of the bigger companies, like IBM or Accenture (Ramadorai, 
2011). The Indian economy had attained a high level of liberalisation by then and there 
were other smaller domestic companies that were emerging in the IT sector alongside 
some bigger ones like Infosys and Wipro (which are number two and three respectively 
in India by revenues). The company came up with a vision of being in the Top 10 globally 
by 2010. The parameters were not only by revenues as Interviewee 1 explained: 
‘We had a set of parameters which were there, so it was not just on revenue 
numbers, so we had margins, we had number of people, we had different 
areas which were there, so there were few areas which we wanted to be in 
the top 10 on all of those areas...’ 
 
Interviewee 2 has commented on the positioning of the company based on revenues 
and profit in his book: 
‘While benchmarking ourselves against other companies, we discovered 
something rather interesting. Revenue and profit were the most commonly 
used parameter but we decided to do it differently. We looked at other 
companies in the sector from multiple parameters, in terms of revenue and 
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profits, market capitalisation, number of employees, revenue per customer 
and profit per customer. We did not worry about market cap at that time 
because we were not listed. But ultimately, we decided that rather than 
target a specific metric, we should just aim for a global position which 
mattered’ (p. 23, Ramadorai, 2011)’ 
 
As already mentioned above, the company listed in 2005. The parameters on which the 
company planned to define its vision of ‘Top 10 by 2010’ were set as revenue, 
profitability, number of employees and market capitalisation. However, the media (like 
Business Standard, 2002 and Anderson, 2008) interpreted the ‘Top 10 by 2010’ as the 
need for TCS to earn revenues of USD 10 billion by 2010. While the company achieved 
its top 10 player goal in the global IT software and services industry19 (Ramadorai, 2011), 
it did not get to the USD 10 billion revenue number until much later and didn’t break 
into the top 10 IT service companies until 2013 (HfS Research, 2015). 
 
Service firm characteristics have not generally been considered in the existing theories 
of firm growth; where the theories have concentrated on manufacturing firms as they 
can achieve high growth through economies of scale (Jewell et al., 2014). Economies of 
scale are reducing average cost20 by producing more. This aspect is somewhat restricted 
for service firms as their output is manual services rather than manufactured goods. 
However, as we see from the TCS experience, through organic growth (from a small 
team in 1978 to a staggering 362,079 employees currently), the company was able to 
build low cost solutions with presence at both on-sites and off-sites. HfS (2014) in a 
report stated that TCS is considered to be the most flexible service provider when it 
came to pricing and terms, and in the process winning contracts around the globe. 
Further, they are strong on implementations and have managed to delink the direct 
correlation between revenues earned and their headcount with concentrated focus on 
its product suite with fixed-priced projects, thus monetising its product group. 
 
The acquisitions (Appendix 7) the company has made, both in the home market and 
overseas market, have been focussed on acquiring capabilities. Gaining market shares 
has been secondary. Once a target, and with it market shares, has been acquired, TCS 
has always aimed at providing additional services from its existing product suite. This is 
                                                          
19 TCS recognized by Global Services Magazine and neoIT in 2007 Global Services 100 Listing 
New York, 31st January 2007; 
http://www.tcs.com/news_events/press_releases/Pages/TataConsultancyServicesawardedtoppositioni
nGlobalServices100top10bestperformingitservicesproviderscategory.aspx 
20 Average Cost = Total cost/Number of goods or units produced 
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akin to re-combinative assets (Narula, 2015) where a bundle of assets is used to 
undertake an activity and then recombine the assets by substituting them with exiting 
assets to create a new bundle of assets to undertake similar activity. In the case of TCS, 
they were using acquired capabilities and resources to provide a set of services which 
they didn’t previously provide. This was supplemented with capabilities and services that 
TCS already possessed and hence, increasing the penetration into the set of new clients 
which had been acquired from the acquisition. 
 
Interviewee 1 clarified the company’s strategy of organic growth versus nonorganic 
growth: 
‘See to a large extent we have always focused on organic growth, because 
we believed that unless [required] we will not necessarily go in for inorganic 
growth unless there is a specific need. So, for example, if we need to bridge 
a big gap in our competency then we will consider looking at options which 
are available in the market…if that [gap] fills in and then it [the target 
company] comes at the right price without having to go through a 
significant challenge of integrating that and impacting our margins, we go 
for it, so inorganic growth’ 
 
Hence, any acquisitions have been to fill gaps in the company’s existing capabilities and 
resources to service any particular geography. As stated in literature, for firms to 
maintain a competitive edge in the international market, they need to acquire capabilities 
and also build internal capabilities and advantages (Rugman & Verbeke, 2004). 
Companies can build or acquire technologies to provide differentiated services and 
products which will help them create a dominant position in their industry. 
 
Further, the acquisition targets have been carefully chosen so that integration of the two 
entities is carried out with the least disruption. Once an acquisition has been carried out, 
the intent of TCS has been to increase the services provided to the clients that have 
been acquired through the acquisition and hence through organic growth. Clarifying this, 
the interviewee further stated: 
’That’s been the focus, that if the customer has the propensity to spend 
why not they spend entirely with us rather than going to multiple vendors; 
and that has been the strategy which has driven the large part of the 
organic growth’ 
 
Acquisitions are considered a major activity for companies towards global business 
expansion and form part of major strategy decision for corporates to achieve growth 
projections and creating sustainable value (Trompenaars & Asser, 2010; Calipha et al., 
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2010). However, more and more companies, both from the developed world and 
emerging countries use both mergers and acquisitions strategy along with organic 
growth strategy to enhance growth (Warter & Warter, 2014). In the case of TCS, 
mergers and acquisitions has not been a significant strategy but more of an ancillary 
strategy to promote a significant organic growth. 
 
6.5 Host Country Environment 
TCS looked outward almost from inception and opened its first overseas office in 1973. 
Today, the company operates in 45 countries. As seen in the previous section, TCS has 
internationalised mainly through an organic growth strategy and its overseas acquisitions 
have been negligible in terms of real numbers (Appendix 7). It has had a sizeable addition 
of employees through these acquisitions, hence acquiring tangible resources. Through 
these acquisitions, the company has also acquired intangible capabilities in the form of 
specific technological capabilities, for example the shared service insurance capability in 
Latin America or the non-voice BPO services in US/India. 
 
Talking specifically about the Latin American acquisition and the number of employees 
that they acquired, Interviewee 1 said: 
‘We did the acquisition of a company called Comicrom. So that was an 
acquisition we did around the same time 2006 [2005] time period. So, close 
to 20,000 people in the Latam region, which is quite significant’ 
 
Retention of employees of acquired entities through various means is important for the 
success of any such acquisition and further, integration of the two units require a healthy 
two-way communication and a conducive environment for the same (Ranft & Lord, 
2002). 
 
Interviewee 2 mentions how understanding the ethics value system of the host country 
and imbibing the Tata value system to the acquired employees is key for integration of 
the acquired company within TCS. This is further supplemented with open and frank 
communication around expectations of the acquired entity and its employees. More 
importantly, as Interviewee 2 elaborates, during the pre-acquisition period, other than 
the asset itself, the host country is also researched and both feedback from leadership 
teams and the market regarding the host ethical value system and the TCS value system 
is studied closely with regards to fitment and ease of integration. This ensures that the 
acquired employees continue to be with TCS even after the mandatory 1-3 years post 
the acquisition. Both Interviewee 1 and 2 emphasised on effective communication 
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regarding the expectations from the acquired employees and stated that only those 
employees left the organisation or were asked to leave the organisation where it was 
clear that they did not want to be part of the newly-merged entity due to difficulties 
integrating with the culture or with the way the merged entity operated. Both 
interviewees added that the integration was a well-thought-out process as each 
acquisition was planned with a different purpose (for growth or adding capabilities by 
providing competency). If the acquired employees did not contribute towards the merged 
entity’s objective, then their departure was imminent.  
 
So, clearly communication is open and transparent in the case of TCS and the required 
expectations are clearly spelled out. 
 
The role of the individual has generally been neglected in mergers and acquisitions 
research which may explain how and why cultural differences between the home country 
and the host country can cause an issue towards integration (Weber, 2015). Weber 
states that culture fit studies appreciate that people-related issues are among the major 
problems that arise from a merger and acquisition (M&A). However, there are no 
theoretical explanations for the same. 
 
As already mentioned above, both interviewees stated how the integration of an M&A is 
managed and employees who feel they cannot accept the ‘culture’ of the organisation 
leave or are made to leave. Interviewee 2 further expands about the approach that the 
company takes in various geographies and the expectations that TCS has in the new 
geographies. Each new set up is treated like a start-up with the expectations that each 
start-up may or may not be successful. People responsible for the new geography are 
encouraged to experiment, this includes employees at junior levels. Sometimes the 
reality of the host market does not meet the expectation of the TCS head office. In such 
situations, the strategy of operating in the market can be changed or the initiative may 
be completely shut down. The company approaches each geography with acceptance of 
the fact that success should not be expected each and every time. 
 
Weber (2015) also states that HR practices and the training of employees do not feature 
heavily in merger and acquisition studies, but development and training are important 
aspects in any successful integration and it is imperative to understand the knowledge 
and experience of human capital when creating new practices and improving upon 
existing practices. TCS has been heavily investing in training and development. There is 
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large secondary data available on the training and development practices of TCS. There 
are also online forums between past, present and future employees, where there is 
discussion regarding training and development. Interviewee 3 also mentions that 
employees traveling to other countries are sensitised to local culture, etiquettes and 
basic laws of the land. 
 
Interviewee 2 mentions that it is company policy to ensure that there is presence of HR 
in all the countries in which they are present and also, more importantly, senior HR 
personnel are sent from the home country whenever there is an acquisition. He adds 
that a lot of thought is given to integration of the Tata value system into that of the 
acquired entity. Both the HR functions and the finance capabilities personnel are bought 
together to integrate the cross-functional teams to release the potential of the 
international workforce. The company has established processes over the years which 
are now used seamlessly in any part of the world and is appreciated by the existing 
employees, acquired employees and new hiring in international markets. 
 
Excerpts from the current CEO of TCS regarding a recent acquisition in France also 
mention how integration is being managed and the importance of the role of HR function 
for any of their overseas acquisitions: 
‘We're one team. You should visit and see. We're one team now. There was 
none [no challenges]. We went there multiple times. We went there, our 
HR people lived there. Five business unit heads went there because the 
clients that we got through Alti belong to five different units. They went 
and parked themselves’ (Kalbag & Das, 2013; p.1) 
 
Gomes et al. (2013) stress that the success of mergers and acquisitions depends upon 
the synergy available from the merger and the realisation of such synergy. 
 
Interviewee 3, who has worked with TCS for 25 years in various countries across the 
globe, confirms that there is emphasis on orientation of local employees (in other 
countries) with Indian organisational culture and employees, especially from the HR 
functions, to go through training sessions and they may be posted to India to imbibe the 
Tata organisational culture. Further, as a registered company in another country, the 
company has to follow the laws of the land. Giving an example of India in relation to 
Brazil, the interviewee said that in India it was not compulsory for an employee to be 




Interviewee 2 also stresses the compliance of the host country along with culture which 
are very important considerations for acquisitions. He says that TCS sets up internal audit 
teams for internal scrutiny with regard to regulatory compliance and audit committee 
compliance with internal procedures and disclosures. These have also been an important 
consideration when acquiring or setting up subsidiaries in new locations. 
 
As mentioned in the background section, TCS was almost like a start-up when it ventured 
overseas to start looking for business and contracts. It has internationalised organically 
with almost negligible inorganic growth. 
 
Narula (2015) mentions that nascent companies do not expand overseas as the 
locational assets available in host countries are superior but look outward due to 
ownership advantages developed in the home market; but dependence on such assets 
lose significance as the companies mature in the international markets. In the case of 
technological firms, the ownership advantages are in the form of cheap labour and a 
specialised knowledge infrastructure. Narula further emphasises that Indian IT firms do 
not invest highly in R&D and remain at the lower end of their sector in host countries. 
Locational assets such as cheap labour dissipate over time and Indian IT firms have not 
developed organisational expertise in hiring, training and developing overseas 
employees. They prefer to send an Indian workforce to onshore locations and select 
destinations which are institutionally closer to their home market. 
 
However, this doesn’t seem to be in line with TCS practices. As Interviewee 3 stated in 
his email, until the early 2000s most of the TCS employees in countries other than India 
were Indians. However, over the last 15 years, TCS recruits locally in the countries that 
it is present in. 
 
Similarly, TCS used cost arbitrage as a key capability which was a locational asset to 
their advantage. However, as mentioned in the Resources and Capabilities section, the 
company has, over time, managed to delineate revenues earned with the number of 
employees and are concentrating on fixed-priced projects. Further, TCS invests heavily 
in R&D (as also evidenced in the Resources and Capabilities section). It has a large 
presence in developed markets which are far removed from India, which is the home 
market in terms of institutions and culture. Further the company regularly hires overseas 
(especially in USA and UK) and invests heavily into training and development of overseas 
staff (TOI, 2011; Firstpost, 2012; NDTV, 2014). 
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Talking about organic growth and the requirement for the same, Interviewee 1 said that 
a Greenfield project involved having a pool of talented people with the appropriate 
knowledge of the services to be provided in the new location. The knowledge about the 
local market is another important factor and how well that market perceives and receives 
the company is key towards its success. 
 
Culture is mentioned by all three interviewees. First, in understanding the culture of the 
acquired company for easy integration with the acquire company’s culture in the case of 
inorganic growth and second, in understanding the culture of the host country where 
TCS wants to grow organically. As Buckley et al. (2013) have explained, understanding 
the local culture of a host market helps increase trust between the two sides and also 
reduces transaction cost. Any market transaction has a cost but not all markets are 
efficient, and firms may internalise that transaction in case it helps reduce cost. ‘Firms 
will internalise transactions until the marginal cost of doing so exceeds the marginal 
revenue’ (Buckley, 2009, p. 310). 
 
Comparing hiring and integration of people in case of a WOS and an acquisition, 
specifically in the UK, Interviewee 2 stated that TCS entered the UK as early as 1970 and 
was then incorporated as a private company in England and Wales in 1998. Due to 
linkages dating back to British rule, understanding of the UK market and its culture was 
relatively uncomplicated. There was no major difference in setting up its own private 
company versus acquisitions that TCS had carried out in UK. Culturally, TCS has faced 
no issues in the UK; whether in hiring, recruiting or integration. 
 
During its initial stages, TCS had looked at developed markets and has a significant 
presence in emerging market countries today. The company has involved itself in projects 
in low-income markets and with customers requiring welfare and aids (UNCTAD, 2014). 
The project involves developing a water-purifying system using rice husks. 
 
A company can come up with various strategies to suit particular host countries both in 
the case of organic or inorganic growth. However, it cannot be prepared for all the types 
of challenge that TCS has experienced in the US. The company was having a dispute 
with US district Orange County on delayed deliverables and a lawsuit filed by the county 
was recently settled (Mendonca, 2016). In another lawsuit, the company was faced with 
a huge fine levied by a US grand jury on the grounds of ‘trade secret’ theft 
(Kondalamahanty, 2016). A client of TCS accused the company of downloading 
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confidential information during the process of installing the software for which it had 
been hired. This client has further made allegations that TCS then extracted trade secrets 
from the downloaded files to help a rival of the client. TCS is still fighting this lawsuit on 
grounds of unsupported evidence. 
 
The institutional environment in India (home country) is different from the US (host 
country) and the inexperience of dealing with an unknown institutional environment can 
cause learning penalties (Perkins, 2014). However, in the case of TCS, such lawsuits 
have only recently occurred though they have been present in the US for more than 
three decades. Hence, there is a continuous learning that is required of companies in 
divergent host markets. 
 
6.6 Brand and Logo 
A company can be distinguished by its brand, which can be a logo, trademark or package 
design. This helps in the identification of the company’s goods and services (Ghodeswar, 
2008). Companies with strong brand names enjoy advantages in the form of premium 
prices and customer loyalty, and can expect a good response for new products and 
services launched (Ghodeswar, 2008). 
 
In the case of the Tata Group, the various firms within the group use the same ‘Tata’ 
logo as a prefix to the actual activity that is being carried out by the various specific 
companies, for example Tata Consultancy Services, Tata Motors, Tata Steel, Tata 
Chemicals, to name just a few. 
 
Figure 16: Tata Group Logo 
 
The main company shareholder in all the various Tata companies (both listed and 
unlisted) is the Tata Sons, and they charge a royalty from all the group firms for the use 
of the Tata brand name (Contractor et al., 2015). In an agreement named the ‘Tata 
Brand Equity and Business Promotion’, which was carried out in 1996, group companies 
using the name ‘Tata’ had to pay 0.25% of annual revenue or 5% of profit before tax; 
this was further capped to INR 750 million (USD 11 million) in 2015 (Zachariah, 2015). 
Companies which incur a loss are not expected to pay this royalty. 
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Each company in the group is expected to work assiduously to build the brand name. 
Explaining what the group has done at headquarter level to project the company as a 
global name, especially in the various locations that the Tatas are present in, Interviewee 
1 said that top management itself was involved in various brand-building exercises. This 
had started during the 1990s when the chairman (Mr. Ratan Tata) commissioned the 
‘Tata’ logo and the focus was clearly towards a brand-building image. The main reason 
behind the exercise was targeted towards the company’s growth in international 
markets, so there was recognition of any Tata company when it set up either a Greenfield 
project or a subsidiary in another country. The main objective of the brand strategy was 
to create comfort among new employees or any partnerships that Tata companies forged 
in other countries.  
 
This has not been a one-time exercise and the company continues to focus on global 
brand building on a continuous basis. In 2013, the group was preparing a blueprint with 
a focus on Europe, USA and Africa, and the action plan was to include television 
advertisements, hoardings and partnerships with major sports clubs involved in golf and 
football (Gupta, 2013). 
 
TCS has also involved itself in various activities to continually build the ‘Tata’ brand as 
Interviewee 1 further explained: 
‘TCS as an organisation, we’ve been very focused on looking at how we can 
actually help build our brand. So, we’ve used certain of our initiatives, like, 
for example, we have a focus on fitness, as a theme, as part of our people 
initiatives. So, we launched a fit for life initiative within the organisation, 
then we’ve taken it at a larger scale and we said, we will focus on 
sponsoring marathons’ 
 
The company has sponsored marathons in New York and Amsterdam as main sponsors 
and co-sponsors in Chicago, Berlin, Singapore and Boston (TCS site). 
 
The brand-building exercise for TCS started in 2006-07, when the company hired a global 
consultant to help TCS position its brand at a global level through use of taglines and 
graphics (PTI, 2006). 
 
6.7 Internationalisation Strategy and the Financial Crisis 
Will EMNEs survive the financial crisis was a question that was raised in the aftermath 
during 2008-09 (Sauvant et al., 2009; Hill & Jongwanich, 2009). It has been stated that 
more companies are up for sale post a crisis; this was observed after the 1990s Asia 
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crisis. However, EMNEs actually reduce any acquisitions or expansion during such post-
crisis periods (Makaew, 2010; Erel et al., 2012). 
 
Contrary to this, TCS made an acquisition in 2008, which was during the period of the 
financial crisis. It acquired the Indian BPO arm of a large US multinational bank 
(Citibank). The deal was worth USD 505 million (ENS, 2008). 
 
Talking about this acquisition, both the interviewees said that it was a strategic capability 
acquisition deal. TCS was not present in the non-voice area. It was a choice between 
building an asset from scratch versus acquiring a well-developed unit. Added benefit was 
that the unit which TCS acquired was serving Citibank in many countries. So for TCS, it 
was also an entry point into countries where they were not yet present. Further, business 
processing service for a major multinational bank also provided opportunity for TCS to 
pitch their services to other banks. For TCS, this was an opportunity to enter the business 
processing service areas. 
 
Hence, it was an opportunity that emanated out of the financial crisis on which TCS 
capitalised. Citibank’s valuations were at an all-time low post the financial crisis and it 
had to be rescued by the US Government. It was selling some of its assets which were 
not directly related to banking services and became a slimmer organisation (Ellis, 2008). 
The BPO arm at India came up for sale and TCS, which until that point did not have a 
BPO unit, decided to buy it as it saw a long-term opportunity for the BPO services. TCS 
calls the division ‘Business Process Services’ (BPS). Today, almost 15% of total TCS 
revenues are generated by its BPS arm (TCS Balance Sheet, 2016). 
 
Relating to the organic growth post the financial crisis, Interviewee 1 said that there was 
actually a lot of traction and business that TCS bagged due the crisis affecting the 
banking business to a larger extent and the companies requiring IT services in the case 
of mergers and acquisitions in the banking sector: 
‘See the financial crisis if you really look at hit banking [sector] to a large 
extent in the biggest way, right? But one thing very interesting happened 
in that time period, while there was a slowdown in growth in the banks or 
other financial services organisation, they were doing quite a few 
acquisitions, so we actually started getting back into the growth trajectory 
very much close to that event, okay, so within one or two quarters itself we 
started winning a lot of contracts which were to do with acquisitions and 




The banks were hit by major regulatory issues in the aftermath of the crisis and another 
opportunity that TCS spotted was innovation services for the banking sector, a capability 
that has been mentioned in the Resources and Capabilities section above. Elucidating 
on the same, Interviewee 1 further stated that multinational banks were very high 
handed but that the financial crisis had changed that. Many of the banks while having 
captives were not in a position to invest in new technology required for innovation in 
customer services as they were tied up with regulatory issues as a result of the financial 
crisis. 
 
Interviewee 2 confirms that cost reduction was most imperative for their global 
customers coming out of the financial crisis and these clients were willing to transact 
with any company that helped bring operational level costs down. This proved to be a 
huge opportunity for TCS and they were able to grow both their top line (revenues) and 
bottom line (profit after tax) during the period following the financial crisis. 
 
Hence, the company was not negatively affected by the financial crisis and it bagged 
many major deals post the crisis. It continued to be engaged in various overseas 
investments and strengthened its portfolio of services as a result of the crisis. 
 
6.8 Discussion 
From its inception, TCS has developed from being just a software company to a global 
IT company providing management consulting and driving organisational change and 
processes (Contractor et al., 2015). Today its revenues exceed USD 10 billion and are 
considered one of the top 10 IT service companies in the world. As a small fledgling Tata 
entity in the early 1970s, TCS internationalised in its very early stages by setting up an 
office in New York in 1973. This is akin to born global firms, however the born-global 
concept is fairly recent and the characteristics of such firms differ from the type of 
company TCS was during its early stages. TCS does not fit the standard description of a 
free-standing company either, nor that of an international new venture as has been 
discussed in section 6.4 of this chapter. Hence, the internationalisation pathway of TCS 
is unique and extends the interpretation of multinational companies. 
 
The company sought developed markets in its initial overseas foray as it felt that there 
was no presence of any domestic demand for the services it was offering and countries 




Seeking developed markets which were further from home does not align with IB 
literature which states that EMNEs seek initial internationalisation closer to home and/or 
in economies similar to home markets due to institutional proximity. This is known as 
psychic distance which is the perceived distance between two countries based on 
cultural, economic and geographical factors (Håkanson & Ambos, 2010; Azar & 
Drogendjik, 2014). Entering markets which are perceived to be psychically distant can 
create high levels of uncertainty (Evans & Mavondo, 2002) as the firms may not have 
full information of such host markets and the challenges that they may face (Azar & 
Drogendjik, 2014). 
 
For TCS, other than the common spoken language ‘English’, India was very far removed 
from USA and UK in all other manners. Over the years TCS has also made entry into 
non-English speaking countries, opening a software centre in Hungary in 2001 and an 
operations back-up site in China and then focussing on the domestic market there, 
employing a large number of locals (Goldstein, 2008). 
 
TCS is also different from other EMNEs which first establish themselves in their home 
market before venturing overseas. EMNEs are known to exploit CSAs rather than FSAs 
during internationalisation (Kedia et al., 2012). This was also seen in the case of TCS, 
which used CSAs like English-speaking engineers and scientists to their advantage 
through a cost-arbitrage strategy. The company’s comparative advantage lies in the low-
cost professionals available in India along with its networking and alliance partners to 
get business and contracts in the overseas markets (Contractor, 2007). 
 
However, over the years, the company also built strong FSAs by investing heavily in HR 
practices of training and developing their people all over the globe. It has relied on 
internal practices to create strategies to integrate a very global workforce. 
 
The company has internationalised through an organic growth pathway rather than using 
the path of mergers and acquisitions. The very few acquisitions that the company did 
make were to gain capabilities rather than market shares. The capabilities and resources 
that the company acquired were an addition to its existing product suite, thus enlarging 
the services that it could offer as a company. It hoped to increase market share by 
providing a larger product suite to its existing clients and cross-selling to new clients. 




Indian private companies are more entrepreneurial and adventurous in nature 
(compared to Chinese firms) as the Indian government does not control them and 
industrialised nations do not see them as an impending danger to their own economies 
(Ramamurti, 2013). TCS affirms to this notion by being present in all the continents and 
in both developed and developing economies. The company has been innovative in 
creating specific capabilities and a global delivery system. While in its initial stages, the 
company gained from cost arbitrage it had on the basis of its capability convinced clients 
to move to a more stable fixed-pricing model, thus assuring stable revenues and repeat 
clients. 
 
While a Change model (based on Logic Model, Yin 2014) was prepared for TCS, the 
company had internationalised close to its inception. Through the change model, it can 
be observed how the company became a global brand name in IT services based on 
internal resources and capabilities and the dynamic external environment (Figure 17). 
The change model involves understanding of events over a period of time. As an 
analytical tool, the events observed over a period of time can then be matched to theory. 
 
Figure 17: TCS Change-Level Model 
 
 
1. In 1971-72, a new political party formed the Indian government. This party had a 
socialist belief and they believed in the self-sufficiency of the country. Foreign 
companies were allowed to remain in India only if they sold a certain percentage 
of their shares to the public or formed a joint venture or a partnership with a local 
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Indian company. Unilever was one multinational company that remained in India 
and transformed into an Indian publicly traded company 
2. The exit of IBM, created a gap in the IT services of the country. TCS imported a 
Burroughs (a US-based hardware company) mainframe and commenced providing 
services to Burroughs customers within India and also extended their services to 
Burroughs clients in overseas locations. This was the first Indian offshore project 
to be established during the period 1974-76. However, in 1978, Burroughs entered 
India (capital investment) and set-up a joint venture (JV) with the Tatas and most 
of the employees of TCS were transferred to this JV. TCS had to stop servicing the 
Burroughs clients within India as that service was moved to the JV and was 
relegated to being like a start-up 
3. This is when the company ventured overseas and opened an office in New York in 
the year 1979 as it felt that the Indian domestic market did not have the demand 
for the type of services that TCS specialised in. For TCS the process of 
internationalisation began close to its inception due to the external environment 
prevailing in India at that time 
4. TCS already had experience of providing services to overseas clients due to its 
background with Burroughs. The company had access to country specific 
advantages in the form of English-speaking engineers and graduates, and invested 
in its employees through various training programmes. TCS was a pioneer in 
collaborating with various Indian schools and colleges to provide specific IT 
intensive skills and developing computer science curriculum. It can be stated that 
the company was instrumental in the origination of India’s country specific 
advantage in the form of English speaking engineers and graduates’ adept in IT 
skills 
5. This enabled the company to create a low-cost arbitrage strategy for selling its 
services which were attractive to overseas clients with high labour intensive needs 
6. The company then created a unique Global Network Delivery Model (GNDM) that 
enables the company to meet their clients’ specific sourcing strategies. The 
platform runs continuously supporting all TCS clients globally 
7. The company then collaborated with its clients and other institutions in creating a 
co-innovation network which brings various networks onto one platform for 
innovative ideas in the field of IT 
8. This further enabled the company to create its global brand awareness and was 
counted as one of the top IT companies in the world 
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9. The company had internationalised at an early stage without creating a strong 
base in its home market. It mainly invested overseas through direct capital 
investments into wholly owned subsidiaries (WOS) or a JV/Partnership (depending 
upon the law of the land. The company believed in organic growth rather than 
inorganic growth and made its first acquisition only in 2005 
10. The company was open to inorganic growth only if such an acquisition helped the 
company acquire additional resources and capabilities which it did not possess 
and, further, if such additional resources and capabilities helped the company 
achieve a dominant positon in the industry 
11. Irrespective of the mode of entry into a specific market, the company did face 
various challenges due to different ethics value systems. The company believed in 
effective communication in regard to acquired intangible assets 
12. The company has achieved its 10 x 10 objective of being a USD 10 billion company 
and ranked in the top ten IT companies in the world 
13. Effects of Financial Crisis on Outward FDI 
 
6.9 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter explores the internationalisation of Tata Consultancy Services using a 
theoretical framework based on the dynamic capabilities and the resource based 
approach. The company, while being a Tata Group company, was a fledgling company 
with no real base in the home market and chose internationalisation almost at the start 
of its journey at a time when the home country had a closed market economy with major 
restrictions placed on foreign exchange flows. The company’s main competitive 
advantage was cost arbitrage which helped it to get business in developed markets and 
then build both internal and external capabilities which it exploited through its unique 
Global Delivery system; thus building a company that is globally recognised today. Along 
with such unique capabilities, the company invested heavily in its resources to adapt to 
a dynamic environment and also adopted new learnings and experience which link to 
the dynamic capabilities theory. Such integration and adaptation is also indicative of 
managerial capability towards assimilation and absorption. The company also 
contributed diligently to grow the group brand for an increased awareness which also 
increases its own competitiveness. The company in the initial stages of its journey set 
targets for itself to become a global top ten company in its field and, as per revenues 
earned, the company is in the top ten in the world among technology companies. The 
company’s focus is on continued innovation through research and development to build 
new capabilities for sustained growth and profitability. 
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7. Indian Hotels Company Limited (The Taj Group of Hotels) 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Indian Hotels Company Limited (IHCL) is present in hospitality services. IHCL along with 
its subsidiaries is known as the ‘Taj Group.’ The company owns hotels and resorts in 
India and overseas. The company was established more than one hundred years ago, 
in undivided India21. This chapter examines its internationalisation strategies from the 
perspective of dynamic capabilities and the resource based theory from within the 
strategic management field.  
 
During British colonial rule, hotels were built in India specifically for the British officials 
and other travellers from Europe. India was the first country in Asia to have a commercial 
hotel (Pal, 2015). 
 
The hospitality industry in India has roots since the late 1800s; however, the country is 
best known for its IT services and outsourcing capabilities and has been called the back-
office power of the world (Dossani & Kenney, 2007); which is moving jobs that do not 
require face-to-face interphase between the clients of higher-wage and lower-wage 
countries, and is an important feature of globalisation today. India, along with 
Philippines, has been at the forefront of this outsourcing since the 1990s (Peck, 2017). 
 
IHCL, which is part of the Tata conglomerate, was established in 1899 (company 
website). Within India, the Taj Group of hotels is placed at the luxurious end of the 
hospitality chain in India with a presence in more than 60 locations but it is the other 
Tata Group companies like Tata Steel, Tata Motors and Tata Consultancy Services which 
have attracted more attention from media and academic researchers.  
 
IHCL also has an international presence with 17 properties overseas; however, it is 
miniscule compared to over 100 properties that IHCL has in India, the home country. 
This is also in contrast to IT companies like TCS (which is also a Tata Group company) 
and Wipro and the telecom company Airtel that have been analysed in previous chapters 
(Chapters 6, 5 and 7 respectively); wherein it has been seen that these companies have 
a relatively large presence in foreign markets. Further, for both the IT companies, most 
                                                          
21 Undivided India is referred to a period before 15th August 1947 when the country was still ruled by the 




their revenues is earned from overseas markets and billed in foreign currencies. Hence, 
compared to these companies, IHCL’s limited internationalisation and the strategy 
behind the same forms the focus of this chapter. 
 
IHCL’s first foray overseas was to Zambia in Africa way back in 1979 followed by Yemen 
in 1980 and then London, UK in 1982. This was a time when India had severe restrictions 
on movement of foreign exchange capital (Hutchison et al., 2012) so what prompted 
IHCL to build hotels in other emerging markets overseas during that time with high 
capital investments.  
 
Hotel companies have high fixed costs and, unlike other service companies like IT 
services or manufacturing companies, cannot take advantage of economies of scale or 
do not expand to gain superior technology as the hospitality services is very personalised 
with considerable human interaction. Hence, it becomes imperative to understand what 
the company was hoping to acquire by way of internationalisation. Also, given that the 
company was well established in India and had the antecedents of the Tata Group, did 
the company hope to transfer its home-grown capabilities to the overseas market? So 
this chapter will also analyse and understand what these capabilities were and if the 
company required additional capabilities to operate successfully in foreign host markets. 
 
Further, a firm can face different issues in the various host markets which can arise due 
to a loss of advantage from specific resources or capabilities transferred overseas 
(Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2007). So, another question that this chapter seeks to answer is 
how the company manages various host-country environments, the opportunities and 
challenges that may differ from its home-country environment to gain competitive 
advantage.  
 
The hospitality industry is highly affected by crises (Wang & Ritchie, 2010), be it 
economic, political or financial. I have personally experienced this while working in the 
corporate sector: travel and hotels are the first expenses that are curbed during any kind 
of a crisis or expense-reducing exercise. Hence, this chapter will finally examine the 





7.2 Company Background 
IHCL is a public limited company with Tata Sons Limited, an Indian conglomerate, as its 
primary promoter shareholder. The company was established in the year 1899 by the 
founder of the Tata Group himself, Jamsetji Nusserwanji Tata (1839-1904) and became 
an incorporated entity in the year 1902 (1st April 1902). The hotel business of IHCL is 
known as the Taj Hotels Resorts and Palaces. 
 
The company opened its first hotel in Mumbai (the financial capital of India) known as 
the Taj Mahal Palace22 with 225 rooms. This hotel was built opposite the Gateway of 
India23, was considered an architectural wonder and was the first hotel that was built for 
Indians by an Indian entrepreneur (Pal, 2015). Today this iconic hotel is known as the 
Taj Mahal Palace and Tower Hotel after a new wing with additional rooms was opened 
in 1972, taking its total capacity to 560 rooms (IHCL Company website).    
 
In 1970, the company ventured into preservation of palaces and royal residences 
belonging to erstwhile stately kings and princes24 and took over the management of two 
such properties in Jaipur and Udaipur, two cities in the western state of Rajasthan (which 
is a desert state that borders Pakistan). Such an arrangement of managing heritage 
hotels helps maintain historical and cultural venues to increase heritage tourism, thus 
providing livelihood and development of local artisans (Chhabra, 2015).   
 
IHCL launched its first overseas operation in Zambia, which still exists today, and its first 
overseas hotel in Yemen, which has since been divested. The company’s approach to 
internationalisation has been based on a three-pronged approach; building its own 
properties or acquiring properties overseas; however, the most favoured has been the 
management approach. This has been discussed in detail in the ‘Internationalisation’ 
section further in the chapter.  
 
It was also the first hotel chain in India to have a presence in all the major five 
metropolitan cities of the country (Roy, 2013). 
                                                          
22 The Taj Mahal Hotel was attacked by terrorists during the infamous attack on locations frequented by 
foreigners in Mumbai on 26th September 2008. The hotel was closed after this attack and reopened in 
2010 after extensive restoration work that took almost 18 months. 
23 The Gateway of India was built in the 20th century (1913) and adjoins the Mumbai Harbour and the 
Arabian Sea. It was built as a principle point of entry for the British elite (Asian Historical Architecture) 
24 The princely states and kingdoms were dissolved during the Indian independence from the British rule 
in 1947 to form one united country. 
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Today, the company has more than 100 properties in 63 locations within India and 16 
properties (owned and managed) in 10 other countries (Appendix 8) with a total of 
16,459 rooms. The consolidated revenues of IHCL for financial year 2016 were USD25 
703.31 million (IHCL Company Balance Sheet, 2016)  
 
To interpret the motivation behind the limited internationalisation that IHCL has carried 
out, I interviewed three senior executives in November 2014. All three interviewees were 
career Tata Group employees. They only provided information related to past strategies 
and no forward looking statements were provided due to investor protection rules as 
guided by the stock exchange (Bombay Stock Exchange and the National Stock Exchange 
of India) on which the company is listed. 
 
I was not allowed to record the interviewees but was able to take extensive notes. Post 
transcribing the interviews, the same were shared with the interviewees to confirm that 
all information provided during the interview had been captured.  
 
For the sake of validity and reliability and to ensure triangulation, additional documents 
have also been referred to. These include but are not restricted to company balance 
sheets, investor and analyst presentations, corporate presentations made to investors 
and analysts, and media and newspaper reports present in the public domain.   
 
The words indented in quotation marks are the quotes from the interview notes. 
 
7.3. Resources and Capabilities 
The resource based view gives rise to the dynamic capabilities approach and the 
knowledge based view and can help explain a company’s competitive advantage in 
relation to its competitors (Nieves & Haller, 2014; Dunning & Lundan, 2008). The 
knowledge-based view indicates that a firm may possess unique resources through 
which it can differentiate itself and thus create a competitive advantage (Dierickx & Cool, 
1989; Rumelt, 1984). Such resources need to be adapted due to change in the external 
or internal environment which is possible through dynamic capabilities so that firms can 
continue to maintain their competitive advantage (Helfat & Winter, 2011; Ambrosini & 
Bowman, 2009).  
 
                                                          
25 USD INR rate as per Reuters on 22nd October 2016 (Appendix 9)  
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In the hotel industry, the level of employee’s knowledge and their skills and abilities can 
be related to development of dynamic capabilities along with a multi-level knowledge of 
the working of the industry itself to develop different types of dynamic capabilities, thus 
maintaining a healthy competitive advantage (Nieves & Haller, 2014).   
 
To analyse the resources and capabilities that the company possessed, we traced the 
history of the Company again in this section. IHCL was the first indigenous hotel 
company that was established in India during the British rule. The first hotel that the 
company built and which became operational in 1903 in Mumbai was built especially for 
the Indian traveller (Pal 2015). Until then, most of the hotels present in India were used 
to cater for British royalty, the British army, and British and European business travellers 
and tourists.  
 
It was almost seventy years later, in 1972, that the company built an extension to their 
first hotel. This was followed by the inauguration of two properties in 1974; one in Goa 
(a beach resort state on the western part of India overlooking the Arabian Sea) and the 
other in Chennai (erstwhile Madras) in the south of India overlooking the Bay of Bengal 
(Company Timeline Appendix 10). 
  
This was followed by the company’s first overseas foray in 1979. Tata Group had set up 
Tata Zambia in 1977 as its headquarters for Africa due to the apartheid rule in South 
Africa; then moved to South Africa in 1994 with the largest Greenfield investment in the 
country (Gelb, 2014). The company was exporting trucks and buses manufactured by 
Tata Motors (erstwhile TELCO) into Zambia (Tata, 2016). Two years later, in 1979, IHCL 
took over the management of an existing hotel in Lusaka (the capital of Zambia) called 
the Pamodzi Hotel. This was done to facilitate the various Tata employees traveling to 
Africa to work. IHCL then later acquired a 70% stake in the hotel in 1997 and renamed 
it the ‘Taj Pamodzi’. Once apartheid was lifted in South Africa, the company’s 
headquarters moved to Johannesburg with the establishing of Tata Africa Holdings in 
1994 (Tata in Africa, 2016; Taj SA, 2016).  
 
In 1980, IHCL opened its first hotel outside India in Northern Yemen (which has since 
been divested). This was followed by the acquisition of St. James Court in London, UK. 
 
Talking about the capabilities that the company possessed and which it was able to 
leverage while expanding overseas, Interviewee 1 stated: 
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‘The knowledge to manage hotels. That is the main criteria. We know how 
to do it and then know how to do it well. Plus, the quality of service that 
you provide – those are the main capabilities you need’ 
 
Interviewee 2 had a different perspective which was about the differentiation in service 
provided in Asia (of which India is a part) compared to that of developed countries like 
USA and UK and the extension of this service to the Indian traveler overseas constituting 
a capability that the company possessed: 
‘The Asian hospitality experience differs from hospitality in USA or Europe 
because we have a different cultural ethos. Access to the outbound Indian 
traveller is an important strength that the Taj has as it expands overseas’  
 
Interviewee 3 clarified such a capability which was inherent in the general Indian 
hospitality environment: 
‘We used our experience in India to introduce a unique service in New York. 
We have always had highly personalized services delivered to our guests in 
our Grand Palaces in India. Inspired by that, we started the Royal attaché 
service at the Pierre, NY, of course, for our guests in the Grand Suites. It 
was the hallmark of personalized service, and was very well received and 
appreciated by our guests’  
 
Adrien Glover (2016), the deputy digital editor at Travel + Leisure (a leading world travel 
magazine) reporting about these services and on having experienced these services first 
hand, stated that most hotel chains only talk about providing services which are fit for 
royalty, however the Taj at NY actually provides a butler service, known as the Royal 
Attachés, who have real life experience of having tended to royalty and heads of states.  
 
This is an example of companies developing capabilities in their home country and 
successfully transferring the same to another host market to provide a differentiated 
product towards competitive advantage (Rugman & Verbeke, 2004; Teece, 2014). 
 
There are limited studies of the hotel and tourism industry in relation to the knowledge-
based view and the dynamic capabilities approach (Nieves & Haller, 2014). The study 
that these authors have conducted on the Spanish hotel industry ties in with what the 
interviewees of IHCL state about knowledge resources and understanding the traveller 
segment that they are catering to as being their specific capabilities that help the 
company expand in overseas markets. This is also supported by an earlier study 
conducted by Chen and Dimou (2005) which indicates that ‘idiosyncratic knowledge’ (p. 
1739) is an important factor for hotels in their quest for internationalisation. Successful 
hoteliers are aware of their customers’ needs, which may change over time, and are 
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willing to accommodate such changes (Yu et al., 2014). These can translate into dynamic 
capabilities as the company evolves due to change in the external environment 
(Ambrosini et. al., 2009). This aspect will be further analysed in the section on ‘host 
country environment’ in this chapter (Section 7.6). 
 
7.4 Mode of Internationalisation 
Mode of entry and the location of entry are both key for overseas performance and the 
success towards internationalisation (Buckley et al., 2014). Entry-mode strategy is a 
challenge for the hotel industry (Yu et. al., 2014).  
 
Hotels can expand overseas through a Greenfield path, which is building a hotel on land 
acquired or leased in an overseas location. IHCL set up a subsidiary in Sri Lanka in 1979 
and entered into a contract with the government of Sri Lanka to build a 400 room hotel 
which became operational in 1983. 
 
Another way a hotel chain can expand overseas is by taking up a management contract 
of an existing hotel in an overseas location. In Sri Lanka itself, IHCL undertook a 
management contract of an airport hotel and rebranded it as the ‘Taj Gateway Hotel.’ 
This hotel had been built and was owned by a different business group. Similarly, the 
company also entered in to management contracts of ‘The Pierre’ in New York, USA and 
the ‘St. James Court’ in London, UK in the years 2005 and 1982 respectively. IHCL 
continues to manage these properties until today (Taj Group website, 2016).  
 
A third and final way that a hotel chain can expand overseas is through the acquisition 
of an existing hotel in a foreign location. IHCL had acquired the Ritz-Carlton hotel in 
Boston, USA in the year 2007. However, in the May 2016 corporate presentation, post 
the financial year (2015-16) results, the company stated that their Board of Directors 
had approved the divestment of this property while having the intention to retain the 
management contract. This was soon followed by the actual sale of the property for USD 
125 million in July 2016 (Punnen, 2016).  
 
Earlier, the company had also divested a property that they had acquired in Australia 
known as the ‘Blue Hotel’ in Sydney. The property was acquired in 2006 and was sold in 





The company also divested a few more properties in the US. Given these divergent ways 
of expansion in the overseas market, the interviewees were asked in what situations the 
company follows specific strategies and the reasons therefore. Explaining this, 
Interviewee 2 stated: 
‘Hotels can be either operated by owners (owner operator) or by pure 
operators. Obviously, the ideal situation is always to be ‘asset light’ that is 
to be a pure operator. You have management contracts and you build the 
business by leveraging the brand equity. In regions like the Middle East and 
South-East Asia, we did not want to invest capital, as the brand was known 
and so we could leverage the brand through management contracts. In the 
developed markets, the Western world, there are big global chains already 
existing; there is a lot of competition so the first step is to acquire as the 
objective is to get the brand known in the market’ 
 
From the above it can be inferred that the choice of entry mode depends upon the 
location. Interviewee 1 emphasising on this fact also added that management contracts 
were more favoured: 
‘Management contracts are favoured as they are better because there is 
‘no’ equity stake. However, if there is no brand recognition, then an 
acquisition may be required’ 
 
This ties in with literature where Contractor and Kundu (1998) analysing major hotel 
brands concluded that hospitality service companies did not place major emphasis on 
control through high equity stakes. It was possible for hotel chains to be run under 
management contracts and benefit from global suppliers, logistics and brand recognition. 
Hotels and restaurants prefer non-equity mode for overseas ventures and operations 
(Erramilli et al., 2002). 
 
Interviewee 3 added why the company was keen on management contracts rather than 
owning properties overseas: 
‘Every company’s strategy evolves over time. Being ‘asset right’ is 
strategically important today. We need to choose which locations we need 
to own a hotel in and in which locations we need to manage hotels. To this 
end, we keep seeking opportunities’ 
 
This was also echoed by Interviewee 2 who also mentioned that the current strategy of 
the company was more inclined towards being ‘asset right’ rather than merely ‘asset 
light, which is only divesting the properties that the company feels that it does not fit 
with its brand image:’ 
‘The ideal situation is to move towards a more ‘asset-light’ structure. That 
does not mean that the company will not look at acquisition opportunities, 
selectively; we are, in fact, moving to an “asset-right” model’ 
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Unlike other in service firms, in the hotel industry control can be achieved without 
majority equity share as assets like real estate can be separated from knowledge-based 
resources or managerial capabilities (Contractor & Kundu, 1998; Villar et al., 2012). 
 
Specifically, in response to the need for acquisition given that the strategy of the 
company was to be ‘asset light’, Interviewee 3 added further:  
‘There are several considerations that go in before one looks at an 
acquisition. The locations of the portfolio, the types of assets, how the 
portfolio ‘fits’ with the existing Taj Group portfolio, the current financial 
performance of the new portfolio, the potential of its performance under 
the Taj Group etc. They all need to fall in place for us to consider an 
acquisition’ 
 
This was confirmed by Interviewee 1 who, mentioning about Europe (where the group 
presence in negligible), said: 
‘We are always looking. Scouting was done in continental Europe. There 
has to be a match too. It should fit into what our brand stands for. We want 
to be known as a ‘luxury’ brand overseas, accordingly whatever we manage 
or acquire, has to fit into the strategy of the company’ 
  
As Alon et al. (2012) in their study of the hotel industry have pointed out, hotel size does 
not depend on the internationalisation mode of the company but the kind of presence 
that the hotel company wants to have in the market selected for international expansion 
and hence, different entry strategies are used by different hotel companies when 
expanding overseas. Management contracts are preferred by luxury chains (Dev et al., 
2002). A hotel chain’s internal capabilities, host market’s absorptive capacity and the 
presence of trustworthy partners in the host markets also affect the choice of ownership 
and control decisions when entering a new host market (Brown et al., 2003). 
Hence, IHCL has not considered acquisition as a major growth strategy for 
internationalisation as they feel that any acquisition needs to fit in with their brand 
image, which is to be known for ‘luxury hotels’ and which is what the company stands 
for. It is discernible that for the company ‘brand’ image is very important. This has been 
discussed in the next section. 
 
7.5 Brand 
Brand equity is a key driver for a hospitality company’s success (Kim & Kim, 2005). The 
performance of luxury hotel chains is positively correlated to the customer-brand equity 
which is defined by brand loyalty, brand image and perceived quality of services. A 
hospitality firm that is the ‘owner of the brand’ can charge a premium price and have a 
200 
 
larger market share due to a greater brand awareness created which further helps 
creating brand loyalty among customers thus translating into higher revenues for the 
firm (Sangster et al., 2001; O’Neil & Mattila, 2004). ‘Branding is one of the most 
dominant trends in the global hotel industry’ (Kayaman & Arasli, 2007; p. 92).  
 
Elucidating upon the necessity for a strong brand image, the interviewees stated: 
‘Brand is very important. A typical traveller from NY knows the Four Seasons 
and will tell his travel agent or secretary to book him in Four Seasons 
wherever he travels. So, what do you do? You go to the major source 
markets which are in the developed world. Hence, to get that traveller to 
come and stay with us when they travel to India, we need to go there and 
set up the brand, offering world class services in major source markets like 
USA’ (Interviewee 1) 
 
‘In the developed markets, the Western world, there are big global chains 
already existing; there is a lot of competition so the first step is to acquire 
as the objective is to get the brand known in the market. Once that is 
achieved, and there is brand recognition with travellers in those markets, 
those travellers are more likely to stay with Taj when they travel to India 
as they are now familiar with the brand. The US and UK are big markets 
for the hospitality industry especially in the luxury sector and that is what 
the target is – the source markets’ (Interviewee 2) 
 
Literature on the need for a strong brand image for hospitality firms ties in with what 
the interviewees have stated. Measurement of brand value is required to understand the 
global position of a hospitality firm with an underlying strategy of introducing new and 
improved services to gain competitive advantage in both the home and host markets 
(Keller, 2003; Jiang et al., 2002; Kotler et al., 2006).  
 
Another insightful concept that emerges from the interviewee’s excerpts above on the 
importance of brand building is about the location choice of hospitality firms in foreign 
markets. There is mention about the need of building a brand name in developed 
markets like the USA and UK as these are considered to be major source markets for 
travellers to India, both in the luxury sector and the business sector.  
 
There were severe restrictions on entry of foreign firms into India which changed when 
the Indian government introduced market-oriented reforms during 1991-92 (Bhagwati 
et al., 2010). Liberalisation paved the path for both private and foreign investments in 
industries which until then were controlled by the Indian government. This enabled 
foreign firms to enter the market which included multinational hotel chains and also 
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increased foreign business travellers coming to India, especially from the developed 
markets.  
 
As the Taj brand was not popular overseas, the international expansion post 
liberalisation in the country was carried out mainly for brand recognition. As Interviewee 
2 further clarifies on the need to increase the brand visibility in foreign markets: 
‘There was a need to improve the brand visibility overseas so that we could 
get the international traveller to recognize the brand and then associate 
with it and stay in our properties when they come to India, given the 
increased competition from global chains in India. The expansion was also 
driven by a desire to establish the Taj as a global luxury chain’ 
 
Luxury embodies quality of service, status and exclusivity (Atwal & Williams, 2009). 
Luxury brands have a unique brand identity and can retain customer loyalty and thus a 
certain level of sales and profitability. 
 
A consistent brand image is an important driver for hospitality services and global brand 
strategies (Santos et al., 2016). IHCL unlike other Tata Group companies uses the 
exclusive ‘Taj’ logo for its hotels and resorts to create its unique brand identity. 
 
Figure 18: Taj Group of Hotel Logo 
 
 
From the above it can be inferred that for IHCL, brand building is an important strategy 
as it expands overseas, however, the strategy is aimed more to cater to the Indian 
traveller traveling overseas and to increase the percentage of foreign travellers to its 
Indian hotels.  
 
Given that the company already had a strong presence in the home market, its main 
focus towards building an international brand image to target international travellers 
bound for India, thus providing competition to the global hotel chains that entered India 
post the market liberalisation phase of 1991-92, is consistent with extant theory of 
establishing in foreign markets to be competitive in the home market (Fitzgerald, 2015). 
However, as Mathews (2002) and Goldstein (2007) have pointed out, emerging market 
companies are not required to have ownership advantages as they can obtain the same 
through acquisitions or strategic partnerships to gain a competitive advantage in host 
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and home country. This cannot be said to hold true for IHCL. The company did not 
acquire a brand image. It had a brand name which the company deliberately chose to 
build in the international market based on the service standard that it had acquired in 
its home country to attract international travellers to its properties mainly in the home 
market.  
 
7.6 Host Country Environment 
IHCL operates in 10 international locations today with 16 properties (Appendix 8). 
Compared to some of the international hotel chains like the Marriott, which is 
headquartered in USA and has more than 5000 properties (managed and owned) in more 
than 100 countries, outside its home country (Marriott Corporate website, 2016) or the 
Hilton, another USA headquartered hotel chain which has more than 4500 properties 
(owned and managed) in more than 100 countries outside the USA (Hilton Corporate 
Website, 2016), the Taj Group of Hotels international presence is miniscule. 
 
However, irrespective of the size of its international presence, IHCL needs to manage 
different host environments both in the developed markets (like USA and UK) and the 
emerging markets (like the Middle East, Asia and Africa).  
 
In hospitality services, it has been suggested that hotel chains could follow a 
‘glocalisation’ strategy; that is to have standardised global facilities merged with the 
localisation of the host market through architecture and interior designs (Yu et al., 2014; 
Holjevac, 2003). Such a combination will enhance hospitality firm’s competitive 
advantage. Evidence of such ‘glocalisation’ practice was found in a study conducted by 
Whitla et al. (2007) of British hotel chains with significant overseas presence. This was 
also echoed in what one of the interviewees stated on the way Taj runs its hotels in 
various locations: 
‘We have a well-defined brand architecture, with each brand having its 
brand standards across product and service. We strive to ensure that these 
standards are met for each of our brands, be it in Mumbai, Maldives, 
London or New York. That being said, there is always a sense of place that 
we bring into each hotel. A Taj hotel in New York will not be the same as 
one in Dubai, or London – there is a sense of place’ (Interviewee 3)  
 
Yu et al. (2014) confirm this, that having hotels in different locations, which are different 
from the home market and away from the head office, will have different strategies 
which will depend on the host market cultural, economic and social environments. 
Hospitality companies have to be very careful regarding cultural and social norms. For 
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example, consuming cow meat in India is considered illegal due to religious sentiments. 
Similarly pig meat cannot be consumed in Islamic tradition. None of the fast food chains 
in India, like McDonalds, Kentucky Fried Chicken or Pizza Hut serve any beef products 
in their outlets. Hence, hotel chains and restaurants have to be very observant and 
sensitive to local sentiment. Thus, most hotels are run as independent entities with day-
to-day functioning at the individual hotel unit level (Whitla, et al., 2007).  
 
The main resources in hotels are the employees providing services to the clientele. Taj 
hotels are present in a variety of countries with very different socio-cultural backgrounds. 
An imperative question then arises about integrating the human resources in to the 
culture of the parent company or for the top management to run a hotel successfully 
embracing the cultural requirements of the host nation. Discussing these aspects, the 
interviewees said: 
‘Each hotel has its own clientele; they have their own quirks and 
requirements. When you take over a hotel, you have the leverage of the 
guest history, their preferences. You want to run the hotel successfully, 
then you have to retain the talent so that the hotel runs smoothly. They 
know the guest history and guest preferences. Top of the line can be 
retained or you can bring someone depending upon the situation but the 
end result should be that the property is up and running. The approach can 
be different in different countries’ (Interviewee 1) 
 
‘The integration of new associates into the Taj or Tata culture is a process. 
Our people are the best advocates of our culture within the company and 
across hotels. So, when we acquire a hotel, or the management contract of 
a hotel, we strike a right balance between experienced Taj hands from 
other hotels and newer associates of the hotel. The experienced Taj hands 
facilitate the process of the Taj and Tata Culture permeating through the 
hotel. I do not think it’s different for a Management Contract or for an 
acquisition’ (Interviewee 2)  
 
It is clear from what the interviewees state that there is a balance between retaining 
local talent and having managers from the home country. Literature on hospitality 
management shows that there is a positive relationship between human resources of 
hotel firms and the performance and customer satisfaction (Tracey, 2014).  
 
Another aspect is on training of employees specifically for adjusting to a new 
environment (Bauer et al., 2007; Wang et al., 2011). Here it would be new management 
which IHCL has acquired or entered with into a new management contract in a new host 
country. Talking about training of personnel in IHCL, Interviewee 3 explained: 
‘Another facilitator is the Tata Business Excellence Model (TBEM), which we 
implement in all our businesses’ 
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The TBEM model of the Tata Group is a system that assesses performance of all Tata 
Group companies and drives business improvements (Tata website on TBEM, 2016). It 
is enabled to enhance value for all the stakeholders, be it the shareholders, customers, 
suppliers or promoters. It is considered to be a very robust process and is implemented 
across all Tata Group companies across the globe. As Interviewee 3 further elucidates: 
‘I think TBEM is a great tool to ensure that not only the Taj culture but that 
the Tata culture spreads across geographies’ 
 
Training and development are important factors for successful integration of home 
country practices with host country requirements (Weber, 2015). This helps in creating 
new practices and improves on existing practices.  
 
Specifically asking the question about learnings from a particular geography and 
implementing such learning back to the home country or other host countries, 
Interviewees 2 and 3 said: 
‘The productivity of the manpower in the developed markets is always 
something to learn from. Multi-skilling is one aspect which is rare in this 
part of the world [as in India]’ (Interviewee 2) 
 
‘Global cuisine is another thing that we have established in our hotels which 
has been a learning from other geographies’ (Interviewee 3) 
 
Host country experiences differ and companies adapt to different markets in various 
ways. The learning is two-way with existing capabilities transferred to host markets and 
capabilities acquired transferred back to home market. This is indicative of learning by 
managers which differs from country to country (Aharoni et al., 2011). 
 
Companies are not always successful in all markets. From a resource-based perspective, 
a firm may not always be an advantageous position on the basis of capabilities and 
resources transferred to another host market (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2007). IHCL 
experienced this in Australia where it divested the property that had been acquired in 
Sydney and also a few properties in the USA. Explaining about the divestment and 
change in strategy, the interviewees stated: 
‘We have divested the Lexington in NY and the Blue in Sydney and in the 
late 90s we divested 2-3 hotels in Washington too. They were not fitting 
into the overall strategy of the chain any more. They were not adding 
value.’ 
 
‘For the business to be successful, it is important for there to be some scale 
and a certain critical mass. With just one hotel in Australia, we did not have 
any significant brand presence in the marketplace. Therefore, it was felt 
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that it would be better to exit that market and focus on a smaller 
geographical area.’ 
 
There remains a difference between the host countries and the home country. 
Companies need to be prepared to handle different host markets because it is not always 
easy to replicate home market capabilities and advantages in other international markets 
(Contractor, 2013). Clarifying on the difference of international markets from the home 
country market, Interviewee 2 stated: 
‘Each market has its own intricacies. We talked about being culturally close 
however; it is not possible to transfer the same model to another location. 
You cannot do a complete replication of model. In Bhutan, we didn’t make 
many modifications; there was no requirement of drastic changes. In Africa, 
each country is different, each market is different, and so you need to have 
differences from country to country. So depending on the country/the 
market, you augment your services. Basic service levels are same but you 
add according to the need of the location where you are present’ 
 
Hence, companies should be aware on the requirements of handling separate 
geographies, customer preferences, customs and local values for sustained competitive 
advantage or to attain the strategy employed. In the case of IHCL, it is clear that their 
limited presence in overseas markets has been to create a brand name easily 
recognisable. This has been done with the main aim to increase foreign travellers to its 
Indian hotels and also to cater to the Indian traveller overseas. Further, training and 
development plays an important role for the company to manage its properties (either 
owned or managed) in the overseas markets. 
 
7.7 Internationalisation Strategy and the Financial Crisis 
Global crises affect the hospitality sector negatively as tourist travel decreases and future 
investments are put on hold (Okumus & Karamustafa, 2005). Hotels across segments 
(luxury, business, budget) experienced drops in occupancy and drop in average room 
rates post the financial crisis of 2008 which led to an overall decline of revenues for hotel 
chains (Kimes & Anderson, 2011). However, Barsky (2009) in his study stated that while 
overall revenues for the hotel chains may have dropped, luxury hotels were able to 
maintain higher rates than business hotels. The reason behind the same is that during 
crises, global corporates cut down on business travel as a first measure towards cost 
management. In another study (on US hotel chains) it was revealed that while the effects 
of the financial crisis were not as immediate as the effects of a terrorist attack such as 
that of 11th September 2001 on the hospitality sector. The effects of the former were 
longer lasting than the latter (Enz et al., 2011). 
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However, in a recent study (Santos et al., 2016), the authors concluded that global 
tourism had not been affected to the extent expected post the financial crisis of 2008. 
While there have been financial periods with negative growth rates, overall tourism has 
seen growth. There have been increased foreign direct investments made by 
international hotel chains post the crisis period. 
 
IHCL, which did experience negative profits post the financial crisis and continues to do 
so (Appendix 11), had made an unsolicited bid for the Orient-Express hotels (OEH) in 
2012. IHCL owned 7% shares in OEH and made a voluntary offer for the remaining 93% 
for an amount of USD 1.2 billion (Terlep, 2012).  
 
Discussing the matter of the unsolicited bid, given the negative results of IHCL, 
Interviewee 1 commented on the financing: 
‘I am not sure about the financing but for any bid, there would have been 
a pool of funds allocated. It is about the timing and priority. You have 
constraints but also there is an opportunity – so it is pool of funds versus 
the constraints and an available opportunity. Then there is opportunity 
versus trade-off – if the deal fits into the long-term strategy of the firm – 
then you take the plunge’ 
 
Hence, it was a trade-off between the long-term strategy of the company and how it 
geared to meet the same despite the financial crunch. Explaining about the long-term 
strategy that IHCL had and how the bid for OEH fit into that plan, Interviewees 2 and 3 
elucidated:  
‘As I mentioned earlier, not having been involved with the transaction, my 
guess is that the Orient Express would have provided Taj a presence in 
some key geographies with some high-quality assets’ (Interviewee 2) 
 
‘The portfolio included some iconic assets in locations that Taj was not in’ 
(Interviewee 3) 
 
Irrespective of the negative effects of the crisis, the company wanted to increase its 
global presence. This is augmented by media reports on IHCL’s unsolicited bid for OEH 
stating that the company wanted to increase its global presence, however the bid was 
finally rejected and IHCL withdrew the offer in 2013 (France-Presse, 2013). This was the 
second such bid (the first one being in 2007) which also OEH had rejected. Since, then 
IHCL has sold of majority of its stake in OEH (now known as Belmond Ltd.). A total of 




From the above it can be inferred, irrespective of the negative effects of the financial 
crisis, the company was willing to invest towards achieving its strategic goal of increasing 
its international presence and hence towards increased internationalisation.  
 
7.8 Discussion 
IHCL is a leading hotel chain in India. While it does also have business and budget hotels 
in its portfolio, its brand name is associated within the luxury class of hotels. The 
company was the first Indian hotel chain and was established by the scion of the Tata 
Group. The hotel company was established to cater to the Indians within India. It is well 
recognised in India from its iconic first property built in the financial capital of Mumbai 
to now over 100 properties within the country. It has been nominated several times for 
the best Asian Hotel group (World Travel Awards, 2016). World leading travel magazine, 
Travel + Leisure, has given top honours to the Taj Group within Southeast Asia for its 
services, quality and commitment towards its customers in 2014 (Voyager World, 2015).  
 
The company’s first international hotel came up in Africa when it followed another Tata 
Group company to cater to its business travellers. The main aim of the company has 
been to follow the Indian traveller overseas. Outbound Travel from India has soared 
since the mid-1990s post the market liberalisation of India and the relaxation of the 
foreign exchange market (Appendix 12). India is only second to China vis-à-vis the 
number of overseas travellers and the United Nations World Tourism Organisation 
(UNWTO) has stated that, by 2020, India’s outbound market will be almost 50 million 
travellers (BITB, 2016). The other aim of IHCL towards internationalisation was to create 
the ‘Taj’ brand awareness overseas. This was done to increase the number of 
international business and luxury travellers to their various hotels in India to compete 
with the international hotel chains that have entered the country post the market 
liberalisation of the early 1990s. Inbound travel to India has also been increasing 
(Appendix 13). The largest source markets are USA and UK (India Tourism Statistics, 
2016). IHCL has strategically built its presence in these two markets to attract tourists 
from these countries to its properties in India by strategically building its brand which 
has not been acquired but is inherent to the company built out of its own ownership 
advantages in the hospitality service industry.  
 
IHCL is also present in other countries which are holiday destinations like Malaysia, 
Maldives and Sri Lanka. Tata Group headquarters for Africa was moved to South Africa 
from Zambia after apartheid was lifted; after which IHCL entered into a joint venture 
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with a local developer to acquire two heritage buildings in Cape Town to open a luxurious 
tourist hotel (Taj, SA, 2016). The company is looking to expand into countries like China, 
Japan and the Middle East, which are all high tourist and business destinations 
(Shrivastava, 2016). 
 
The company has sought management control over acquisitions and Greenfield 
developments in overseas markets with the intention of reducing assets on its books, as 
hotels incur large fixed costs. However, the company has always sought to acquire if the 
acquisition fits into its strategic plans which is increasing its global presence; this is 
evident from the action the company made towards the unsolicited bid to acquire OEH. 
 
Analysts have pointed out that the company has a very high debt to equity ratio and 
that the company balance sheet would have been highly leveraged if it had been 
successful in its bid to acquire OEH (Baggonkar, 2014). IHCL has since then divested 
most of its stake that it held in OEH to reduce its debts (Shrivastava, 2016).  
 
The company possesses inherent knowledge of the hotel business and prides itself in 
the luxury segment and has used its unique knowledge-based capabilities and resources 
towards its internationalisation strategies. The company has also assimilated capabilities 
that it did not possess from its experience in overseas markets and has then combined 
the same with its existing capabilities to enhance its customers’ experiences of hospitality 
services.   
 
The company has established that host markets are different and have accordingly 
approached each market differently with different degrees of success. It has had to 
divest in markets like Australia and from a few properties in USA as it has not been able 
to replicate favourable business outcome that it has experienced in other markets. The 
company has sought to develop and train its employees in the overseas market towards 
a consistent culture of services in all its locations. The company has sought to be 
culturally aware of the various overseas markets in which it is present to gain some 
competitive market share against larger companies like the Marriott and the Hilton; its 
presence is almost negligible internationally. The company has not sought to grow 
internationally through the franchise route, unlike many of the US hospitality and food 
chains which have largely depended on franchising for their internationalisation by 
sharing financing with local partners while preserving their business model and brand 
names (Fitzgerald, 2015).  
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7.9 Chapter Conclusion 
This exploratory case study using a framework of dynamic capabilities and the resource-
based approach examines the internationalisation strategies of the oldest hotel chain in 
India. The entrepreneurial capability of the parent group company enabled the building 
of the first hotel for this company in a country which was under colonial rule and where 
the existing hotels catered solely to the colonial rulers and their partners. The company 
gradually built its knowledge-based resources which are imperative in the hospitality 
services to create a name in luxury hotel services within India and then through 
acquisitions, management contracts and the Greenfield route entered overseas markets. 
Its main strategic intent of internationalisation has been to build a global brand image. 
The company has presence in both developed and emerging markets. The company’s 
main resources being human resources, it has invested heavily in training and 
development and augmenting the acquired local talent towards a uniform brand image 
synonymous with luxury services. This is indicative of managerial capability towards 
assimilation and absorption. The company has expanded its services through its 
learnings and transformed or added to existing resources in line with the requirement of 
the host country which links to the dynamic capabilities theory. The group has been 
featured as one of the top ten luxury hotel chains in the world by Forbes (Olmsted, 
2015). The company’s future plans have a growth strategy both in domestic and 
international markets with a focus on management contracts and to ensure an efficient 
debt and equity mix along with technology and digital upgradation for improved 




8. East India Hotels Limited (The Oberoi Group of Hotels) 
 
8.1 Introduction 
East India Hotels Limited (EIHL) falls into the category of hospitality services. The 
company’s hotels are known as the Oberoi group of hotels. The company owns hotel, 
resorts and cruise ships in India and overseas. The company is more than 80 years old 
and was established in undivided India26. This chapter traces the company’s 
internationalisation strategies from the perspective of dynamic capabilities and the 
resource-based theory from within the strategic management field. 
 
The first commercial hotel in Asia was built in India (Pal, 2015) during British colonial 
rule. These hotels were built specifically to cater to the officials of the British army and 
other travellers from Europe. 
 
Among business activities, India is more famous for IT services and business processing 
outsourcing services (Dossani & Kenney, 2007). Known as the back office of the world, 
India has seen jobs moving from richer developed countries to its shores, these jobs 
typically do not require face-to-face interphase with the clients. Philippines, an English 
speaking Asian country, along with India have been the forefront of receiving 
outsourcing work from the 1990s (Peck, 2017). Whereas, the hospitality services of 
India, with roots since the late 1800s, does not have the global recognition that IT 
services do. 
 
The Oberoi group was founded in 1934 and was incorporated as EIHL in 1949 (Company 
Website, 2016). The Oberoi group has a presence in both luxury tourist and high end 
business traveller hotels and is placed at the high luxurious end of the hospitality chain 
within India. The company also has ancillary businesses like a tours and travel services, 
printing press, project management, flight catering business and corporate air charters. 
 
EIHL has 22 hotels and a motor vessel in India and 5 hotels and 2 cruise liners in 
overseas markets. Compared to the other company among my data set which is also in 
the hospitality services, Oberoi’s presence is quite small. Hence, compared to even larger 
international hotel chains (like the Marriott and the Hilton); the Oberoi’s group presence 
                                                          
26 India was a British Colony and gained independence on 15th August 1947. At the time of independence, 




is negligible. Hence, this chapter will focus on EIHL’s strategy towards its limited 
internationalisation. 
 
EIHL internationalised by opening its first property in neighbouring Nepal (the Soaltee 
Oberoi) and in Singapore (Imperial Hotel) in 1969. It then started exporting technical 
and hotel management services to Zanzibar, Tanzania in Africa in 1974. The company’s 
earlier presence overseas was through export of management expertise to countries like 
Australia, Egypt and Singapore where the group took over management contracts of 
luxurious hotels. There was restriction on movement of foreign exchange capital  during 
this period and by exporting technical services and management services, the company 
was instrumental in earning foreign exchange for the country. 
 
The hospitality services are disadvantaged compared to manufacturing and IT services 
companies as they have high fixed costs and do not get the benefit from economies of 
scale. Hotel services are very personalised, especially in the luxury and business 
categories, hence, hotel companies do not internationalise to gain superior technology 
or economic rents. So, another aspect that this chapter will analyse is the motive behind 
the internationalisation strategy of the company. EIHL was well established within India, 
so did the company hope to transfer its home-grown capabilities to the overseas market? 
What were the capabilities and resources that the company possessed? Once in overseas 
markets, did the company require additional capabilities and resources to operate 
successfully in foreign host markets? 
 
Firms possess capabilities and resources which are transferred overseas as they 
internationalise. However, host markets are different from home markets and the 
advantages of home markets may not be replicable in other host counties and 
advantages from these resources and capabilities may be lost due to various reasons 
not anticipated (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2007). Hence, this chapter will also explore the 
various locational challenges of international markets that the company may have faced 
and how it overcame such challenges and if it managed to gain any competitive 
advantage in such markets. 
 
Another factor that concerns hospitality services is that it is negatively affected by any 
kind of crisis (Wang & Ritchie, 2010), be it economic, political or financial. Travel and 
tours were severely affected during the September 2001 terrorist attacks in USA, the 
bird flu virus and, more recently, the global financial crisis (Alegre & Sard, 2015). The 
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cause of the financial crisis on the internationalisation strategy of the company will be 
the final aspect that this chapter will explore. 
 
8.2 Company Background 
EIHL is a public limited company and the owner promoters are its primary shareholders. 
The Oberoi group was founded in 1934 by R.B. Mohan Singh Oberoi (1898-2002). EIHL 
was incorporated in 1949 and was listed on an Indian Stock Exchange in 1956. The hotels 
business of the group is known as the Oberoi Hotels and Resorts. 
 
M.S. Oberoi worked as a manager in a hotel in Shimla (a city in the hills of the northern 
region of India) and acquired the property from the owner, who was also his mentor, in 
1934. The company’s website (2016) states, that the money to acquire the Shimla 
property was raised from selling family jewellery and mortgaging all the assets owned 
by M.S. Oberoi and his wife. This was followed by taking over the management of a hotel 
in Kolkata in 1938 (in the eastern part of the country and the capital of the British colonial 
rulers) which was built by an American, Arathoon Stephen, and finally acquiring it in 1943 
(Pal, 2015). 
 
This was followed by acquiring Associated Hotels of India (AHI) in 1943, which had 
properties in Shimla, Delhi (capital of India) and 4 other cities in the north-western part 
of the country (which are now part of Pakistan). With this acquisition, M.S. Oberoi was 
the first Indian to have a hotel chain in undivided India. 
 
Until this point, M.S. Oberoi had only acquired hotels but in 1965 the Oberoi 
Intercontinental was opened in Delhi, a hotel built by the company but franchised to 
InterContinental Group of Hotels headquartered in Great Britain. This hotel was 
considered the first modern luxury hotel in the country (Pal, 2015). The modernity of the 
hotel lay in the departmentalisation of its operations and services. 
 
The company did make some acquisitions overseas but they have since been divested 
and currently all the properties overseas have been built by the company on an individual 
basis or in partnership/joint-venture basis. This has been further analysed in the 




Today, the company has a total of 29 properties, 2 cruisers and 1 backwater motor in 6 
countries with plans for more (Appendix 14). The consolidated revenues of EIHL for 
financial year 2016 were USD27 274.82 million (Company Balance Sheet, 2016). 
 
To interpret the motivation behind the controlled internationalisation of EIHL, I met a 
senior member of the company in February 2015. I also met another senior employee 
who has been associated with the group for over 40 years, however, this interviewee 
was not comfortable providing a consent form or allowing the interview to be recorded. 
I was able to take notes and was provided with verbal consent to use the notes of the 
conversation for this chapter. I was also able to contact over email three ex-management 
trainees (from the batch of 1992-93) who went to work at Oberoi properties in 
international locations (Sri Lanka, Egypt and Indonesia). The information sought was at 
operational level about the working of the company at these locations. 
 
Other senior employees associated with strategic direction of the company were not 
available due to logistical reasons. Hence, the analysis in this chapter may suffer from 
single-informant bias (Ernst & Teichert, 1998). However, given the seniority of the 
interviewee who has been associated with the company for more than a decade, then 
interviewee was able to provide an in-depth, overall view of the company’s 
internationalisation process from a strategic perspective. In addition, company 
documents such as balance-sheet, investor and analyst presentations, corporate, bank 
and media reports which are available in the public domain have been used for 
triangulation purposes, for validity and reliability. 
 
The whole interview was recorded. The words indented in quotation marks are direct 
quotes from the interview. 
 
8.3 Resources and Capabilities 
The resource-based view gives rise to the dynamic capabilities approach, which is a 
firm’s capabilities required for long-term subsistence (Winter, 2003); and the knowledge-
based view explains a company’s competitive advantage in relation to its competitors 
(Nieves & Haller, 2014; Dunning & Lundan, 2008). The knowledge-based view indicates 
that a firm may possess unique resources through which it can differentiate itself and 
thus create competitive advantage (Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Rumelt, 1984). External 
                                                          
27 USD INR rate as per Reuters on 2nd November 2016 (Appendix 15)  
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environments are dynamic in nature and for firms to survive in such environments, they 
are required to manipulate and modify their existing resources base; this is known as 
dynamic capabilities (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Rindova & Kotha, 2001). Resources 
thus adapted can help firms maintain their competitive advantage (Helfat & Winter, 
2011; Ambrosini & Bowman, 2009). 
 
Knowledge is vital for the successful performance of any organisation within any industry 
(Shaw & Williams, 2009). In the hotel industry too, the level of employee’s knowledge, 
skills and abilities along with a multi-level knowledge of the working of the industry itself 
helps create a competitive advantage; this knowledge is what develops different types 
of dynamic capabilities (Nieves & Haller, 2014). Specifically, in hotel companies, 
investing in knowledgeable front line managers creates distinctive competitive 
advantage (Canina et al., 2006). 
 
To analyse the resources and capabilities that the company possessed, the history of 
the company is retraced in this section. EIHL was the first Indian hotel chain that was 
established in the country. It was formed mainly through acquisitions of hotels that had 
been built by the British and the Americans during the colonial rule, especially for the 
British royalty, British army, British and European business travellers and tourists. One 
of the initial hotels that the company had acquired, in the city of Calcutta, (now Kolkata 
and also known as the City of Joy), was very popular during WWII for its high class 
services (Pal, 2015). 
 
The company entered into agreements with international hotel chains to build India’s 
first modern luxurious hotels, in Delhi (with InterContinental Group of Hotels) and in 
Mumbai (with the Sheraton group of Hotels). These associations helped to bring 
international travellers to India and were considered to be M.S Oberoi’s international 
outlook for the Indian tourism sector. The company later collaborated with the Hilton 
Hotels for international marketing for the sole purpose of attracting foreign travellers. 
The company’s ‘Trident’ brands of hotels were rebranded to ‘Trident Hiltons’. 
 
The company was the first to start a school for providing hotel management training. 
Known as the Oberoi Centre of Learning and Development (originally The Oberoi School 




The company, again due to the vision of M.S. Oberoi, entered into travel related services 
like a travel agency (Mercury Travels) and a flight catering business (The Oberoi Flight 
Services). The latter was to cater to international flight chains. 
 
EIHL entered into the restoration of heritage palaces and monuments and this was also 
when the company internationalised through the restoration of two heritage properties 
in Egypt and Australia and by exporting management expertise to run these hotels. 
According to the company website, EIHL faced stiff resistance by the local government 
in Melbourne when it was awarded the contract in Australia for the restoration work of 
the heritage property there. Both management contracts have since ceased. 
 
From the above it can be inferred that the company has been very strong in service and 
in business relationships. Confirming this fact, the interviewee stated: 
‘Oberio’s [the interviewee refers to the company as Oberoi] strength is in 
service. Oberoi is not a very food-focused hotel, but very, very service 
oriented. Wherever we are there now, some of the hotels… where we have 
association, has happened because of relationship or… obviously, 
ultimately, it has to be relationship’ 
 
It is said that the company’s investment in Egypt was due to the relationship that M.S. 
Oberoi had with the earlier Presidents of Egypt (Gamal, Abdel Naseer and Anwar Sadat) 
(Appendix 16) (The most famous hotels in the world, 2009). 
 
The thought process which M.S. Oberoi displayed towards creating a hotel chain, 
interacting with global hotel chains for building luxury hotels in India, exporting 
hospitality management, using relationships to forge new deals overseas, creating 
ancillary businesses so as to create a global brand and to attract foreign travellers to 
India, is credibly indicative of dynamic capabilities in the form of entrepreneurial activity 
and managerial capability. Dynamic capabilities comprise of entrepreneurial action 
alongside organisational strategy (Helfat et al., 2007). As Teece (2014) points out, 
entrepreneurial management activity involves creating markets for new ideas and also 
strengthens capabilities of support functions for transactional ease. Teece further adds 
that entrepreneurial management activity also entails the creation of new knowledge 
and new opportunities to increase commercialised transactions. Entrepreneurs are a 
firm’s resources and new ideas along with their existing combined knowledge form 
distinctive services that are rendered (Penrose, 1959). Teece (2014) eludes to Penrose’s 
idea concerning the description of dynamic capabilities. 
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A firm’s resources consist of all its tangible and intangible assets (Barney, 1991). 
Resources and capabilities are expected to have VRIN properties (having value, being 
rare, cannot be imitated and are non-substitutable) for firms to build and sustain a 
competitive advantage (Wernerfelt, 1984; Peteraf, 1993). For manufacturing firms, 
tangible factors affect the performance of the firm rather than intangible factors (Buckley 
et al., 2014). However, within hotel companies, tangible goods are easily replicated and 
the competitive advantage hence lies in differentiation through the quality of service 
which is the intangibles (Bharwani, 2013). Hotels are about services and they can, 
through their employees as the main source of resources for innovations and 
organisational knowledge, create a distinct service culture (Lusch et al., 2007). 
 
The Oberoi group follows a broad-based differentiation strategy (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 
2009). The company targets the affluent traveller, both domestically and internationally 
and provides a high degree of personalised services with high luxury and comfort 
standards (Dev & Glanzverg, 1990). The company believes that their employees are the 
source of their strategic advantage and through them the company can create 
competitive advantage (Bharwani, 2013). ‘In view of their guest profile, the luxury 
resorts require a committed, talented and multi-skilled workforce with good background 
and education for translating the organisational vision, of surpassing customer 
expectations through anticipation of their needs, attention to detail, excellence, warmth 
and concern, into reality’ (p 318). 
 
Hence, the company has its own training school, which is in itself an important resource 
that the company possesses and was visualised by M.S. Oberoi himself. Having had the 
personal experience of being a management trainee with the Oberoi School of Hotel 
Management in the early 1990s, I can confirm that the company’s vision for the school 
was to provide unified training to its management at all levels and across all hotel 
services (like front staff, room service and kitchen chefs). Management trainees came 
from the countries where the company had a presence. This confirms with literature that 
training and development are important factors required for successful integration of 
home country practices with host country requirements (Weber, 2015). This helps in 
creating new practices and improves on existing practices. 
 
The company’s main capability is focused on services as the interviewee enunciated: 
‘Oberoi’s capability meaning, the focus is always the service’ 
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Other than the training school which is targeted at undergraduates working towards 
postgraduate degrees, the company also has a 3-year long ‘Systematic Training and 
Education programme’ (STEP) which is for high school graduates and provides successful 
students with a bachelor’s degree in Tourism studies. The students at both levels are 
absorbed by the company. The industry has termed it a milestone in hospitality training 
and education (HospitalityNet, 2013). 
 
Specific idiosyncratic knowledge is key for hotels in obtaining a competitive advantage 
(Chen & Dimou, 2005). Successful hotels have managers who keep track of customer 
needs and provide services as per change which is dynamic in nature (Yu et al., 2014). 
The interviewee elucidating to the promoter owners keen sense of vision for the 
company said: 
‘I mean, he [P.R.S Oberoi, the son of the founder] used to travel, stay in 
overseas hotels, that’s how his learning developed. And he really 
understands what’s the industry [hotel services]. I think that is the reason, 
there also his foresight… because had I been there, as it is, you know, this 
is your age and you should work and come, sit, work in the office. But he 
didn’t do that. He understood that this learning is important’ 
 
PRS Oberoi spends a lot of time in his own hotels and visits other hotels during vacation 
in order to learn new ideas that he can implement in his own hotels, such as the large 
bathrooms of the Regent in Hong Kong or the walk-in closets of the Carlyle hotel in New 
York (ET Bureau, 2012). Though, he does not embrace everything, such as very hi-tech 
technology which may not be user friendly. This was due to an experience he faced in 
one of his stays in another hotel where it took him half an hour to locate the bedroom 
light switch (ET Bureau, 2012). 
 
Entrepreneurial learning for the creation of specific knowledge towards providing 
superior services is consistent with the dynamic capabilities approach in the hotel 
services (Nieves & Haller, 2014). Companies evolve and learn due to the dynamic nature 
of the environment and these translate into dynamic capabilities (Ambrosini et. al., 
2009). 
 
However, the introduction of new products alone cannot ensure differentiation; the 
product should have properties that can create valuable experience for the guest (Verma 
et. al., 2008). Hence, hotel companies need to continually innovate through intuitive 
understanding of customer needs so as to enhance customer experience (Bharwani, 
2013). Towards this, the Oberoi provides various innovative experiences in its different 
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locations according to local surroundings and this can be personalised to different guest 
needs and choices. 
 
The company faces competition from other hotel chains, both domestic and 
international, and while the Oberoi has more properties than the international chains, 
the latter have leverage in a multiple brand image (Ghosh & Puliyenthuruthel, 2015). 
However, the company’s very strong brand differentiator in the luxurious category which 
helps it to maintain a top two position in most of the cities in which it is present (Thadani, 
2016). 
 
8.4 Mode of Internationalisation 
The resource-based approach can explain the entry mode choice of firms and the 
strategy behind various modes of entry that a company’s resources can sustain, thus 
the resource-based approach of internationalisation is at the centre of strategic 
management which defines success of the firm due to complementarity between the 
firm’s resources and opportunities in the external host market (Ekeledo & Sivakumar, 
2004). 
 
The resource-based approach also states that host country-specific knowledge is 
essential to attaining competitive advantage (Quer et al. 2007). Hence, the entry mode 
in a new country depends upon the cultural proximity, that is cultural distance, and the 
higher the distance, the more entry mode will lean towards joint ventures and 
partnerships (Pak & Park, 2004; Madhok, 1997). Cultural distance is the difference in 
work and business behaviours between two countries (Hofstede, 1980). 
 
If a company has the tacit knowledge of hospitality services, then there is a preference 
to enter a new market through management contracts rather than through capital 
investments, which is the foreign direct investment route (Brown et. al., 2003). 
 
The need to be asset-light and operate hotels on a fees basis has become significant 
among hotel companies (Sohn et al. 2013). Entering into a new market overseas is a 
challenge for hotel companies (Yu et. al., 2014). As Buckley et al. (2014) capsulate that 
success of internationalisation depends upon both entry mode and location choice. 
 
Hotels companies prefer the management contract. A management contract is where 
the owner of the hotel property pays a fee to an operator to run hotel operations and 
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services (Sohn et. al., 2013). EIHL entered Egypt and Australia through management 
contracts of the Mena House in 1971 and The Windsor in 1980 respectively. The 
company went on to acquire the property in Australia in 1990 but then later sold it off 
in 2005. It also exited from the Mena House management contract. 
 
The other way in which hotels can enter a foreign market is through a Greenfield project, 
which is building a hotel on land acquired or leased in an overseas location.  
 
Talking about the preferred entry mode of the company, the interviewee said: 
‘Oberoi never is in favour of acquisition. Because… Oberois’ don’t like any 
construction which is done by others. So, we always like to ensure that the 
construction, finish, everything is towards, it is to our satisfaction; and 
secondly there is construction and designing of a hotel is also very 
important from the point of view of servicing. So, we always either construct 
a hotel ourselves, or we associate ourselves from the construction stage in 
terms of designing, supervising, everything’ 
 
As stated earlier, the company was the first Indian hotel company to export hotel 
management services. It had a large presence overseas through management contracts. 
However, these have mostly ceased. The interviewee did mention that the company was 
present in many countries in Africa and Asia but the company slowly exited most of 
them. The company is making either direct investments to increase its global presence 
or is involved in the designing of the properties being built for which it has already won 
management contracts for the future running of operations and services. For example, 
in Morocco the company is making investments (The Oberoi Marrakech, 2016). 
 
However, the company is not totally overlooking the acquisition mode as the current 
Managing Director (MD) and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Vikram Oberoi stated in an 
interview, adding that properties which may fit the image of the company are not easily 
available and hence they prefer to look at assets which are in the early stages of 
construction so that they can get involved from the start to have an asset in line with 
the brand image of EIHL (Sathyanarayanan, 2016). Interior design and hotel architecture 
differentiates the hotel brands; hence hotel owners involve brand owners during the 
initial design of the properties (Hanioglu & Arditi, 2013). The company (brand owner) 
may or may not inject capital investments into such properties but the management 




While the company predominantly owns most of its hotels either by way of individual 
ownership or through joint ventures, for rapid expansion, the company is mainly looking 
at management contracts and prefers to be asset light (Sathyanarayan, 2016). 
 
This affirms a study by Brown et al. (2003) on hotel entry modes in foreign markets 
which suggest that entry mode depends on the capacity of the host market to absorb 
the entrant’s competitive advantage. EIHL is mainly looking at joint ventures with limited 
investment or management contracts in the new markets that it is seeking. This implies 
what the study by Brown et al. states, that the presence of trustworthy joint-venture 
partners in the host market enables new entrants to have a lower ownership preference. 
Hospitality companies have lower equity preferences for new ventures (Contractor & 
Kundu, 1998). Hotel chains can benefit from global suppliers, logistics and brand 
recognition and can easily be run via management contracts (Erramilli et al., 2002). 
 
8.5 Brand 
In the earlier section (Section 8.4), in a quote by the current MD and CEO of EIHL it was 
stated that during internationalisation, acquisitions of overseas properties can be sought 
only if the target property fits the established brand image of the company. Brand equity 
is of key importance in hospitality services (Kim & Kim, 2005). Customer brand equity is 
defined by brand loyalty, brand image and perceived quality of services and such 
customer brand equity is positively co-related to the performance of luxury hotels. A 
known premier brand can attract a larger market share through brand awareness and 
thus customer loyalty; hotels with premier brand image can charge premium prices too 
translating into higher revenues (Sangster et al., 2001; O’Neil & Mattila, 2004). 
 
The Oberoi group, which are known for their opulent interiors and a world-class cuisine, 
are one of the most expensive hotels and can charge high prices due to the premium 
product on offer (Ahlostrom & Bruton, 2009). 
 
Hotels have unique services synonymous with the hotel brand which determines 
customer loyalty and thus hotel performance (Xiong & King, 2014). This is due to the 
intangible and heterogeneous nature of hotel services, the quality of which can be 
inferred only after experiencing the same (Xie & Heung, 2012). Hotel customers pay for 




For EIHL, branding is particularly important in the targeting of foreign customers as the 
EIHL brand stands for the highest service standards and there is a perceived difference 
between local and foreign tourists with respect to payment. As the interviewee 
elucidates: 
‘What you are paying is for the presentation, service, everything. Now, if 
you are targeting an Indian, he will never be ready to pay any… you know, 
an exorbitant price for this component of that cost which probably a 
foreigner will pay. So, that could be one of the reasons why he targeted… 
always targeted and created everything for them. Now, with that in mind, 
you… our outside hotels are all tourist locations’ 
 
The joint MD, Arjun Oberoi also emphasised this fact and the preferred location of the 
‘Oberoi brand’ which are the source markets (Sathyanaraynan, 2016). While the 
company is not present in markets like USA, UK or Europe, the need to be in such source 
markets is recognised by the company. 
 
The tie-up with Hilton that the company had forged in 2003 was executed especially for 
marketing the brand to overseas customers. As the interviewee stated: 
‘Oberoi group, for that matter thought that unless we have a tie-up with somebody 
who is known there [overseas in source markets]; they [foreign tourists] will not 
come and stay with us. Hilton [tie-up] happened from that thought process’ 
 
The tie-up with Hilton lasted for five years until 2008. The reason for dispersing with the 
tie-up was explained by the interviewee: 
‘We realized that the 5% commission that we are [paying to Hilton]…and 
by that time we also realized that our brand is also quite strong now and 
acceptable. Particularly Oberoi [brand] was all along there. Trident was a 
newer brand. So, once we were confident that our brand can sell on its own 
and we were not happy with the kind of service that they [Hilton] were 
providing, we discontinued’ 
 
The company replaced Hilton with the ‘Trident’ brand. Talking about the future of such 
branding alliances, the Executive Chairman stated that the company would not forge 
alliances with any foreign hotel brands in either the domestic market or any foreign 
market (Mishra, 2008). 
 
The Trident brand logo was inspired by the Dutch painter Piet Mondrian and the company 






Figure 19: Trident Hotel Logo 
 
Its main brand the Oberoi Hotels and Palaces was placed second of the most luxurious 
hotel brands in the world in 2015 (Luxury Branding, 2015). The readers of Travel + 
Leisure have voted it the best hotel brand in the world in 2015 and 2016 and the world’s 
leading luxury hotel brand in 2016 by the World Travel Awards (Oberoi Awards, 2016) 
 




The company’s luxurious resorts are all under the Oberoi brand. This helps the company 
to leverage the brand equity in both domestic and international markets (Bharwani, 
2013). The company uses special PR groups to strengthen its brand image, thus 
increasing the brand-recall among the class of travellers that it targets. It also 
participates in various industry trade and road shows in its key source markets 
(Bharwani, 2013). 
 
For EIHL, brand building is an important strategy in attracting foreign tourist to its 
properties in the domestic market. Hence, it internationalises in major tourist 
destinations. As hospitality can be experienced, special brand values help differentiate 
one hotel brand from another and unique services accentuate guest experience (O’Neill 
and Mattila, 2010, Xiong & King, 2014). 
 
The Oberoi brand had a strong presence in the luxury segment in the home market. Like 
IHCL (Chapter 7), EIHL also developed the Oberoi brand in international markets to 
attract international travellers to its hotels in India. By developing properties in holiday 
destinations which are frequented by Indian and international travellers, it has only 
sought to strengthen its brand which was already associated with the luxury chain of 
services that it was providing in its home market. So, it already possessed ownership 
advantages and did not engage in deliberate acquisitions overseas to create one. This is 
contrary to the view that emerging market companies are not required to have 
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ownership advantages as they can obtain the same through acquisitions or strategic 
partnerships so as to gain a competitive advantage in host and home country (Mathews, 
2002; Goldstein, 2007). 
 
8.6 Host Country Environment 
For hotel firms, it is convenient to understand the domestic market; however, in the case 
of India, it is not that simple as language, culture, heritage, cuisine and attire differ 
vastly in each of India’s 29 states. Hotel chains in India, while maintaining standardised 
brand features, do provide a local touch to their different properties in different states. 
For international locations too, it has been suggested that hotels should have a ‘glocal’ 
strategy, which is to have standardised global facility along with the host country local 
flavour which helps enhance the competitive advantage (Yu et al., 2014; Holjevac, 
2003). The local experience can be achieved through architecture and interior designs 
of the property, local cuisine, cultural entertainment etc. A study conducted by Whitla et 
al. (2007) found evidence of a ‘glocal’ strategy in British hotels with significant presence 
in foreign markets. 
 
EIHL operates in five international locations and two more locations will have an ‘Oberoi’ 
branded property by 2017. All international locations in which the company is present, 
or where it has immediate future plans, are emerging market countries; however, the 
locations are all famous tourist spots. Explaining the reason behind the same, the 
interviewee said: 
‘As far as outside India is concerned, you will find that, the target has 
always been tourist spots. So, the reason why we are targeting foreigners 
in India as target customer [for overseas locations too]’ 
 
The company had branch offices in New York, London, Dubai, Australia and Singapore. 
Since then, the company has closed all these branch offices, but recently reopened the 
Dubai office. 
 
The company earlier had properties in nine other countries, other than India: Nepal, Sri 
Lanka, Singapore, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Tanzania, Indonesia, Australia and Iraq. Since, it 
has stopped operations in Nepal, Sri Lanka, Singapore, Tanzania and Australia. However, 
it has added a presence in Dubai, Mauritius and Saudi Arabia with plans underway for 




The company has divested its properties in Iraq and Pakistan but this was due to political 
factors. Iraq divestment happened as Saddam Hussein did not want a major hotel where 
political leaders stayed to be owned by foreigners. The Pakistan divestment happened 
due to the 196528 war. 
 
The divestment in Sri Lanka happened due to a disagreement with their local partners. 
It was a management contract. As per the Management Trainee (who is a local Sinhalese 
and was posted back to Sri Lanka after the training period): 
‘The owning companies didn't place priority on maintaining the property 
and as a result some of the facilities were run down. The owning company 
wanted Oberoi's to pull out and therefore didn't do any refurbishment and 
closed down many outlets’ 
 
The Tanzania project was due to the insistence of the Indian government in 1970 for the 
island’s National Day and the company had no influence on the structure of the building; 
MS Oberoi exited Africa as soon as political compulsions decreased (The most famous 
hotels in the world, 2009). 
 
Hence, the company was not successful in all the international markets it entered due to 
a variety of reasons which can be attributed to social, political and economic environment 
of the host country. 
 
The interviewee talking about the structure of the organisation mentioned the hotel 
development team and how the head of that team often travels overseas to identify 
locations before the current Executive Chairman talks to potential investors and partners 
regarding the development of overseas properties and brand building. 
‘His [head of development] job is to basically target people and explain to 
them [about Oberoi and what the brand stands for] and then develop what 
is the location. And once he finds out something [identify the location or 
property] then Mr. Oberoi [PRS Oberoi, the current Executive chairman] 
pitches in’ 
 
While, the company’s overseas presence is very limited, it does need to manage different 
host environments. While the presence is only in emerging markets, just by virtue of 
being less developed, they are not common in culture, food habits, language, and socio-
political environment. Hence, EIHL need to manage different host country environments. 
                                                          
28 India and Pakistan have been at war in 1965 and 1971. The latter led to Bangladesh being separated 
from Pakistan (which was East Pakistan before then).  
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EIHL company vision states that they have a diverse workforce with vast varied 
experience from different cultures and that they are adept at handling problematic 
situations and use these experiences to further train and develop the employees at all 
their properties (Company Website Vision, 2016). The vision/mission further explains 
that learning and development of all its staff is a continuous process and the company 
is very open to hearing what their employees have to say and inculcate practices to 
make the company the best place to work in throughout its properties whether in India 
or overseas. 
 
Explaining the training and development at various levels and services in different 
countries, the interviewee stated: 
‘We do two things; one is that, the longer duration trainings, which 
ultimately targets developing somebody to management staff kind of thing. 
For that, people are sent by these three hotels [Oberoi, Maidens and 
Trident], they, you know, select that these are the people who have 
potential and then they can be developed [in the Oberoi school]. But apart 
from the longer duration things which is generally six months to one year, 
we also organise short courses…for which they [trainees] come from there 
[overseas properties] along with the hotels in India, and those includes for 
housekeeping, for kitchen chefs, those kinds of staff. Even at management, 
top most general manager levels also, they also at times come [for 
training], because general managers [of the various properties overseas], 
they are all locals [from the host country].’ 
 
From the above it is inferred that the company believes in training local talent for uniform 
services and a global brand image. This confirms to literature on hospitality management 
that states customer satisfaction and performance of a hotel is positively related to the 
hotel employees, which are its biggest resources (Tracey, 2014). Training and 
development helps create perfect integration between home country practices and host 
country requirements which enables creation of new practices and improvement of 
exiting practices (Weber, 2015). 
 
Home country advantages are not easy to replicate in international markets (Contractor, 
2013). Hence, EIHL has used training and development which is consistent for different 
levels and services to provide a homogenous brand image across its properties in India 
and elsewhere in the world. 
 
8.7 Internationalisation Strategy and the Financial Crisis 
Any kind of crisis, domestic or international, can negatively affect the hospitality sector 
due to a decrease in tourism, which leads to hotel chains holding off future investments 
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(Okumus & Karamustafa, 2005). The aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008 on the 
hospitality sector was a significant drop in occupancy levels (across different segments 
like luxury, business, budget) which further lead to a drop in average room rates as 
hotels competed with each other to attract travellers; this resulted in an overall decline 
of revenue for the hotel sector (Kimes & Anderson, 2011). It is a known fact that global 
corporates cut down on business travel as a first measure towards cost reduction during 
crisis periods. The global financial crisis hit the financial sector and most of the 
multinational banks in a very adverse way and travel was suspended followed by bonus 
cuts, or no bonuses in some cases, within the banks. The effect of the financial crisis 
was long drawn rather than immediate as was revealed in a study of US hotel chains 
affected by the terrorist attacks of September 2001 (Enz et al., 2011). 
 
Most big hotel chains have various segments within their portfolio of properties. The 
Oberoi group falls within the luxury segments, whereas IHCL (the other hotel company 
analysed in Chapter 7) has three distinctive segments targeting the luxury traveller, the 
business traveller and the budget traveller. A study by Barsky (2009) postulates that the 
luxury hotel segment within the hospitality sector was able to maintain its average room 
rates compared to other segments post the global financial crisis. While the immediate 
effect of the financial crisis on both EIHL and IHCL was negative, over time EIHL has 
improved and the company is profitable compared to IHCL which remains in the red 
(Appendix 17). 
 
Overall, the global tourism industry was not affected to the extent which was expected 
post the financial crisis as per a recent study conducted by Santos et al. (2016). The 
study further states that while there have been interim periods of negative growth, 
overall global tourism has increased and foreign direct investments from global hotel 
chains have also seen a significant rise. 
 
The Oberoi group has always been conservative in nature when it has come to 
expansion, both in India and in the overseas market. The company faced a terrorist 
attack in its prime Mumbai property at the time of the financial crisis. At the same time, 
they had another luxury hotel opening in the business centre of Mumbai. Talking about 
the conservatism in expansion strategy and the crisis period, the interviewee said: 
 
‘This industry [hospitality] has a huge fixed cost. After a level, your 
profitability goes up substantially. Similarly, when your revenue goes down, 
then you are affected. The person who runs the hotel, he is probably the 
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best hotelier in the country. Maybe, he [PRS Oberoi] has seen ups and 
downs and that is why he wants to be conservative. This conservatism 
actually helped us during that period [2008-09]. Terrorist attack29 
happened. Business suddenly dropped. Then we had 100 crores plus 
investment in renovating the hotel. That [the new property in BKC30] was 
more or less complete, but the balancing investment had to be done. Side 
by side, the insurance money was stuck [towards the property effected by 
the terrorist attack]. We were conservative in terms of investing money. 
Even during that period also, we didn’t have to face any cash crunch.’ 
 
 
According to the company website, EIHL established a wholly owned flight services 
subsidiary in Mauritius in 2008. In 2010, the company acquired all the shares of its 
international hotel joint-venture company called EIH Holdings through another of its 
international subsidiaries. Due to this move, EIH Holdings which had business interests 
in some of the Oberoi properties in overseas locations but did not have a worldwide 
license agreement to the brand name; by becoming a WOS it was able to gain that 
license (PTI, 2010). 
 
From the above, it can be inferred that the company has a conservative strategic outlook 
so that it was protected from severe disturbances due to any kind of crisis. The financial 
crisis did have certain negative effects due to the decrease in tourism but the company 
continued to make informed investments both in India and in the overseas market. 
Today the company is in profit which cannot be said of all Indian hotel companies. 
 
8.8 Discussion 
EIHL is one of the leading hotel chains in India. Both its brand of hotels, the ‘Oberoi’ and 
the ‘Trident’ are considered among the luxury class of hotels. EIHL was the first hotel 
chain of India, though as an Indian hotel company it was second to IHCL (Chapter 7). 
However, it expanded quickly through acquisitions of hotels (most of them no longer 
with the company) before it started building its own hotels. Oberoi is known for its 
opulent products and services. The company has a penchant for building its own 
property or having ventures with owners so that they can associated with the building 
of the property as per its world class standards. Its Oberoi brand of hotels has won the 
‘World’s Best Brand’ for 2015 and 2016 by the world’s leading travel magazine, Travel + 
Leisure; The World Travel Awards has awarded to the ‘Oberoi Hotels and Resorts’ as the 
                                                          
29 Mumbai faced a terrorist attack on 26th November 2008. Both IHCL and EIHL properties in the south 
of Mumbai were affected badly and had to be shut down. 
30 BKC: Bandra Kurla Complex in Mumbai is the new business centre of Mumbai with all the 
multinational banks and the Indian private banks and many Indian and MNC companies present.  
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most luxurious brand in the word for 2016; and in 2014 it had been awarded as the ‘Top 
Luxury Hotel and Brand’ by ReviewPro’s Hotel Awards, (2016). The company has 
strategically built its brand. While it was tied up with Hilton for marketing aimed towards 
international travellers, it felt that the intrinsic value of its brand image as a luxurious 
hotel was affected, so it terminated the marketing tie-up. EIHL has relied on its service 
levels to create its global brand image which is to be a luxurious class hotel. 
 
The company’s first international hotel was established in neighbouring Nepal, followed 
by Singapore in the late 1960s. The company was the first to initiate a training school 
for hotel services and then exported management expertise to overseas markets. Its 
internationalisation strategy was to create a brand awareness to cater to foreign tourists 
coming to India. Inbound travel to India has almost quadrupled since 2000 (Appendix 
13). The company was way ahead of its rival Indian companies (like IHCL) to target 
foreign travellers. IHCL’s brand awareness exercise in source countries like USA and UK 
was a reflexive action to counter the international hotel chains that arrived in India post 
the country’s economic liberalisation. EIHL has strategically expanded in locations which 
are considered tourist destinations to showcase its deluxe hospitality services rather than 
be present directly in the source markets of the developed countries. ‘Oberois; as a 
brand was already established among foreign tourists. However, akin to IHCL (Chapter 
7), EIHL has also not sought to diversify internationally through the franchising route as 
has been seen for many of the, mainly US, international hotel chains. 
 
The company is not present in many of its early international locations as it exited due 
to political reasons, difference in outlook with the local partner, or the company felt that 
the country was not a destination for the brand image that it portrayed (like in Africa 
and Latin America). 
 
All its current presence is in emerging markets and the new properties currently under 
development are also in emerging markets. However, the company feels that it is 
important to be represented in centres like New York, London and Paris, but due to their 
conservative nature towards outward investment, the company feels that it will only 
move to those locations if there is a perfect fit with their brand image. However, 
countries like Hong Kong, Singapore and China are centres where the company feels 
that they are closer to their ideology of hospitality services (Sathyanarayan, 2016). 
Hence, the company prefers to seek host countries whose perceived psychic distance is 
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low; that is the understanding of culture and other geographic factors of these countries 
is high. 
 
The company also added flight catering and a travel company to its portfolio as additional 
capabilities to complement its main business of hotels. This has helped the company 
maintain a healthy competitive advantage against its rivals (domestic rivals) and 
compared to other hotel chains shows a profit on its balance sheets. 
 
The company’s biggest resource is its employees. Through its training school, it provides 
training to staff at management level, housekeeping level and for kitchen training at 
post-graduate level and it also has a bachelor’s level programme aimed at high school 
graduates who, upon successful completion, are absorbed by the company. The 
company believes that all its employees (at least at managerial level) should have 
assimilation. This confirms what Teece and Pisano (1994) state about a company’s 
culture being mirrored in the value and beliefs of its employees. The company’s school 
is known for the high quality of its trained graduates and generally find employment with 
other hotel companies too for the same reason. 
 
8.9 Chapter Conclusion 
This exploratory case study uses a framework of dynamic capabilities and the resource-
based approach to analyse EIHL’s approach to internationalisation. The founder owners 
had entrepreneurial capability to build India’s first hotel chain, first through the 
acquisition mode, then through building its own properties with the help of international 
partners, and then management contracts. While most of the early properties that were 
acquired were divested, the company has continued to build its portfolio both in the 
domestic and international market. However, in the latter, the expansion has been 
limited with a specific strategic intent of building its brand image to attract foreign 
tourists in India to its properties in the country. The company is a niche player targeting 
the luxury traveller and the high-end business traveller through its brands, Oberoi and 
Trident respectively. The company has had a conservative outlook towards investment 
leading to a profit on its balance-sheet in the aftermath of the financial crisis and the 
terrorist attacks of 2008. In international locations, the company is present only in 
emerging but high-end tourist destinations, though it aspires to be in a few developed 
country cities with a high tourist percentage and other such emerging market cities and 
countries. The company prides itself on its high quality of employees and the emphasis 
it puts on training and development. This is indicative of managerial capability towards 
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assimilation and absorption. The company has expanded its services through addition of 
capabilities for added competitive advantage which links to the dynamic capabilities 
theory. The company’s future plans have an expansion strategy for both domestic and 
international markets with a need to be asset light but not losing sight of the right type 
of acquisition which would complement its brand image. In sum, the company’s main 












9. Cross Case Analysis 
 
9.1 Introduction 
This thesis has investigated if firms from emerging markets own resources that help 
them internationalise and how these firms gain dynamic capabilities through 
internationalisation. Hence, this chapter highlights the main findings already discussed 
in the individual analytical chapters (Chapters 4 to 8). This chapter further presents a 
cross-case analysis of the five companies that have been studied, to bring out the 
homogenous and heterogonous characteristics of their internationalisation progression.  
 
The discussion in this chapter is organised into separate sections (9.2 to 9.6) based on 
the strategic understanding of the internationalisation processes of the different 
companies. For consistency, the different section headings maintain the chronological 
order in which the companies in the dataset have been analysed. The individual company 
background is not being mentioned again in this chapter to avoid duplication; however, 
the particular services that the company provides will be highlighted. This will facilitate 
the cross-case analysis and the comparison and likeness between each company which 
has been discussed in section 9.7 followed by the chapter conclusion in section 9.8. 
   
9.2 Resources and Capabilities 
Some IB scholars have theorised that emerging market companies lack capabilities and 
resources and hence they internationalise. As has been seen the company specific 
analysis chapters, all the five companies under study possessed resources and 
capabilities prior to the process of internationalisation. This is further explained below. 
 
9.2.1 Airtel Resources and Capabilities 
Airtel created the ‘average revenue per minute’ (ARPM) model which was based on 
charging the customer as per the minutes used rather than the pricing model that 
prevailed in developed markets which was to charge customers a fixed price irrespective 
of the usage. Airtel implemented this model by creating an operational expenditure 
(OPEX) variable pricing process rather than a capital expenditure (CAPEX) fixed pricing 
process by outsourcing its network planning, mobile towers, call centre support and IT 
infrastructure, thus creating a ‘minutes factory’ model as it is widely known as. One of 
the main factors for the success of the model also lay in the demographic construct of 
its home market (India) which had a low tele-density and a very high population density. 
As the home market saturated, Airtel internationalised to markets seeking similar 
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demographic profile as India. Airtel then developed Airtel money (using mobile for 
money transfer) in response to competition in Africa and then implemented this acquired 
capability back in the home market. 
 
9.2.2 Wipro Resources and Capabilities 
Wipro possessed capabilities in the form of low cost arbitrage which was developed due 
to country specific advantage in the form of English speaking engineers and scientists. 
Due to the low-cost arbitrage, the company could build technologies at a larger scale. 
However, due to market liberalisation in India, the entry of MNCs resulted in the 
company acquiring global certifications which assisted the company to internationalise 
both through the organic and in-organic route. The company’s acquisitions were targeted 
for acquiring additional capabilities and resources that it lacked but were required for it 
to provide a competitive edge in international markets. The added capabilities so 
acquired facilitated the company to provide value-added services to its clients in addition 
to cost advantages. 
 
9.2.3 TCS Resources and Capabilities 
TCS was mainly providing data and technology services to companies within its parent 
group and various Indian governmental organisations. It also sought clients using its 
parent network (the contract for Iran government). Importing a Burroughs mainframe 
computer provided it with an opportunity to service Burroughs clients in India and in the 
US. The company, thus, gained experience working with overseas clients and this is also 
considered as the first Indian offshore project that was initiated in the early 1970s. The 
company was also instrumental in partnering with educational institutes within India to 
develop computer science courses and IT skilled based curriculum. This initiation created 
a base for India to develop English speaking computer scientists and engineers’ adept 
at technology services thus establishing the onset of India’s technological cost effective 
services. The company internationalised very early on mainly due to the nature of the 
services it provided built on the basis of its inherent resources and capabilities and for 
which domestic demand within India was lacking during that time (late 1970s – early 
1980s). Through various partnerships and joint ventures formed in foreign markets and 
then later through acquisitions, the company also acquired additional resources and 
capabilities which it did not possess and which the company required for long term 




9.2.4 IHCL Resources and Capabilities 
IHCL was the first Indian hospitality services company to build an indigenous hotel in 
India catering mainly to the Indians at a time when the country was still a British colony.  
The company’s initial internationalisation was in countries where there was a presence 
of other companies from within its parent group. However, when it entered other foreign 
markets, it was equipped with the knowledge of managing hotels and the unique 
differentiation of services atypical of the Asian hospitality experience which was converse 
to the hospitality services available in USA or Europe. Such capabilities were acquired 
due to the cultural ethos prevalent in India emanating from the various royal provinces 
(before India became a democracy post-independence from the British rule). IHCL 
provided training to staff in overseas markets to create resources that were consistent 
with its unique services and also introduced particular services in host markets (like the 
butler services in New York) that had not been experienced in those markets. 
 
9.2.5 EIHL Resources and Capabilities 
EIHL was the first Indian hotel chain and was established in India through acquisition of 
hotel properties owned either by the British colonial rulers or other private foreign 
owners. The company established its credentials in the hospitality services through 
partnerships with international hotel chains and was the first in India to also establish a 
hotel management school. The company was known to have an international outlook 
from the very onset for the Indian tourism sector. The company’s focus was in providing 
exceptional services through compulsory training and development of its staff, the main 
resources in hospitality services. In its international endeavours, EIHL adapted local 
experiences in its services to create product differentiation and establish itself as a 
provider of luxurious hospitality services. 
 
9.3 Internationalisation 
As presented in the Literature Review Chapter (Chapter 2), Indian companies generally 
prefer the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) route towards internationalisation and bulk 
of their outward investment is directed towards developed markets. From the five 
companies studied for this research work, it can be deduced that M&A is a preferred 
route however, the companies may follow a different investment mode depending on 
the host country requirement. Similarly, location choice is divergent. The difference in 
motivation behind the mode of internationalisation, organic or in-organic and location 
choice is dependent upon the type of services provided, the particular capabilities of the 
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company and also the leadership attributes of the company. These differences and 
attributes have been discussed in detail in this section. 
 
9.3.1 Airtel’s Internationalisation 
Airtel’s ‘minutes model’ was created on the basis of the Indian demography with high 
population density and a low telecom density. Hence, the location choice for the 
company was appropriated towards similar demographics accessible in other emerging 
markets. Consequently, Airtel first ventured into Sri Lanka (a neighbouring emerging 
country). For Airtel, entering a neighbouring country, where one of the languages spoken 
was common with one of the Indian languages, was akin to extending the company’s 
telecom boundary. Airtel used the green-field approach for Sri-Lanka; however, the 
country had a small demography with a relatively substantial tele-density. This along 
with the telecom regulations in the country of a floor pricing was inefficacious for Airtel. 
This experience led to the company reassessing its internationalisation mode, hence, 
when it entered Africa and another neighbouring country (Bangladesh), it sought the 
M&A route with the conjecture that in new international markets with a well-established 
telecom presence, a greenfield mode of internationalisation would be ineffectual. 
 
9.3.2 Wipro’s Internationalisation  
Wipro’s initial internationalisation was through a green-field mode during the late 1990s. 
However, in early 2000s when the company set an aggressive growth target for itself, it 
sought the M&A route to achieve its targeted growth plan. The company perceived that 
it lacked specific capabilities which were required for it to compete in international 
markets for example BPO services or consulting services. Wipro’s acquisitions during 
2000-2010 were small and medium size and the company did not leverage its balance 
sheet for the same. Recently (over the last couple of years), armed with acquisition 
experience, the company has ventured to acquire large size companies but has 
continued to use its cash surplus towards these acquisitions. The early phase of 
internationalisation was directed towards developed markets. Currently, more than 70% 
of the company’s revenues are derived from developed markets. 
 
9.3.3 TCS’s Internationalisation 
TCS can be considered as the champion of the Indian IT services off-shoring model. It 
internationalised at a time when India was not open to foreign businesses, believed in 
self-sufficiency through import substitution policies and had strict foreign exchange 
regulations. For the services that TCS had capability in providing led the company to 
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open an office in New York in an effort to search for clients in USA and then later in 
other developed markets before venturing to emerging markets too. As per the 
company, 80% of its revenues are generated from developed countries. Given the 
genesis of the company (the parent Tata being the pioneers of Indian industrialisation), 
TCS believed in internationalising via the organic mode. It sought partnerships or Joint 
ventures (JVs) only in countries where it was a requirement by law or the country culture 
was far removed from what TCS had already experienced through establishment of 
wholly owned subsidiaries (WOS). Subsequently, as the company became comfortable 
with the host environment, it has aimed to fully acquire such JVs or partnerships. 
Notwithstanding the company’s inclination to organic growth for its internationalisation, 
TCS has also sought the M&A mode directed towards attaining capabilities that the 
company perceived it lacked for sustained competitive advantage in the international 
market. 
 
9.3.4 IHCL’s Internationalisation 
For IHCL, to be present in developed markets has been necessitated to attract clients to 
its home properties given that Indian tourism witnesses large number of developed 
market tourists. Other than organic or inorganic mode of internationalisation, hotel 
companies also undertake management contracts as hotel companies can achieve 
control through knowledge-based resources rather than equity control. IHCL has sought 
all three modes of internationalisation in different geographic location. Recently, the 
need to be ‘asset-light’ due to balance-sheet leverage exigencies has compelled the 
company to divest some of its international assets and pursue the management contract 
mode in foreign markets. Also, for IHCL, the main purpose of internationalisation has 
concerted towards brand building to attract clients to its properties in the home market. 
Hence, internationalisation through acquisition has not been a primary growth strategy 
for the company. Nonetheless, acquisition remains a strategic intent given it confirms to 
the company’s ‘luxury brand’ image. 
 
9.3.5 EIHL’s Internationalisation 
EIHL is dominant in the luxury hotel category. The company’s initial internationalisation 
was through the management contract route. As the first hospitality service chain in 
India, the company had established itself for exporting hotel management services. 
However, the top management inclination towards a certain image depiction for the 
company led it to exit such management contracts and assimilate towards organic 
growth in international markets. Over the last few years, the company has entered 
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management contracts or JVs where it has been involved in the design and interiors of 
a new property with limited investments, hence focussing on an ‘asset-light’ mode of 
investment. Analogous to IHCL, even EIHL is open to acquisitions only if such acquisition 
is befitting to its ‘opulent service’ depiction. Further, the company has chosen to 
internationalise in emerging markets with a high tourist density from developed markets 
to create its brand in order to attract such tourists to its home country properties.   
 
9.4 Brand and Logo 
Portraying a strong brand image has been an inherent strategic aim for each of the 
company in the data set of this study. Each company has endeavoured to internationalise 
their respective brand towards achievement of specific organisational goals. These 
specific goals and purported branding and logo have been summated in this section. 
 
9.4.1 Airtel’s Brand and Logo 
Airtel has used advertisements targeted towards all age groups and sections of the 
society. Its current logo was created in 2010 just before the company first invested 
overseas. Airtel has purposefully used a single branding in all the countries that it 
operates in which has culminated in the company re-branding its acquired assets. The 
aim has been to create a universal single brand image and the company has been 
successful towards this aim. 
 
9.4.2 Wipro’s Brand and Logo 
Wipro’s current logo was designed in 1998 before the company’s first outward 
investment. The company has used specific brand image to differentiate itself within the 
IT services. Post the market liberalisation in India, the company partnered with DMNCs 
entering India to create a global awareness of its brand which assisted the company 
during its process of internationalisation. The company’s logo portrays its inherent values 
which is consistent with the perceived service requirement of its client base. 
 
9.4.3 TCS’s Brand and Logo 
TCS uses the parent company logo similar to most companies within the group. TCS 
along with the other group companies have been required to diligently build the group 
brand image across the globe as the group has grown in international markets as per 
group directives. TCS has partnered with various sports clubs and charitable 
organisations along with sponsoring various events across the globe for brand 
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recognition. For the specific achievement of its organisational goal of being a global top 
ten IT company, TCS has used global consultants towards building its brand image. 
 
9.4.4 IHCL’s Brand and Logo 
IHCL unlike TCS has not used the parent company logo as branding is a dominant trend 
in hotel services. Hotel brands enthuse quality of the product and services provided. 
IHCL has used internationalisation as a tool for building its brand image in overseas 
markets. The primary motive for the same has been to create competitive advantage in 
the home market against the well-known international hotel chains that entered India 
post the market liberalisation which has seen an increase in both tourists and business 
travellers.  
 
9.4.5 EIHL’s Brand and Logo 
Brand equity is of prime importance for hotel companies. Brand differentiator can be 
created through unique experiences that customers experience. Similar to IHCL, brand 
building for EIHL in international markets has been intended towards making its 
properties attractive to international travellers inbound for India thus providing 
competition to the international hotel chains in the home market.   
 
9.5 Host Country Environment 
Possession of resources and capabilities and a strong presence in the domestic market 
does not ensure success in different international markets. The inherent resources and 
capabilities should be easily transferable to other host markets or the company should 
have the ability to transform or supplement their existing resources and capabilities base 
in response to the requirement of the host market so as to create or strengthen 
competitive advantage in dynamic external environments. This section discusses the 
individual company’s response to the external host countries. 
 
9.5.1 Airtel and Host Country Environment 
Airtel has only sought other emerging markets towards its internationalisation given its 
particular telecom model which was created for demographics with high population 
density and low telecom density. The company expected instant success in the African 
countries that it had entered similar to the success that it had experienced in its home 
market. The company did not face any issues in implementing its pricing model in Africa 
unlike in Sri Lanka, where the regulators implemented a pricing floor; however, Airtel 
had not anticipated the marked difference between consumer preference in Africa vis-
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à-vis consumer preference in India, its home market. The other miscalculation was in 
understanding the vastness of Africa and the level of urbanisation. Airtel had not 
envisaged individual issues of each country that it was present in Africa with separate 
borders, duties and taxes. Airtel has already withdrawn from two countries in Africa thus 
limiting its exposure to 15 countries. Additionally, it is also considering withdrawing from 
Sri Lanka. 
 
9.5.2 Wipro and Host Country Environment  
Wipro was well established in India as an IT services company. The company is present 
in both developed and emerging markets and has continually sought to develop its 
home-grown capabilities along with acquiring capabilities that it lacked to provide value-
added services to its clients. The company was faced with a myriad of challenges specific 
to each host market, for example language issues in Germany and in Japan; cultural 
issues in Latin America and France with respect to work hours. Wipro has confronted 
each challenge by changing its hiring process, training and development of hired locals 
in foreign countries, sensitising to local language and cultures. Wipro, in the early stages 
of its internationalisation process, had realised that home country advantages cannot be 
easily replicated in another country. The company believed in continuous learning of its 
managers towards adaptability and integration of acquired employees for preservation 
of technology and capability knowledge. Wipro remains present in all the countries that 
it has invested in and continues to explore newer markets and geographies. 
 
9.5.3 TCS and Host Country Environment 
TCS internationalisation characteristics are distinctive from the other companies in the 
data set of this study. It was a small company with negligible presence in the home 
market when it first internationalised. Today it is present in 45 countries. As the company 
has expanded its presence in overseas markets, it has combined the ethics value system 
of each host market with the company value system to enable seamless integration of 
local hires and acquired employees in such host markets. Effective communication is 
another key attribute for the success of TCS in the various countries that it is present in. 
TCS has extensively used its human resource services to manage employee expectations 
and integration. The company’s approach to each new geography precedes with the 
knowledge that success is not achievable each time and accordingly the company 
anticipates modification to its internationalisation strategies. The company has also 
complemented its main ‘cost-arbitrage’ capability with delineation of revenues and 
employees to provide fixed-cost products thus ensuring client stickiness. The company 
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has continually adapted itself to various host markets through the constant learning 
process. 
 
9.5.4 IHCL and Host Country Environment 
IHCL has limited international presence with sixteen properties in ten different countries, 
both developed and emerging countries. For hotel companies, it is advantageous to 
follow a glocalisation model which combines the local culture with the standardised 
global facilities that a hospitality chain may offer. IHCL follows this principle with a 
different experience that its customers can encounter in its various properties in different 
countries along with a standardised brand image that the company represents. 
Employees are the most important assets for hotel companies. Hence, IHCL invests in 
employee training and development. For properties acquired, the company policy is to 
retain the local employees for uninterrupted guest experience. IHCL also exports home 
country managers to ensure that its home-grown capabilities that project its brand are 
preserved. The company has not hesitated in surrendering properties in specific 
countries that have been detached from the company’s internationalisation strategies. 
IHCL has embraced the multi-productivity skills of developed market employees for 
incorporation in its home market properties. Another aspect of being present in foreign 
markets has been the adoption of global cuisines in its properties. The company has 
been sensitive to the requirement of each market that it is present in to increase the 
appeal of its brand for foreign tourists in the home market. 
 
9.5.5 EIHL and Host Country Environment 
EIHL has adopted a cautious stance while expanding overseas. This is inherent with the 
company managerial characteristics and strategy that the company has embraced even 
in India, its home market. The company’s initial internationalisation drive was not 
successful, mainly due to divergent ideas with the local partners or due to political 
factors. EIHL is currently present only in emerging markets; however, each market has 
disparate culture, language, food habits and socio-political environment. Hence, the 
company devotes time and energy in the continuous learning and development of its 
staff. The company considers portraying a uniform brand image in each country of its 
presence. Hence, in foreign markets, it either partners with other local hotel owners with 
similar vision or it develops its own properties. That is another reason for its limited 
presence in international markets as hotels have high fixed costs. For the company, 
training and development has been its major arsenal for integration of its home practices 
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with host country practices for improved service experience for its clients and create a 
brand image to attract the increasing number of foreign tourists to its Indian properties.  
 
9.6 Internationalisation Strategy and the Financial Crisis 
Internationalisation strategies and motivations can get affected in the face of various 
crises which could be internal to a company or external to a company. External crises 
can occur within the boundaries of a nation or could be global in nature like the global 
financial crisis of 2007-08 which affects companies across nations. Outward investments 
from developing and transition economies have increased over the past two decades. 
This increasing trend has also been witnessed in the case of India over the past decade 
(Figure 1). During this period, world economy was affected by the global financial crisis. 
Hence, the financial crisis has been used as the basis of discussion around the effects of 
the external environment on internationalisation decisions of the companies. 
 
9.6.1 Airtel’s response to the Global Financial Crisis 
Airtel was well established in India. As the home market was saturating, the company 
strategised to internationalise. The company first made an offer to acquire an established 
telecom network company in Africa in 2008 and again in 2009. The offer was not 
accepted. It then made its first outward investment in 2009 with a greenfield venture in 
Sri Lanka followed by acquisitions in Bangladesh and Africa in 2010 (In Africa, Airtel 
finally acquired a company but which was different from the one which Airtel had offered 
to acquire in the first instance in Africa). The company financed the African acquisition 
through banking finance and as has been mentioned by the interviewee (Chapter 4), the 
cost of debt financing was higher during that period due to the financial crisis. 
Nonetheless, the company pursued its internationalisation strategies and extended its 
operations beyond the home country borders. 
 
9.6.2 Wipro’s response to the Global Financial Crisis  
Wipro is known for its ‘string of pearls’ approach which is aggressively acquiring small 
to medium entities in foreign host markets. The company has pursued an in-organic 
growth mode towards internationalisation over an organic growth mode. However, 
during the period between 2007 and 2012, the company did not acquire any company 
in overseas markets. The company’s decision was based on the fact that target 
companies for Wipro, which could add to its existing capabilities, did not lower their 
valuations due to the effects of the financial crisis. The companies that did lower their 
valuations were those which were excessively affected by the crisis. This included losing 
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key people (technology staff) and also clients and hence, acquiring such units would not 
have proven beneficial for the company. However, Wipro continued to invest in overseas 
markets during the post-crisis period either through global partnerships or setting up 
WOS. Hence, the overall internationalisation strategy of Wipro did not lose momentum; 
the company just repositioned its overseas investment mode. 
 
9.6.3 TCS’s response to the Global Financial Crisis 
The global financial crisis for TCS proved to be a vast business opportunity. As already 
mentioned in the chapter analysis (Chapter 6), the banking sector was affected 
negatively by the financial crisis. The valuations of a major multinational bank, which 
was bailed out by the government in its home market, were at an all-time low and this 
bank was selling some of its ancillary businesses. One such unit was a BPO service, 
which was physically in India and was supporting many of the banks businesses in 
various countries. TCS was lacking a BPO service arm and it actively pursued and 
acquired this unit from the MNC bank. The unit was renamed as a Business Process 
Services’ vertical within TCS and generates almost 15% of TCS revenues globally. 
Another effect of the crisis that the banking sector experienced was the increased 
regulatory monitoring. TCS also seized this opportunity to introduce technologies that 
would assist banks for such regulatory monitoring and also decreasing operational costs; 
hence, resulting in increased business for TCS. Thus, the financial crisis had a positive 
affect for TCS as it continued to invest in overseas markets keeping the company’s 
internationalisation strategies active. 
 
9.6.4 IHCL’s response to the Global Financial Crisis 
IHCL has been negatively affected as a consequence of the global financial crisis as can 
be deduced from the company’s financial balance sheet. The company also suffered due 
to exogenous factors caused by the terrorist attacks in Mumbai (the financial capital of 
India) during November 2008. During a period of crisis which is internal to a country or 
external on a global scale, hospitality and travel services are first among all other sectors 
and industries to experience an immediate effect, generally conflicting. Irrespective of 
the financial condition of IHCL, the company had extended an unsolicited offer for 
another hotel chain in 2007 and then again in 2012. Given the company’s requirement 
to be ‘asset-light’ due to balance-sheet considerations, the attempt to acquire another 
hotel chain is indicative of the willingness of the company to achieve its strategic 
direction towards internationalisation irrespective of the financial implications. The 
acquisition was aimed towards extending presence in key geographies where IHCL was 
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not present. The bid for the target company was made during 2012 as the market 
valuation was low, however, the management of the target company was cognizant of 
the fact that such valuations was a result of the market dynamics and the IHCL offer 
was rejected. Thus, lower market valuation and a compatible brand image of the target 
company compelled IHCL to contemplate an acquisition while suffering from the 
aftermath of the financial crisis thus keeping its internationalisation strategies in focus. 
 
9.6.5 EIHL’s response to the Global Financial Crisis 
EIHL has maintained a conservative outlook towards growth whether expanding in the 
home market or in international markets. The company has strived to project a brand 
image synonymous with luxury services. This management vision of a world class luxury 
brand has prompted the company to exit a few international markets due to both internal 
and external causes. Other than the financial crisis, EIHL was also faced with a terrorist 
attack in November 2008. Nevertheless, the company keeping with its conservative 
outlook towards internationalisation, continued to invest both in the home market and 
the overseas market. It sought banking finance for a new property in Mumbai (the 
financial capital of India). The company established its own flight catering services in 
Mauritius and also bought all the shares in an international JV which enabled the 
company to use its own brand name for international licences. Hence, it can be stated 
that despite the crises that the company faced due to the financial crisis in the form of 
lowered occupancy or the terrorist attacks, the company continued to seek limited 
internationalisation in line with the global brand image that it stands for.    
 
9.7 Cross- Case Summary 
Analysing the cross-case findings produce five themes. 
 
First, that all five companies possessed home grown capabilities and resources in the 
particular service stream that they offered. The companies internationalised on the 
strength of these resources and capabilities. However, internationalisation was not 
sought specifically to acquire additional resources and capabilities for all the companies. 
 
Second, target host countries and mode of internationalisation differed for each company 




Third, strategy and the motivation for internationalisation is driven by the 
entrepreneurial intent of the owners and senior managers which is reflected in the long-
term goals and plans of the company. 
 
Fourth, each of the company was cognizant of the fact that host countries are different 
from home country and accordingly altered their operational strategies to suit the host 
country environment through organisational learning. 
 
Finally, external crises do not alter the main internationalisation objectives of the firm 
other than the directional path.  
 
In sum, each company has its institutional difference depending on the evolution and 
organisational context emerging due to an evolving and dynamic external environment. 
Nevertheless, there are certain common themes that have emerged too. 
   
9.8 Chapter Conclusion 
In this chapter, individual and cross-case analysis has been presented which brings forth 
the similarities and the differences between the companies in the data set towards their 
internationalisation process and experiences.  
 
The next chapter is the discussion chapter that will provide a synopsis of each of the 
internationalisation factors. It will then proceed to provide a theoretical synthesis thus 








Continuing with the focus of investigating the internationalisation process through the 
lens of resource-based and dynamic capabilities theory, this thesis has specifically 
questioned if emerging market firms own resources and capabilities that help them 
internationalise and if they develop or acquire further resources and dynamic capabilities 
through the process of internationalisation thus strengthening their competitiveness in 
international markets.  
 
This chapter summarises the main findings around the five main phenomena associated 
with company internationalisation (Section 10.2); namely, resources and capabilities, 
internationalisation mode, brand and logo, host country environment and effects of the 
financial crisis (external environment) on internationalisation strategies. These five main 
phenomena have been discussed in depth in the specific company chapters. This was 
followed by the discussion around the salient features of each of the five companies in 
the data set with respect to each of the phenomena in the previous cross-analysis 
chapter (Chapter 9).  
 
As has been mentioned earlier in this study, emerging market multinational companies 
(EMNEs) are not expected to possess ownership advantages due to technological 
constraints (Ramamurti, 2012); further EMNEs are expected to differ significantly from 
DMNCs due to the ideological differences in culture, politics and the institutional 
environment prevalent in their home market (Buckley et al., 2014). Hence, 
internationalisation experience of EMNEs is also expected to be vastly different from the 
internationalisation experience of DMNCs. This study has highlighted such differentiation 
while also highlighting some similarities that these companies have with regard to the 
existing theories of internationalisation. Hence, section 10.3 presents a theoretical 
synthesis with an integration of theory with data evidence. The main themes have been 
captured from strategic management theory specifically around resources and dynamic 
capabilities theory and internationalisation theory. Conclusion to this section captures 
the theoretical contribution from this study. 
 




10.2 Summary of Main Findings 
This section summarises the understanding of internationalisation across the five 
companies in the data set. Like in chapter 9, the various sub-sections maintain the same 
chronological order around the main phenomena investigated in the analysis chapters 
and which are associated with company internationalisation. 
 
10.2.1 Resources and Capabilities 
As has been mentioned repeatedly in this study, EMNEs were not expected to possess 
ownership advantages due to technological constraints (Ramamurti, 2012). This section 
affirms that the five Indian service sector companies that have been investigated 
possessed certain resources and capabilities prior to their internationalisation. These 
capabilities and resources were developed internally and enabled the companies to 
internationalise successfully. The presence of these resources and capabilities across the 
five companies are summarised in Table 3. The table also exhibits some of the resources 
and capabilities that the companies acquired post internationalisation. It can be seen 
that only the telecom company and both the IT companies acquired additional 
capabilities and resources to strengthen their competitiveness in various host markets 
which further enabled them to enter newer markets. This can be tied to the dynamic 
capabilities model for internationalisation as stated by Luo (2001) wherein it is expressed 
that ‘dynamic capabilities require a base of established capabilities or resources as well 
as the ability to efficiently deploy these resources and to continuously create bundles of 
new resources and knowledge’ (p. 358). Presence of prior knowledge is a firm attribute 
and tacit knowledge is specific to firms due to none or limited transferability (Grant, 1996 
& 1997). All the five companies possessed distinctive resources and capabilities which 
were then deployed in international markets and then, as per the requirement, additional 
resources and capabilities were acquired which helped the companies create competitive 
advantage in the present markets and also enter newer markets with the new resources 
and capabilities developed. Given the specificity of the services provided by each firm, 




Table 3: Resources and Capabilities 
 
 
The development and acquisition of capabilities, especially in the case of the two IT 
companies, to create a strong competitive advantage in foreign markets conforms the 
views of Rugman and Verbeke (2004) that companies need to complement home-based 
FSAs with host-based FSAs through aggregation and arbitrage for success in various 
foreign markets in different regions. Further, the R&D capabilities of the two IT 
companies, the ‘minutes factory’ model of the telecom company and the specific aspect 
of the hospitality services intrinsic to the Indian hospitality culture in the case of the two 
hotel companies, had VRIN properties. 
 
10.2.2 Mode of Internationalisation 





Table 4: Mode of Internationalisation 
 
 
From the table, it can be affirmed that different company’s internationalisation and 
location choices are divergent and dependent upon the company’s strategic intent and 
inherent capabilities. Within similar services, the management direction and long-term 
goals affect such choices as has been seen in the case of the two IT companies with 
Wipro continually seeking acquisitions and TCS investing mainly in organic growth and 
strategic partnerships. Wipro already had an established presence in the home country 
and had built partnerships with MNCs to create its brand awareness; hence, the company 
sought the acquisition as a pre-dominant internationalisation mode in developed markets 
for an accelerated growth strategy in foreign markets. On the other hand, TCS had a 
negligible presence in the home market when it first internationalised. The company had 
worked only with one MNC in India. Therefore, the company was required to set up 
wholly-owned subsidiaries to attract business and clients and thus slowly build its 
reputation and brand in foreign markets. In certain difficult countries, due to culture and 
language barriers, the company pursued the strategic partnership route or JVs.   
 
For the hospitality service companies, while the intent to attract foreign tourists to its 
properties in the home market is similar, the approaches taken by them are disparate 
with IHCL seeking only the management contract route after the initial acquisition 
failures and EIHL preferring the organic route along with seeking the management 
contract route in overseas markets. For IHCL, the effects of the financial crisis and the 
terrorist attacks of 2008 were extremely negative and the company divested many of 
the overseas acquired properties towards an asset-light balance sheet. However, the 
focus of attracting foreign tourists to its home properties have continued and IHCL 
continues to pursue its internationalisation objectives through the management contract 
route. EIHL has always had a mixed approach towards its internationalisation mode. 
While the company too was affected by the financial crisis and the terrorist attacks in 
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2008, it has managed to turn around its balance sheet thorough a cautious expansion. 
It has chosen to be present in very niche markets and keeping in line with its ‘luxurious 
only’ brand image seeks JVs in overseas market with green-field projects along with an 
interest in management contracts too.   
 
Given that only five companies were studied for this thesis, location choice cannot be 
generalised; however, within these five companies, three have preferred developed 
markets which is 60 percent of the sample size. This corresponds to India’s OFDI figures 
with sixty percent or more targeted towards developed markets.   
 
10.2.3 Brand and Logo 
A strong brand image is a significant feature and a key intangible resource that can 
prove to be a source of sustainable competitive advantage (Javalgi & Grossman, 2014) 
which can assist the company in its internationalisation process. The competitive 
advantages that a company can attain due to a strong brand image are premium prices, 
customer loyalty and a positive response to new products and services launched 
(Ghodeshwar, 2008). According to Ghauri et al. (2016), branding capability is an 
important factor for market driving in foreign markets. 
 
Each of the companies in the data set has strived to create a unique brand identity using 
campaigns, advertisements, collaborations, charities and other such similar modes. 
Company logos and taglines are associated with the core values that these companies 
stand for along with the products and services that they provide. For both Airtel and 
Wipro, a distinctive, recognisable, global logo was essential as they commenced outward 
investments. Especially for Wipro, favourable brand recognition was imperative and 
intrinsic to their internationalisation strategy. Both Airtel and Wipro used global brand 
management companies to create their present logos. For the two hospitality companies, 
internationalisation was a means to promote their brand to develop competitive 
advantage in the home market against international hotel chains by targeting clients in 
host markets. While TCS uses the logo of its parent company, they have an extensive 
campaigning programme spread across the globe to promote the company. 
 
10.2.4 Host Country Environment 
To be successful in different host markets, each company in this study has adopted 
various ways to acquire competitive advantage. They have ascertained that home 
country advantages and product models are not fully replicable outside the home 
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market; this could be due to a loss of an advantage, which might occur due to the nature 
of the host market, or the creation of a disadvantage, which could arise again due to 
the typical nature of the host market, and lack of complementary resources due to the 
unavailability of the same in the host market (Cuervo-Cazzura et al., 2007). In the case 
of Airtel and Wipro, this edification has been from non-achievement of the proposed 
strategic direction of their internationalisation process. Airtel had misjudged the African 
market, expecting it to have almost similar demographics as India and thus expecting 
its very successful ‘minutes model’ in India to attain the same success as in the African 
countries. Similarly, Wipro faced cultural and language issues, in particular regions which 
compelled the company to hire local managers for increased adaptability and integration 
of company objectives with the local culture and requirements.      
 
For each of the five companies it can be concluded that localisation has been 
indispensable in order to flourish in foreign markets. This connects to the dynamic 
capabilities theory, which states that companies have the ability to change or adapt its 
resources to suit the changing external environment (Ambrosini & Bowman, 2009). The 
critical aspect for success and sustained competitive advantage is continuous learning 
and development of its employees. For home market managers, it is important to 
sensitise to host market requirements which is attained through self-learning and which 
differs from country to country (Aharoni et al. 2011). Similarly, for local hiring or acquired 
managers, it is important to integrate with the company’s vision, mission and global 
strategic intentions.  
 
10.2.5 Internationalisation Strategy and the Financial Crisis 
There was a vast reduction of OFDI from developed markets as an aftermath of the 
financial crisis. In comparison OFDI from emerging and transition economies increased 
significantly. Scholars (Krugman, 1998; Aguiar & Gopinath, 2005) have indicated that 
lower cost valuation of assets may occur as an after effect of a global or regional crisis. 
Such low-cost valuations of assets may have assisted EMNEs to pursue active 
acquisitions, especially in developed markets post the financial crisis of 2008-09. 
However, all sectors and industries are affected during such global crises and the 
financial global; crises had vastly affected the banking sector and financing from banks 
had become expensive. How do the EMNEs then finance acquisitions or other overseas 




The study of the five companies in the data set demonstrate that they have been 
disparate when faced with similar crises; nevertheless, their motivations and strategies 
towards their internationalisation have remained consistent regardless of the dynamic 
external environment. This is evident from the fact that both Airtel and IHCL made 
unsolicited bids for established companies in 2008 in light of the lower valuations caused 
by the financial crisis. However, both were unsuccessful and consequently withdrew their 
offers. Wipro, while remaining on course in continually expanding into foreign markets, 
changed the mode of internationalisation from aggressive acquisitions to investment only 
through the organic mode. For the kind of capability acquisitions that Wipro targeted, 
companies with such capabilities were not available for sale because of lower valuations 
due to market conditions which then prevailed while their expected worth was much 
higher. Companies which were available for acquisition and were in Wipro’s line of 
business were not attractive targets. This was due to the fact that these companies were 
already losing sales and clients and, hence, would not have added to any capability 
advantage that Wipro sought from its acquisitions. However, for TCS lower valuation of 
an MNC bank subsidiary turned advantageous as they acquired a capability (BPO) which 
they had lacked. This capability acquisition assisted TCS to acquire additional clients. 
EIHL continued to maintain its conservative investment outlook and cautious approach 
to investments whether in India or overseas in line with its managerial vision.  
 
10.3 Theoretical Synthesis 
While literature has been considered when analysing the individual companies, this 
section will recapture key literature in light of the themes and issues arising in individual 
cases and across cases. The key concepts will first be described and then integrated with 
the key theoretical aspects. This will then form the basis of the empirical and theoretical 
contribution presented in detail in this chapter and summarised in the final conclusion 
chapter (Chapter 11). 
 
10.3.1 Resource Based and Dynamic Capabilities Literature 
Firms are unique, having distinctive resources which provide distinctive services 
(Penrose, 1959). The services provided can either be in the form of physical goods or 
intangible services. These goods and services are sold to generate profits. Penrose 
further stated that firms also behave differently in the face of risk and uncertainties and 
firms will require specific managerial resources to plan for unforeseen occurrences. The 
global financial crisis of 2008-09 was such an unforeseen event. Firms will continue to 
use a resource until it is profitable, or may require for an unprofitable resource to be 
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modified or totally removed. Firms will acquire or develop resources that help them build 
competencies for sustained competitive advantage (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney & Clark, 
2007). Consequently, for attaining competitive advantage in foreign markets, firms will 
administer various strategies which could be accessing new resources, transforming 
exiting resources, acquiring new capabilities and new knowledge and exploiting 
innovative capabilities (Hitt et al., 1997). 
  
Capability building is an ongoing process which is required by firms to counter 
unforeseen exogenous factors. Such capabilities can be termed as dynamic capabilities 
of the firm (Winter, 2003). A dynamic capability is the ability of a firm to manipulate and 
modify its resources to maintain competitive advantage in dynamic changing external 
environment (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Rindova & Kotha, 2001). Firms, especially 
those from emerging markets, may invest overseas to acquire the resources they lack 
or acquire additional resources complementary to those they already possess (Tan & 
Meyer, 2010). Such internationalisation strategies could include economies of scale, 
global sourcing, global innovations and knowledge management, acquiring global 
customers and risk diversification (Peng & Meyer, 2011). Firms can aggregate 
operations, adapt to local markets or consider financial arbitrage or a combination of 
these strategies when adopting internationalisation.  
 
The Uppsala model explains the development of individual firms over time (Vahlne & 
Johanson, 2013). The earlier versions of the Uppsala model (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977, 
2009) indicated that the internationalisation of Swedish manufacturing firms was based 
on domestic success followed by a cautious approach towards expansion in overseas 
markets. It was stated that internationalisation happens in stages with additional 
resources being committed as the company progresses through each stage from being 
a domestic firm to an international firm. In the process, the firm encounters various 
experiential learnings that help it to internationalise successfully. In the 2013 version, 
the authors explicate that the eclectic paradigm (Dunning various) does not explain the 
organisation and growth of the individual firm, rather it explains the functioning and 
organisation of the larger economic system. They further state that economic theory is 
also not suitable for the study of individual firms. Further, that the assumptions on which 
the internalisation theory is based are unrealistic. The Uppsala model uses the dynamic 
capabilities theory to interpret the internationalisation of multinational business 
enterprises (MBE) wherein the competitive advantage of the firms is in the form of 
dynamic capabilities. Here the concept of the MBE is an attempt to also embrace other 
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firms rather than the typical manufacturing MNE. Vahlne and Johanson (2013) in revising 
the Uppsala model assume that products are heterogeneous, there are a multitude of 
transactions taking place in the market, learning and innovation form a large part of the 
internationalisation process, there are limited number of actors with primarily dyadic 
relationships, and firms use networks and that there is uncertainty in the external 
environment. The main building block of this model is the inter-organisational process 
which evolves due to learning and experience thus affecting the operations and dynamic 
capabilities of the firm. The authors state that as per their model, mode of 
internationalisation loses relevance as does the value of internalisation. Finally, the 
authors raise the question about the location choice of firms while internationalising 
stating that for firms does the actual location hold priority or having a partner (network) 
in a certain location which determines the location choice.  
 
10.3.2 Internationalisation Literature 
The size and scope of a firm’s internationalisation is representative of the firm’s strategic 
direction and growth intent (Hitt et al., 2006). The degree of internationalisation can 
indicate effective use of resource utilisation, market power or access to new resources 
and capabilities. Firms go through three stages of internationalisation, namely: early 
internationalisation (a stage where they face unfamiliarity with the foreign markets); 
later internationalisation (length of internationalisation during early stages finally results 
in benefits); and excessive internationalisation (incremental internationalisation in all 
types of market may lead to reduced profits), (Contractor, 2007).  
 
Firms that internationalise very close to their origination have been termed born-global 
firms and they are a function of technological advancement and international 
entrepreneurial orientation (Knight & Cavusgil, 2004). These firms are generally small to 
medium in size having progenitors with prior international experience of working with 
DMNCs in foreign markets with a strong international network. These entrepreneurial 
cum owners of these firms build distinctive capabilities through market, internal and 
network learning, all of which leads to accelerated internationalisation of these firms 
(Weerawardana et al., 2007).  
 
Fairly similar to born-global firms is the concept about international new ventures (INVs) 
which are identified with firms formed through internalisation with pre-existing global 
networks and alliances and the ability to raise capital through alternative governance 
structures and emerge due to the unique capabilities of its founders/entrepreneurs in a 
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technologically developed environment (Oviatt & McDougall, 1994; Rialp et al., 2005). 
Accessing business history literature, another form of companies that internationalised 
on conception were the free-standing companies (FSCs). FSCs emerged during the period 
1600s to 1800s and existed until after World War II and were mainly British domiciled 
companies which did not have any domestic presence in the home market and were set 
up solely to conduct and manage lines of business that operated overseas, mainly in 
British colonies (Wilkins, 1988). FSCs were markedly different from the modern-day 
multinationals as the former were set up for the sole purpose of operating in one 
overseas market whereas MNCs established themselves first in the home countries prior 
to venturing to several overseas host markets (Wilkin & Schröter, 1998).  
 
The location choice of firms as per Ghemawat (2001) is based on the CAGE framework: 
Cultural distance, which is language, religion or social norms; Administrative, political or 
institutional distance; Geographic distance which is inadequate communication, physical 
remoteness or different climates; and Economic distance which stems from the 
difference in economic levels of the consumer, lack of information knowledge, and the 
quality of human resources. Cultural distance as the main measure of psychic distance 
was an index proposed by Kogut and Singh (1988) and was an accepted norm for 
locational choice in international business literature (Håkanson & Ambos, 2010). Psychic 
distance is the perceived distance between home country and host country based on 
cultural closeness rather than distance. However, in recent times with increased 
experience of internationalisation, managers have increased investments to culturally 
distant countries (Buckley et al., 2008); hence the relevance of psychic distance has 
diminished (Meyer & Thaijongrak, 2012).  
 
10.3.3 Integration of Theory and Data Evidence  
Each of the five companies possessed unique resources and capabilities and their 
response to uncertainty (financial crisis) was also distinct (Penrose, 1959). Airtel using 
exploitive approach of internationalisation in Africa has been largely unsuccessful as its 
capabilities have not been fully replicable in the continent. Airtel faces uncertainty around 
the success of its model in Africa and has sought to sell two of its operations in the 
African continent as well as to consolidate its towers and operational costs. It can be 
stated that companies need to combine both exploitive and explorative capabilities for 
internationalisation success (Prange & Verdier, 2011). Both IT companies face 
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uncertainties in the US market given the change in government31 which has announced 
they will decrease certain types of visas which will affect the Indian workforce of these 
companies in USA. TCS and Wipro will be required to adapt and adopt ‘shaping’ 
strategies, to collaborate with the USA government and its US client to survive conditions 
where their main model of ‘cost-arbitrage’ could be affected due to the reduction of the 
work visa for its Indian engineers. On the other hand, EIHL chose to exit countries which 
they perceived not fitting with the brand image they wished to portray, like in Nepal and 
Tanzania; or they were not comfortable with the political environment, for example in 
Iraq and Pakistan. Hence, EIHL chose to exit such countries to survive, which is 
considered the harsh route. Reeves et al. (2015) state that in an unpredictable business 
environments, companies need to consider ‘adaptive’ measures which is to continually 
change in an environment neither predictable nor malleable or ‘shaping’ strategies in an 
unpredictable but malleable surroundings where firms collaborate and evolve; and then 
there is the ‘renewal’ approach to strategy which is appropriate in environments like the 
financial crisis when firms need to take harsh steps for survival. 
 
Airtel developed a capability in its ‘minutes model’ and also acquired the model for 
building ‘Airtel Money’ that provided them with the ability to compete against competitors 
in host markets. This conforms to what the authors Wernerfelt (1984) and Barney and 
Clark (2007) state about firms acquiring or developing resources that help them build 
competencies for sustained competitive advantage. Similarly, Wipro and TCS also 
acquired capabilities and resources through acquisitions for sustained competitive 
advantage in various global host markets which affirms to what Hitt et al. (1997) state 
about firms accessing new resources or acquiring resources and capabilities for attaining 
competitive advantage in foreign markets.  
 
For Wipro and TCS, their internationalisation has been towards achieving the targets 
that they have set for themselves, be it generating revenues or achieving a global 
position within the IT services sector. Airtel’s internationalisation has been limited to 
emerging markets based on their pricing model which the company perceived would not 
function in a developed market given the specificity of the product. 
 
                                                          
31 The new President of USA, Donald Trump’s new policies of ‘America First’ has steered towards the 
decrease of H-1B visas that Indian IT companies used to acquire for their Indian engineers and scientists 
(Srivastava, 2017). This policy will restrict Indians workers of the IT companies from traveling to USA 




TCS acquired the MNC bank BPO and developed capabilities during the financial crisis to 
take advantage of the banking sector collapse which affirms to the possession of 
dynamic capabilities that have been attained by continually building on existing 
capabilities to impede external factors not in the control of the companies (Winter, 
2003). Thus, TCS renewed its resources and capabilities in response to a dynamic 
environment (Ambrosini & Bowman, 2009). Airtel had not factored the regulatory 
environment across borders while importing infrastructure for its operations. The lead 
time was almost 3 months compared to 5-7 days within India. This was reduced 
considerably, by almost one third, due to the efforts of the company to manage the 
transfer of such equipment across borders within the African continent.  
 
Wipro has used overseas investment to acquire additional capabilities to enhance its 
suite of product services that ties in with Tan and Meyer’s (2010) postulations about 
EMNEs using FDI to acquire resources that they deem to lack. Similarly, TCS has also 
acquired resources thus expanding its capabilities in servicing clients.  
 
Each company studied has appreciated the need to adapt to the host market 
requirement, whether it be embracing cultural or social needs which are instrumental in 
surviving in such host markets. This has come about through managerial learning 
towards building dynamic capability using both exploitive and exploratory learning 
(Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004). Such self-learning of managers differs depending on 
different countries (Ahoroni et al., 2011). TCS and Wipro have both adopted cost 
arbitrage in service provision in developed market through CSAs in the form of English-
speaking scientists and engineers adept in IT services. TCS has attained aggregation 
through its global network delivery model. Thus, the ‘AAA’ model (Peng & Meyer, 2011) 
has been used individually or in combination towards global diversification by these 
companies.   
 
Górska (2013), Tuzová et al (2015) and Oliveira (2017) have questioned if the Uppsala 
model explains the internationalisation of SMEs and service sector firms from developing 
economies. From the evidence of the companies in my data set it can be stated firmly 
that the Uppsala model does not fully explain the internationalisation of service sector 
firms. The early internationalisation of TCS without a strong base in the home country 
or established networks in foreign locations does not fit the Uppsala explanation of 
Internationalisation. The rapid internationalisation of Wipro and Airtel without networks 
is also contrary to the cautious approach presumed in the Uppsala model 
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internationalisation theory. However, the experiential learning and knowledge adaption 
due to internationalisation has been experienced by each firm in the data set.       
 
Companies internationalising go through three stages of internationalisation (Contractor, 
2007), the first being a stage where they are unfamiliar with the foreign market which 
holds true for TCS. When TCS first set up an office in USA in 1979, it was aware that the 
services it provided only would be appreciated in developed markets; however, when it 
opened its office in New York, it had no clients and it took some time and effort for the 
company managers to familiarise themselves with the market and win the first contract 
for the company. The same can be corroborated for Airtel too. Airtel’s experience in Sri 
Lanka with a Greenfield venture was not productive for the company. The experience in 
Sri Lanka led to the company adopting an acquisition mode in Bangladesh and Africa. 
However, Airtel has still not managed to reach the second stage of internationalisation 
which results in benefits for the firm; for Airtel with its continued losses in Africa, it can 
be stated that the company has moved directly to the third stage of internationalisation 
as per Contractor’s (2007) three stages of internationalisation. The third stage of 
internationalisation does not conform to TCS or Wipro as these two companies continue 
to expand their presence in overseas markets and have managed to sustain their 
competitive advantage while continuing to make profits. For both TCS and Wipro, the 
bulk of their revenues are earned from their overseas operations.  For IHCL and EIHL, 
their internationalisation process has been limited and focussed and, hence, can be 
rendered to be somewhere in between the first and the second stage of 
internationalisation as per Contractor’s (2007) stages of internationalisation. 
 
Accelerated internationalisation has been associated with born global firms which are 
small to medium in size (Knight & Cavusgil, 2004; Weerawardana, 2007). This 
association does not correspond with Wipro’s accelerated internationalisation. Wipro was 
already a large company with a strong presence in its home market. The company had 
also listed on the NYSE just around the same time that it made its first overseas 
investment.  
 
Another phenomenon of born global firms is that these firms do not wait to reach a stage 
of maturity before they invest overseas and have global intentions at the advent due to 
entrepreneurial global aspirations (Cavusgil & Knight, 2015). However, in the case of 
TCS, this does not hold true as it was not an entrepreneurial structure. The managers 
of TCS who had taken the decision for TCS’s first international venture did not have prior 
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multinational work experience. TCS was either their first job or they were from other 
companies within the parent group.  TCS does not fall within the ambit of international 
new ventures (INVs) either as was defined by Oviatt and McDougall (1994) or Rialp 
(2005). This was due to the fact that TCS was not set up through pre-existing global 
networks or alliances. My study also shows that TCS does not conform to an earlier form 
of multinationals known as the Free-Standing Company (FSC). Wilkins (1998) was 
instrumental in identifying FSCs which were set-up only to operate in single overseas 
countries and had no domestic presence.   
 
Thus, from my study it is explicit that TCS’s internationalisation and Wipro’s accelerated 
internationalisation was unique and does not fit the standard explanation present in the 
literature. Hence, the definition of internationalisation requires to be extended to 
accommodate the initial internationalisation phase of TCS and Wipro’s accelerated 
internationalisation.   
 
As mentioned above, psychic distance is the perceived distance and measures the 
cultural closeness between two countries. It has been stated in literature that EMNEs 
seek internationalisation in countries where the perceived distance is low. For Airtel, this 
holds true as all the foreign markets that it sought were perceived to be similar in 
demography to the home country. However, the company has not achieved the success 
in Africa that it had expected and continues to struggle in the continent. This evidences 
that the company did not account for the considerable cultural differences between 
Africa and India. For example, any money saved on telecom calls were used for other 
purposes rather than for making additional calls as was the case in India. This was due 
to economic conditions in Africa being worse than in India.   
 
Perceived psychic distance also does not justify Wipro and TCS seeking developed 
markets like USA and UK for their initial internationalisation. Other than the common 
language spoken, there were no similarities with those English-speaking developed 
countries. Further, for the European developed markets like Germany and France, the 
language spoken was also different. Hence, it can be stated that psychic distance was 
not relevant for these companies. This conforms with Meyer and Thaijongrak’s (2012) 
statement that the relevance of psychic distance has decreased with increased 
managerial learning and informed decision making around location choice (Buckley et 
al., 2008). The network-based model of Uppsala theory (Vahlne & Johanson, 2013) also 
states that psychic distance is irrelevant as a source of uncertainty.  In the case of TCS 
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it can be ascertained that psychic distance was never relevant as it only sought 
developed markets in the initial stages due to the specificity of the IT services that it 
could provide during that time. 
 
My study has shown that the five companies in the data set are present in countries 
which are culturally different from the home country, India. TCS, Wipro and IHCL have 
actively sought developed markets especially those of the USA, UK and European 
countries which are economically superior. Geographic distance has been immaterial for 
each of the five companies. This implies that the five companies have managed 
administrative distance too. This has been achieved by hiring local talent in management 
positions in the foreign markets. Hence, it can be stated that for the Indian companies 
in the data set, locational choice using the CAGE framework (Ghemawat, 2001) does not 
hold true. 
 
Internationalisation objectives for IHCL and EIHL were similar, which was the need to 
attract foreign tourists and business travellers to their properties in the home market. 
Hence, their scale of internationalisation has been limited to source markets and popular 
tourist destinations. This is in accordance with what Hitt et al (2006) have stated, that 
the size and scope of a firm’s internationalisation is representative of the firm’s strategic 
direction and growth intent.  
 



















From this section, it can be stated that the resource-based and dynamic capabilities 
theories within the strategic management literature are imperative towards the 
theoretical analysis. Possession of resources and capabilities, managerial and 
organisational learning, adaptation to host markets, exploitive and explorative 
capabilities, and location choices can be appraised in strategic management terms. 
Further, the two IT companies, TCS and Wipro are pursuing global strategies while Airtel 
is pursuing an international regional strategy and the two hospitality services companies, 
IHCL and EIHL are pursuing a limited internationalisation strategy. Psychic distance does 
not hold relevance for location choices for either of the companies. The 
internationalisation process of both Wipro and TCS is unique and does not fit the 
textbook internationalisation explanations of these firms and, hence, there is a need to 
extend the internationalisation definition of firms. 
 
10.3.4 Contribution – Towards a New understanding of EMNE 
Internationalisation 
While the contribution has been reaffirmed in the final concluding Chapter (Chapter 11), 
this section emphasises the main differences in internationalisation of the companies in 
the data set with reference to the literature discussed in the previous section (Section 
10.3.3).  
 
This study has extended the theoretical understanding behind the concept of 
multinational companies as well as the accelerated internationalisation concept 
associated with born-global firms. It further discusses whether the firms possess or lack 
ownership advantages, as there is discussion in international business literature of the 
plausible lack of such ownership advantages within emerging market firms and one of 
the significant reasons for internationalisation is to acquire such advantages.  
 
The concept of psychic distance does not articulate the locational choices of the firms 
investigated. Emerging market companies are not similar in nature or culture, with 
different languages, religion, social norms and economic conditions. Hence, the psychic 
distance concept based on cultural proximity needs revisiting or removing completely to 
study international location choice of firms. Similarly, the three stages of 
internationalisation also do not fully hold for the five companies in the data set with the 
two IT companies remaining in the second stage despite increased internationalisation. 
The telecom company moving straight to the third stage from stage one and the 
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hospitality companies due to their limited internationalisation in between stages one and 
two. Therefore, this concept also needs re-articulation.   
 
The early internationalisation of TCS does not fit into the given definition of born-global 
firms, neither does it fit into the explanation of early ventures like INVs and FSCs. Hence, 
the early internationalisation of TCS without any domestic presence with a high HQ 
investment and with managers who had not worked for other multinational companies 
and in an environment, that was not technologically very advanced expands the 
definition of the conception of multinational companies. 
 
Wipro and Airtel’s internationalisation can be termed as ‘accelerated internationalisation’ 
with a spate of acquisitions in a short space of time. However, unlike born global firms 
which are associated with the concept of accelerated internationalisation, both Wipro 
and Airtel were large firms with an established presence in their domestic market. The 
companies had collaborated with DMNCs to create and increase the awareness of their 
brand. Acquisitions by TCS and Wipro were sought for capability development which is 
also antithetical to the internalisation concept as these capabilities increased the product 
suite of both the companies and were not aimed towards intermediate products (Coase, 
1937) as has been seen in the case of manufacturing companies. 
 
Given the conclusion as demonstrated above, this thesis now proposes a new 
developmental concept called the ‘Fast Capability Acquisition Model’ or FCAM. This 
concept relates to large emerging market service companies with an established 
presence in the domestic market. These companies have a desire to quickly establish 
themselves in foreign locations which is mainly attained through setting up Greenfield 
ventures, Joint ventures and partnerships or through capability and resource 
acquisitions. It is important to note here that these companies wanted to establish 
themselves overseas and also venture overseas to acquire capabilities and resources 
which were otherwise not available in the domestic market. 
 
The building block for the FCAM model is anchored on the missing links in the existing 
theories which do not fully explain the internationalisation of the service companies that 
have been investigated in this study. While this has been already been discussed above, 




Table 6: FCAM Building Block 
 
 
As is evident from the FCAM building block table, there are specific missing elements in 
the theory sets that do not explain the internationalisation of the five firms in this study 
in totality. However, there are attributes of these theory sets to which the 
internationalisation of the firms in the data set do conform to. Each of the five companies 
have demonstrated entrepreneurial orientation and the two IT companies and the 
telecom company have embraced accelerated internationalisation using technological 
advancement which is atypical of born global firms. Further, TCS internationalised on 
263 
 
the very onset of its inception, in line with the earlier INVs and FCS. Both Airtel and 
Wipro were well established in the domestic market before they ventured overseas, 
which is pursuant to the stages model. Finally, using R&D towards knowledge flow as 
an internalisation tool in international markets by the two IT companies, is in consonance 
with the internalisation theory. Notwithstanding the common attributes, there are certain 
missing links in these theory sets on the basis of which this study introduces a new 
concept, namely the FCAM model, to explain the internationalisation of emerging market 
service sector firms. 
 
The FCAM model has been conceptualised on the basis of accelerated internationalisation 
to acquire intellectual property capabilities and market penetration, which has been 
achieved for establishing an international presence quickly rather than in a phased 
manner.  
 
The entrepreneurial capabilities apparent in all the firms are not specific to small firms 
but, as has been demonstrated in this study, are also found in large firms. Other specific 
internal factors can be attributed to cost arbitrage capabilities created due to FSAs and 
CSAs (that have been explained in detail in the empirical chapters). The presence of 
such capabilities assists these firms to adapt to client needs with the quick provision of 
customised services. This has been a unique factor that can be credited to Indian IT 
sector firms. The unique model created by Airtel as a response to the particular 
demography of India is also characteristic of market adaptation.  
 
External factors like domestic market saturation (for the telecom company) and 
competition from DMNCs due to market liberalisation leading to internationalisation were 
also idiosyncratic to the Indian market. In addition to this, a limited demand for certain 
services due to institutional incapacity leading to accelerated internationalisation despite 
a large domestic presence for some of the companies, is a distinctive feature too. 
 
Brand awareness specifically to provide competition in the domestic market by the 
hospitality companies is also particular to the two Indian companies. 
 
Further, the accelerated internationalisation with the intent to acquire intellectual 





The FCAM model is an explanatory model and not a causal model. With the help of the 
FCAM model, specific firm behaviour towards their internationalisation has been 
explained. Further, this model has helped conceptualise internationalisation behaviour 
of only the five firms that have been studied in this thesis. It is possible that such a 
conceptualisation may apply to other firms but to confirm the same is beyond the scope 
of this study and forms the basis for future studies.  
 
10.4 Chapter Conclusion 
In this chapter summary of findings around resources and capabilities, mode of 
internationalisation, branding strategies, response to different host markets and effects 
of the financial crisis on internationalisation process was discussed. This was followed 
by a theoretical synthesis to compare and contrast the five companies in terms of some 
key theories derived from key literature on resource-based and dynamic capabilities 
theory and internationalisation literature.  
 
In the next chapter, which is the final chapter of this thesis, conclusion of this study will 
be provided by answering the research questions along with articulating the contribution 







The purpose of this chapter is to present the final conclusion of this thesis by presenting 
the main findings and contribution to knowledge. Specifically reflecting how this study 
achieves the objective of understanding the strategic motivations behind Indian services 
sector firms’ internationalisation processes within the framework of dynamic capabilities 
and the resources-based approach and effects of the dynamic environment on the 
process of internationalisation. 
 
This chapter considers the analytical chapters and the cross-case analysis to answer the 
research questions and concludes the main research question that was raised in Chapter 
1. The empirical and theoretical contributions are then presented followed by the 
limitations. Agenda for future research concludes this chapter. 
 
11.2 Conclusion to the Research Questions 
The aim of this section is to summarise the main findings of this thesis based on the five 
research questions first, which will then be followed by concluding the main overarching 
research question in the next section (Section 10.3). Summaries from the analysis 
chapters (Chapters 4-8) will be referred to including the findings from the same as it 
delimits what the study has found while analysing the five companies and, hence, 
concludes the research questions. Each of the five research questions were further 
broken into specific questions (as presented in Chapter 2) and those will also be 
answered within each of the sub-sections below.  
 
It should be noted here that it was the aim to address each of the research questions 
within the analysis chapters, answers to each of them have not been exclusively 
examined within the same. This section addresses each of the research questions.  
 
11.2.1 Research Question 1:  
 
Why do Indian companies internationalise and what is the favoured entry 
mode for outward investment and the reasons behind the same? 
 
From the analysis of the five service sector companies, it can be stated that the 
motivations for internationalisation for Indian companies are disparate in nature. The 
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external dynamic environment, in the form of market liberalisation in India along with 
the entrepreneurial activities of the firm, has been the dominant factor for 
internationalisation of these firms. The new Uppsala Internationalisation Process Model 
captures the aspect of such entrepreneurial activities towards internationalisation 
motivations of firms (Johanson & Vahlne, 2006, 2009).  
 
Common elements of the internationalisation motivations included a focus on growth 
through internationalisation and the need for sustained competitive advantage in the 
face of increasing competition in the home market from the advent of multinational 
companies. With liberalisation leading to inbound FDI, companies in emerging 
economies were exposed to MNCs and were faced with competition in their home market 
which helped them look outward themselves and thus become MNEs in turn (Daniels et 
al., 2007). 
 
Internationalisation motives have been divergent as has been evidently determined in 
this thesis.  The need to acquire clients for the specific services provided and hence 
market seeking in the initial phase of internationalisation was a factor for one of the IT 
companies. The expanse of the internationalisation for both the IT companies stand in 
contrast to the purposeful international strategy and the more limited strategies of the 
other three companies in the data-set. 
 
To answer the more specific question if internationalisation as a means for Indian firms 
to catch up with more established players, it can be confirmed for the two IT service 
companies. Individual goals established for the firms in terms of achieving specific global 
position within the sector and revenues earned, can be confirmed for the two IT 
companies and hence, the need to catch up with the more established players in their 
field. Acquisition and Greenfield mode in developed countries as a tool was used to 
pursue rapid internationalisation (Tsai & Eisingerich, 2010). This was not the case for 
the hospitality companies nor for the telecom company as the latter was already an 
established telecom services player by number of subscribers, mainly due to the large 
Indian population (1.3 billion); therefore, the internationalisation motive was the 
saturation in the home market and the need to continue to achieve growth. 
 
Addressing the question about the type of overseas investment that Indian firms favour, 
it can be stated that acquisition as a mode of internationalisation has been dominant. 
Acquisitions require high obligation and are a risky proposition which EMNEs prefer for 
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accelerated internationalisation (Meyer & Thajongrak, 2013). However, it has also been 
determined that associated fixed costs in hospitality services prompted the companies 
in that specific service sector to seek management contracts as modes of 
internationalisation. Whereas, organic growth mode in international markets has also 
been evidenced. Thus, this thesis demonstrates the need to qualitatively analyse 
companies to understand internationalisation motives as it has been evidenced that 
companies do not follow similar investment modes.          
 
Global strategies depend on capturing economies of scale, thus leading to globalisation 
based on standardisation of products: multi-domestic companies treat each market 
separately adapting to local requirements as they go with high degree of autonomy 
granted to the subsidiaries (Harzing, 2002). The other differentiation between global 
companies and multi-domestic companies lies in the exploitation of FSAs and CSAs 
(Rugman & Verbeke, 2004). Global companies use cost efficiency (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 
1989) and hence prefer Greenfield internationalisation. Multi-domestic companies prefer 
to acquire in local markets to adapt to local circumstances (Harzing, 2002). However, 
this conclusion was reached through the study of manufacturing companies. 
 
In the case of the IT companies studied for this thesis it was observed that they have 
used CSAs to generate FSAs and have used economies of scale to create cost arbitrage 
but have also locally adapted with decentralised subsidiaries with centralised objectives. 
However, one company has preferred Greenfield while the other, acquisitions. Hence, 
internationalisation theories based on manufacturing companies cannot be adapted to 
service companies. 
 
Thus, it can be concluded that global corporate strategies are inherent to a company 
and any two companies with the same motivation can chose totally divergent paths 
towards their internationalisation. 
 
11.2.2 Research Question 2 
 
Whether Indian MNEs that invest overseas possess home-grown capabilities 
and are they able to transfer the same to overseas markets?  
 
The objective of this question is to understand, first, if Indian firms believe that they lack 
strategic assets which may help them to compete in international market and the home 
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market and, second, if the companies then seek internationalisation as a means of 
acquiring such assets as it is has been stated that EMNEs invest overseas to acquire 
strategic assets as they are not endowed with dominant firm advantages (Ramamurti, 
2013, Cuervo-Cazurro & Ramamurti, 2014). 
 
From the analysis chapters, it is evident that all the five service companies possessed 
specific resources and capabilities which facilitated their individual internationalisation 
strategies. Hence, it can be stated that the companies were confident about their abilities 
to survive in foreign markets based on their home-grown capabilities.  
 
The resource based view states that companies develop competitive advantage based 
on the strengths of its resources which could be acquired or developed (Wernerfelt, 
1984; Barney & Clark, 2007). This has been corroborated in this thesis with the 
companies acquiring additional capabilities and resources to substantiate and 
consolidate their position in their chosen host markets. Further, there is evidence that 
companies had the ability to internationalise even during a restrictive foreign policy 
regime in India which is then indicative of assured capability capacity to attain 
appreciable competitive advantage in host markets. While, the dynamics of the home 
country environment was a catalyst for internationalisation strategies, it has been 
determined that the initial internationalisation was based on the strength of home-grown 
capabilities. 
 
The IT companies have invested heavily in R&D, thus continually building on their 
existing capabilities which is congruent to firms attaining internationalisation success; 
not only through acquisitions but also through building and developing in-house 
capabilities and advantages (Rugman & Verbeke, 2004). 
 
Thus, in summation it can be validated that the Indian firms in this study did not lack 
strategic assets which might have impeded their internationalisation strategies. 
However, these companies were not satisfied in competing in international markets only 
on the basis of home grown capabilities and resources but were willing to acquire 





11.2.3 Research Question 3 
 
Do Indian companies in the data set require building capabilities that suit host 
markets or are they able to transform existing capabilities to meet the needs 
of different host markets? 
 
Building on the previous section, it has already been substantiated that these companies 
were already in possession of certain resources and capabilities which assisted these 
companies to internationalise thus refuting the notion that companies from emerging 
markets may not be endowed with strategic internal resources. 
 
In relation to the sub-question (Chapter 2) on the type of properties that these resources 
had, it has been revealed that, given the dissimilar services that these companies 
provide, properties of the existing resources were also dissimilar. 
 
While the low-cost arbitrage international strategies of the IT companies are not 
inimitable (Lewin & Peeters, 2006), the innovation technologies, unique R&D capabilities 
and the patents that the companies maintain can posit to hold VRIN properties 
(Storchevoi, 2015).  
 
The unique ability of the telecom firm to outsource its capital expenditure thus reducing 
pricing for the end user is indicative of dynamic capabilities. However, such a low pricing 
model is not inimitable, neither is it non- substitutable but the ability for a company to 
implement the model successfully to achieve a formidable position in the telecom 
services industry is its rare capability. This innovative model has also been adopted by 
developed market companies and is a corroboration of the fact that EMNEs have the 
ability to contribute to innovations rather than only borrowing innovations and can be 
referred to as reverse innovation (Govindarajan & Ramamurti, 2016).   
 
For hotel services companies, their human capital is their biggest resource base which 
provides them with unique service capabilities. Human capital specific to one activity 
may not be rare or create value; however, totality of coordinated activities among human 
resources in varying sequences moving towards creating a boutique of hospitality 
services for the client can be both inimitable and non-substitutable (Ferrary & 
Mozgovaya, 2014). Industry focussed skills make such human capital rare and extensive 
training and development of staff for creating industry-focussed skills further add value 
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to such human capital. Hence, it can be confirmed that both the hospitality companies 
possessed resources with VRIN properties. 
 
Another sub-question to RQ3 is to understand if the five companies need to continually 
make changes or supplement the resources and capabilities that they possess. The 
explanation provided in RQ2 can be extended to respond to this. The companies in the 
data set, especially the IT and the telecom companies were continually developing, 
acquiring, changing and supplementing their existing resources and capabilities towards 
sustained competitive advantage which confirms to Rugman and Verbeke’s (2004) view 
that companies are required to continually enhance their FSAs through aggregation and 
arbitrage. 
 
The final sub-question involves comprehending if a dynamic environment necessitates 
creation, integration, recombining of new resources while entirely releasing existing 
resources. Dynamic capability of a firm establishes the ability of a firm to redefine its 
resources to adapt to a dynamic environment (Ambrosini & Bowman, 2009). This is a 
reflection of the resource based view (Teece et al., 1990). 
 
From the experience of analysing the five companies, it can be confirmed that none of 
them have totally released any existing resources. However, some companies have 
exited from certain markets. Reasons thereof on the one hand have been that such 
markets did not add any value to the long-term objectives and on the other the political 
environment has also caused such exit. The failure to totally comprehend the host 
market has also been the cause for exit and a possible merger as has been seen in the 
case of the telecom company. This has been further accentuated by a change in the 
dynamics of the domestic market arising from a price war initiated by another Indian 
conglomerate.  
 
Technology is continually changing and so is the business landscape. The IT companies 
launched certain services post liberalisation due to the fast pace of infrastructure growth 
in the domestic market. These services were then extended to global infrastructure 
companies which is demonstrative of dynamic capabilities. As mentioned earlier, a cost 
arbitrage model in not inimitable and hence the IT companies have strived to provide a 
variety of services towards client efficiency and benefit. Aggregation (Ghemawat, 2007) 
in addition to arbitrage as a competitive tool has been used efficiently by the IT 
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companies to become one of the largest and well recognised companies in that sector 
globally. 
 
Thus, from the above it can be established that these Indian companies internationalised 
based on their home-grown capabilities and resources which did have a combination of 
VRIN properties. For sustained competitive advantage and growth, the companies did 
adapt to host markets and client requirements by continually investing in innovation, 
R&D and new product development for enhanced client servicing and experience. 
However, they did not hesitate to exit markets that were not compatible with their long-
term strategies and goals.   
 
11.2.4 Research Question 4 
 
If the Indian companies in the data set, follow divergent internationalisation 
strategies depending upon the host country? 
 
The first sub-question of RQ4 asks ‘how Indian firms manage diverse host-country 
advantages which may differ from home-country advantages?’.  
 
Internationalisation has its benefits, nonetheless, firms can face a myriad of issues 
during the actual process of internationalisation. From a resource based perspective, 
reaching a position of advantage based on home-market resources and capabilities may 
not always be successful (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2007). Each host market has been 
different demographically with divergent culture, language, regulatory environment and 
infrastructure. The main response of each company has been to locally adapt as per the 
requirement of the host nation which has been achieved through adopting resource-
based strategies (Wernerfelt, 1995) and decision making through self-learning of the 
managers (Aharoni et al., 2011). Retention of employees through transparent 
communication, training and development and financial incentives was another strategy 
employed by the companies in the various host markets. Another common aspect among 
the companies studied was having a balance of managers both from the host markets 
and the home market to align the host country requirements with the headquarter long-




The second sub-question of RQ4 about achieving the same degree of success as the 
home market in absence of home-country advantages provides diverse response among 
the companies.  
 
Neither of the IT companies have divested in any host country that they have invested 
in and while they acknowledge that each host market may not achieve the same level 
of success, both the company’s major revenues come from foreign markets, which 
indicates that they have been far more successful in international markets than the home 
market. For the telecom company, success in another emerging market, home to its 
largest outward investment, has not been as the company had expected. The company 
has already divested two of its operations in that market and planning a merger in 
another Asian country. The hospitality companies too have divested stake in countries 
not meeting the objective of their internationalisation strategies. 
 
In terms of the third sub-section, if Indian firms can replicate a favourable business 
outcome from one host market to another, the companies were explicit in their response 
of the awareness of their understanding that each host market will be different and the 
handling of the diverse needs of each host market will also require distinct strategy 
within the overall internationalisation objective of the company. Managers may become 
presumptuous in the process of transferring existing knowledge from home market 
expansion to host market expansion leading to failure in international markets (Thomas 
et al., 2007). This can then discourage such firms from further expansion to international 
markets. Hence, it is imperative for firms to accurately utilise existing knowledge for 
internationalisation especially for firms from emerging markets. As Contractor (2013) 
has stated, companies which are in the process of internationalising will benefit from the 
knowledge of administrating different approaches to different host markets. 
 
Hence, it can be concluded that different companies follow different strategies in 
different host markets and such knowledge is anticipated or appropriated through 
learnings of the managers. 
 
11.2.5 Research Question 5 
 
Does the external environment affect internationalisation strategies in any 




For RQ5, the global financial crisis has been used as the reference point and the 
companies were asked if the same had affected their internationalisation strategies and 
the action that the companies required to counter any negative effects of the crisis. 
 
Sauvant et al. (2009) questioned if the flow of FDI may experience a major drop post 
the financial crisis, specially from emerging countries in Asia (Hill & Jongwanich, 2009). 
However, there was another view that lower asset prices may actually create 
opportunities for cash-rich EMNEs to actively acquire in developed markets.  
 
As has been consistently seen in this study, each of the company has responded 
contrastingly to different situations. This has also been observed in the various ways in 
which the companies have responded to the global financial crisis. However, there has 
been a commonality wherein none of the companies studied entirely put on hold their 
internationalisation plans due to the effects of the global financial crisis. Three of the 
companies adopted an aggressive internationalisation stance. For the telecom company, 
outward investments commenced only post the crisis. The IT companies used the 
financial sector meltdown to provide services required for a stricter regulatory 
environment that became essential as an aftermath of the crisis. The only significant 
change noticed in one of the IT companies as an effect of the crisis for a few years was 
the change in its investment mode from a more aggressive acquisition strategy to a 
somewhat conservative organic growth. For the hospitality service companies too, as 
they were in the luxury sector, the effect of the crisis was largely reduced for them. 
 
In sum, it can be confirmed that these companies were resilient to the effects of the 
financial global crisis and their growth objective through internationalisation remained 
mainly intact. 
 
11.3 Conclusion to the Main Research Question 
The overarching research problem of this study was as follows:  
 
If firms from emerging markets own resources and capabilities that help them 
internationalise, if they develop or acquire further resources and dynamic 
capabilities through internationalisation, and to what extent does the 





This study has revealed that the company’s possession of home-grown capabilities and 
resources have enabled their respective internationalisation. The motivation lay in the 
increasing competitive landscape of the home country and the specificity of the services 
offered coupled with the entrepreneurial intent of the owners and senior managers 
motivated such internationalisation. An external crisis like the global financial crisis did 
not affect the overall internationalisation strategic directions of these firms. 
 
It can be concluded that each company’s historical evolution or organisational context 
are divergent. The heterogeneity has evolved due to a dynamic external environment 
which has assisted in each of the company’s development of home-grown resources and 
capabilities for providing the distinctive services that they offer. The IT companies are 
already global leaders in their IT vertical. While the telecom company is struggling, it is 
in the top three by subscribers in its telecom vertical. The hospitality companies with 
their focussed internationalisation remain at the luxury end in their hospitality vertical. 
 
11.4 Contribution of the Study  
This research work contributes to a finite understanding of Indian firms in the services 
sector and their strategic motivation towards internationalisation. This section details the 
expected contribution. 
 
11.4.1 Empirical Contribution 
This study provides a contribution towards the field of knowledge.  
 
First, the process of internationalisation has been studied using the dynamics capabilities 
and the resources based view. Thus, establishing the fact that emerging market 
companies can possess home-grown resources and capabilities and that they do not 
internationalise specifically to acquire such resources and capabilities. Hence, this study 
refutes the notion that emerging market firms lack ownership advantages and that they 
internationalise mainly to acquire such advantages.   
 
Second, this study contributes to the expanding literature on understanding emerging 
market multinational companies. Specifically, to the very limited literature that is present 
on Indian multinational companies. As this study used elite interviewing sources to 
gather data around the understanding of the strategic motives, it has considerably more 
significance than current literature on India which is largely based on secondary data 
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including government reports and company-published records, and remains descriptive 
in nature with emphasis on trends and pattern of Indian overseas investment.    
 
Third, each of the companies’ approaches to internationalisation is heterogeneous in 
nature. This then contributes to the understanding that generalisation is not an added 
advantage for studying organisation decision making process. Qualitative studies thus 
bring out the unique characteristics that determine the strategies and motives behind 
company decisions; here it was internationalisation motives.      
 
11.4.2 Theoretical Contribution 
This study also provides a theoretical contribution by extending the understanding of the 
conception of multinational companies and the accelerated internationalisation concept 
associated with born-global firms.  
 
The given definition of born-global firms states that such firms are entrepreneurial in 
nature with global managers. These firms do not wait to reach a stage of maturity to 
internationalise with sights set on international markets right from their inception (Knight 
& Cavusgil, 2004; Weerawardena et al., 2007; Singal & Jain, 2012 quoting Rennie, 
1993). The concept of born global is ingrained in three interrelated attributes - new 
market conditions, technological advancement and capabilities of the managers 
(Nummela et al., 2004 quoting Madsen & Servais, 1997). However, this thesis has 
revealed that this is not entirely demonstrative of all such firms which internationalise at 
the inception with no global managers or advanced technology. It has been a case of 
specific services being provided with negligible domestic market demand, which then 
has led the company to seek an international developed market. Thus, this thesis seeks 
to extend the definition of born-global firms.  
 
Similar to the concept of born-global firms, international business literature has also 
discussed about international new ventures (INV) which are theoretically similar to born-
global firms. INV organisations are formed through internalisation with pre-existing 
global networks and alliances and the ability to raise capital through alternative 
governance structures and emerge due to the unique capabilities of its 
founders/entrepreneurs in a technologically developed environment (Oviatt & McDougall, 




Another form of international company discussed in business history literature is the free-
standing companies (FSC) which emerged during the period 1600s to 1800s and existed 
until after the Second World War. FSCs were markedly different from the modern-day 
multinationals as the former were set up for the sole purpose of operating in one 
overseas market whereas MNCs established themselves first in the home countries prior 
to venturing to several overseas host markets (Wilkin & Schröter, 1998).  
 
As evidenced in chapter 6, companies can internationalise at a nascent stage with the 
backing of parent company investments, without having global managers or pre-existing 
global networks or alliances. It was also seen that the environment was not 
technologically advanced and the move to internationalise was as an outcome of the 
political restrictions on foreign investments to and from the home-market. Thus, this 
thesis aptly demonstrates that the concept of born-global firms, INVs and FSCs do not 
encapsulate the formation of all such firms that internationalise at a nascent stage. 
Instead, this thesis evinces that firms without global managers, without pre-existing 
networks and without a technological advanced environment do have the ability to 
internationalise based on the specificity of their inherent capabilities and services 
provided. 
 
Another aspect of born-global firms is accelerated internationalisation. However, as 
discussed in chapter 4 and 5, companies which are well established in the domestic 
market can also experience accelerated and rapid internationalisation. This is not an 
attribute associated with born-global firms. Hence, ‘accelerated internationalisation’ 
cannot be limited to born global firms but needs to be expanded to include firms that 
have a large presence in the domestic market and seek such rapid internationalisation 
due to the saturation of the domestic market, as shown in this thesis.  
 
This study also states that psychic distance does not hold relevance for locational choice 
for any of the companies in the data set as each of the company has ventured into 
geographies which are not culturally or physically close. Thus, this study rejects this 
theoretical basis to understand the location choice of firms. As Vahlne & Johanson (2013) 
have ascertained that psychic distance is irrelevant for location choice decision for 
internationalisation. The relevance of psychic distance has decreased with increased 
managerial learning and informed decision making around location choice (Buckley et 
al., 2008). Thus, psychic distance as a concept for understanding locational choice 
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towards internationalisation is irrelevant for Indian service firms as this thesis has 
demonstrated.  
 
Studying service sector firms from India, this study agrees with Górska (2013), Tuzová 
et al (2015) and Oliveira (2017) that the Uppsala model fails to explain the 
internationalisation of all EMNEs. The stages model or the Uppsala model (Johanson & 
Vahlne, 1977) is based on the internationalisation experience of Scandinavian 
manufacturing firms within Europe, which states that firms internationalise gradually, 
starting by exporting first to foreign markets through intermediaries and then by setting 
sales subsidiaries in such markets and then finally to setting up production operations in 
those host markets. However, as this study has revealed that companies can 
internationalise with a negligible home base and a non-existent international network. 
The Uppsala model does not explain the accelerated internationalisation as has also been 
the case for two of the companies without the presence of an international network 
either. Hence, it can be stated that context of European Swedish manufacturing firms is 
distinct from Indian service sector firms. Thus, this thesis expounds that the stages 
model is not suitable for explaining the internationalisation of emerging market service 
companies and thus demonstrates the weakness of the Uppsala stages model.   
 
These critiques of existing theoretical explanations of internationalization as applied to 
Indian service firms indicates a theoretical gap in the explanation of internationalization. 
In order to address this at a conceptual level, this study proposed a new developmental 
concept called the ‘Fast Capability Acquisition Model’ or FCAM. This concept emerged 
specifically from the study of the accelerated internationalisation strategies evidenced 
for two of the companies in the data-set. Both these companies were well established in 
the domestic market and due to domestic market saturation and competition from 
DMNCs in the home-market adopted accelerated internationalisation through Greenfield 
ventures, joint-ventures and partnerships or through capability and resource 
acquisitions.  
 
Hence, it can be stated that the FCAM model has been conceptualised based on 
accelerated internationalisation to acquire intellectual property capabilities and market 
penetration which has been achieved for establishing an international presence quickly 
rather than in a phased manner. Such, accelerated internationalisation with the intent 
to acquire capabilities not leading to internalisation can be stated as a specific feature 
of Indian service sector firms. This is demonstrative of dynamic capabilities wherein firms 
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continue to build or acquire capabilities as an ongoing strategic management process 
(Winter, 2003). Dynamic capabilities are a form of organisational process which amongst 
others include acquisitions and strategic alliances (Helfat, 2007).   
 
The building block (table 6, Chapter 10) for the FCAM model is anchored on the missing 
links in the existing theories which do not fully explain the internationalisation of the 
Indian service companies that have been investigated in this thesis. For example, the 
entrepreneurial capabilities witnessed in all five firms have been stated in literature to 
be symptomatic of small and medium sized firms only. However, as has been evidenced 
in the empirical chapters (Chapters 4-8), large companies can also demonstrate 
entrepreneurial capabilities. This could be a specific feature of emerging market 
companies with majority holding by the promoters. However, this thesis is not seeking 
generalisation based on the five companies analysed; this is a possible future research 
agenda (section 11.6). Cost arbitrage by the IT firms as evidenced in chapters 5 and 6 
due to specific FSAs and CSAs is an attribute of the Indian market which then facilitates 
expedited client servicing. India with its vast pool of English speaking graduates’ 
complements enhanced customer experience which is generally lacking in other 
emerging markets as has been demonstrated in chapters 4, 5 and 6 with respect to the 
challenges faced in various host markets. 
 
The mass model by the telecom company is also a response to the adaption to the 
idiosyncratic Indian market. As has been demonstrated in chapter 4, a similar mass 
model has not been entirely successful in other emerging market countries. This 
corroborates as stated by Aharoni et al. (2011) that sensitising to various host-markets 
is attained from managerial self-learning. Exploratory endeavours can result in failure 
traps whereas exploitation may result in success-traps (Wang et al. 2015 further quoting 
Gupta et al., 2006). Success trap is when a company over-relies on past experience 
without taking into consideration new demands or challenges. It is evident that the 
company has experienced a success trap due to adopting an exploitive approach in other 
emerging counties.      
 
Market saturation for the telecom company and competition from DMNCs for the IT 
company due to market liberalisation was also idiosyncratic to the Indian market which 
led to the internationalisation of those companies. Institutional incapacity leading to 
limited demand for certain services despite a large domestic presence for some of the 
companies, like IT services, is a distinctive feature too. Internationalisation specifically 
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for brand awareness is also unique in the case of companies as demonstrated in chapter 
7 and 8. 
 
Thus, this thesis in understanding and analysing the internationalisation of the five 
Indian service sector firms, has revealed how certain theory-sets do not evidently explain 
their internationalisation strategies. Hence, there is a need to re-visit or extend such 
theory-sets to consider the internationalisation of such emerging market service firms as 
has been revealed in this thesis. To that extent, a new developmental concept called the 
‘Fast Capability Acquisition Model’ or FCAM has been proposed to understand such 
emerging market service sector firms. 
 
11.5 Limitations of the Study 
There are certain limitations that this study has reflected. First, due to the elite nature 
of the interviewees, a pilot study could not be conducted and hence the development of 
the research questions was restricted. Also, it was not possible to conduct a follow-up 
question session either personally or through email.  
 
Second, the five companies represent a small percentage of the overall services sector 
in India; hence the findings are limited to the companies’ studies. However, these 
companies are at the top of the specific services that they provide, either by revenues, 
brand recall or number of customers. 
 
Third, the focus on interviewing only the decision makers does limit the findings to a 
certain extent. Though, effort was made to conduct a few interviews, via email 
questionnaire, from middle-level managers who had worked in international markets of 
these companies. Also, as the services provided are different in nature, they are not 
strictly comparable.  
 
In sum, despite the limitations, effort has been made through analytical and procedural 
steps to ensure the rigour, quality and integrity of this study. These are outlined in 
Chapter 3.   
 
11.6 Potential for Future Research 
There is a need for continuance of research on companies from emerging markets as 
the extant international business theories are based on companies from the developed 
markets. Further, there is a need to investigate service sector firms as many of the 
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theories are based mainly on the study of manufacturing companies. Studying 
companies from emerging markets through the lens of strategic management, especially 
organisational decision making process towards internationalisation, has a lot of 
potential. 
 
The FCAM model proposed is an explanatory model and not a causal model as explained 
in Chapter 10. This model has helped conceptualise internationalisation behaviour of 
only the five firms that have been studied in this thesis. It is possible that such a 
conceptualisation may apply to other firms but to confirm the same is beyond the scope 
of this study and forms the basis for future studies.  
 
This study focussed only on the views of the decision makers (elite interviewees). Hence, 
an area of further research would be to investigate the managers of these companies 
posted in international markets and the congruency in decision making at subsidiary and 
headquarter levels. This is especially worth investigating given the narrow level of 
decentralisation of Indian promoter-held companies.  
 
The study also covered only five companies providing three different types of services. 
While it was clarified, that generalisation is not aimed for in this study, it will be beneficial 
to study more service sector companies. Possibly a study of comparison between similar 
services of companies from different emerging markets has the potential of throwing 
interesting results.  ` 
     
11.7 Closing Remark 
This thesis has investigated the strategic motivations behind the internationalisation of 
Indian service sector firms. Emphasis has been given to resources and capabilities. The 
main findings suggest that companies internationalising already possess resources and 
capabilities that instigate their internationalisation but, at the same time, the companies 
keep adapting and recalibrating their resources and capabilities to suit host markets, and 
their main strategic intent towards internationalisation does not drastically modify due 































Wipro Limited Timeline 
 
Year Particulars 
1945 Western India Vegetable Products Limited was incorporated 
1946 Initial Public Offer 
1977 Company name is changed to Wipro Products Limited 
1981 Diversifies into IT services 
1983 a) Software subsidiary is established (Wipro Systems Limited) 
b) Technologies subsidiary is established (Wipro Technologies Limited) 
1984 Company name is further changed to Wipro Limited 
1985 Manufacturing and marketing indigenous PCs  
1990 Software services commenced 
1991 R&D centre and technology plant opened in Aurangabad, Maharashtra 
1994 a) Wipro Systems Limited and Wipro Technologies Limited are merged 
and amalgamated with Wipro Limited 
b) Overseas design Centre (Odyssey 21) set up tp provide technology 
services to overseas clients 
1996 Registered office of the company relocated to Bangalore from Bombay 
1997 a) Embraces six-sigma for its software and technology services and is 
the first IT company to do so worldwide 
b) MoU with Swiss company for technical know-how 
1998 a) The brand was redefined. The sunflower went rainbow with the 
tagline ‘Applying Thought’ 
b) The software business of the company was certified SEI-CMM Level 5 
– the first Indian company to be certified globally 
c) Operations commenced in Japan 
1999 a) Wipro Net Limited formed – a JV with KPN (Royal Dutch Company) to 
provide internet services in India 
b) Launch of the first bilingual Line Matrix Printers in India 
c) The company’s PCs are certified by US NSTL certification for Y2K – 
the only Indian PC to be certified 
d) The company has the highest market capitalisation in the country 
2000 a) Wipro lists on NYSE 
b) Wipro is tying up with companies from USA and Japan to co-develop 
solutions ranging from online businesses to telecom technologies 
c) Microsoft ties up with Wipro to outsource software development 
d) Wipro sets up the first call centre in the country in a tie-up with local 
merchant banker 
e) Wipro Net limited is 100% subsidiary of Wipro Limited in buy-out of 
KPN shares 
2001 a) First Indian company to be certified ISO 14001 certification 
b) Wipro Net Limited amalgamated with the company 
c) Another strategic tie-up in the US 
2002 a) Launches German Operations 
b) Enters the BPO business by acquiring a local company (Spectramind) 
c) First overseas acquisition – American Management Systems in the US 
2003 a) Enters Middle East through partnership in Bahrain 
b) Sets up training centres in Riyadh 




d) Company launches laptops with Intel microprocessors 
e) Enters into alliances with multinationals in India to market and 
service within India 
f) AH Premji is on the Forbes top ten most powerful billionaires in the 
world and 17th in the Fortune Magazine list of most powerful 
businessmen outside the US 
2004 a) Long-term outsourcing contract with Royal Dutch Shell worth USD 1 
billion 
b) Wipro sales touch a billion dollars 
2006 a) Acquires Enabler – a Europe based retail solutions provider 
b) Acquires cMango Inc, Usa (Technology Infrastructure Consulting 
Firm) 
2007 a) Acquires a semiconductor design subsidiary of a Singapore company 
(Oki Techno Centre) 
b) Acquires US IT services company (Infocrossing) 
c) Rishad Premji (son of Aziz Premji) joins Wipro 
2008 Global service centre set-up in Malaysia to serve Infrastructure and 
Application Management  Service to ASEAN customers 
2010 a) Wipro Technologies inaugurates new development centre in 
Melbourne, Australia 
b) Hitachi and Wipro to sell co-branded products 
c) Wipro wins contract from Vodafone Essar to build and manage the 
latter’s fixed line service 
2011 Continues to partner with overseas companies to provide services in IT 
and technology 
2012 a) Acquires trade motion analytics company in Australia (Promax) 
b) Partners with Oracle to deliver end-to-end services and applications 
c) Demerges its IT and non-IT business. Wipro Limited is the IT arm 
and Wipro Enterprises holds all the other businesses 
2014 Acquires IT arm of  a Canadian firm (ATCO) 
2015 a) Wipro is in talks to buy a UK based BPO company that manages the 
pensions of millions of UK civil servants (Equiniti) 
b) Will acquire US based Viteos group for $ 130mln 
c) Designit 
d) Celent AG 







Evolution of Wipro Values and Brand 
 
Mid-1970s  Late 90s: “ Applying 
Thought” 
Late 2005-06: “Spirit of 
Wipro” 
Six Wipro Beliefs 
1. Respect the 
individual 
2. Be a business 
leader 
3. Accomplish all 
tasks in a 
superior 
manner 







based on longterm 
profitability 
Four Wipro Values 
1. Human Values: We 
respect 
the unique needs of 
customers and 
employees. 
We are sensitive to their 
differing needs in our 
interactions with them. 
2. Integrity: We deliver 
what 
we commit. With honesty, 
fairness, reliability and 
uprightness in whatever 
we 
do. 
3. Innovative Solutions: 
We 
constantly offer novel and 
superior solutions to 
satisfy the needs of the 
customer. 
4. Value for money: 
Delivering higher value to 
the customer through 
continuous improvement 
in 
quality, cost and speed. 
Spirit of Wipro 
1. Intensity to win 
• Make customers 
successful 
• Excel through 
innovation and 
teamwork 
2. Act with Sensitivity 
• Respect the 
individual 
• Be thoughtful and 
responsible 
3. Unyielding Integrity 
a. Deliver on 
Commitments  
b. Be honest and fair 
in 
action 
c. Conduct and 














TCS Company Milestones 
 
Year Particulars 
1965 TCS was established 
1968 Incorporated as a separate entity with headquarters in Mumbai 
1969 Initiated management consultancy services apart from business 
processing  
1971 Received their first international contract (Iran) 
1974 Pioneered the global delivery model for IT services with their first 
offshore client 
1977 Representative office in UK 
1979 Opened office in New York  
1981 Set up India’s first IT R&D division (TRDDC) at Pune 
1985 Sets up office in Switzerland 
1992 Sets up office in Japan 
1993 TCS obtains ISO 9000 certification 
1994 IEEE documentation standards adopted at TCS 
1996 Engine related design project for GE 
2001 Operations set-up in Hungary 
2002 TCS enters Latin America 
2002 China operations set-up 
2003 TCS crosses USD 1 billion mark in revenues 
2004 All TCS centres are assessed at CMMi & PCMM level 5 making it the 
first IT company in the world to achieve this distinction 
2004 TCS becomes a public limited company after a successful IPO 
2005 Acquires Comicron, company in Chile 
2005 Acquires the pension funds management company Pearl, subsidiary of 
Diligenta in UK 
2005 Banking product company, FNS, acquired in Australia 
2006 ISO 2000 certification received 
2006 Brand launch of the ‘Experience Certainty’ campaign 
2008 Acquires the Indian arm of Citibank 
2008 The company realises its vision of being a top ten IT global player 
across multiple parameters 
2008 TCS revenues cross USD 5billion with profits of USD 1 billion 
2009 A new global delivery service centre is opened in Argentina 
2011 Major partnerships launched with Amsterdam marathon 





Overseas Acquisition by TCS 




2008 US (Indian arm) 
2013 France 







Country Number of properties 







South Africa 1 
Sri Lanka 3 
UAE (Dubai) 1 
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IHCL Company Timeline 
 
Year Particulars 
1899 Indian Hotels Company Limited was established 
1903 The first hotel in Mumbai is inaugurated 
1970 Enters into restoration of heritage hotels (Rajasthan) 
1972 A new wing is added to the hotel in Mumbai 
1974 IHCL opens a property in the tourist destination of Goa in India 
1979 IHCL enters Africa (Lusaka, Zambia) 
1980 IHCL enters Yemen 
1982 IHCL enters Britain (London) 
1998 Property launched in Sri-Lanka (tourist destination of Bentota) 
2001 Company enters Maldives 
2005 The company makes a presence in USA (New York) 
2006 Enters Australia (Sydney) 
2007 Extend presence in USA (Boston) 
2008 Bhutan 
2010 South Africa (Cape Town) 
2012 Unsuccessful bid for Orient-Express Hotels 
2014 Malaysia, Sri Lanka (second property in Colombo); Australia property 
divested 
2015 Launch of property in Dubai 
2016 Boston property divested 















2011-12 514.61 0.46 
2012-13 559.42 (64.30) 
2013-14 616.58 (82.78) 
2014-15 640.71 (56.50) 
2015-16 703.31 (9.04) 
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Year Number of outbound 















Year Number of inbound 


















Country Number of 
properties 







Saudi Arabia 1 
Total 32 
  
Morocco (upcoming) 1 














M.S. Oberoi with President Sadat of Egypt 
Source: http://www.famoushotels.org/article/606  
 
 
Appendix 17  
                                USD million 
Financial 
Year (01 






2011-12 214.69 18.12 
2012-13 224.00 7.04 
2013-14 235.71 16.65 
2014-15 253.42 10.06 
2015-16 274.82 18.19 






AAA  Aggregation, Adaptation, Arbitrage 
ARK  Activity, Resource, Knowledge 
ARPM     Average Revenue per Minute 
ARPU  Average Revenue per User 
BPO  Business Process Outsourcing 
BRIC  Brazil, Russia, India, China 
BRICS  Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa 
BSE  Bombay Stock Exchange 
CAGE  Cultural, Administrative, Geographic and Economic (framework) 
CAPEX  Capital Expenditure 
CEO  Chief Executive Officer 
CFO  Chief Financial Officer 
COINTTM  Co-innovation Network 
CSA  Country Specific Assets 
CSR  Corporate Social Responsibility 
DM  Developed Market 
DMNC  Developed Market Multinational Company 
EIHL  East India Hotels Limited 
EMNE  Emerging Market Multinational Enterprise 
DSE  Delhi Stock Exchange 
EU  European Union 
FCAM  Fast Capability Acquisition Model 
FDI  Foreign Direct Investment 
FII   Foreign Institutional Investor 
FSA  Firm Specific Asset 
FSC  Free Standing Company 
GBP  Great Britain Pound 
GNDMTM  Global Network Delivery Model 
HR  Human Resources 
IB  International Business 
IDP  Investment Development Path 
IHCL  Indian Hotels Company Limited 
IIT  Indian Institute of Technology 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
INR  Indian Rupee 
IPO  Initial Public Offer 
INV  International New Venture 
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IT  Information Technology 
JV  Joint Venture 
LDC  Lesser-developed Countries 
LLL  Linkage, Leverage and learning 
M&A  Merger and Acquisition 
MD  Managing Director 
MNC  Multinational Company 
MNE  Multinational Enterprise 
NIC  Newly Industrialised Country 
NIE  Newly Industrialised Economy 
NPD  New Paradigm of Development 
NSE  National Stock Exchange 
NYSE  New York Stok Exchange 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OFDI  Outward Foreign Direct Investment  
OLI  Ownership, Location and Internalisation 
OPEX  Operational Expenditure 
PSU  Public Sector Undertaking 
R&D  Research and Development 
SOE  State Owned Enterprises 
TAT  Turn-around-Time 
TBEM  Tata Business Excellence Model 
TCS  Tata Consultancy Services 
TMTC    Tata Management and Training Centre  
TNC  Trans-national Corporation 
TRDDC  Tata Research and Development Design Centre 
UK  United Kingdom 
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development  
USA  United States of America 
USD  United States Dollar 
WB  World Bank 
WIR  World Investment Report 
WOS  Wholly Owned Subsidiary 
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